Savvas v The Queen [1995] HCA 29

High Court of Australia Deane, Dawson, Toohey, Gaudron and McHugh JJ Savvas v The Queen [1995] HCA 29

ORDER Appeal dismissed

Cur adv vult

The Court delivered the following written judgment:—

1 June 1995 Deane, Dawson, Toohey, Gaudron and McHugh JJ

After a lengthy trial the appellant was convicted of two offences. One was of conspiring with others to import a quantity of heroin, not less than the commercial quantity. This is an offence against the Customs Act 1901 Cth. The other was of conspiring with others to supply the heroin. This is an offence against the Drug Misuse and Trafficking Act 1985 NSW.

In respect of the offence of conspiring to import heroin, Hunt J sentenced the appellant to a term of imprisonment for twenty-five years, with a minimum term of eighteen years. In respect of the offence of conspiring to supply heroin, Hunt J sentenced the appellant to a minimum term of imprisonment of eighteen years, together with an additional term of six years. His Honour specified 25 August 2006 as the date on which the appellant would be eligible for parole. The sentence of eighteen years is to be served concurrently with the sentence of twenty-five years. The maximum penalty for the offences involved was life imprisonment.

The appellant appealed against his convictions. The Court of Criminal Appeal dismissed his appeal [1] and there that matter rests. The Court of Criminal Appeal granted leave to appeal against the severity of the sentences but dismissed the appeal [2] . It is against that dismissal that the appellant appeals to this Court.

1. R v Savvas (1991) 55 A Crim R 241. 2. R v Savvas [No 2] (1991) 58 A Crim R 174.

There is only one ground in the notice of appeal. It reads:

The Court of Criminal Appeal erred in finding that Hunt J did not err in taking into account for the purpose of sentencing a finding of fact amounting to the commission of substantive crimes for which the Appellant had neither been charged nor convicted. There is some ambiguity in the ground. It may be taken to mean that Hunt J was not entitled to embark upon fact finding as alleged or that, even if the fact finding was warranted, Hunt J erred because in truth he sentenced the appellant for offences with which he had not been charged. But as the argument was developed in the Court of Criminal Appeal and in this Court, it is the latter aspect upon which the appellant relies.