R.J OF AUSTRALIA. 307 [HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA.} MPBELL . a 3 : : - 4 APPELLANT ; Prarntirr, AND IBSTER ROMETCH LIMITED . . ._ Responpents. DerENDANTS, ON APPEAL FROM THE SUPREME COURT OF TASMANIA. xctice—High Court—Appeal from Supreme Court of State—Mistrial—New Trial. H. ©. ov A. In an action to recover damages for personal injuries alleged to have been 1918+ sustained by the plaintiff by reason of the negligence of the defendants, the 445. cm jury found a verdict for the defendants. The Full Court of the Supreme yy, 19 99 Court of Tasmania refused an application by the plaintiff for a new trial. i On appeal, the High Court, being of opinion that there had been a mistrial, gayan vay, _ directed a new trial to be had. and Rich JJ. Decision of the Supreme Court of Tasmania reversed. PEALS from the Supreme Court of Tasmania. An action was brought in the Supreme Court in its Local Courts Jurisdiction by Gordon Beresford Campbell, an infant, by his friend Adela Maria Campbell, against Webster Rometch , claiming damages for injuries sustained in an accident a motor omnibus belonging to the defendants in which the was refused. The jury returned a verdict for the defendants. e plaintiff moved for a new trial. The motion was heard by H.C. or A. 1918. Sw CAMPBELL v WexstER Rometcu Lrp. HIGH COURT [191 Nicholls C.J., who dismissed it. The plaintiff appealed to the Full Court, first, from the order dismissing the motion for a new trial — and, secondly, from the refusal of the learned Chief Justice to direct the jury, and by the second appeal he asked for a new trial. The Full Court having dismissed both appeals, the plaintiff now appealed in each case to the High Court, and the appeals were heard together. L. L. Dobson (with him G. M. Johnstone), for the appellant. C. S. Page, for the respondents. The judgment of the Court, which was delivered by Barron J., was as follows :— This is a case which, owing to causes the responsibility for which I do not wish to allocate in any particular way, has resulted in the Full Court upholding a verdict which cannot be supported, and it is a case which went to the jury in such a way that — it was scarcely reasonable to expect them to arrive at a proper conclusion according to well known principles of law. I am dis- tinctly of opinion that there has been a mistrial, that it was not in any sense a trial of the issues between the parties, and that the ends of justice have so been subverted. We are all of opinion that the first appeal should be dismissed without costs, and that the second appeal should be allowed and a new trial ordered. The costs of the second appeal and of the proceedings in the Supreme Court should abide the event of the new trial. Order accordingly. Solicitors for the appellant, Crisp & Crisp. Solicitors for the respondents, Page, Hodgman & Seager. bd i! Be ae ewes' ye en ee ee es : d F