Egan v Willis [1998] HCA 71

High Court of Australia Gaudron, McHugh, Gummow, Kirby, Hayne and Callinan JJ Egan v Willis [1998] HCA 71

ORDER Appeal dismissed with costs

Cur adv vult

The following written judgments were delivered: —

19 November 1998 Gaudron, Gummow and Hayne JJ.

1. On 1 May 1996, the Legislative Council of New South Wales passed a resolution calling on the appellant, the Leader of the Government in that House and Treasurer, Minister for Energy, Minister for State Development and Minister Assisting the Premier, to table certain papers in the House or deliver them to the Clerk. The appellant did not do so, the Cabinet having earlier agreed that Ministers should decline to comply with any orders from either House of Parliament to table documents.

2. On 2 May 1996, the Legislative Council passed a resolution adjudging the appellant guilty of a contempt of the House (par 2), suspending him from the service of the House for the remainder of the day's sitting (par 3(a)), and ordering him to attend in his place at the Table of the House on the next sitting day to explain his reasons for not complying with a number of orders of the House to table documents, including the papers mentioned in the resolution of 1 May 1996 (par 3(b)). The appellant did not leave the House. The Usher of the Black Rod (the second respondent) was directed by the then President of the Legislative Council (the first respondent) to escort the appellant from the chamber and the parliamentary precincts. Black Rod did this, taking the appellant from the chamber and the parliament building out on to the footpath of Macquarie Street.

3. The appellant brought an action in the Supreme Court of New South Wales seeking declarations that (i) pars 2 and 3 of the resolution of 2 May 1996 were invalid and (ii) his removal into the street constituted a trespass. Those proceedings were removed into the Court of Appeal of New South Wales. That Court (Gleeson CJ, Mahoney P, Priestley JA) [1] dismissed the claim for the first declaration and, in respect of the other claim, declared that the respondents "committed an actionable trespass to the person of the [appellant] by reason of the extent of his removal on 2 May 1996".