Pereira v Director Of Public Prosecutions [1988] HCA 57

High Court of Australia Mason CJ Dawson, Toohey and Gaudron JJ Pereira v Director Of Public Prosecutions [1988] HCA 57

ORDER Application dismissed

Cur adv vult

15 November 1988 Mason CJ, Dawson, Toohey and Gaudron JJ

THE COURT delivered a joint judgment.

The applicant was convicted in the District Court (NSW) on two charges that:

(a) between 1 June 1984 and 1 August 1984, in contravention of the Customs Act 1901 Cth, she was knowingly concerned in the importation into Australia of a quantity of cannabis resin being not less than the traffickable quantity; and

(b) on or about 1 August 1984 she, without reasonable excuse, had in her possession a quantity of cannabis resin not less than the traffickable quantity which had been imported into Australia in contravention of the Customs Act.

An appeal against those convictions was dismissed by the Court of Criminal Appeal of the Supreme Court (NSW). The applicant now seeks an extension of time within which to file and serve application for special leave to appeal from that decision.

The charges related to the same body of cannabis resin. The resin was contained in cricket balls and a jewellery case which, with other items, were in a parcel posted from Bombay, India. The parcel was addressed to Mr and Mrs J Caulfield, 14 Foxall Street, Elanora Heights, New South Wales, 2101. On 1 August 1984 the parcel was delivered to that address which had then been occupied by the applicant and her young son for some six weeks. The applicant took delivery of the parcel, but had not opened it when police executed a search warrant at her premises a little over an hour later.

The substantial issue in the trial was whether the applicant knew that cannabis resin was secreted in the parcel. Counsel for the applicant conceded that evidence as to her actions at the time of and subsequent to the delivery of the parcel was sufficient to support an inference of such knowledge. The issues raised by this application are whether it was permissible for the jury to be directed on "wilful blindness" and, if so, the adequacy of the direction given by the trial judge.