High Court of Australia Barwick CJ McTiernan, Menzies, Windeyer and Walsh JJ. Hall v Samuels ORDER Application for special leave to appeal dismissed. No order as to costs. Sept. 23. Barwick CJ, McTiernan, Menzies, Windeyer and Walsh JJ. THE COURT. This is an application for special leave to appeal from a judgment of the Full Court of the Supreme Court of South Australia which heard and by majority dismissed an appeal from a decision of Mr Justice Zelling, then an acting justice of the Supreme Court, upon a special case stated by a special magistrate sitting as a court of summary jurisdiction on the hearing of a complaint of the commission of two offences contrary to the Police Offences Act, 1953-1967 SA. Although only an application for special leave to appeal, we have heard a full argument by leading counsel on behalf of the applicant, the defendant before the magistrate. Counsel has argued two principal points: 1. That s 163 of the Local Government Act, 1934-1969 SA so qualifies s 75 of the Police Offences Act, 1953-1967 SA that a police officer has no power of arrest of a person found committing a breach of the Local Government Act, or of any bylaw made thereunder except in conformity with s 163 of the Local Government Act; 2. That par 19 of s 3 of bylaw IX made by the Council of the Corporation of the City of Adelaide in purported pursuance of the powers contained in the Local Government Act, is invalid as not being authorized by any relevant power to make bylaws given by that Act. We have also had the benefit of the judgments of the primary judge [(1)] and of their Honours of the Full Court [(2)] which dealt with these matters. 1. (1969) 22 L.G.R.A. 57. 2. (1969) 22 L.G.R.A. 70. The Court, having heard and considered the arguments advanced, is of opinion that s 75 of the Police Offences Act is not qualified as submitted. The police officer's power of arrest given by that section, in the Court's opinion, was available to him without resort to s 163 of the Local Government Act. The Court is further of opinion that par 19 of s 3 of bylaw IX is not beyond the powers of the City Council of Adelaide granted to the City Council by the Local Government Act of that State. In the Court's opinion the validity of that paragraph may be placed on one or more of several provisions of the Act. There is no need, in refusing special leave to appeal, to go further into that question: it is sufficient that in the Court's opinion the paragraph of the bylaw is valid. These conclusions having been reached, there is no other matter in the case which would call for the grant of special leave. Indeed I understood counsel for the applicant to concede so much. Therefore the Court does not go into those matters at all. The Court for these reasons is of the opinion that special leave to appeal should be refused.