Court of Criminal Appeal Supreme Court New South Wales Medium Neutral Citation: Fantakis v Director of Public Prosecutions [2021] NSWCCA 271 Hearing dates: 27 October 2021 Date of orders: 17 November 2021 Decision date: 17 November 2021 Before: Beech-Jones CJ at CL at [1] R A Hulme J at [67] Campbell J at [68] Decision: Bail Refused Catchwords: BAIL – application for bail pending appeal – applicant convicted of murder – appeal against conviction pending in Court of Criminal Appeal – necessity to demonstrate "special or exceptional circumstances" – interrelationship between proposed grounds of appeal and delay in hearing appeal as well as length of sentence still to be served – nature of consideration of grounds of appeal in hearing bail application pending appeal against conviction – length of submissions – some grounds reasonably arguable but given length of sentence and period of time until appeal heard special or exceptional circumstances not demonstrated – bail concerns appreciable – bail refused. Legislation Cited: Bail Act 2013 (NSW) Criminal Appeal Act 1912 (NSW) Jury Act 1977 (NSW) Law Enforcement (Powers and Responsibilities) Act 2002 (NSW) Supreme Court (Criminal Appeal) Rules 2021 (NSW) Cases Cited: Edwards v The Queen [2021] HCA 28 El Hilli & Melville v R [2015] NSWCCA 146 El Khouli v R [2019] NSWCCA 146 Mahmood v Western Australia (2008) 232 CLR 397; [2008] HCA 1 Obeid v R (No 2) [2016] NSWCCA 321 R v Fantakis [2018] NSWSC 1815 R v Fantakis, Woods and Cheong [2018] NSWSC 749 R v Fantakis; R v Woods [2018] NSWSC 1700 R v Fantakis; R v Woods [2018] NSWSC 1814 R v Murray (1987) 11 NSWLR 12 Shepherd v The Queen (1990) 170 CLR 573; [1990] HCA 56 United Mexican States v Cabal (2001) 209 CLR 165; [2001] HCA 60 Category: Principal judgment Parties: Terry Fantakis (Applicant) Director of Public Prosecutions (Respondent) Representation: Counsel: In person (Applicant) M Millward (Crown) Solicitors: In person (Applicant) Office of the Director of Public Prosecutions (Crown) File Number(s): 2021/248739 Decision under appeal Court or tribunal: Supreme Court Jurisdiction: Criminal Citation: [2018] NSWSC 1700 Date of Decision: 8 November 2018 Before: Wilson J File Number(s): 2013/297834 Judgment 1. BEECH-JONES CJ at CL: This is an application by Elefterious (Terry) Fantakis (the "Applicant") for bail pending the hearing of an application for leave to appeal against his conviction for murder. To obtain a grant of bail pending the appeal, the Applicant must, inter alia, demonstrate that "special or exceptional circumstances" exist to justify the grant of bail (Bail Act 2013 (NSW), s 22(1)). For the reasons that follow, I do not consider that he has done so. Background 1. Between 26 February 2018 and 25 May 2018, the Applicant stood trial before Wilson J and a jury on an indictment that charged him with the murder of Elisha (Sam) Karmas on or about 11 August 2011. He stood trial with Andrew Woods and Derek Cheong, each of whom were charged with one count of accessory after the fact to murder. 2. On 25 May 2018, the Applicant was found guilty of murder. On the same day, Mr Woods was also found guilty. Mr Cheong was found not guilty. 3. On 8 November 2018, the Applicant was sentenced to a term of imprisonment of 24 years commencing on or about the date of his arrest, namely, 3 October 2013, with a non-parole period of 18 years. His non-parole period expires on 2 October 2031. The balance of his sentence expires on 2 October 2037 (R v Fantakis; R v Woods [2018] NSWSC 1700). 4. Mr Karmas was last seen on 11 August 2011. The Crown alleged that Mr Karmas was murdered by the Applicant sometime that afternoon at the Applicant's home in Wilga Street, Punchbowl ("Wilga Street"). The Crown alleged that, with the assistance of Mr Woods, the Applicant disposed of Mr Karmas' body in the early hours of 12 August 2011. 5. Mr Karmas lived with his family in Warwick Street, Punchbowl. His house was across the road from two duplexes, both of which were owned by the Applicant's family. From around March 2008 to June 2011, Maria Angeles lived in one of the duplexes. For a period, Ms Angeles was in a relationship with the Applicant's brother, Nicholas. Nicholas died in May 2011. By that time his relationship with Ms Angeles had broken down and they were estranged. The Crown contended that the Applicant developed a hatred of Mr Karmas, at least in part because he held the irrational and erroneous belief that Mr Karmas and Ms Angeles were responsible for his brother's death and were possibly having an affair. 6. Mr Karmas' body was never found. The Crown case against the Applicant was largely circumstantial, although the Crown relied on documents written by the Applicant in which he described having harmed and tortured Mr Karmas. The Applicant said those documents were unreliable because it was evident from their contents that his mental health was severely affected at the time he wrote them. The Crown also relied on what it contended were admissions captured on listening devices and various lies and other conduct said to evidence a consciousness of guilt. One form of conduct said to evidence that guilt was the Applicant's participation in a telephone call with Woods on 25 November 2011 when threats were said to be made against the life of the police officer investigating the disappearance of Mr Karmas (the "informant") [1] (see [36]). 7. Otherwise, it is not necessary at this point to describe the scope of the Crown case and all the circumstances it relied upon. It suffices to state that, on this application, the Crown submissions noted that it was apparently not in dispute at the trial, that just before 2.00pm on 11 August 2011, Mr Karmas travelled with the Applicant and Mr Cheong in the Applicant's blue Ford Transit van from Warwick Street to the Applicant's home at Wilga Street. [2] There was evidence that Mr Cheong returned home at around 3.30pm to 4.00pm that afternoon (and most likely left Wilga Street shortly after 3.00pm). Between 3.57pm and 5.26pm, various text messages were sent from Mr Karmas' mobile phone that the Crown contends were fictitious and in fact were sent by Mr Woods acting on the instruction of the Applicant. The Crown contended that the Applicant and Mr Woods disposed of Mr Karmas' body sometime between 1.00am and 4.36am on the morning of 12 August 2011. The Crown adduced evidence tracing the movement of both of their vehicles on the evening of 11 August 2011 to a unit occupied by Mr Woods' grandmother in Campbelltown. There was evidence that they had left that unit at around 1.00am. Bail Pending Appeal 1. As noted, s 22(1) of the Bail Act requires the Applicant to demonstrate that "special or exceptional circumstances" exist to justify the grant of bail. In El‑Hilli & Melville v R [2015] NSWCCA 146 at [13], Hamill J observed: "Given that the 'special or exceptional' circumstances requirement in s 22 replaces the show cause requirement (where applicable) and the structure of the Bail Act, the same reasoning employed by the Court of Appeal in DPP v Tikomainaleya supports the following propositions. First, where s 22 is engaged, there are two stages. The applicant must demonstrate that 'special and exceptional circumstances exist justifying the [decision to grant bail]'. Then the Court must apply the 'unacceptable risk test' and do so by application of the exhaustive list of matters set out in s 18. The second proposition is that the same factors and evidence may operate at both stages. Where an applicant establishes special and exceptional circumstances, it is likely that the same material will also succeed in satisfying the unacceptable risk test. However, that cannot be stated as a universal proposition and the bail authority must apply each test in accordance with the terms of the Act. A case may arise where a particular matter qualifies as a 'special or exceptional circumstance' and yet the application of the unacceptable risk test results in the refusal of bail. Such a case is likely to be rare because the 'unacceptable risk' factors are imported in the 'special or exceptional circumstances' requirement by s 22(3)." 1. Section 22 was considered by this Court in El Khouli v R [2019] NSWCCA 146 at [22] ("El Khouli") where the Court, Hoeben CJ at CL, Walton and Wilson JJ, observed that: "… a distinction appears to have been drawn on the authorities, when the grounds of appeal are advanced as a factor demonstrating special or exceptional circumstances, between cases where the strength or merit of an appeal has been relied upon in isolation, and those where the applicant relied upon that factor in combination with other factors including whether the applicant would have spent a substantial part of his or her sentence in custody by the time of the hearing of the appeal." (emphasis added) 1. Their Honours noted that in the former type of case the applicant must show more than the grounds seem arguable and that it may be necessary to establish that the appeal is "most likely to succeed" (El Khouli at [23]). 2. I do not take El Khouli as specifying different thresholds about the relative strength of the proposed grounds of appeal that must be shown in order to demonstrate special or exceptional circumstances. The above passage from El Khouli identifies a particular matter that is often highly relevant to a grant of bail pending an appeal, namely, whether an "applicant would have spent a substantial part of his or her sentence in custody by the time of the hearing of the appeal". That circumstance is relevant to an assessment of whether special or exceptional circumstances have been shown in that the appeal may be rendered futile, or at least of lesser utility, if there is no grant of bail. Often, the interaction between the assessment of the relative strength of the appeal and the utility of the appeal will bear heavily upon whether or not special or exceptional circumstances exist (see United Mexican States v Cabal (2001) 209 CLR 165; [2001] HCA 60 at [41]). 3. In this case, the Applicant does not solely rely on the relative strength of his grounds of appeal to demonstrate special or exceptional circumstances, although it is a substantial component of his application. Even so, a consideration of the relative strength of his proposed grounds of appeal must be undertaken in combination with an assessment of the appeal's utility, that is, the likelihood that, in the absence of a grant of bail, he may spend a substantial part of his sentence in custody by the time of the hearing of his appeal as well as the period of time between this application and when his appeal will be heard. 4. The Applicant's appeal was originally listed to commence on the date that this bail application was heard. However, on his application, it was adjourned until May 2022. Hence, the period of delay between this point and the likely hearing of his appeal should bail be refused is six months. By the time his appeal is heard, there will still be over a decade of his non-parole period to be served. In those circumstances, it cannot be said that even if he was to be ultimately successful on his appeal, he would either have spent a substantial part of his non-parole period in custody by the time of the hearing of his appeal, or that his appeal will have been denied utility because he was incarcerated in the meantime. These circumstances mean that the level of persuasion of the relative strength of his grounds of appeal that the Applicant must demonstrate is that much higher. 5. A further matter must be noted about the assessment of the relative strength of the grounds of appeal that is often undertaken in support of an application for bail pending the hearing of a conviction appeal. Section 71 of the Bail Act requires that a bail application be dealt with expeditiously. That requirement and the interlocutory nature of an application for bail pending appeal would be wholly undermined if the bail application was treated as a dress rehearsal for the substantive appeal or an occasion to evaluate the strength of the proposed grounds. Instead, the approach of "this Court is confined to reaching only a broad overall view of an applicant's apparent prospects" (Obeid v R (No 2) [2016] NSWCCA 321 at [17]). 6. The Applicant represented himself at the hearing of the application. He relied upon 97 pages of submissions in chief, together with over 300 pages of documents in support, 65 pages of written submissions in reply and a further substantial affidavit from him in support. The Crown responded with 54 pages of written submissions and 2 substantial affidavits in support. The Court was provided with a further 1,000 pages consisting of the material filed by the Applicant to date in support of his grounds of appeal, including his affidavit annexing various evidence. The bulk of this material was addressed to the prospect of the success of his grounds of appeal. 7. It follows from what I have stated that this was wholly excessive and should not be repeated in this or any other bail application that comes before the Court. When necessary, the case management powers available to the Court under the Criminal Appeal Rules will be utilised to limit the size of written submissions produced in support of a bail application (and a substantive appeal) (Supreme Court (Criminal Appeal) Rules 2021, r 4.1). In this case this material has been reviewed but only in the context of reaching "a broad overall view of [the] applicant's apparent prospects" of success in his appeal against his conviction (Obeid supra). Prospects of Success 1. The Applicant's notice of appeal contains 17 grounds. Grounds 1 to 2: Mental Illness and Substantial Impairment 1. Ground 1 contends that the trial miscarried because the trial judge failed to leave the defence of mental illness to the jury. Ground 2 contends that the trial miscarried because the trial judge failed to leave manslaughter to the jury on the basis of the defence of substantial impairment. These grounds are the subject of submissions on the substantive appeal prepared by Senior and Junior Counsel. Those Counsel do not seek to argue the other 15 grounds which the Applicant will present himself. 2. Both grounds 1 and 2 rely on material that was before the trial judge concerning the Applicant's mental state at the time of Mr Karmas' disappearance. It suffices to note that reliance on the defence of mental illness or substantial impairment were expressly disclaimed by his counsel at the trial. Further, even if it was to be assumed in the Applicant's favour that these grounds were strong, they would not be matters that would justify a grant of his release on bail at this point given that both the establishment of the mental illness defence, or the entry of a verdict of manslaughter, would ordinarily warrant the continuing detention of the Applicant. Grounds 4 and 5: "Shifting" Crown Case 1. Ground 3 of the appeal is addressed below. Ground 4 of the appeal contends that the Crown shifted its case to deprive the Applicant of a fair trial. Ground 5 contends that a miscarriage of justice was occasioned by her Honour leaving to the jury a possible basis for conviction which had not been relied upon by the Crown during the trial. 2. This compliant relates to an aspect of the Crown Prosecutor's address concerning the time in the afternoon on 11 August 2011 when it is said that the Applicant killed Mr Karmas. The case against Mr Cheong was that he assisted the Applicant after he murdered Mr Karmas at Wilga Street during the time period from just prior to 2.00pm until he left to return home after 3.00pm (see [8]). In her closing address, the Crown Prosecutor referred to the documents written by the Applicant which describe Mr Karmas leaving Wilga Street alive, returning later in the afternoon on 11 August 2011 and the Applicant attacking him (see R v Fantakis, Woods and Cheong [2018] NSWSC 749 at [24]). The Crown Prosecutor contended that the jury should not accept that Mr Karmas left Wilga Street and then returned, but instead was killed during the period when both the Applicant and Mr Cheong were present. However, the Crown Prosecutor conceded that, if the jury considered that Mr Karmas left Wilga Street and came back after Mr Cheong had returned home, then Mr Cheong should be found not guilty (at [25]) as he was. 3. Apparently, some days after the Crown Prosecutor addressed on this topic, counsel for Mr Woods sought to confine the Crown case by seeking a direction to the effect that the jury could only consider the Crown case against his client on the basis that the Applicant killed Mr Karmas during the time that Mr Cheong was present at Wilga Street (at [34]). In her judgment, the trial judge observed that Counsel for the Applicant joined in Mr Woods' application "but did not assert that any particular prejudice had been occasioned by the Crown Prosecutor referring to the evidence of a departure from and return to Wilga Street by Mr Karmas as providing evidence that Mr Karmas was murdered later on 11 August 2011 than the Crown alleged" (at [37]). 4. The trial judge declined to make the direction sought. Her Honour did not accept that there had been any "shift" in the Crown case against either the Applicant or Mr Woods. Her Honour noted that, in his evidence, the Applicant addressed his movements for the whole of that afternoon and was otherwise aware that the Crown was relying on his own documents as admissions to the effect that he had killed Mr Karmas (at [75] and [87]). 5. The Applicant's submissions in support of his bail application [3] and in support of his substantive appeal, [4] contend that this amounted to a fundamental change in the Crown case which denied him a fair trial. He contends that he was denied the ability to call evidence such as evidence from his mother to the effect that she was present at Wilga Street later in the afternoon and thus he could not have killed Mr Karmas at that time. 6. At the level of analysis required for the purpose of this application, I note two matters about this ground. The first is the approach of counsel for the Applicant as recorded by the trial judge noted above. The second is the comprehensive reasons given by the trial judge for rejecting the suggestion that the Crown had shifted its case or that any prejudice was occasioned by any such shift or perceived shift (R v Fantakis; R v Woods [2018] NSWSC 749). The trial judge was in a far superior position to a bail court to determine such matters. That said, I do not consider that the points made by the Applicant in relation to this ground are without substance. I am prepared to accept that his complaint about this aspect of the trial is reasonably arguable. Nevertheless, for the reasons already outlined, the mere existence of a reasonably arguable ground of appeal against a conviction for a count of murder where an appeal is close to being heard and the bulk of the sentence remains to be served, does not amount to special or exceptional circumstances. Ground 6: Trial Judge Direction 1. Ground 6 of the appeal complains about the adequacy of the directions given during the summing up by the trial judge. The first complaint is that a direction of the kind envisaged in Shepherd v The Queen (1990) 170 CLR 573; [1990] HCA 56 should have been given on the basis that the return of Mr Karmas to Wilga Street later in the afternoon on 11 August 2011 was an "indispensable intermediate fact" and thus the jury should have been directed that they had to be satisfied of that matter beyond reasonable doubt. [5] At this point it suffices to note two matters about that contention. First, the ground has as its premise that the acquittal of Mr Cheong was because the jury were not satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that Mr Karmas was killed during the time that he, Mr Cheong, was at Wilga Street. I was not persuaded of that premise. Second, no such direction of the kind now sought was sought at the trial. 2. The second complaint made with ground 6 is about an alleged failure of the trial judge to note in the summing up that the Crown Prosecutor had failed to put to the various witnesses that Mr Karmas had returned to Wilga Street that afternoon. [6] No such application was made to the trial judge at the trial. 3. The third complaint made with ground 6 concerns a failure of the trial judge to give a "Jones and Dunkel direction" (although presumably this is meant to refer to a direction referable to Mahmood v Western Australia (2008) 232 CLR 397; [2008] HCA 1 at [27]) in relation to the failure of the Crown to call the Applicant's mother. [7] Again, no such direction was sought on behalf of the Applicant at the trial. 4. The fourth complaint made with ground 6 is that the trial judge failed to give a Murray direction (see R v Murray (1987) 11 NSWLR 12) in respect of the reliance by the Crown on the documents written by the Applicant referring to Mr Karmas returning to Wilga Street and being attacked. [8] This ground appears to have little substance. No such direction was sought. A Murray direction only relates to the evidence of a witness that is critical to the Crown case and not written material. The documents written by the Applicant were not the only evidence relied on by the Crown to demonstrate his guilt. 5. The fifth contention in relation to ground 6 is that the summing up was unbalanced. [9] It suffices to note that no complaint about the summing up was made on his behalf at the trial. 6. Overall, the matters raised in relation to ground 6 do not add any further weight to the conclusion noted above in relation to ground 4. Grounds 7 and 9: Seized Computer Data 1. Ground 7 of the appeal contends there was a non-disclosure of documents by the prosecution which occasioned a miscarriage of justice. The documents identified in the Applicant's submissions as not having been disclosed appear to be the original phone records used to compile a spreadsheet of various telephone calls and SMS messages tendered at the trial, documents authorising the destruction of certain drugs found at his home, documents relevant to the discovery of cannabis in the co-offender Mr Woods' vehicle on 7 September 2011 and documents pertaining to the odometer reading for his blue Ford van. [10] 2. The material filed by the Crown on this application reveals that there is a substantial factual dispute as to whether these documents were disclosed. In relation to the phone records and the odometer reading, an affidavit sworn by the informant and read on the bail application, suggests that they were provided. The Applicant complains that the odometer reading that was provided was not referrable to the date that he sought. However, the Crown's affidavit indicates that all the records containing odometer readings were provided. [11] 3. As for the material concerning the finding of drugs on Mr Woods, the informant's affidavit suggests that material concerning that was served as part of the brief. [12] Further, the Applicant's submissions in support of his bail application suggest that all of this material is designed to establish the proposition that the informant planted drugs on Mr Woods. When he was pressed on the relevance of this material to his conviction appeal, the Applicant contended that this material would have allowed him to "put [the] recordings in context" [13] being those recordings which involve a discussion between himself and Mr Woods in which the informant was threatened and which were relied on as consciousness of guilt. 4. The alleged "context" is best explained by considering ground 9 which is related to this aspect of ground 7. Ground 9 contends that the trial judge erred in admitting part of a conversation recorded by a listening device, namely, that part in which it was said that the Applicant and Mr Woods planned to kill the informant because they wanted to disrupt her investigation. In his written submission on the appeal, the Applicant contends that the trial judge erred in failing to exclude the evidence because, in effect, his discussion with Mr Wood was "taken out of context as they were in reference to Mr Woods' frustration for having been charged by the informant in a separate drug matter when Mr Woods was contesting the alleged weight, claiming that the drugs had been planted". [14] In her summing up, the trial judge told the jury that the Applicant's explanation for participating in the conversation was that he "became so distressed and so resentful of what he saw as the police unfairly targeting him and placing enormous pressure on him in the context of this investigation .… that he became hostile to the police". [15] This is completely inconsistent with the "context" the Applicant now seeks to invoke as the explanation for the conversation. 5. The material sought in relation to this topic appears to be irrelevant to the case that was made against the Applicant at his trial. This aspect of ground 7 and ground 9 appears to have very little substance. Ground 8: Subpoena to Commissioner of Police 1. Ground 8 of the appeal contends that the trial judge erred in law in denying production of documents sought by a subpoena filed by the defence on 16 March 2018. It seems that the trial judge set aside parts of a subpoena for production addressed to the Commissioner of Police which related to an investigation and allegations of fraud against Mr Karmas. It seems that her Honour did not consider that there was sufficient likelihood that anything produced would be of assistance to the defence. Nothing in the material I have reviewed appears to provide any basis to interfere with that assessment. Ground 10: Verdict Jury Selection 1. Ground 10 contends the trial judge erred in law by including the foreperson in the ballot process for the selection of the verdict jury. The Applicant's trial commenced with 15 jurors. Section 55G(1) of the Jury Act 1977 provides that, if the jury in a criminal proceeding consists of more than 12 persons, then immediately before the jury is required to retire to consider its verdict, the jury for the purpose of considering returning a verdict is to be constituted by only 12 members of the expanded jury. Section 55G(2) then provides: A verdict jury is to be constituted by— (a) if the expanded jury has chosen one of its members to speak on behalf of the jury as a whole (a foreperson)—the foreperson and 11 other members of the expanded jury selected by ballot, or (b) if there is no foreperson—12 members of the expanded jury selected by ballot. 1. The precise course of events that led to the selection of the jury is not available on the material provided to the Court. According to the Applicant's submissions lodged in support of his substantive appeal, [16] throughout the trial there was one elected foreperson who did not change, and the trial judge included the foreperson in the ballot. This was said to be an error. In its submissions on this ground, the Crown contended, inter alia, that this was contrary to the position the Applicant took at trial in that it was accepted that, by the time of the ballot, there was no foreperson. It was also contended that, even if there was an error, the Applicant would have to demonstrate it gave rise to a miscarriage of justice. I will act on the basis that, like ground 4, this ground is reasonably arguable. Grounds 11 and 12: Accumulation of Errors and Jury Directions 1. Ground 11 contends that an accumulation of errors caused the trial to miscarry. This contention does not add anything further to the assessment of the relative weight of the other grounds in terms of whether special circumstances exist. 2. Ground 12 contends that her Honour failed to give a direction to the jury of the need to separate the evidence between the two allegedly conflicting hypotheses relied upon by the Crown about the time of Mr Karmas' murder. In short, this relates to the matter noted in relation to ground 4 and what the Applicant describes as the "5 o'clock theory", namely, that Mr Karmas may have returned to Wilga Street after 5.00pm on 11 August 2011 as was apparently suggested by the documents written by the Applicant. It suffices to state that no direction of this or similar kind was requested of the trial judge. Ground 13: Wrongful Admission of Evidence 1. Ground 13 contends that the trial miscarried as there was wrongly admitted into evidence a document seized from the Applicant's vehicle that became known as Exhibit AA or the "George's River note" as well as documents written by the Applicant and video recordings seized from the Applicant's home. 2. The so-called George's River note was a handwritten note seized from the Applicant's motor vehicle which stated "…wrap in black cotton sheet and tie with black ribbon (shoe lace) tight and through in the river (George's River)" (R v Fantakis [2018] NSWSC 1815 at [13]). The Applicant now contends that on a closer inspection of the note what is actually written is "Imagine all nasty into black, wrap in black cotton sheet and tie with ribbon (shoe lace) tied and through in the river (George's River)". [17] It is contended that these additional words somehow deny the note of probative force. 3. The trial judge gave reasons for admitting the note (R v Fantakis [2018] NSWSC 1815). It does not appear that the point now sought to be raised was made to the trial judge. The note, even with the additional words, seems capable of being a reference to the manner of disposal of the body. In a case where no body was discovered it is difficult to envisage a proper basis upon which her Honour could have rejected the note. 4. As for the writings and video documents, the reasons for their admission are also set out in R v Fantakis [2018] NSWSC 1815. This included a document written by the Applicant in which he referred to torturing Mr Karmas (at [11]). Notwithstanding that parts of those documents record deluded ramblings, the trial judge gave careful consideration to the admissibility and potential prejudice from its admission. At this stage, nothing has been presented to suggest that her Honour erred. Grounds 14 and 15: Police Conduct 1. Ground 14 of the Applicant's notice of appeal contends that there was a miscarriage of justice on account of the conduct of the New South Wales Police during the investigation. The submissions in support of his bail application contend that the New South Wales Police have recently conceded that various crime scene warrants were unlawfully executed by the police. In particular, it was alleged that they conceded they did not comply with s 88 of the Law Enforcement (Powers and Responsibilities) Act 2002 ("LEPRA"), including not filming the execution of the crime scene warrant, not having an independent observer present, not using property and seizure exhibit forms and not issuing receipts to occupants after warrants had been executed. In support of the contention, the Applicant refers to the transcript of argument about subpoenas he issued out of the Local Court in 2019 in relation to charges laid against him of intimidate police. [18] His subpoenas were ultimately set aside. 2. Section 88 of the LEPRA does not regulate the execution of crime scene warrants. It does not contain any requirements for filming of their execution, the use of independent observers, the issue of property seizure exhibit forms and the issue of receipts. The issue and execution of search warrants is regulated by Part 5. Both a perusal of the transcript relied upon by the Applicant, and the Crown's submissions, reveals that all of his allegations of breaches of LEPRA are contested. More importantly, the submissions do not appear to identify any relevant connection between any alleged breach of LEPRA and any unfairness in his trial so as to give rise to a miscarriage of justice. 3. Ground 15 contends there was a miscarriage of justice at the Applicant's trial on account of the New South Wales Police withholding and not disclosing computer data seized from him. 4. This ground is related to one of the Applicant's contentions as to why he should obtain bail. It seems that on or about 7 June 2013 the police seized computer data of the Applicant pursuant to a warrant. In an affidavit read on this application, the informant describes how, between September 2014 and February 2018, there was service of a brief of nine volumes of material which was said to include some of the electronic material that was seized in June 2013. The Applicant contends that it did not include all of that material. He contends that he made a request for all of the material to be provided and it was not. 5. Since the time of his trial the Applicant has attempted to obtain a readable copy of all the electronic material that was seized. In 2020, the Applicant caused to be issued a notice requiring the production of the data in digital format. In August 2020, an officer of the New South Wales Police exchanged emails with the Applicant's legal representative in which the latter nominated the format in which the electronic data would be provided. [19] In October 2020, the police provided that electronic material in that format to the Governor of the correctional centre where the Applicant is detained. [20] In May 2021, the Governor of the gaol acknowledged receipt of the material but advised that the format of the files was incompatible with Corrective Services' computer system. The Governor also advised that he had been in contact with the New South Wales Police and they were not in a position to provide the contents in another format. The Governor added that Corrective Services' information technology branch are "undergoing laptop trials and this avenue is unavailable until the trial is complete and outcomes advised". [21] 6. The Applicant contends that there should be a grant of bail to facilitate his access to that electronic material which currently cannot be arranged while he is in custody. Two matters should be noted about that contention. 7. First, the only matter nominated in the Applicant's submissions as potentially occasioning a miscarriage of justice from his inability to access this material prior to his trial is his contention that the seized material included material relating to Mr Woods' drug matter. That has already been addressed. Unlike, say, the circumstances that arose in Edwards v The Queen [2021] HCA 28, there is no suggestion that at any point in the prosecution of the Applicant that the Crown Prosecutor deployed material that was seized that was not served upon him or his legal representatives. Hence, there appears to be little basis for contending that any alleged failure to provide this material prior to his trial occasioned a miscarriage of justice. 8. Second, the above material suggests that, presently, the Applicant is unable to access the data although the Governor's letter indicates that access may become available. However, it is clear that he has had access to legal advisors. It was not suggested that he has exhausted their ability to facilitate his access to the electronic material. Grounds 16 and 17: Further Directions 1. Ground 16 of the appeal contends that the trial judge failed to give a "fundamental direction to the jury that they had to be satisfied of the truth of the admissions in the writing evidence beyond reasonable doubt before being able to find the accused guilty of the 5 o'clock theory". 2. At the trial there was a significant amount of expert evidence and other material addressed to the Applicant's state of mind at the time he wrote the documents in which he admitted harming and torturing Mr Karmas upon his supposed return to Wilga Street on 11 August 2011. The trial judge gave the jury comprehensive directions in relation to that material. No direction was sought at the trial to the effect that, before they convicted the Applicant, the jury had to be satisfied beyond reasonable doubt of the reliability of that material. At this point, I am not satisfied that any such direction would have been required. As noted above, the reasoning in support of the contention appears to have as one of its many premises that the only basis upon which the jury could have convicted the Applicant, and acquitted Mr Cheong, was by rejecting the suggestion that Mr Karmas was killed between 1.50pm and around 3.00pm. As noted, at this point, I do not accept that premise. 3. Ground 17 contends that the trial miscarried because the trial judge failed to leave manslaughter to the jury on the basis of self-defence and provocation. No such directions were sought at the trial. From my review of the material, I cannot discern any evidentiary basis upon which self-defence or provocation could have been put to the jury. Ground 3: Unreasonable Verdict 1. Ground 3 of the proposed grounds of appeal contends that the verdict of the jury was unreasonable and cannot be supported having regard to the evidence (Criminal Appeal Act 1912, s 6(1)). A finding on a bail application to the effect that it is likely that this Court will later determine the verdict was unreasonable and cannot be supported having regard to the evidence is likely to be rare. 2. In this case, I have reviewed the trial judge's summing up. Notwithstanding the Applicant's complaints, it appeared to canvass the material relied on by the Crown and by the Applicant and their respective arguments. It suffices to state that the summing up suggests that the case against the Applicant was a reasonably strong one. Nothing in my review of the material provided by the Applicant on this application has suggested to the contrary. Conclusion 1. Leaving aside grounds 1 and 2, I would assess grounds 4 and 10 to be reasonably arguable and the rest of the grounds of appeal appear to be relatively weak. Other Aspects of the Bail Application 1. As noted, in his bail application, the Applicant nominated other reasons that are said to warrant the grant of bail. The first has already been addressed, namely, his inability to access the computer data seized by the police. 2. The Applicant's submissions also refer to the potential for COVID-19 outbreaks and their effect on his access to computers and printing services. It is self-evident that, to this time, the Applicant has had the capacity to produce prodigious amounts of written material notwithstanding that he has been incarcerated. Save for the possibility that further COVID-19 outbreaks may affect his access to computers (and his complaint about accessing the seized computer data), there is no basis for contending that he is hampered in preparing and presenting his appeal. The potential for further COVID‑19 lockdowns, and for them to affect his preparation of the appeal, can be accepted. However, the Applicant has already filed his written submissions. Should any further lockdowns affect his ability to prepare for oral argument then that can be accommodated when his appeal is heard. 3. The proposed bail conditions involve the Applicant living with his mother. The Applicant's mother swore an affidavit in support of the bail application. She describes her personal difficulties including depression and health issues. It can be accepted that a grant of bail of the Applicant will be of assistance to his mother. 4. The passage from El‑Hilli set out above refers to the unacceptable risk factors in the Bail Act being imported into an assessment of whether special and exceptional circumstances are made out. It suffices to note that the material provided by the Crown indicates that the Applicant had a poor record of compliance with bail conditions when he was arrested on a charge of intimidating police prior to his arrest in October 2013 on the charge of murder. It seems that within hours of his being released he breached a bail condition that prevented him from contacting the co-accused Woods. Given that there is evidence of him discussing threats to the informant and the evidence at his trial about his dispute with Ms Angeles, I consider that any grant of bail, even on strict conditions, would carry an unacceptable risk of his interfering with witnesses and committing a further offence. Conclusion 1. Given my assessment of the bail concerns, the short period between now and when the appeal is due to be heard, my assessment of the relative strength of his appeal, and the significant proportion of the non-parole period still to be served by the Applicant, I consider that special or exceptional circumstances are not made out. 2. I propose that the application for bail be refused. 3. R A HULME J: I agree with and am grateful for the detailed analysis of the material relied upon by the Applicant. I agree that the application for release on bail should be refused. 4. CAMPBELL J: I agree with Beech-Jones CJ at CL. ********** Endnotes 1. Summing up at p 112. 2. Crown Bail submissions at [57]. 3. Applicant's Bail submissions at [320] to [383]; Bail reply submissions at [40] to [175]. 4. Applicant's Appeal submissions dated 3 May 2021 at [683] to [829]. 5. Applicant's Bail submissions at [158ff]. 6. Applicant's Bail submissions at [205ff]. 7. Applicant's Bail Submissions at [244]. 8. Applicant's Bail Submissions at [189]. 9. Applicant's Appeal submissions dated 3 May 2021 at [1149]ff. 10. Applicant's Bail Submissions at [388] to [501]. 11. See affidavit of Roxanne McGee sworn 13 October 2021 at [5] and [7]. 12. Affidavit of Roxanne McGee sworn 13 October 2021 at [4]. 13. Tr 27/10/2021, p 28.50. 14. Applicant's Appeal submissions dated 3 May 2021 at [1374]. 15. Summing Up 118. 16. Applicant's Appeal submissions dated 3 May 2021 at [1497] to [1539]. 17. Applicant's amended appeal submissions dated 9 August 2021 at [1583] to [1584]. 18. Annexures O and P to the Applicant's bail submissions. 19. Annexure C to the Applicant's bail submissions. 20. Annexure 4 to the Applicant's affidavit sworn 22 October 2021. 21. Annexure 4 to the Applicant's affidavit sworn 22 October 2021. DISCLAIMER - Every effort has been made to comply with suppression orders or statutory provisions prohibiting publication that may apply to this judgment or decision. The onus remains on any person using material in the judgment or decision to ensure that the intended use of that material does not breach any such order or provision. Further enquiries may be directed to the Registry of the Court or Tribunal in which it was generated. Decision last updated: 17 November 2021