Tamar Timber Trading Co Pty Ltd v Pilkington [1968] HCA 15

High Court of Australia Barwick C.J. Kitto, Taylor, Menzies and Owen JJ. Tamar Timber Trading Co Pty Ltd v Pilkington [1968] HCA 15

ORDER Appeals dismissed with costs.

Cur. adv. vult.

The following written judgments were delivered:—

Apr. 1 Barwick C.J.

Tamar Timber Trading Co. Pty. Ltd. (Tamar Timber Trading), the appellant in the first matter, and Tamar Sawmilling Co. Pty. Ltd. (Tamar Sawmilling), the appellant in the second matter, are both subsidiaries of Tamar Timber Industries Pty. Ltd. That holding company has five subsidiary companies, the group being engaged, apparently, in differing aspects of the timber business in Tasmania. Tamar Timber Trading operates a sawmill at Rocherlea, near Launceston, Tamar Sawmilling operates a sawmill at Legerwood in north-eastern Tasmania, Tasmanian Timber Yard Pty. Ltd. carries on the racking operations of the group in Rocherlea, Rocherlea Timber Co. Pty. Ltd. operates a sawmill with an attached racking yard at Rocherlea, and Tamar Timber Processing Pty. Ltd. carries on the business of kiln-drying and timber-dressing at Rocherlea.

On 18th August 1965 an officer of the Transport Commission of the State of Tasmania stopped two vehicles owned by Tamar Timber Trading and Tamar Sawmilling respectively whilst they were carrying green sawn timber from Legerwood. Both vehicles carried an ordinary motor vehicle registration number and were licensed as well under the Traffic Act 1925 of the State of Tasmania as ancillary vehicles. This licence restricted their use to a particular area of the State unless a permit had been issued permitting the vehicle to move out of the area (see the Traffic Act, s. 24). No such permits had been issued with respect to the subject vehicles. Though when stopped by the officer they were not out of the area to which their licences restricted their use, their subsequent travel was outside that area. Complaints were laid against the appellants for unlawfully using motor vehicles as public vehicles in a place which the licences in respect thereof did not authorize the vehicles to be so used, the relevant use being the carriage of the timber outside that area. On the hearing of the complaints, each appellant claimed that s. 92 of the Constitution protected its use of its vehicle in the proved circumstances and that, accordingly, the relevant restrictions of the Traffic Act did not apply to that use.