District Court New South Wales Medium Neutral Citation: R v Hannachi; R v Chamon [2019] NSWDC 911 Hearing dates: 17 June 2019 Decision date: 19 July 2019 Jurisdiction: Criminal Before: Norrish QC DCJ Decision: Hannachi – Sentenced to term of imprisonment of 6 years; non-parole period 3 years 7 months imprisonment. Confiscation order for $13,230 cash Chamon – Sentenced to a term of imprisonment of 5 yrs; non-parole period 3 years imprisonment Catchwords: Hannachi CRIME – sentence – supply prohibited drug � commercial quantity – MDMA - take part in supply prohibited drug � commercial quantity – knowingly deal with proceeds of crime – totality of offending – in charge of street level dealers - foreign national – plea of guilty - special circumstances - parity Chamon CRIME – sentence - knowingly deal with proceeds of crime – participate in criminal group – supply prohibited drug – MDMA – vital role – totality of offending – parity – prior good character – plea of guilty - special circumstances – foreign national Legislation Cited: Crimes Act 1900 Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act 1999 Drug Misuse and Trafficking Act 1985. Cases Cited: Attorney General's Application (No 1) [2002] 56 NSWLR 147 Bugmy v R [2013] HCA 37 Hili and Jones v R [2011] HCA 45 Johnson v R (2004) 78 ALJR 616 Lee v R [2019] NSWCCA 106 Mill v R (1988) 166 CLR 59 Moss v R [2013] NSWCCA 242 Muldrock v R [2011] HCA 39 Olbrich v R (1999) 199 CLR 270 Parente v R [2017] NSWCCA Pearce v R (1998) 194 CLR 610 R v Qutami [2001] NSWCCA 353 R v Way [2004] NSWCCA 131 R v XX (2009) 198 A Crim R 38 Shi v R [2004] NSWCCA 135 Category: Sentence Parties: Regina (Crown) Cheker Hannachi (offender) Florian Julian Henry Chamon (offender) Representation: Counsel: Mr Taylor (DPP) Mr N Funnell (offender Hannachi) Mr G James QC (offender Chamon) Solicitors: Mr Simons (DPP) File Number(s): Hannachi 2018/00108314; Chamon 2018/00108370 Publication restriction: No Judgment 1. Gentlemen, you do not have to stand up, but it is my practice to tell prisoners in advance what sentence is to be imposed. Most people being sentenced are primarily interested in what sentence is imposed rather than why it is imposed, and unless there is a security reason not to do, I do not see any reason to deny someone the information that is most important to them provided at the earliest opportunity. 2. Before I get into my reasons, and before I tell you what is to be the sentence, I am sorry to keep you in suspense, but I have distinguished between you because you two must understand that you are each charged with different offences with different maximum penalties and the true extent of your criminal conduct is not known to me because I am captive to the agreed facts and the charges that have been brought against you. 3. The Prosecutor produced a document called an organisation chart or something similar which purported to show the relationship of you to each other and to others that have pleaded guilty, but that organisation chart bore no relationship really to the detail of the charges brought against you. 4. I have distinguished you for two very important reasons. One, in your case, Mr Hannachi, you have pleaded guilty to two charges carrying a greater maximum penalties than your co-accused and also you were in breach of good behaviour bonds imposed by other courts, and in Australia, or at least New South Wales, breaching conditional liberty is an aggravating factor in sentencing. 5. Mr Hannachi, in your case I propose to impose a sentence of six years' imprisonment with a non-parole period of three years and seven months' imprisonment. That sentence will commence on 6 April 2018, which is the date you came into custody for the first time. 6. Mr Chamon, I propose in your case to impose a sentence of five years' imprisonment with a non-parole period of three years' imprisonment. That sentence will commence from the date you came in custody, which I understand to be 6 April 2018. 7. The two gentlemen before me today, Mr Chamon and Mr Hannachi are two of a group of people that appeared before me approximately four weeks' ago. Each of the offenders, including these two prisoners pleaded guilty to a range of offences, many of which are not common. Having said that, it is clear from the Agreed Statement of Facts there is an interrelationship between these two prisoners and the other offenders in a range of ways. The other offenders are to be sentenced at a later time for reasons that do not affect these two gentlemen. 8. In Mr Chamon's case, his parents came over from France. His father gave evidence, and in a perfect world, I would have liked to have sentenced the prisoner in the presence of his immediate family. But, as I was required to go to a regional court for several weeks, that was not possible. 9. I propose to set out the particular charges that are brought against each of the prisoners. I do that in the context of some submissions that were made to me about the respective criminality of the two men. The particulars are of considerable importance in fact when one has regard to the agreed facts and some particular submissions made by the learned Crown Prosecutor about Mr Chamon. 10. One matter that emerged from my reading of the material - bearing in mind the matter came before me unannounced with five accused and lots of things to read - is that during the period of the time encompassed by the Agreed Statement of Facts it emerged, particularly in the defence case of Mr Chamon, that he was overseas for some weeks. 11. This may be of some significance when one has regard to the particulars of the charges and an understanding that the criminal conduct alleged against Mr Chamon that can be proven by the Crown did not commence until late January 2018. Whereas the matters involving Mr Hannachi commenced at an earlier time. 12. With regard to Mr Chamon, the charges to which he pleaded guilty are firstly, if I could describe it as sequence 3, a crime of knowingly deal with proceeds of crime between 30 January 2018 and 6 April 2018 at Pyrmont. The proceeds of crime were $163,235 in Australian currency, that he knew was the proceeds of crime, and which was in his possession at the time of his arrest. This is an offence contrary to s 193B(2) Crimes Act 1900 and has a maximum penalty of 15 years' imprisonment. 13. Further, the prisoner has pleaded guilty to and is to be sentenced for an offence of participating in a criminal group in the period of time between 8 March 2018 and 6 April 2018 at Pyrmont. The criminal group included Mr Hannachi and other co-accused, some of whom are to appear before me, including Mr Bianchi and Mr Wandji Watchou. He admitted to contributing to criminal activity; that is, the supply of prohibited drugs and knowingly deal with proceeds of crime. That charge is sequence 5 in the sequence of Court Attendance Notices. 14. The third charge for sentence is sequence 6. That is a charge of supplying a prohibited drug on 30 January 2018 to wit, 28.3 grams of 3,4‑Methylenedioxymethamphetamine, otherwise known as MDMA, sometimes referred to as Ecstasy. 15. The 'participate in a criminal group' offence carries a maximum penalty of five years. Supplying a prohibited drug contrary to s 25(1) Drug Misuse and Trafficking Act carries a maximum penalty of 15 years and/or a pecuniary penalty of 2,000 penalty units. 16. I am required to take into account on a Form 1 two other charges. One is an offence committed on 31 January 2018 of supplying a prohibited drug in an indictable quantity, the prohibited drug being Ketamine in a quantity of 28.1 grams. The second charge is another offence of supplying a prohibited drug in an indictable quantity on 28 March 2018, the quantity being 17 grams, the drug being MDMA. Those matters if dealt with on indictment would carry maximum penalties of 15 years imprisonment. 17. I am sorry gentlemen, there is one thing I should have said at the outset. The law requires me in New South Wales to deal with all the matters that have been raised by the parties and the law also requires me to deal with a number of matters that may not have even been mentioned by the parties and therefore it will take some time for me to give my remarks on sentence and there will be many matters of which you will have no interest in one way or the other and it is for this reason amongst others that I have told you in advance what the sentences are to be but that does not relieve me of the obligation I have to set out clearly the basis upon which I have reached the decisions that I have. 18. With regard to Mr Hannachi I have four principal offences to deal with. The first offence, sequence 3, is an offence contrary to s 25(2) Drug Misuse and Trafficking Act 1985. This is described as "sequence 3" and it is a crime of the prisoner on 23 January 2018 at Surry Hills in the State of New South Wales agreeing to the supply of an amount of prohibited drug to wit, 141 grams of 3,4‑Methylenedioxymethamphetamine being an amount which is not less than the commercial quantity applicable to that prohibited drug. That offence carries a maximum penalty of 20 years imprisonment and/or a pecuniary penalty of 3,500 penalty units. It also has a standard non-parole period of ten years imprisonment. 19. Sequence 5 is another offence contrary to the same provision. This is an offence committed between the 28th day of December 2017 and the 30th day of January 2018 at Surry Hills in New South Wales and it is offence of knowingly take part in the supply of an amount of a prohibited drug, in this instance 335 grams of MDMA, again being an amount which is not less than the commercial quantity applicable to that prohibited drug and, of course, it carries the same maximum penalty and the same standard non-parole period. 20. There is a further indictable offence of supplying 599 discrete dosage units or DDUs of Lysergide on the 6th day of April 2018 at Darlinghurst, the day of the prisoner's arrest. This is an offence contrary to s 25(1) Drug Misuse and Trafficking Act 1985 and carries a maximum penalty of 15 years and/or 2,000 penalty units and finally there is sequence 8, an offence of knowingly deal with the proceeds of crime contrary to s 193B(t) Crimes Act which carries a maximum penalty of 15 years. That was an offence committed at Darlinghurst on the 6th day of April 2018 when the prisoner was arrested. 21. In the case of Mr Hannachi there is a Form 1. That is concerned with the sequence 5 offence in relation to the 335 grams of MDMA and there are two offences on this Form 1. One an offence said to have been committed of between 22 November 2017 and 6 April 2018 at Darlinghurst, knowingly direct activities of a criminal group whose activities were organised and ongoing and included, amongst others, co-accused of these two men and Mr Chamon. 22. The other offence on the Form 1 is an offence of supplying a prohibited drug, to wit, 64.17 grams of 3,4-Methylenedioxymethamphetamine contrary to s 25(1) the Drug Misuse and Trafficking Act. I did not mention but I mention now the fact that the matters on the Form 1 relating to Mr Chamon are to be taken into account in respect of the supply prohibited drug offence that is, supplying the indictable quantity of MDMA. 23. I should point out in relation to the matter that MDMA has an indictable quantity of 1.25 grams, a commercial quantity of 125 grams and a large commercial quantity of 500 grams. 24. Each of the prisoners pleaded guilty at the first reasonable possibility, or the first reasonable opportunity available to them, and I propose to give them each a discount of 25% upon the otherwise appropriate sentence for the utilitarian benefit of their pleas of guilty. Each of the prisoners has been in custody since 4 April 2018 and all time spent in custody will be taken into account of course. 25. The prisoner, Mr Chamon, has no prior criminal convictions. Mr Hannachi in New South Wales has a number of convictions. He was convicted on 6 September 2018 at Central Local Court in respect of an offence of larceny involving a value of property less than $2,000 and placed on a good behaviour bond for a period of 12 months. He was also convicted of failing to appear in accordance with a bail acknowledgment and placed on another s 12 bond for a period of 12 months. 26. He was called up in relation to those offences on 8 May 2017 at the Central Local Court, apparently for alleged breaches of those bonds, and it would seem that new orders were made or alternatively no action was taken in relation to the bonds. 27. On 8 May 2017, he was convicted of possessing a prohibited drug and giving a false name for which he was modestly fined on both counts. On 6 September 2016 he was also convicted of dishonestly obtain property by deception and was placed on a good behaviour bond for 12 months, in respect of two counts concerning those matters. He was also convicted on 10 April 2018 in respect of charge brought on 26 March 2018, approximately a week before his arrest, of possess prohibited drug. 28. The Crown has indicated in the coversheet relating to the prisoner that at the time of the commission of the offences with which I am concerned, he was then subject to, by identifiable sequence numbers and H numbers, three s 9 bonds. That being an aggravating factor for sentence under s 21(A)(2) of the Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act 1999, here and after to be referred to as the Act. 29. The facts of the matter as set out in an Agreed Statement of Facts and the facts cover not only the involvement of the two men with which I am now concerned but other co-accused to come back before me. Two other people who I should make special mention of. One such person is a man called Nicholas Coulaud. Mr Coulaud figures to a degree in the Agreed Statement of Facts. As I understand it, he resided at an address in Steam Mill Lane Haymarket, which also figures prominently in the facts with the prisoner Mr Chamon. Mr Coulaud's precise role is not defined. He has never been charged with anything as I understand it, and apparently he left the country before he could be charged. The facts set out some preliminary information about matters relating to police operation or investigation that commenced around about the second November 2017 and culminated with the arrest of the two prisoners plus other people. 30. Para 6 of the Agreed Statement of Facts, notes that telephone intercepts of a particular phone service, referred to as a "run phone" used by a co‑accused or an associated accused Mr Wandji Watchou and Mr Micah, had established that those people were engaged in street level supply on behalf of Mr Hannachi. The runners or street dealers were working in shifts and supplies were made of a number of different prohibited drugs which are not identified but I would expect include MDMA. Mr Hannachi also used the run phone referring to himself as "Jacob". The facts state that he in turn obtained "prohibited drugs from Coulaud and Chamon," at the address at Haymarket. 31. There was some emphasis placed upon para 6 by the learned Crown Prosecutor. But that has to be seen in the context of the particular charges to which Mr Chamon has pleaded guilty and the particulars supplied in the knowledge, as I said as I understand it, that Mr Chamon was overseas for some period over - either December and/or January of 2017 and 2018. The facts go on to deal with the offences committed by Mr Wandji Watchou over a period time from 7 December 2017, being specific instances of supply. 32. Mr Hannachi in terms of his criminal conduct which is for sentence today, first appears in the facts at para 13. That states, that on 28 December 2017, Wandji Watchou, Mr Hannachi and a person referred to as Medhi were holidaying on the Gold Coast. Wandji Watchou was monitored by electronic and physical surveillance, organising and sourcing seven ounces of MDMA for supply and the supply was arranged by a known person contacting Wandji Watchou on a particular mobile phone number. Various calls were intercepted to the point where one of the runners was organised to make the supply and was monitored leaving an address in Crown Street and going to the address at Steam Mill Lane where he was met by Coulaud, the man who was missing. 33. Later on Mr Micah met with a known person outside the address in Crown Street and supplied 194 grams of 3,4 methylenedioxymethamphetamine for $12,950 which police seized and identified to have a very high purity of 77%. Coulaud was keeping a lookout when the drug was supplied. And during the course of the supply to the known person, Micah said, "I spoke to Jacob, you know Jacob, right." Jacob being a reference to the accused Mr Hannachi. He went on to say; "Cause he's the one that told me to bring it to you." At the very time that this was occurring as I understand it, Wandji Watchou was with Mr Hannachi on the Gold Coast. 34. On 23 January 2018, the known person spoke with Hannachi and during that call that person referred to having to wait for two hours the other week and Mr Hannachi replied as I would understand it in English, "We wasn't here, you know that we wasn't here." The accused is identified as knowingly take part in the relevant supply which gives rise to the sequence 5 offence. There are then further detailed facts in relation to Mr Wandji Watchou's activities and communications with others consistent with his involvement in the supply of drugs. 35. The next matter concerning Mr Hannachi is the sequence 3 charge, concerning the agreement to supply 141 grams of MDMA. On 23 January 2018, Mr Hannachi and the man I earlier referred to who was up at the Gold Coast with Mr Hannachi, Mr Medhi were monitored by electronic and physical surveillance organising the supply of five ounces of MDMA to a known person. Of course none of the people that were charged knew that they were dealing with people that were providing information to the police. 36. About 2pm on 23 January 2018, the known person called what was called the 'run phone' to speak with Mr Wandji Watchou and Medhi answered. The known person then sent a text message to that phone asking for two ounces of MDMA, saying that Mr Wandji Watchou usually does it for $1,6050 per ounce. Medhi was then monitored electronically as he messaged Mr Hannachi and they discussed the transaction. Mr Hannachi directed Medhi to reply to the person in contact and tell him the price was $2,000 per ounce. 37. The known person then requested a price for five ounces of MDMA and further electronic monitoring captured Mr Hannachi texting Mehdi to tell the known person $8,500 for five, "that makes 1,700", 1,700 being no doubt $1,700 per ounce. The known person agreed to that price and agreed to meet at Crown Street at 5.30pm for the supply to take place. He attended at Crown Street at the agreed time but had to leave before the supply could take place. 38. He called on the 'run phone', spoke to Mr Wandji Watchou and complained about having to be kept waiting. The phone was then handed to Mr Hannachi and a conversation unfolded in which Mr Hannachi said "Do you need your five ounces?" He went on to say "Sometimes we are busy". He also said "If you're going to come back, no problem", ending the call. 39. The person endeavouring to purchase the drugs called back at 8.54pm and spoke to Hannachi about how to arrange transactions in the future and Mr Hannachi said he would send a text to that person through a Wickr app messaging system where of course as we all know messages can be deleted and certainly they are encrypted. On 30 January the known person sent a Wickr message from a username 'Jacobsama'. 40. Sequence 5 in the charges brought against Mr Hannachi includes the allegation of knowingly being involved with or agreeing to supply 141 grams of MDMA. Mr Chamon first gets a mention of any substance in the facts for events that occurred on 30 January 2018 in respect of his involvement in the supply of 28.3 grams of MDMA. On 30 January Mr Hannachi and Mr Wandji Watchou were monitored and subject to surveillance, sourcing five ounces of MDMA for supply. 41. A person was met at 261 Crown Street. Wandji Watchou told that person that he had four ounces but if he wanted the fifth ounce they would have to travel to pick it up. So the facts reveal that Wandji Watchou already had four ounces at that point. The known person drove with Wandji Watchou to the address of the prisoner Chamon at Steam Mill Lane, Haymarket. Wandji Watchou went inside and returned with the relevant quantity of drug that particularises this prisoner's involvement in the transaction, that is 28.3 grams of MDMA. 42. This was the date of the involvement of Hannachi in the supply of 141 grams of 3.4‑methylenedioxymethylamphetamine, as I said earlier, consistent with sequence 5. The Crown case is that the accused Chamon, and he admits this, supplied one ounce of MDMA on that date. So far as Mr Hannachi's involvement in directing activities of a criminal group, that charge being sequence 9 on a Form 1, in addition to his direction of supplies on 28 December 2017 and 30 January 2018 and his agreement to supply drugs on 23 January, telephone intercepts show that Mr Hannachi directed the actions of the street level suppliers, including the people that I have already referred to. 43. At one point he spoke to a customer on the phone and said "I am the boss here, my name is Jacob". Ultimately Mr Wandji Watchou was charged and that occurred on 2 February 2018. One might have thought for those participating in the criminal activities that these two prisoners were involved and that might have been a bit of an alarm signal for them but they continued on. Mr Chamon was the subject of surveillance at the address at Steam Mill Lane, Haymarket and on 31 January 2018 he committed the sequence 2 offence which is one of the Form 1 matters when a male person came away from the prisoner's address supplied by Mr Chamon with 28.1 grams of ketamine. 44. The person supplied was stopped by police and the drugs found on him were analysed and found to be that quantity. Hence the particularity of the charge. So far as Mr Chamon's involvement as a participant in a criminal group (the sequence 5 offence to which I earlier referred), on 7 March 2018 a number of surveillance devices were installed in the unit where the prisoner lived and the prisoner was monitored on a number of occasions receiving, handling and packaging prohibited drugs in his apartment and what are described as "significant" amounts of Australian currency were handled by him in connection with drug supply activities. 45. For example, on 11 March 2018 the surveillance devices captured Mr Chamon paying an estimated $40,000 cash for 15 packages from an unknown male. We do not know what are in the packages but the devices apparently captured reference to that quantity of money. On 14 March 2018 devices captured Mr Massett to whom I earlier referred and Mr Bianchi, another person to whom I have earlier referred, attending upon the premises, bringing along a Country Road bag and placing a white plastic shopping bag on the table, saying "Come here and count, we have to close the curtains". 46. When the bag was opened, clear sandwich bags of cash were placed on the dining table, the money was counted by Massett and sandwich bags of money were handed to Chamon to count. Massett explained that the names on the bags identified the runner who owned the money and Mr Hannachi was referred to by his "code name" of Jacob. Chamon and Massett counted thousands of dollars whilst talking about drug supply and other syndicate members, as they are referred. 47. Masset picked up a stack of money and placed it in a white plastic bag and then placed it inside other bags before leaving the premises to be stopped by police with $10,240 in Australian currency. Massett was charged in relation to that matter as I understand it. He is not a co‑accused of this particular prisoner and I have been provided with the result of the sentencing proceedings of that offender at the Local Court. 48. Whilst it is a relevant matter in the sentencing of these two prisoners, it is a relatively minor matter and no issue of "parity" directly arises in relation to the way in which he was dealt with, which was leniently. The obligation of this Court to impose stronger penalties. I just point out in relation to that matter again that on 14 March 2018 in light of his arrest, one might have thought amongst these two prisoners that concern might have arisen as to the prospect of future arrests but the two men continued on. 49. On 18 March 2018 the prisoner Chamon counted an estimated $60,000 in his apartment before placing it into a gold backpack. He made a phone call, speaking in French, and said these words; "Time to go, collect, going to work and deposit/drop off". On 25 March 2018 in the context of the prisoner's participation in a criminal group, surveillance devices captured Mr Chamon counting money in the unit at Steam Mill Lane, Haymarket. The prisoner was recorded saying the words; "I'm going to collect today" and left the apartment. 1. When he returned, he removed five packages from his backpack which he then sealed, using a vacuum sealer machine. So far as the sequence 7 charge, the matter on the Form 1 of supplying 17 grams of MDMA, on 28 March 2018 surveillance devices captured Bianchi, another person referred to as "James" entering the apartment and a conversation occurred between Bianchi and the prisoner Chamon, during which Mr Chamon said "Here there is" and then in the facts it states "D here". 2. The prisoner supplied a package containing 17 grams of MDMA to Bianchi, who in turn supplied it to James, with Bianchi saying to James; "Should be enough for this week 17 grams. If you are running out just text me and I will help you". Mr Bianchi then handed Mr Chamon two sandwich bags of cash, which Chamon placed in a grey shoebox. 1. During the course of the conversation Bianchi said to Chamon; "You're going to have to brief me for when you leave, because you're going to have to brief me on the clients, how it works". "I'll come one night and we'll talk it". Chamon replies; "Jacob will tell you". 1. On 29 March 2018 surveillance devices captured Hannachi and Bianchi attending the Steam Mill Lane Haymarket address and meeting up with Mr Chamon. On 30 March Mr Chamon and another person were recorded by surveillance devices counting and recounting large bundles of cash. 2. On 1 April 2018 surveillance devices captured Chamon removing five bundles of cash from a white shoebox and counting an estimated $120,000 in the company of a person called Malla. Mr Chamon left the apartment with the cash and attended an address in Camperdown, returning to the unit at 6.42pm that evening. Mr Bianchi and Mr Hannachi were observed in the apartment at this time along with another unknown male, and Bianchi was observed counting cash in the apartment. 3. Eventually the police had enough of all this and decided to stamp it out. So with a relevant search warrant, search warrants were executed at various placed. Mr Hannachi was arrested at a unit in College Street, Darlinghurst. He had in his possession $13,230 of Australian currency, which is one of the matters on the Form 1, the sequence 8 offence, the 599 DDU, or Discrete Dosage Units of Lysergide, which is substantive supply prohibited drug offence to which he has pleaded guilty. He also had 69.2 grams of MDMA, sequence 11, which is indictable supply prohibited drug which is for some reason placed on a Form 1. He had a notebook with drug amounts and cash amounts, references to himself or some password or some username, "Jacob 69004". He had other documents. He had two sets of electronic scales, a bag of 1,000 empty gelatine capsules in a large shopping bag containing empty clear releasable bags, and, of course, numerous documents in his own name Mourad Hannachi. 4. When interviewed the prisoner confirmed his name, the phone number that he had with him confirmed that he knew Mr Chamon and others, confirmed that he had travelled to the Gold Coast with particular people. He identified himself on surveillance and CCTV footage from 29 March. He stated that the $13,000 found in his premises was the remainder of his savings brought from France. That was obviously false in light of his plea. He denied any knowledge of the LSD, as it is described, and the MDMA found in his premises, stating only 10 grams of MDMA was his and for his own personal use, which was not true. There was some co-operation by the prisoner, which I have taken into account, but it was fairly minimal. 5. Mr Chamon was arrested on 6 April at Steam Mill Lane, Haymarket. A total of $163,235 belonging to him was found in the premises, and the facts set out the places where it was variously found. A set of digital scales, three boxes of vacuum seal bags, a number of mobile phones and laptops, numerous cards and personal documents in his own name and in the name of a person 'Mueller'. 6. The prisoner Chamon was not as co-operative to the extent that Mr Hannachi was co-operative. He exercised his right to silence, simply admitting that his address was Steel Mill Lane; stating that he had lived at that address for some period of time beforehand. Then there are details as to the arrest of other people in the facts. 7. So they are the facts upon which the prisoners are to be sentenced. 8. I make the point in the context of submissions made to me at some length by the Crown and Mr James and in accordance with the High Court's decision in Olbrich, I sentence each of the prisoners for what they actually did; what is actually proven beyond reasonable doubt. I note, as I have said earlier, the fact that contrary to the way in which the Crown sought to represent the Crown case against Mr Chamon, I am captive to the particulars that have been pleaded and the pleas entered by him to particular charges. 9. As I said earlier, I am also required to take into account matters that might explain why the particulars are as they are. That is for some period of time it seems as though the prisoner was not in the country to be involved in criminal activities with which other people were involved. 10. As to the cash that was found in the possession of the prisoner Chamon, some of that money, it is reasonably possible, could be the proceeds of other moneys that were counted by the prisoner. I am not satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that the $164,000 was not some or all of the other cash which the surveillance devices identified. It is quite clear from what I can read in the facts that the surveillance devices include video recording of the activities of the offenders. But that is not necessarily so. 11. With regard to the offending I will come back to the way in which the parties sought to classify it. I am mindful of the fact, particularly in relation to Mr Hannachi, that he has two offences that have standard non-parole periods. The obligations under Part 4, Divison 1B of the Act require me to identify where particular offences lie in relation to the middle range of objective seriousness. 12. I turn now to the subjective cases conducted by the parties. The subjective case of Mr Chamon is more substantial than that of Mr Hannachi, without any criticism of the way Mr Hannachi's case was conducted. Mr Hannachi, of course, did not have the benefit of family being able to travel over from France. 13. The prisoner's mother and father were present in Court. Chamon's father gave evidence before me. He struck me as a perfectly respectable man, and he gave evidence of the fact that he was a respectable businessman, living in the vicinity of Toulouse and Montpellier. He had a business under the name of "Vidal Peinture" and his 22 year old son; I take it to be the younger brother of the prisoner; worked in that business. He gave evidence that when the prisoner is released and of necessity will return to his home country of France, he can offer accommodation and employment. It would appear in the evidence of the father that the business he conducts is a substantial business. He has 25 employees and he conducts his business throughout Southern France as far as Provence, which I would understand to be to the east of Montpellier, and he would do his best to assist him to avoid further offending. 14. The prisoner has written a letter of apology to the Court, which I have taken into account. Of course, he has not given evidence himself, neither did Mr Hannachi, and any out of court representations that are not subject to the test of cross-examination will be approached obviously with some circumspection, as many cases have identified, including the decision of R v Qutami [2001] NSWCCA 353. The prisoner, as I earlier indicated, however has no prior criminal convictions and I am prepared to accept that in France he led a lawful existence. As I understand the matter the prisoner being born in April 1994 is now 25 years of age. So he is a relatively young man and he has never been in gaol before. 15. When he was spoken to by a psychologist he spoke in passable English for the majority of the assessment and only sought the assistance of the interpreter when it was needed, which is perfectly acceptable. He had no history of psychosis, no history of mental illness or disability. He gave a history which I am prepared to accept in general terms. He came to Australia on a working visa. He said that he himself was a user of cocaine which he claimed to be in quite "large amounts". He struck me that, even though he may well have been a user of cocaine the truth of the matter is he was fully able to negotiate his way through the commission of the offences with which I am concerned. He expressed remorse to the psychologist, as he did in his letter of apology to me, for his involvement in the offending and the impact of his offending on his family and to those who were sold relevant substances. 16. He has had employment within the prison, as part of the history, working in the laundry. He has had regular contact with his family and his partner in France. He gave details of his background living with his parents in a perfectly lawful way. 17. He said that he started working at the age of 16 in his father's business. Then he worked for a number of years as a life guard at a local beach, and he completed, he said, a university degree, arriving in Australia in 2015, where he worked in various manual labouring positions. He obviously found supplying of drugs eventually much easier on him, and much more profitable than undertaking work. 18. He was a talented swimmer it was said. He used that skill in his 'life saving' activities. Amongst the documents that I have been provided are not only a reference from his partner concerning his involvement in life saving and other community activities, but there are, as I said, certificates that support that claim. 19. The prisoner has had some injuries, and he was diagnosed with a collapsed lung when he was 17. That led to the advice to limit physical exertion. He has no evidence of head injury and there was no suggestion whatsoever of the prisoner having a diagnosable, or a diagnosed disability, or mental illness. 20. He claimed that he had been a user of MDMA since 2016, which he said he first used in Australia. He said that he; "believed that illicit drug use was widespread and common in Australia". He progressed from weekend use to more substantial use of MDMA and cocaine, particularly in the nine months between July 2017 and April 2018. I approach that claim with circumspection but I have got no reason to doubt that he was not a user of the substance, or substances, that he was concerned with for supply. 1. It was in this report that he gave the history of returning to France for six weeks in December 2017 and January 2018, a fact of which nobody made any comment to me in the course of the plea for reasons best known to themselves. 2. He is described as "not inherently antisocial". He has no history of juvenile misbehaviour, or any condition that might suggest a personality disorder. The psychologist does her best to try and analyse his offending, but that analysis is really entirely dependent upon the say so of the prisoner. But it is correct, I think, in her observation, notwithstanding his involvement in serious offending, that he has minimal identifiable criminogenic treatment needs, other than matters relating to substance abuse. He has some "protective factors" for what is described as "pro-social" functioning, particularly the support of his family and his partner. In the letter to the Court that he wrote he said that he was drug free, and he regarded himself as a better person, and was proud of the work that he had done whilst in custody, and the full time employment that he had undertaken. 3. I have, attached to an affidavit from his solicitor, a number of reports showing his involvement in employment whilst in custody, and very positive references to his industry in custody. He is variously described as "polite, being well mannered, working as instructed and showing respect for officers and getting along well with other inmates", a matter picked up in the affidavit of the solicitor. 4. I have taken into account the reference of his partner and I expect that she would be able to support him on his release to custody. I have a number of character references which have been translated for the Court which I have taken into account. These references, in a range of ways, point to what I have already referred to in my remarks, his involvement in life saving activities, and extra-curricular social activities in France; being usefully employed whilst living in France, or else studying; being pro-social and positive in his outlook. There is no mention in these references to the prisoner appearing to have any difficulties with drugs in France. He is variously described as respectful and polite in the manner in which he is described in the gaol records. These people also speak of their willingness to assist him on his release from custody back to France, and I accept the references show people that are regarded as respectable people with respectable employment. 5. So that material, including certificates provided by the prisoner, has all been taken into account. I am prepared to accept as a fact that living in France the prisoner had a lawful lifestyle and was highly regarded by those people known to him, and his conduct here in Australia would be seen as "uncharacteristic" by the standards of those people in France that know him. 6. Mr Hannachi's case is contained really within a psychological report, and a reference I have read today for the first time from his former partner, which I will come to in a moment. This psychological report does not identify any mental illness or mental disability that I am required to take into account other than referring to the prisoner's use of what we call in New South Wales 'prohibited drugs' over a period of time. 7. The prisoner is now 35 years of age, born in December 1983. He is a man of Tunisian descent, as it is described, but a French citizen. He was co‑operative during the interview with the psychologist. He was purportedly "philosophical" about his incarceration. He said he felt healthier now than he did when he came into custody. He grew up in Lyon. He has four siblings living with his parents. His father was very strict and the prisoner complained of physical assaults from his father over a period of time. 8. He reports a matter that I do not propose to put on the record concerning his mother reflecting her reaction to what I would understand to be a climate of domestic violence. She was hospitalised for six months. She did recover but she returned to Tunisia to live with her family of origin for two years and the children were left in the care of their father when the prisoner was aged between 10 and 12. He was, he said, mistreated during that period of time. 9. He has a history of substance abuse, he said, going back to the age of 15 starting with the abuse of alcohol and then in his early 20s long before he came to Australia being a regular user of cocaine and other drugs. He has never attempted any sort of rehabilitation program or counselling. 10. His education was limited. He would no doubt have not benefited from the family circumstances in which he lived. He had difficulties at school. He began training when he left school as a mechanic and then also started training as an electrician but failed to finish those programs but his employment was disrupted by his abuse of alcohol and drugs particularly. 11. He claimed that he in fact was unemployed when he travelled to Australia. It raises the very interesting question of how he came to be in Australia and why he came to Australia in the context of him having a history of unemployment or no permanent employment and given his age. I will come back to also his personal circumstances in that respect in a moment. 12. He claimed that he got involved in drug supply through his associations in Australia with people in the 'party scene'. He has contact with the mother of his child. As I said, there is no diagnosis, nor any attempt of diagnosis of any mental illness or disability that I should consider other than a background of drug dependency. It is thought that he needs assistance and guidance in relation to that aspect of his background. The psychologist was frank enough to say that it was not clear on the available evidence that his offending was simply a function of his substance use or indeed a function of a more serious and pervasive anti-social personality disorder, but he did appear to her to be psychologically stable and I have taken that report into account. 13. His former partner has written to the Court. She is the mother of his son who I understand is 11 years of age. They met when he was a teenager and lived together for a period of time. She frankly says that his behaviour towards her was a reflection of what he had told her he had experienced during his own childhood. She left him because of his use of alcohol and because of him being "excessively violent towards me". I will not hold that against him as a stain upon his character, more a direct statement of his social circumstances before he came to Australia. She claimed that he came to Australia because "he couldn't get over" their separation. She is shocked, she says by the offences he has committed. He had no involvement with drugs to her knowledge which is somewhat different from the history that he has given the psychologist. She has forgiven him for his violence towards her and she and his son would wish to support him on his return to France which I have taken into account. 14. In the context of that material, picking up just one aspect of the submissions that were made by learned counsel for the prisoner, he invoked the decision of Bugmy v The Queen [2013] HCA 37. Mr Bugmy was an Aboriginal man from a place called Wilcannia, probably one of the most desolate and deprived, dysfunctional communities in New South Wales if not Australia. He assaulted a prison officer as is well-known and he successfully appealed to the High Court. 15. I accept for the purposes of sentencing this prisoner that the principles in Bugmy could apply to this man even though he is not an Aboriginal man, even though the matters relating to his background have arisen in another country in a totally different context than his circumstances in Australia. I pause to say, however, the evidence available is unsworn, untested and is contained within hearsay representations which the Crown has not had the opportunity to challenge. The authorities are clear that these are matters that must be approached by a Court with some circumspection but I do accept as a general principle that a background of dysfunction can compromise a person's capacity to mature and learn from experience. They do not necessarily diminish with the passage of time and full weight should be given to a person's deprived background if it is proven in every sentencing decision. It is not necessarily, however, a matter of the same mitigatory relevance as other aspects of sentencing and one must always give weight to the conflicting purposes of punishment in sentencing particular offenders but again the other matter to be identified is that all these matters are matters of degree. 16. I had submissions from Mr James, the learned Queen's Counsel appearing for Mr Chamon, and Mr Funnell the learned Counsel appearing for Mr Hannachi. They both conceded, although their submissions touched upon different topics, that the s 5 threshold had been past. Quite obviously it is so. I do not need Parente to identify that and they put particular submissions to me about matters concerning their role and the seriousness of the criminality with which I am concerned which I have taken into account and a number of the matters that they referred to, I have already noted in my remarks on sentence. 17. I will come back to some aspects of the Crown submissions shortly, but arising out of all this material there are quite a number of legal issues to be addressed. Firstly, each of the offenders has matters on a Form 1 in respect of a particular charge and those matters have been taken into account in accordance with the guideline judgment in relation to Form 1 matters, Attorney General's Application (No 1) of 2002 [2002] 56 NSWLR 147, particularly at [18]‑[44]. As the Chief Justice pointed out in that judgment, when considering matters on a Form 1 usually "the entire point of the process" is to impose either a longer sentence or alter the nature of the sentence that would have been required if the principle offence had stood alone. 18. On the other hand, the Court is not required to codify or identify the extent of any particular increase. The Court pointed out that usually when matters are taken into account on a Form 1 they will provide a context for understanding the principle offending and they may require greater weight than given to retribution and deterrence. 19. In that regard, of course, I am required to have regard to s 3A Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act 1999. That means in this particular case by reference to these two offenders having regard to the facts of the matter and the subjective cases that they have conducted, I am to ensure that they are adequately punished in respect of each of the offences. I am required to prevent them and others from committing similar offences and there can be no doubt, of course, that in relation to the area of drug supply in the context, for example, of the acknowledged damage that can be done in the letter written to the Court by Mr Chamon, general deterrence is a very important matter. I am required to make the offenders accountable for their actions, to denounce their conduct. There is no particular victim here but there is the community affected by their conduct invoking s 3A(g). 20. So far as protecting the community from the offenders, well, of course, they are in custody, they will be deported. Their actions in being involved in drug supply have had an effect upon the community so there is some element of protection involved but it is not really a practical issue for the Court to concern itself with. Much of the drugs supplied were to people acting for the police. 21. In relation to s 21A of the Act, of course, the fact themselves are eloquent of the features of the case. The Crown had put as aggravating factors in its written submissions in the case of both prisoners that the offences were committed for "financial reward". Of course, there is a great deal of authority coming from the Court of Criminal Appeal about the need to ensure one does not double count aggravating factors with features of the case that would ordinarily be required to be considered under s 21(1). 22. The extent to which there was financial reward is not clear. The fact that Mr Chamon had over $160,000 in his possession shows very clearly the success of the criminal activities in which he and Mr Hannachi, to some extent, although not perhaps directly in relation to that amount, were involved. But neither prisoner has walked the 15 metres to the witness box to tell me precisely what they earned. Not that I can draw any inference adverse against them from their silence. Neither has either prisoner revealed the detail of the profiting from their activities. 23. I do note, however, as far as I am aware there is no evidence of the prisoners having any particular sums of money apart what was found upon them at particular times, placed in accounts or in other places that might reflect the extent of their profiting from their criminal conduct. But it does not require a great deal of additional evidence to understand that drug dealing is a profitable exercise and the extent of dealing in this particular matter is indicative of that when one has regard to particular instances of supply and the amounts of money that were negotiated for particular quantities of MDMA and the like. 24. But that having been said, and all things considered, I cannot conclude that financial reward is an additional aggravating factor as matters under s 21A(2) are required to be considered. I am informed and it is not denied, that the accused Mr Hannachi was in breach of conditional liberty and I have already referred to that particular matter as a substantial aggravating factor in his case. 25. I just turn for the moment to s 54A and 54B of the Act. These provisions are directly relevant to Mr Hannachi and the two offences that have the standard non-parole period to which I have referred. S 54A, in its amended form since the decision of the High Court in Muldrock v R [2011] HCA 39, states that the standard non-parole period for an offence in the Table of the Division is a matter taking into account only the objective factors affecting the relative seriousness of that offence that is within the middle range of seriousness. 26. This brings me back to an assessment of that aspect of the matter as it is statutorily required in relation to Mr Hannachi. I have had regard to the submissions of the respective parties, counsel for the Crown and Mr Funnell. In my view having regard to the quantity, the role of the prisoner which is important, although quantity is not necessarily determinative of this matter, the context in which the offending appears, the first offence with which I am concerned involving Mr Hannachi is below the middle range of objective seriousness. The second offence, (sequence 5) the greater quantity of MDMA particularised, in my view not just by reason of that but again in proper context is a matter within the "middle range". I am mindful of what the Court of Criminal Appeal in the decision of R v Way [2004] NSWCCA 131, set aside by Muldrock on its principal findings, said about the middle range of objective seriousness being "not necessarily a narrow band". But in the context of the quantity and the role of the prisoner I would place that offence at the echelons of the middle range of objective seriousness. 27. The offending in each instance is serious. Of course, in the case of Mr Hannachi the supplying of the Lysergide is less serious by reason of its maximum penalty than the other supply offences. The offence of knowingly deal with proceeds of crime is in the context of, for example, the offending of the same type by Mr Chamon, offence at the lower level of seriousness even allowing for the prisoner's continuing involvement as the Form 1 indicates of directing criminal activity. But the sum of money by contrast and sums of money that one might see associated with s 193B(2) Crimes Act 1900 is relatively modest. It is, of course, as one can see from the facts, part of what sums of money would have been received either directly by Mr Hannachi or on behalf of Mr Hannachi over a period of time. 28. What is important to note about each of the offences in assessing their objective seriousness is to see the offending, at least as it may be identified within the particularised dates, as representing planned and "organised" criminal activity. Not as an aggravating factor but as simply context for each individual offence. Each offence by relation to the other demonstrates a course of conduct of seriousness to the detriment of the community. If one understands a District Court judge is sitting here sentencing hundreds of people in relation to these offences, the offending is to be seen in that wider context and judged accordingly. 29. With regard to some of the other particular matters picked up in the submissions, Mr James spent a good deal of time referring me to a decision of Lee v R [2019] NSWCCA 106. This was a decision where an appeal against sentence was upheld on the basis of a false or unsafe factual finding by the sentencing judge as to the relationship of the offender to the course of conduct and particularly in the context of the sentencing judge determining that the prisoner had sourced the relevant drugs that were the subject of the particular charges brought against the prisoner. 30. The prisoner had pleaded guilty to an offence of supplying a large commercial quantity of the prohibited drug, cocaine, which carries a greater maximum penalty and a greater standard non-parole period than the offences, for example, relating to Mr Hannachi. That offender had a solitary principal charge, but had three matters on a Form 1 including knowingly dealing with proceeds of crime involving a sum of $23,370 as with each of these offenders in various ways participating in a criminal group and a separate offence of knowingly allowing the use of premises he occupied as drug premises. That is not a charge brought against Mr Chamon. 31. I was told, or it was submitted to me, that I might regard this offence as providing some guidance in a comparative case context in accordance with what the High Court said in Hili and Jones v R [2011] HCA 45. It provides very little assistance in a practical way. But I am mindful in the context of the Crown's submissions of the caution that I must use in determining particular facts that were urged upon me by the Crown. I cannot conclude, notwithstanding what I have referred to in the facts, that Mr Chamon, for example was "the source" of prohibited drugs. Clearly he had a vital role to play in the drugs being provided to others or been received into the house. He had a vital role to play in accounting for the proceeds of criminal activity particularly drug supply evidenced very eloquently by the sum of money that he had in his possession on 6 April. But in the absence of any detail as to his French colleague, in the absence of other evidence reflecting upon, for example, who he was taking money to on a particular occasion in the circumstances I identified in the facts, trying to attribute to Mr Chamon responsibility beyond what is evident in the facts beyond reasonable doubt would be an exercise in speculation. 32. So far as Mr Hannachi is concerned it is not disputed by reference to the agreed facts that the prisoner was directing operations of a street level supply network of some degree of sophistication. It is clear that the drugs were coming from another source and I do not for one moment suggest that Mr Hannachi had the means to, for example, manufacture the drugs. He no doubt was a person who was part of a chain of people. No doubt there are many other people further along the chain probably profiting to a greater extent than he did from the activities that he has admitted in his pleas. But the two prisoners in their respective ways by reference to the facts available were playing what could be described as important roles. Mr Hannachi admits to the extent to which he was directing people to commit crimes. His own counsel, as I noted, agreed in his submissions that the prisoner could be categorised on the agreed facts as the boss of the street level dealers, but was only concerned with street level dealing and I accept that that is so. 33. He sought in his submissions in a manner that was not undertaken by Mr James, as I noted it, to try and identify his client as being "not as important as Mr Chamon". Well, that may be true in a particular way in an isolated incident as it is reflected in the facts, but the truth of the matter is, as I tried to make clear at the outset and I went to some considerable length to identify this, the particulars of the charges and the character of the charges reflect upon Mr Hannachi greater criminality by reason of the time in which it is proven he was involved and the character of the offending to which he has pleaded guilty. 34. In every sentencing exercise it must be said that an important yardstick for determining the appropriate sentence is the maximum penalty that is prescribed for a particular offence. The facts of the matter are Mr Hannachi comes forward with an inferior subjective case facing more principal charges two of which carry substantially greater maximum penalties than the offences to which Mr Chamon has pleaded guilty. As I tried to explain to the two gentlemen as they sat there, and they may have some debate amongst themselves in French when they leave the Court about this very matter, there is a proper basis for distinguishing the two men. I hasten to say although the two men were involved in the same criminal enterprise in various ways no real issue of parity arises in the strict sense. They have pleaded guilty to different offences in different factual circumstances but, having said that, I am not ignorant of the fact that there is relationship with their criminality which informs my view as to what the appropriate sentences should be. 35. Counsel for the prisoner noted what I have already referred to as the background of disadvantage. Insofar as the issue of financial benefit as an aggravating factor he cited the decision of Ciccarelli which he either provided to me, or I myself obtained, and naturally I accept the determination of the Court of Criminal Appeal in relation to its discussion of that matter. He submitted to me, as did Mr James, that the offenders were remorseful and contrite. I accept of course their pleas of guilty reflect their remorse and/or contrition but I could not conclude remorse or contrition as "mitigating factor" as it is required under s 21A (3) without direct evidence of the matter from either prisoner. But I still note their expressions of remorse respectively. 36. Dealing with mitigating factors that rise in this particular matter in the case of Mr Chamon he did not have any record of previous convictions. He was a person of good character. I am prepared to accept on the basis of his background and the support he has, that when he returns to France or if he remained in Australia he was unlikely to re-offend, that he has good prospects of rehabilitation, his pleas of guilty are a mitigating factor as I have identified. 37. Even though he was in breach of conditional liberty I am prepared to accept that Mr Hannachi did not have a record that was significant so far as previous convictions were concerned. The only significance of his previous record is that it is consistent with him being a drug user. I could not conclude that he was a person of good character, particularly in light of the reference from his partner. As to whether he is unlikely to re-offend and has good prospects of rehabilitation they are matters that are problematic. He will need to return to France. Whether he can avoid using drugs in the manner in which he described when he returns to France is difficult to say but it is the fact that with assistance he can achieve that and it is a matter I have factored in in considering s 44 of the Act, that is in determining there are special circumstances. 38. I need to, if I may, just go back to the Crown's submissions because some matters raised by the Crown of course I accept. There were general principles referred to by the Crown in relation to the fixing of sentences for offences of the type with which I am concerned. I have already made comments about the organisational chart. The Crown made submissions about it, identifying the role of an offender. I obviously particularly pay attention to Olbrich v The Queen (1999) 199 CLR 270. There were submissions made which more often appear in Commonwealth sentencing proceedings involving organised importations concerning the importance of menial or limited roles, but neither offender could claim to have been performing menial roles. 39. Reference was also made to Shi [2004] NSWCCA 135 and particularly those observations at [34] that those who engage at any level in drug supply networks require deterrent sentences, whatever their roles may be. I have taken into account the Crown's submissions about the respective roles of the offenders and I have already dealt with that. Clearly the s 5 threshold is passed and no issue of serving their sentences in the community arises and in any event they would not have the opportunity to do so because they will be, I would imagine, deported. 40. I have had regard to Parente v The Queen [2017] NSWCCA 284 which authority sets out at [107]-[115] the relevant principles in sentencing offenders substantially involved in criminal activity such as these two men. The need to have regard to the purposes of sentencing, the importance of protection of the community and the recognition of the social impact of drug use. One need only have to pay heed to what is happening at an inquest at the moment in relation to drug use at festivals, an important area of concern for the community. 41. One must have regard to the maximum penalty and the relevant standard non-parole period when it applies. I appreciate that Parente held it was not necessarily the case that a term of imprisonment should be imposed, save for exceptional circumstances, but this case does not bring that issue into sharper focus. 42. With regard to the sentencing of the prisoners of course I have to have regard to the totality of the offending, that is, I have got to have regard to what has been said about the matter by decisions as Johnson v The Queen (2004) 78 ALJR 616, particularly at [18], where it adopted what had been said some 16 years before in the decision of Mill v The Queen (1988) 166 CLR 59, particularly at p.63. There the majority of the High Court adopted the observations of Dr Thomas in his seminal work "Principles of Sentencing" (at pp56 to 57). Also relevant in this regard are the observations of the High Court majority in obiter observations in a conviction appeal in Pearce v The Queen (1998) 194 CLR 610, particularly at [45]. There they reflected upon the need when sentencing for multiple offences to fixing individual sentences appropriate for each offence and then turning one's mind to the totality of the criminality and the extent of accumulation and concurrency. 43. In that regard, of course, s 53A Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act 1999 may be invoked, and that is what I am doing in this particular matter by fixing an aggregate sentence. Then, as I am required to do under the Act, fixing indicative sentences. In the sentences that have a standard non-parole period as part of the legislation, one is required to fix a non-parole period. 44. I have also had regard to what Hall J said in the decision of XX (2009) 198 A Crim R 38, particularly at [52], where his Honour reflected upon a range of decisions setting out various principles that need to be taken into account, matters of consideration of the separation of offences from one another in time and purpose, and the overlapping of offending obviously relevant to the issue of concurrency. 45. Although it is pointed out by some of the authorities identified by Hall J, particularly in some decisions of Howie J from the early part of the century, that simply because two offences occur, for example, out of the one criminal transaction, that does not mean, necessarily, that the sentences for those two offences may be concurrent. An example of that being dangerous driving causing grievous bodily harm. In a particular case, in which a number of people suffered grievous bodily harm. Howie J decided that it led in the particular facts of the case to a greater sentence, and a particular sentence for such crime. 46. I was taken to, apart from Lee, a number of decisions said to provide some assistance in terms of comparative sentencing. They are set out in the material that was provided by the parties. One such case in respect of dealing with proceeds of crime was the decision of Moss v The Queen [2013] NSWCCA 242. In that matter, the sums of money were greater than here, but in that matter too I note that the offences were offences contrary to s 193B(3) of the Act which carries a lesser maximum penalty. 47. The Crown, also gave me an extensive list of supposedly quite "comparative," cases. But in fairness to the learned Crown Prosecutor, apart from not providing me with those decisions, he rather generally referred to them (without any disrespect to the skill of his submissions) and I have not had the opportunity, nor was I invited, to research them at length. In fact, the Crown specifically did not invite me to do that in terms of making any relevant decisions. 48. I turn to the orders that are required in the circumstances I have outlined. 49. I am sorry to take so long, gentlemen, sentencing people is not an easy task nowadays, on any understanding of it. 50. Mr Hannachi, would you mind standing, thanks very much, please. 51. In respect of the matters to which you have pleaded guilty, taking into account the matters on the Form 1, you are convicted. Pursuant to s 53A Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act 1999, I sentence you to an aggregate sentence of imprisonment comprising a non-parole period of three years and seven months' imprisonment to commence on 6 April 2018 and to expire on 5 November 2021 with a balance of sentence of two years, five months' imprisonment to expire on 5 April 2024. I am required to fix indicative sentences of imprisonment. In relation to the sequence 3 offence, you are sentenced to three years' imprisonment with a non-parole period of two years. With regard to the sequence 5 offence, taking into account the matters on the Form 1, you are sentenced to four years' imprisonment with a non-parole period of two years, five months. In relation to the sequence 7 offence, I fix a term of imprisonment of 18 months. In relation to the sequence 8 offence, I fix a term of imprisonment of 12 months. That is a total sentence of six years' imprisonment with a non-parole period of three years, seven months. Take a seat. 1. I have made a finding of special circumstances pursuant to s 44. Those special circumstances are that the prisoner is serving a term of imprisonment for the first time. I note that he is serving a term of imprisonment distant from his family and support with English as a second language. I note that on a release to parole - although this may not happen in Australia - he will need professional assistance to adjust to community living, and he would need, in the context of his background of drug usage, professional assistance and counselling to avoid drug usage, which if undertaken will lead to further offending. 2. Can you stand up please, Mr Chamon. Thank you. 3. In respect of the matters to which you have pleaded guilty, taking into account the matters on the Form 1, you are convicted. Pursuant to s 53A Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act 1999, I sentence you to an aggregate sentence of imprisonment comprising a non-parole period of three years to commence on 6 April 2018 and to expire on 5 April 2021 with a balance of sentence of two years to expire on 5 April 20123. Indicative sentences of imprisonment are: In relation to sequence 3, three years and nine months imprisonment. In relation to sequence 5, two years' imprisonment. In relation to sequence 6, taking into account the matters on a Form 1, two years, three months' imprisonment. That is a total sentence of five years' imprisonment with a non-parole period of three years. 1. I have found special circumstances in your case. You are distant from your family, you are in prison for the first time, you have English as a second language, although I have no doubt you and Mr Hannachi can communicate with other people in English. I have taken into account relative isolation. I also take into account on your release parole, you will need professional assistance to adjust to community living and will need guidance and direction in relation to drug usage. 2. A matter common to both of you I should point out is that I do not for a moment believe that you have come to Australia to commit crimes, not that that is necessarily relevant to a finding of special circumstances. 3. Take a seat, thanks very much. 4. Mr Hannachi, do you understand the sentence I have imposed? 5. OFFENDER HANNACHI: Yes. 6. HIS HONOUR: Mr Chamon, do you understand the sentence I have imposed? 7. OFFENDER CHAMON: (No verbal reply) 8. HIS HONOUR: Thank you. DISCLAIMER - Every effort has been made to comply with suppression orders or statutory provisions prohibiting publication that may apply to this judgment or decision. The onus remains on any person using material in the judgment or decision to ensure that the intended use of that material does not breach any such order or provision. Further enquiries may be directed to the Registry of the Court or Tribunal in which it was generated. Decision last updated: 12 June 2020