Supreme Court New South Wales Medium Neutral Citation: Antoun v Antoun [2020] NSWSC 860 Hearing dates: 6 March 2020; 3 April 2020; 8 April 2020; 11 May 2020; 22 May 2020 Date of orders: 6 July 2020 Decision date: 06 July 2020 Jurisdiction: Equity Before: Hallen J Decision: The Court: (1) Orders that access be granted to the third Defendant to inspect only the documents that are identified in the subpoenaed documents as being available for inspection. (2) Orders that access be granted to the Plaintiffs, to inspect only the documents that are identified in the subpoenaed documents as being available for inspection, but only after the evidence in chief of each Plaintiff is complete. (3) Makes no order as to the applicant's costs, to the intent that she is to pay her own costs of the application. (4) Orders that the Plaintiffs' costs of the applicant's notice of motion be the Plaintiffs' costs in the cause. (5) Orders that the third Defendant's costs, calculated on the indemnity basis, of the notice of motion, should initially, be paid out of the estate of the deceased, with liberty to the third Defendant to seek any other order that he is advised. Catchwords: EVIDENCE – Documents produced by Federal Circuit Court – Notice of motion by one of the parties in the Federal Circuit Court proceedings that Plaintiffs in these proceedings not be permitted to inspect the documents produced in Federal Circuit Court proceedings – Claim that documents contain financial and other information of a private and confidential nature – Plaintiffs make claim for family provision order in respect of the estate of their father, who was the other party in the Federal Circuit Court proceedings – Due to dispute, necessary for Court to inspect the documents to determine which documents may be inspected – Documents relating to the deceased, and not containing information of a private or confidential nature relating to the applicant permitted to be inspected but only after the evidence of each of the Plaintiffs is completed – Applicant satisfied that the limited documents did not disclose information of a private or confidential nature Legislation Cited: Practice Note SC Eq 11 Succession Act 2006 (NSW), Ch 3 Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 (NSW), rr 1.8, 7.10, 33.4, 33.13 Cases Cited: Alister v R (1984) 154 CLR 404; [1983] HCA 45 Attorney-General (NSW) v Chidgey (2008) 182 A Crim R 536; [2008] NSWCCA 65 Boase v Axis International Management Pty Ltd [No 3] [2012] WASC 498 Hancock v Rinehart [2015] NSWSC 2140 Hillston v Bar-Mordecai [2002] NSWSC 973 R v Saleam [1999] NSWCCA 86 Stanley v Layne Christensen Co [2004] WASCA 50 Xinfeng Australia International Investment Pty Ltd v GR Capital Group Pty Ltd [2020] NSWSC 620 Category: Procedural and other rulings Parties: Tarnya Sara Alexis Antoun (First Plaintiff) Tamara Antoun (Second Plaintiff) Angelique Antoun (First Defendant) Ashleigh Antoun (Second Defendant) Joseph Hanna (Third Defendant) Representation: Counsel: M Pringle (Plaintiffs) First and second Defendants (no representation and did not appear) Solicitors: Summer Lawyers GP (Plaintiffs) Conceptual Legal Pty Ltd (Third Defendant) M Antoun (Applicant in person) File Number(s): 2019/118417 Publication restriction: Nil Judgment 1. HIS HONOUR: The issue being dealt with in these reasons arose in the Succession List, on a number of occasions, as part of proceedings commenced by two children of the first marriage of Antoine Antoun (the deceased) for a family provision order under Chapter 3 of the Succession Act 2006 (NSW). The first and second Defendants named in the proceedings are the executors and beneficiaries named in the last Will of the deceased and are the children of the deceased's subsequent marriage. 2. Due to the failure of those Defendants to participate in the proceedings, the extent of which do not have to be repeated, on 29 November 2019, I made an order, on the application of the Plaintiffs, that Joseph Hanna, the principal solicitor and director of Conceptual Legal Pty Limited, be appointed, pursuant to Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 (NSW) (UCPR), r 7.10(2)(b), a representative of the deceased's estate for the purposes of the proceedings. He is a solicitor who is independent of all of the parties named in the proceedings and has no interest adverse to their interests. Naturally, before he was appointed, his consent to acting was obtained. 3. On 28 February 2020, the Plaintiffs filed an amended Summons naming Mr Hanna as the third Defendant to the proceedings. The first and second Defendants were not removed as Defendants as they need to be bound by any orders made in the proceedings. 4. Regrettably, that was not the end of matters which have caused a delay in the case management of the proceedings. On 3 March 2020, the former spouse of the deceased and mother of the first and second Defendants, Mary Antoun (the applicant), appeared before Kunc J in the Duty List, seeking leave to file and serve a notice of a notice of motion, to which I shall refer shortly. 5. Upon her undertaking to pay the applicable filing fee, his Honour granted leave to file the notice of motion and affidavit in support in Court; abridged the time for service of the orders, notice of motion and affidavit in support to 4 March 2020; stayed access being granted to inspect certain documents, to which I shall also shortly refer; and stood the notice of motion over to the Succession List on 6 March 2020. 6. The notice of motion filed by the applicant sought an order that "[s]tay and no access until notice of motion is heard". The parties and the Court treated the order sought as an injunction to restrain the parties from having general access to certain documents produced in answer to an application by the first Plaintiff to the Registrar under UCPR r 33.13 to request from the Sydney Registry of the Federal Circuit Court of Australia, the file relating to the dissolution of the marriage of the deceased and the applicant, and the application for the property settlement between those parties which was resolved by agreement between them. Subpoena Packet 19/118417 was produced to the Court in response to the request. (Such letters of request are ordinarily employed between courts in lieu of subpoenas being issued.) 7. In an affidavit made on 3 March 2020, in support of the notice of motion, the applicant acknowledged that she was not a party to the proceedings before the Supreme Court, but submitted that she had been a party to the proceedings in which the documents from each of the files had been produced to this Court. She then stated: "Allowing access is against 'privacy' awarded for family and Federal Circuit Court proceedings. It is not 'just or equitable' for my rights of privacy. Documents requested are … not relevant to Supreme Court matter in that it is a different jurisdiction and purpose and not in interfering or overriding the Will. Documents requested as access does not outline [the deceased's] personal financials rather the documents outlines much of my personal credit card debts, loans, outstanding notices and personal asset which is invasive and of oppressive nature. … Documents completed Dec 2017 and [the deceased died] 2 July 2018 are in relation to personal relationship not concerning Plaintiffs any information provided or any information pertaining to personal or financial was not decided by a Judge and not a result of litigation … There was NO COURT involvement or decision by Court in making the document only consent order. … I wish to urgently request TO STAY and NO ACCESS provided until motion is heard." 1. Having heard, orally, from the applicant on the number of occasions that her application has been before me, it is clear that she bases her opposition to access being granted to the Plaintiffs upon the fact that personal information is contained in the documents produced, and that such information should not be made available for inspection as the information is confidential to her. 2. At a directions hearing conducted on 6 March 2020, the notice of motion proceeded and it was suggested that Mr Hanna, as the representative of the estate, in respect of whom objection to inspection was not taken, should be permitted to have access to, and should consider the documents produced to, the Court from the Federal Circuit Court and Family Court. 3. With the applicant's consent, the Court made the following notations and directions: "1. Notes the undertaking to the Court of Joseph Hanna of Conceptual Legal, the solicitor appointed to represent the deceased's estate in these proceedings, that if permitted to inspect the documents produced by the Federal Circuit Court and the Family Court in answer to the request by the Plaintiffs' will only inspect documents that were filed by, or on behalf of, the deceased in the Federal Court and the Family Court proceedings, and will not disclose any information obtained by that inspection to any other party. 2. Upon the undertaking of Joseph Hanna to the Court, orders that he be permitted to inspect the documents that were filed by or on behalf of the deceased in the Federal Court and the Family Court proceedings by 4:00 p.m. on Monday, 16 March 2020. 3. Directs that by 4:00 p.m. on Friday, 20 March 2020, Mr Hanna inform, in writing, [the applicant] at (email address) whether there are any documents that he believes are, or may be, relevant to these proceedings and identify the nature of the documents that he considers are or may be relevant to these proceedings. 4. Directs that [the applicant] is to inform Mr Hanna, by 27 March 2020, whether she has any objections to the disclosure of any such documents that Mr Hanna considers relevant to these proceedings." 1. On 3 April 2020, the date to which the matter was then adjourned, again in the presence of the applicant, and following discussion with those present, this Court made the following notations and directions: "1. Notes that Mr Hanna, of Conceptual Legal, has undertaken an inspection of document produced by the Federal Circuit Court and the Family Court and provided a summary of those documents to [the applicant], the person who objects to the production of those documents to the Plaintiffs. 2. Notes, with the consent of [the applicant], that Mr Hanna will again inspect the documents and identify, in a meaningful way, the documents a copy of which are required. 3. Directs Mr Hanna to provide to the Court a confidential affidavit identifying the documents, photocopy access to which he seeks, by 4:00 p.m. on Wednesday, 8 April 2020. 4. Grants leave to Mr Hanna to obtain photocopy access to the documents identified in his confidential affidavit. 5. Directs Mr Hanna to provide a copy of all of the photocopy documents, redacted to exclude all relevant information relating to [the applicant], to her by 4:00 p.m. 7 days after he has obtained the photocopy documents. 6. Directs that [the applicant] inform Mr Hanna, in writing, 7 days after the photocopied documents are provided to her, whether she objects to any other parts of the documents which have not been redacted being provided to the Plaintiffs." 1. In relation to the photocopy access it was, of course, limited to the representative of the deceased. Furthermore, the redacted photocopy documents were to be provided only to the applicant, the complete copy of which documents she would already have had. Thus, any photocopied documents were not made available to any other person who was not a representative of a party, or a party, in the family law proceedings. 2. (Since the order for photocopying was made, the Court has required all photocopies made to be returned, and they have been returned, to the Court.) 3. The matter was then adjourned until 11 May 2020. On that date, the applicant appeared again, and she informed the Court that she maintained her objections to even the redacted documents being made available to the Plaintiffs' legal representatives for inspection. 4. In those circumstances, for the purpose of determining the issue, I indicated that I would inspect the documents that had been produced and would consider to which of them, if any, access by the parties should be granted. The matter was adjourned until 22 June 2020. 5. The orders, to which I shall come, flow from these reasons. Procedural Framework 1. There can be no doubt that the documents the subject of the request to the Federal Circuit Court and Family Court, have been produced, effectively, as on subpoena. 2. UCPR r 1.8 provides: The court may determine any question arising under these rules (including any question of privilege) and, for that purpose— (a) may inspect any document in relation to which such a question arises, and (b) if the document is not before the court, may order that the document be produced to the court for inspection. 1. For a subpoena, or in this case, a request to the Federal Circuit Court and Family Court to have been sent at the behest of one of the Plaintiffs, there must be a legitimate forensic purpose and the party making the request, bears the onus of establishing that legitimate forensic purpose: Broadway Plaza Investments Pty Ltd v Broadway Plaza Pty Ltd [2019] NSWSC 410 at [52] (Ward CJ in Eq). 2. UCPR r 33.4 provides: (1) The court may, on the application of a party or any person having a sufficient interest, set aside a subpoena in whole or in part, or grant other relief in respect of it. (2) An application under subrule (1) must be made on notice to the issuing party. (3) The court may order that the applicant give notice of the application to any other party or to any other person having a sufficient interest... 1. In R v Saleam [1999] NSWCCA 86, Simpson J (with whom Spigelman CJ and Studdert J agreed), stated at [11], that the test for determining whether a party is to be granted access to documents produced on a subpoena are "no different from those governing applications for access to documents produced in answer to a subpoena. Before access is granted (or an order to produce made), the applicant must (i) identify a legitimate forensic purpose for which access is sought; and (ii) establish that it is 'on the cards' that the documents will materially assist his case". 2. As to what is required to establish a legitimate forensic purpose, in Xinfeng Australia International Investment Pty Ltd v GR Capital Group Pty Ltd [2020] NSWSC 620 at [36], Ward CJ in Eq, noted: "As I explained in Broadway Plaza Investments Pty Ltd v Broadway Plaza Pty Ltd [2019] NSWSC 410 (Broadway Plaza) (at [49]-[59]), there must be a legitimate forensic purpose for a subpoena or notice to produce in that the documents sought must be relevant and must have a sufficient apparent connection to the issues in the case to justify their production (or, put differently, it must be able to be concluded that they could possibly throw light on the issues in the case) (see Lindsay-Owen v HWL Ebsworth Lawyers [2017] NSWSC 1692 at [24] per Rothman J). It is not, however, sufficient merely to show that the documents sought are, or may be, relevant to an issue for decision; rather, it must be shown that it is likely that the documents will materially assist on an identified issue or that there is a reasonable basis, beyond speculation, that it is likely that they will materially assist (see Cohen v Morgans [2019] NSWSC 608 at [63]). This must be determined by reference to the issues in the proceeding (see Broadway Plaza at [52]; see also Rinehart v Rinehart [2018] NSWSC 1102 at [47])." 1. In Boase v Axis International Management Pty Ltd [No 3] [2012] WASC 498, at [10]–[11], Beech J had summarised the relevant principles governing inspection of subpoenaed documents as follows: "The first question is whether the documents, or the passages to which objection is taken, have apparent relevance to the litigation. Apparent relevance is a low threshold. It is not a question of whether it appears that the party issuing the subpoena could, or could probably, tender the document in evidence. It is enough to establish apparent relevance if a document or class of documents gives rise to a line of enquiry relevant to the issues before the trier of fact, including for the purpose of meeting the opposing case by way of cross-examination. Apache Northwest Pty Ltd v Western Power Corporation (1998) 19 WAR 350, 374; Stanley v Layne Christensen Co [2004] WASCA 50 [9]; Commonwealth of Australia v Albany Port Authority [2006] WASCA 185 [18]. In advance of trial, the determination of whether a document is relevant is a difficult one: National Employers' Mutual General Association Ltd v Waind [1978] 1 NSWLR 372, 385; Apache Northwest Pty Ltd (373). In determining relevance, the difficulty of assessing relevance prior to trial must be taken into account. The necessity for having a document in order to fairly dispose of the issues at trial might well not become apparent before trial: Apache Northwest Pty Ltd (374, 376, 379); Stanley v Layne Christensen Co [9]; Commonwealth of Australia v Albany Port Authority [18]. Ultimately the relevance of the documents produced will be a question for determination at the trial. It is not appropriate for the court to embark on a detailed preliminary enquiry involving evidence from the party seeking to issue the subpoenas and the recipient of the subpoenas: Apache Northwest Pty Ltd (379)." 1. Relevantly, to this case, at [19]–[21], his Honour added: "If a document is apparently relevant, inspection will usually be permitted, even though it is not admissible as it stands and the party seeking the document has not undertaken to tender it or use it in cross-examination: Waind (385); Apache Northwest Pty Ltd (373 - 374). Confidentiality is not of itself a ground to refuse inspection of an apparently relevant document. In the end, the public interest in the administration of justice prevails over the interest in confidentiality of the information: Apache Northwest Pty Ltd (379); Mobil Oil Australia Ltd v Guina Developments Pty Ltd [1996] 2 VR 34, 38. However, confidentiality can be taken into account, together with any assessment of the extent of the document's apparent relevance, in the exercise of discretion whether to permit inspection: Apache Northwest Pty Ltd (380 - 381). The principles of case flow management and the objects in O 1 r 4(b) of the Rules of the Supreme Court 1971 (WA) must be kept in mind in the exercise of discretion whether to permit inspection: Wookey v Quigley [No 5] [2011] WASC 275 [35]." 1. In other words, before access is granted, the Court should be satisfied that the documents produced give rise to a line of enquiry which is relevant to the issues in dispute: Stanley v Layne Christensen Co [2004] WASCA 50 at [9], (Miller and EM Heenan JJ). Mere relevance, however, is not sufficient. As Beazley JA (with whom James and Kirby JJ agreed) considered in Attorney-General (NSW) v Chidgey (2008) 182 A Crim R 536; [2008] NSWCCA 65 at [59]–[63]: "It is not sufficient for a party seeking production of documents to merely establish that such documents are or may be relevant. This is apparent from the comments of Mahoney AP in Carroll v Attorney-General for New South Wales (1993) 70 A Crim R 162. In that case, Mahoney AP was concerned with the question whether access should be given to certain documents that had been subpoenaed in criminal proceedings. His Honour said, at 181: '… the court must, in general, be satisfied that the documents are relevant to an issue for decision by the court in the litigation. It is not open to a party, as on a 'fishing expedition', to subpoena documents merely in order to determine whether they may be relevant and may be of assistance to his case in the proceeding.' (Emphasis added) His Honour stated, at 182, that whilst a party must show, or it must appear, that the subpoenaed documents are relevant to an issue in the proceedings, 'mere relevance is not enough'. His Honour continued: " … But, in my opinion, it is not sufficient for a party subpoenaing the document to say 'the document is relevant because, if it does anything, it establishes the case against me'. He must be able to indicate that the document is relevant in the sense that it may assist his case. In the present case, that could not be claimed. Nor was it shown. At best, the claim was: 'I wish to see the document to see if it may assist my case.' That, in my opinion, is not sufficient. … Neither Kirby ACJ (as his Honour then was) (who dissented on the facts) nor Hunt AJA (who agreed with Mahoney AP in the result) made any reference to 'mere relevance'. However, each applied a test of 'forensic purpose' and the need for it to be "on the cards" that the documents would "materially assist the accused". Accordingly, the second element of the 'test', that is, that it must be "on the cards" that documents would materially assist the case, subsumes in it the notion that "mere relevance" is insufficient. Documents may be relevant even if they do not assist a party's case. To that extent therefore, there is no difference in principle in the test applied by each of the members of the Court. But in any event … the statement of Mahoney AP has been applied in subsequent decisions in New South Wales and Victoria." (citations omitted). 1. Her Honour went on to address the meaning of "on the cards" – an expression formulated by Gibbs CJ in Alister v R (1984) 154 CLR 404 at 414; [1983] HCA 45 – noting, relevantly, at [70]: "… Simpson J's formulation in R v Saleam … represented the commencement of a line of authority in which the test for the production of, or access to, documents, was specifically stated as comprising two steps: a legitimate forensic purpose and that it was "on the cards" that the documents would materially assist the case. However, in stating the test in this specific 'two step' way, her Honour did not state any new principle. … [I]n the authorities that preceded R v Saleam … including Alister, the courts, in determining whether access would be granted to documents sought on subpoena, have always applied a test that involves determining whether each of the factors identified by Simpson J had been established." 1. Although Beazley JA could, and did, not see any reason to depart from the language of Simpson J in R v Saleam, her Honour considered other statements of the test, citing Bell J in Ragg v Magistrates' Court of Victoria (2008) 18 VR 300 at 344 [96]; [2008] VSC 1, at [96], in which his Honour wrote, in the context of a criminal trial: "A legitimate purpose is demonstrated where the court considers, having regard to its fundamental duty to ensure a fair trial that there is a reasonable possibility that the documents will materially assist the defence. That is a low threshold but it is a threshold." 1. These principles apply equally in civil cases: Broadway Plaza Investments Pty Ltd v Broadway Plaza Pty Ltd at [52]. 2. Yet, where a third party applicant objects to access being granted to documents produced to the Court on the basis of a claim of confidentiality, the Court has recognised the need to balance competing interests. Whilst private rights of confidentiality do not override the Court's request for the production of documents by another Court, those rights of confidentiality "may be taken into account in granting access to documents produced on subpoena": Hancock v Rinehart [2015] NSWSC 2140 at [10] (Brereton J, as his Honour then was). 3. Furthermore, in Hillston v Bar-Mordecai [2002] NSWSC 973, Bryson J noted, at [8]: "…the confidentiality of material in [Family Court files] should be given a relatively high value in evaluation of the claim of the plaintiff in this case for inspection. … They include much material which was highly confidential when recorded and so remains, and much material which persons other than Mr Bar-Mordecai who are not parties to this case would reasonably regard as confidential material which ought to be protected. With the limited exceptions to which I will refer this claim outweighs any discernible legitimate forensic purpose of the plaintiff and his advisers in having inspection of them." Determination 1. Having considered the applicant's objection to access, there were reasonable grounds for the objection to access being granted to some of the documents produced. Those documents relate to her financial circumstances and other personal details, which, in my view are not relevant, at all, to the substantive claim and would be confidential to the applicant. 2. Mr Hanna, the third Defendant, and Ms Pringle, counsel for the Plaintiffs, each accepted the submission made by the applicant that information about the applicant's assets, liabilities, income and expenditure is irrelevant to any issues in the substantive proceedings and that it is confidential to her. It was not suggested that any of the documents produced that reveal the financial resources of the applicant would be relevant to the substantive proceedings and no order was sought for access to any documents, or parts of documents, that revealed such information. 3. Then, I considered whether I was satisfied that there are other documents in the files produced that were relevant and whether there was a reasonable possibility that those documents may materially assist one or both of the parties. 4. Having looked at the documents, it seemed to me that there were documents that were both relevant, and that may be of material assistance, in the current proceedings. These related to the fact that a divorce order was made between the deceased and the applicant. Additionally, any documents that revealed the financial resources of the deceased as they were shortly before his death were within this category. Furthermore, these were documents which, if the deceased were alive, he would have had in his possession and that would have been able to be disclosed in litigation. 5. In this case, Mr Hanna, as the representative of the deceased's estate, knows nothing about the deceased's estate. To date, the first and second Defendants, the two children of the applicant, have not assisted him in this regard. It is clear that at least some of the documents that have been produced will assist in providing some information to him about the deceased's property following the settlement of the alteration of property interests between the deceased and the applicant who is now his former wife. In circumstances where such documents, or part of some of the documents, produced to the Court, do not reveal information about the applicant, and refer only to the deceased, there can be no legitimate basis for the applicant opposing the inspection of the documents at the appropriate time. 6. Having looked at the documents in the material produced, and balancing the competing interests of the parties to the proceedings and the applicant who has objected to access being granted, in my view the documents referred to below were relevant and could materially assist the parties in the substantive proceedings. There was a legitimate forensic purpose in permitting inspection. 7. I considered that inspection should be permitted by the Plaintiffs, but only after their evidence in chief is completed, of only the following documents: 1. The divorce order made by the Family Court on 26 March 2018; 2. Certain parts of the Consent Orders entered into so far as they relate to the entitlement of the deceased, being paragraphs 1(a), (b) and (c); paragraphs 2 and 4; paragraph 7(a), (b) and (c); and paragraphs 8 and 9; 3. The whole of the deceased's Financial Statement filed 29 August 2017; 4. Paragraphs 1 to 6 inclusive and 40 to 45 inclusive of the affidavit of the deceased filed 29 August 2017. 1. Practice Note SC Eq 11 requires that, save in exceptional circumstances; parties must serve their affidavits in the principal proceedings before the Court will make an order for disclosure of documents. Some flexibility on this may be required in the case of Mr Hanna who knows virtually nothing about the nature and value of the deceased's estate. 2. I granted first access to the third Defendant to inspect only the documents that I have identified. I also granted access to the Plaintiffs, to those documents, but only after their evidence in chief is completed. 3. To assuage the concerns of the applicant, the relevant documents, or parts thereof, have been photocopied by my Associate and placed in an envelope marked, "Documents to which access has been granted". The original of all documents produced have been placed in another envelope that has been marked "Documents to which access has not been granted". 4. Following the consideration of the documents, and when the matter was last listed, the applicant was informed of the documents that were to be made available for inspection. She indicated that she had no further objection to access being granted only to those documents. A copy of the form of orders was provided to her following the conclusion of the hearing on that date. 5. As the applicant is a litigant in person and has appeared, on each occasion herself, without legal representation, I make no order as to her costs. The Plaintiffs' costs of the applicant's notice of motion will be the Plaintiffs' costs in the cause. The third Defendant's costs, calculated on the indemnity basis, of the notice of motion, should initially, be paid out of the estate of the deceased, with liberty to the third Defendant to seek any other order that he is advised, as against the Plaintiffs. 6. The Court: 1. Orders that access be granted to the third Defendant to inspect only the documents that are identified in the subpoenaed documents as being available for inspection. 2. Orders that access be granted to the Plaintiffs, to inspect only the documents that are identified in the subpoenaed documents as being available for inspection, but only after the evidence in chief of each Plaintiff is complete. 3. Makes no order as to the applicant's costs, to the extent that she is to pay her own costs of the application. 4. Orders that the Plaintiffs' costs of the applicant's notice of motion be the Plaintiffs' costs in the cause. 5. Orders that the third Defendant's costs, calculated on the indemnity basis, of the notice of motion, should initially, be paid out of the estate of the deceased, with liberty to the third Defendant to seek any other order that he is advised. ********** DISCLAIMER - Every effort has been made to comply with suppression orders or statutory provisions prohibiting publication that may apply to this judgment or decision. The onus remains on any person using material in the judgment or decision to ensure that the intended use of that material does not breach any such order or provision. Further enquiries may be directed to the Registry of the Court or Tribunal in which it was generated. Decision last updated: 17 July 2020