Brady v Stapleton [1952] HCA 62

High Court of Australia Dixon C.J. McTiernan and Fullagar JJ. Brady v Stapleton [1952] HCA 62

ORDER Appeal dismissed with costs. Cross-appeal allowed, so far as it relates to pars. 4, 5, 6, 7, 8 and 9 of order of Court of Bankruptcy. Vary order of Court of Bankruptcy by deleting sub-pars. 4 (b), 5 (b), 6 (b), 7 (b), 8 (b) and 9 (b) thereof, and by adding after par. 9 a new par. 9a ordering that the respondent Brady do within thirty days transfer to the applicant 16,580 shares in Canadian Pacific Tobacco Co. Ltd., a new par. 9b ordering that the respondent Eileen Isobel Coward do within thirty days transfer to the applicant 15,700 shares in the said company, and a new par. 9c ordering that said company register transfers of shares made under pars. 9a and 9b forthwith on presentation for registration. Otherwise cross-appeal dismissed. Order that appellants, Peter Michael Brady, Eileen Isobel Coward and Canadian Pacific Tobacco Co. Ltd. pay to respondent Leslie Thomas Stapleton one half of costs of cross-appeal.

The following written judgments on the cross-appeal were delivered:—

Dixon C.J.

The appeal is dismissed with costs, including all costs reserved. Judgment on the cross-appeal will be reserved.

Nov. 19. Dixon C.J. and Fullagar J.

In this case Peter Michael Brady, Eileen Isobel Coward, Georgina May Beer, Thomas Mack, Nino Rodighiero (also known as Roder) and a company incorporated in Queensland under the name of Canadian Pacific Tobacco Co. Ltd. appeal to this Court against the whole of an order made by the Federal Court of Bankruptcy (Clyne J.) on 21st December 1951. The respondent, Leslie Thomas Stapleton, is the trustee of the property of Charles Coward, a bankrupt. Eileen Isobel Coward is the wife of Charles Coward, the bankrupt. Mack is a brother of the bankrupt, and it is therefore possible that his real name is Coward. The respondent cross-appealed against certain parts of the order of Clyne J. When the case was called on for hearing before this Court, counsel appeared for the appellants and applied for an adjournment. The application was opposed by counsel for the respondent, and, after argument, was refused. Counsel for the appellants thereupon intimated that he did not propose to argue the appeal, and he withdrew. The Court then proceeded with the hearing of the cross-appeal. At the end of the hearing an order was made dismissing the appeal with costs, and judgment was reserved on the cross-appeal.