Annetts v McCann [1990] HCA 57

High Court of Australia Mason C.J. Brennan, Deane, Toohey and McHugh JJ. Annetts v McCann [1990] HCA 57

ORDER Appeal allowed. Set aside the orders of the Full Court of the Supreme Court of Western Australia. In lieu thereof, order that

1. in accordance with the judgment of this Court, the first respondent reconsider the question whether the appellants should be heard in respect of any matters arising out of the inquest; and

2. the first respondent not make any finding or publish any rider until he has reconsidered that question.

Cur. adv. vult.

The following written judgments were delivered:—

Dec. 20 Mason C.J., Deane and McHugh JJ.

The question in this appeal is whether Mr. Coroner McCann S.M., who is conducting an inquiry into the death of James Arthur Annetts (the deceased), misconceived or exceeded his jurisdiction in refusing to hear submissions from counsel representing the parents of the deceased ("the appellants"). The facts and relevant statutory provisions are set out in the judgment of Toohey J. We need not repeat them.

It can now be taken as settled that, when a statute confers power upon a public official to destroy, defeat or prejudice a person's rights, interests or legitimate expectations, the rules of natural justice regulate the exercise of that power unless they are excluded by plain words of necessary intendment: Commissioner of Police v. Tanos [1] ; Twist v. Randwick Municipal Council [2] ; Heatley v. Tasmanian Racing and Gaming Commission [3] ; J. v. Lieschke [4] ; Haoucher v. Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs [5] . In Tanos [6] , Dixon C.J. and Webb J. said that an intention on the part of the legislature to exclude the rules of natural justice was not to be assumed nor spelled out from "indirect references, uncertain inferences or equivocal considerations". Nor is such an intention to be inferred from the presence in the statute of rights which are commensurate with some of the rules of natural justice: Baba v. Parole Board of New South Wales [7] . In Kioa v. West [8] , Mason J. said that the law in relation to administrative decisions "has now developed to a point where it may be accepted that there is a common law duty to act fairly, in the sense of according procedural fairness, in the making of administrative decisions which affect rights, interests and legitimate expectations, subject only to the clear manifestation of a contrary statutory intention." In Haoucher [9] , Deane J. said that the law seemed to him "to be moving towards a conceptually more satisfying position where common law requirements of procedural fairness will, in the absence of a clear contrary legislative intent, be recognised as applying generally to governmental executive decision-making".