Amalgamated Wireless (A/asia) Ltd v Philpott [1961] HCA 31

High Court of Australia Dixon C.J. Kitto, Taylor and Windeyer JJ. Amalgamated Wireless (A/asia) Ltd v Philpott [1961] HCA 31

ORDER Appeal dismissed with costs.

Cur. adv. vult.

The Court delivered the following written judgment:—

June 1 Dixon C.J.,Kitto, Taylor and Windeyer JJ.

This appeal turns upon the amendment made by s. 2 (1) (a) of the Workers' Compensation (Amendment) Act, 1960 N.S.W. (No. 30 of 1960), in s. 6 (1) of the Workers' Compensation Act, 1926-1958 N.S.W.. The chief purpose of the amendment was, it would seem, to overcome the effect of the decision of this Court in Darling Island Stevedoring and Lighterage Co. Ltd. v. Hussey [1] ; at all events the case is noted in the margin of the statute. The decision itself involved the interpretation and application by this Court of the decision of the Privy Council in Slazengers (Australia) Pty. Ltd. v. Burnett [1] . By sub-s. (2) of s. 2 of the Workers' Compensation (Amendment) Act, 1960 the amendment made by sub-s. (1) (a) is to be deemed to have commenced on 1st July 1942. In the present case the worker, the respondent's husband, died on 17th May 1957 in conditions which under the provisions as unamended were held by the Workers' Compensation Commission of New South Wales to enable the respondent to recover compensation. An award was accordingly made in her favour. The employer disputed the correctness of the decision. The award was made on 31st March 1958. At the request of the appellant a case was stated under s. 37 (4) of the Act for the opinion of the Supreme Court upon certain questions of law set out therein. The case stated was dated 18th September 1958. It came on for hearing in the Full Court of the Supreme Court on 26th October 1960. In the meantime the Act, No. 30 of 1960, which was assented to on 19th April 1960 had become law and it was necessary to decide the stated case under the Act as retrospectively amended. Neither the case stated nor the questions which it submitted for the opinion of the Supreme Court had been framed with the terms of the amended provision in view, but the findings of fact or some of them, although perhaps made alio intuitu, cover ground which probably will suffice. The facts of the present case are simple enough. The deceased worker, a man of fifty-three years of age, was employed as a process worker in Ashfield by the respondent company. He lived at Drummoyne. On the morning of 10th May 1957 he left his home to walk to a point some three or four hundred yards away to meet a friend who would drive him in a car to his work. He was a little late and hurried. Before he reached the car, probably after covering two hundred yards, he became very distressed: he was seized with cardiac pains. Shortly after reaching his place of employment he collapsed. He was taken home; a doctor saw him and diagnosed his case as coronary occlusion. Two or three days later he was placed in hospital where he died on 17th May 1957. It appeared that some twelve months before his death he had been subject to breathlessness and precordial pain on exertion. On his subjective symptoms a diagnosis of angina pectoris had been made in September 1956. A cardiologist who was called as a witness supported the view that the final occlusive process had been initiated during his walking from his home and became complete when he collapsed at his place of employment. His Honour Judge Conybeare, who heard the claim, in his reasons for his award said that the issue was whether anything relating to the journey of the deceased between his place of abode and place of employment contributed to the eventual coronary occlusion and later to his death. He had said that having regard to the sequence of events, particularly the time sequence, he was driven to the conclusion that something of a pathological nature happened on the walking journey of some three hundred and seventy yards albeit it was a journey slightly downhill or level walking. Having referred to the conflicting medical opinions he said that he accepted that which attributed death to some occlusive process which was materially contributed to by the effort involved both before the onset of the occlusion and subsequently. As appeared from the formal findings this refers to the effort involved in walking from the deceased's home to the car and later, at his destination from the car across the road to the factory.