Taylor v Minister for Lands (NSW) [1975] HCA 11

High Court of Australia Barwick C.J. McTiernan, Gibbs, Stephen and Mason JJ. Taylor v Minister for Lands (NSW) [1975] HCA 11

ORDER Appeal dismissed with costs.

The following written judgments were delivered:—

April 29 Barwick C.J.

In proceedings before the Land and Valuation Court of New South Wales to determine the compensation payable pursuant to a notification under the Public Works Act, 1912 (as amended) of the resumption for the purposes of the Forestry Commission of land comprised within two conditional purchases respectively numbered 51/3 and 51/2 of which the appellant was named in the notice as, and was in fact, the owner, a question arose as to whether the land should be valued under s. 124 or s. 125 of the Public Works Act. Upon the appellant as claimant before the Land and Valuation Court seeking to tender evidence to the Court of the value of the land in the market, it was objected that compensation in the case was restricted as provided by s. 125 of the Public Works Act. The basis of the objection was that the notification had been given within five years "from the time when such land was alienated in fee by the Crown, whether absolutely or conditionally". The Land and Valuation Court upheld the objection and rejected the evidence. The Land and Valuation Court stated a case for the opinion of the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court, (Court of Appeal Division), answered the questions asked in that stated case unfavourably to the appellant.

The appellant, being the holder by transfer of two Crown leases neither of which so far as appears was an additional Crown lease upon or with respect to the other, made an application on 18th December 1950 pursuant to s. 184 of the Crown Lands Consolidation Act, 1913-1951 upon a form for which reg. 244 made under the Crown Lands Consolidation Act provides and known as form 97, to convert the two Crown leases which he held into a conditional purchase. It was observed by the Crown land agent at Scone, who received this application, that it was an application to convert two Crown leases into one conditional purchase and apparently he called the attention of the appellant to that fact and to the view held by the officer that it was not competent under the statute to convert the two holdings into one conditional purchase.