Australian Iron & Steel Ltd v Greenwood [1962] HCA 42

High Court of Australia McTiernan, Taylor, Menzies, Windeyer and Owen JJ. Australian Iron & Steel Ltd v Greenwood [1962] HCA 42

ORDER Appeal allowed with costs. Order of the Full Court of the Supreme Court of New South Wales set aside. In lieu thereof order that the appeal to that Court be allowed with costs, that the verdict of the jury be set aside so far as it assessed the amount of damages and that there be a new trial of the action limited to the assessment of damages.

Cur. adv. vult.

The following written judgments were delivered:—

Aug. 29 McTiernan J.

I would not interfere with the award of damages made by the jury in this action. The complaint is as to general damages. There is no error in the summing-up. I think we ought to presume that the jury did their best to assess the damages according to the directions in the summing-up. To uphold this appeal we must be satisfied that with those directions to go upon, the jury's award is not one which four sensible men would make having regard to the circumstances of the case. The view which a jury might take of the injuries and sufferings of the plaintiff, and the damage done to his enjoyment of life and economic future is outlined by the observations made by the learned judges of the Supreme Court on the evidence. The case is not merely that of a man who lost a leg and returned to work without reduction of pay. This summary leaves out the account which the evidence proves of extreme pain and suffering, and the doubts which it creates about the future earning capacity and economic security of the plaintiff. At the time of the accident he was thirty years of age and on the evidence had prospects of promotion. The amount of £17,000 is assumed to have been awarded as general damages. Mr. Allen by way of argument suggested that £10,000 to £12,000 would mark the limits of a reasonable award. The argument comes down to a denial that £17,000 is reasonable damages and nothing is advanced to support the argument but the figure itself. The onus in this Court is on the appellant to make out that the learned judges of the Supreme Court ought to have said that the general damages awarded are too much to be within any reasonable limit. I am not prepared to decide that their Honours were wrong. In my opinion no good reason was advanced for so holding.