Commonwealth v Anderson [1957] HCA 44

High Court of Australia Dixon C.J. Webb, Kitto and Taylor JJ. Commonwealth v Anderson [1957] HCA 44

ORDER Appeal allowed. Order of the County Court of 23rd November 1956 set aside. In lieu thereof declare that the death of James Alexander Horne Anderson deceased occurred while he was travelling from his employment but after a substantial interruption of the journey, and order that the matter be remitted to the Commissioner for Employees' Compensation or his delegate so that he may consider the exercise of his discretion under the proviso to s. 9A (2) of the Commonwealth Employees' Compensation Act 1930-1954.

Cur. adv. vult.

The following written judgments were delivered:—

July 2 Dixon C.J.

This is an appeal brought in purported pursuance of s. 39 (2) (b) of the Judiciary Act 1903-1955 from a decision of the County Court at Melbourne exercising the jurisdiction conferred by s. 20 of the Commonwealth Employees' Compensation Act 1930-1954. No doubt the word "matter" which occurs in s. 74 of the County Court Act 1928 of Victoria and is defined by s. 3 of that Act very widely is enough to cover a proceeding under s. 20 of the Commonwealth Employees' Compensation Act so that a combination of s. 74 of the County Court Act of Victoria with s. 39 (2) (b) of the Judiciary Act gives an appeal as of right to this Court. I say this because of the doubt I expressed in The Commonwealth v. Wright [1] as to an appeal lying as of right from a decision by the District Court of New South Wales under s. 20 of the Commonwealth Employees' Compensation Act. Section 20 of the last-mentioned Act provides that any person affected by any determination or action of the Commissioner for Employees' Compensation under that Act may, within thirty days of the date of the determination or the taking of the action or within such extended time as the court upon application in that behalf allows, appeal to a county court against the determination or action and the court shall have jurisdiction to hear and determine the appeal, and such appeal may be in the nature of a re-hearing. The expression "County Court" is defined by s. 4 (1) so that it includes the County Court of a State. The Secretary to the Treasury is ex officio the Commissioner for Employees' Compensation (s. 5 (2)) but by writing under his hand he may delegate all or any of his powers and functions (s. 7 (1)). The commissioner is by s. 6 (1) of the Act empowered to examine, hear and determine all matters and questions arising under the Act and the regulations. He may reconsider his determinations and may alter, amend or revoke them (sub-s. (2)). In the determination of matters and questions the commissioner is to be guided by equity, good conscience and the substantial merits of the case without regard to technicalities or legal precedent and is not to be bound by any rules of evidence. Sub-section (4) provides that, in particular, the power of the commissioner shall extend to determining certain matters, the first of which is whether the injury received by an employee entitles him to compensation under the Act. The central provision of the Act is s. 9 (1), which provides that if personal injury by accident arising out of or in the course of his employment by the Commonwealth is caused to an employee, the Commonwealth shall, subject to that Act, be liable to pay compensation in accordance with the first schedule. The incidence, however, of this liability is enlarged by s. 9A. That section in its present form reads as follows: