R v Commonwealth Court of Conciliation & Arbitration; Federated Clerks Union of Australia (NSW Branch), Ex p [1950] HCA 29

High Court of Australia Latham C.J. McTiernan, Webb, Fullagar and Kitto JJ. R v Commonwealth Court of Conciliation & Arbitration; Federated Clerks Union of Australia (NSW Branch), Ex p [1950] HCA 29

ORDER Order absolute against the respondents the Commonwealth Court of Conciliation and Arbitration, Dunphy J., and C. B. Grace. Respondent Grace to pay costs of the prosecutors.

Cur. adv. vult.

The following written judgments were delivered:—

Aug. 2 Latham C.J.

This is the return of an order nisi for a writ of prohibition directed to the Commonwealth Court of Conciliation and Arbitration, Dunphy J., a judge of that court, James Edward Taylor, Industrial Registrar of the court, and C. B. Grace, a member of the Federated Clerks' Union of Australia, New South Wales Branch. The prosecutors are the said branch of the Federated Clerks' Union and M. J. R. Hughes, Secretary of the branch. The prosecutors seek to prevent any action under a summons issued in the Arbitration Court by which it is sought to obtain an order declaring an election of officers of the branch void on the ground of irregularities in the election. The summons was issued at the instance of C. B. Grace, who sought an order for an inquiry into irregularities in the election and orders that certain persons claiming to be officers of the branch, members of the Federal conference, or central councillors should not act, that the election should be declared to be void, and that a new election should be held.

The prosecutors in these proceedings contend that the Commonwealth Conciliation and Arbitration Court has no jurisdiction to take any action in pursuance of the summons on substantially two grounds: first, that the relevant provisions of the Commonwealth Conciliation and Arbitration Act which are contained in the amending Act of 1949 do not apply to the election because the election had been completed before that Act had received the Royal assent, and, secondly, that the alleged application made to the Industrial Registrar did not satisfy the conditions specified by s. 96A of the Act, with the result that there was no basis for the reference of an application to the court, with the further consequence that the court had no power to act in the matter.