Civil and Administrative Tribunal New South Wales Medium Neutral Citation: Crawfords Freightlines Pty Ltd v SafeWork NSW [2022] NSWCATAD 50 Hearing dates: 27 – 30 October 2020 Date of orders: 16 February 2022 Decision date: 16 February 2022 Jurisdiction: Administrative and Equal Opportunity Division Before: K Ransome, Senior Member Decision: The decision under review is affirmed. Catchwords: ADMINISTRATIVE LAW – licensing – ammonium nitrate storage facility – criteria to be applied to assessment - whether regulator can alter assessment criteria – whether separation distances can be applied – risk to persons in surrounding area Legislation Cited: Administrative Decisions Review Act 1997 Explosives Act 2003 Explosives Regulation 2013 Cases Cited: Attorney-General (NSW) v Quin [1990] HCA 21, (1990) 170 CLR 1 Minister for Aboriginal Affairs v Peko-Wallsend Ltd (1986) 162 CLR 24; 66 ALR 299 Category: Principal judgment Parties: Crawfords Freightlines Pty Ltd (Applicant) SafeWork NSW (Respondent) Representation: Counsel: D Kelly (Applicant) C Magee (Respondent) Solicitors: Gillis Delaney Lawyers (Applicant) Legal, Department of Customer Service (Respondent) File Number(s): 2019/00397736 REASONS FOR DECISION 1. Crawfords Freightlines Pty Ltd (Crawfords) is a privately owned company headquartered in Newcastle with operations in freight transportation by road, rail and sea and warehousing. The business operates a major storage facility at Sandgate. The facility at Sandgate has been licensed to store ammonium nitrate since December 2008. In NSW, as in all other Australian jurisdictions, a licence is required to store ammonium nitrate - a compound used in agricultural fertiliser and the main component of an explosive commonly used in the mining industry. 2. At the Sandgate facility ammonium nitrate is stored in flexible bags of approximately 1 tonne to 1.25 tonnes capacity, in 500 tonne stacks, configured as a pyramidal stack. The ammonium nitrate is received in flexible bags through the Port of Newcastle (through truck deliveries), the Port of Sydney (rail – container deliveries) or direct from manufacturing facilities by truck. The ammonium nitrate is distributed by Crawfords in flexible bags or decanted from bags into bulk trucks for distribution to the Hunter Valley and other mining areas in NSW. 3. There are four storage sheds at the Sandgate facility – Sheds A, B, C and D. Over the years varying quantities of ammonium nitrate have been stored in these sheds. At various times the amount of ammonium nitrate able to be stored has been reduced or increased as particular sheds reverted to general storage for a period or sheds were added. On each occasion when there were proposed changes to the storage of ammonium nitrate at Sandgate Crawfords submitted applications to amend its licence which were approved accordingly. 4. Planning approval issued in June 2013 by the Department of Planning permits Crawfords to store a maximum of 13,500 tonnes of ammonium nitrate at the site comprising: 1. Shed A – 4,500 tonnes 2. Shed B – 4,500 tonnes 3. Shed C – 4,000 tonnes 4. Shed C compound – 500 tonnes. 1. In 2014 Crawfords was licenced to store 13,500 tonnes of ammonium nitrate at Sandgate in accordance with the volumes set out above for. In May 2016, at Crawfords' request, Shed C was removed from the licence as Crawfords wished to revert to general freight storage for that shed. This reduced the total licenced capacity to 9,000 tonnes of ammonium nitrate and 65 tonnes of ammonium nitrate emulsion in an outdoor compound. In December 2016 the Sandgate facility was granted a Major Hazards Facility licence. 2. On 1 March 2019 Crawfords submitted an application to SafeWork NSW to amend the licence to reinstate the storage of 4,500 tonnes of ammonium nitrate in Shed C. The amendment was sought as Glencore Coal had advised Crawfords they wished to store 10,000 tonnes of ammonium nitrate at Sandgate to facilitate a daily drawdown to its coal mine site and delivery of ammonium nitrate directly through Newcastle Port. By this application, total storage capacity for ammonium nitrate at Sandgate would be 13,500 tonnes. 3. There then followed correspondence between Crawfords and SafeWork NSW in which SafeWork NSW foreshadowed it intended to refuse the application and Crawfords was given time to submit its response as to why the amendment should not be refused. To that end Crawfords submitted a Quantitative Risk Assessment Report by Julie Green, an explosives consultant, and a risk review prepared by Michael du Plessis. On 8 October 2019 the application was refused by SafeWork NSW, a decision which was affirmed on internal review on 21 November 2019. 4. The application to amend the licence was refused because SafeWork NSW was not satisfied that Crawfords has the facilities, systems and procedures in place to store an additional 4,500 tonnes of ammonium nitrate at Shed C with an appropriate level of safety in regard to the separation distances to vulnerable facilities located nearby. These facilities include a passenger and freight rail line, an aged care facility, a childcare centre, a school and a private hospital. SafeWork NSW was of the opinion that storage of an additional 4,500 tonnes of ammonium nitrate in Shed C presented an unacceptable level of risk to these facilities. The review application 1. The Tribunal has administrative review jurisdiction over a decision, or class of decisions, of an administrator if enabling legislation provides that applications may be made to the Tribunal for administrative review: s 9(1) Administrative Decisions Review Act 1997 (ADR Act). 2. Section 24 of the Explosives Act 2003 (the Explosives Act) confers jurisdiction on the Tribunal to review certain decisions including a decision to refuse a licence. Crawfords applied to the Tribunal for review on 18 December 2019. The Tribunal stands in the shoes of the decision-maker and is to determine what is the correct and preferable decision, having regard to the material then before it. 3. I note that Crawfords is currently licenced to store ammonium nitrate in other sheds and this application is not dealing with any approvals under the existing licence but is confined to the requested amendment to add Shed C. The evidence 1. A large volume of material has been filed in these proceedings, including material relevant to the Sandgate facility's prior development consent and licencing as a Major Hazard Facility as well as various journal articles relating to ammonium nitrate. The primary evidence relied upon by Crawfords is that of: * Peter Crawford, Managing Director, Crawfords * Paul McGrath, Consultant (formerly Compliance Manager, Crawfords) * Robert Tracey, Health, Safety, Security and Environment & Compliance Manager, Crawfords * Ronald Peddie, expert witness * Julie Green, expert witness * Michael du Plessis, expert witness * Ian Denison, expert witness 1. SafeWork NSW relied upon the following witnesses: * Daniel Massey, State Inspector, SafeWork NSW * Michael Morris, Chief Superintendent, Fire and Rescue NSW * Wayne Humphrey, Detective Superintendent, NSW Police Force * Andrew Battye, Manager, Dangerous Goods & Explosives Team, SafeWork NSW * Stephen Gill, Inspector, SafeWork NSW * Xianzhe Lim, Inspector, SafeWork NSW * Joe Nosti, Inspector, SafeWork NSW 1. An oral hearing proceeded over four days in late October 2020. Mr Crawford, Mr Peddie, Ms Green, Dr du Plessis and Mr Dennison gave evidence. The parties filed written submissions with final submissions being received on 3 March 2021. The relevant law 1. In NSW a development consent for the use of land for the storage of ammonium nitrate is required to be issued by the Department of Planning. In addition, various licenses are required to store ammonium nitrate depending on the quantity of material stored. The Environmental Protection Authority also has oversight in relation to certain environmental factors arising out of the storage of hazardous material. 2. The Explosives Act and the Explosives Regulation 2013 (the Explosives Regulation) regulate the requirements for the handling of explosives and explosive precursors in NSW. Explosive precursors are chemicals and materials that can be combined to create an explosive. There is no dispute that the ammonium nitrate stored at Sandgate is classified as "security sensitive ammonium nitrate" which is an explosive precursor that is subject to regulatory and security restrictions. Crawfords requires a licence to store this ammonium nitrate at its facility. Licences are issued by SafeWork NSW. Sub-section 11(2) of the Explosives Act provides that applications for licences may be approved or refused in accordance with the Act and the Explosives Regulations. 3. Under s 14 of the Explosives Act licences may be granted unconditionally or subject to conditions. Section 19 provides that the regulations may make provision for or with respect to licences. Of relevance to this application is cl 37(1) of the Explosives Regulation which provides: 37 Grounds for refusing a licence (1) The regulatory authority must not grant a licence unless it is satisfied that— (a) the applicant is eligible for a licence, and (b) if the applicant has been required to submit a security plan—the plan is appropriate for the safe and secure handling of the explosives or explosive precursors concerned, and (c) if the applicant has been required to submit a safety management plan—the plan is appropriate for managing the hazards and risks to safety associated with the activities that are authorised by the licence, and (d) the applicant has the appropriate facilities, systems and procedures in place for the safe and secure handling of the explosives or explosive precursors concerned, and (e) any additional eligibility requirements applicable to the licence concerned have been satisfied, and (f) the approved fee for the licence has been paid. 1. Each of the paragraphs (a) to (f) must be met before a licence can be granted. At issue in this application is whether Crawfords complies with the requirement in (d) that it has the appropriate facilities, systems and procedures in place for the safe and secure handling of the ammonium nitrate it wishes to store in Shed C. What matters can be taken into account in an assessment of whether an applicant satisfies cl 37(1)(d)? 1. One of the issues in contention between the parties is the breadth and scope of what may be considered when determining whether an applicant for a licence has the appropriate facilities, systems and procedures in place for the safe and secure handling of the explosives or explosive precursors concerned as required by cl 37(1)(d). It is fair to say that, in assessing this application by Crawfords, SafeWork NSW took a different approach to the matters underpinning its assessment of applications of this type. The parties are at odds over the proper approach to be taken by the decision-maker and the relevant matters which may be considered. 2. My understanding of the evidence provided is that, prior to the assessment of the Crawfords application, SafeWork NSW had generally applied a risk assessment approach to the determination of whether an applicant satisfied cl 37(1)(d). This focussed on a range of matters associated with the storage facility itself, including its structure, storage conditions, separation distances between stacks of ammonium nitrate and security, fire and safety management plans. The evidence provided by SafeWork NSW indicates that, over the course of 2019, it formed the view that in its previous assessments of applications for licences to store ammonium nitrate, in addition to the matters usually considered in a risk assessment, inspectors had not fully considered the issues of separation distances to offsite facilities, particularly vulnerable facilities, in order to protect the public from any explosion. 3. There is general agreement between SafeWork NSW and the experts engaged by Crawfords in this matter that ammonium nitrate is not itself an explosive. It also does not burn but, as an oxidising agent, it supports and enhances the burning of other combustible material. When mixed with certain combustible materials, the resulting product is classified as an explosive. It is also possible that ammonium nitrate may decompose explosively when subjected to prolonged heating under confinement, chemical reaction with incompatible materials or shock energy imparted by explosives or projectiles. 4. SafeWork NSW submits that the primary hazard associated with the storage of ammonium nitrate at a facility is an explosion with the four likely scenarios for an explosion being: 1. fire 2. contamination 3. shock impact with high velocity projectile 4. malicious act. 1. I note that these four scenarios reflect those set out in the SAFEX International (SAFEX) Good Practice Guide for the Safe Storage of Solid Technical Grade Ammonium Nitrate. SAFEX sets out the steps that can be taken to reduce the likelihood of each of these scenarios leading to an explosion. 2. SafeWork NSW states that, in addition to steps taken to reduce the likelihood of an explosion occurring, consideration must be given to the consequences of such an explosion (even if unlikely). SafeWork NSW states, again drawing on SAFEX, that the major consequences of an explosion are related to the overpressure that is generated by the explosion. The overpressure at a particular location is determined by the explosive energy from the ammonium nitrate involved in the explosion and the location of the persons or property at risk from the explosion, that is, the distance between the two. Sufficient separation distances from the potential explosion source to offsite people and property is the most effective means to reduce the risk to an acceptable level. SafeWork NSW states that this approach considers what could happen (even if there is a very low likelihood of it occurring) and the resulting consequences. This is known as a "consequence based approach". 3. Dr Massey, State Inspector, SafeWork NSW, states that quantity-based consequence distances are applied in various jurisdictions in Australia and around the world with regard to the storage of ammonium nitrate. 4. In June 2004 the Council of Australian Governments (COAG) agreed to a national licensing system to limit access to security sensitive ammonium nitrate. It was proposed that each state and territory would introduce legislation and/or regulations to give effect to the COAG agreement. In November 2004 COAG issued Ammonium Nitrate Guidance Note No. 4 to provide guidance to regulatory authorities and persons proposing to store security sensitive ammonium nitrate at new facilities in order to achieve adequate separation distances to offsite facilities in line with community expectations for public safety. The Guidance Note recommended new ammonium nitrate facilities be located at a "consequence distance" from vulnerable facilities. Vulnerable facilities are defined to include, among other things, healthcare facilities, childcare facilities, schools, major traffic terminals or public utilities, residential areas and critical infrastructure. This list is not exhaustive. The Guidance Note recommends a minimum consequence distance of 400 m. 5. Australian Standard 4326 The storage and handling of oxidising agents (AS 4326) states that in relation to separation distances to vulnerable facilities and critical infrastructure, the regulatory authority shall be consulted with regard to any separation distances relating to stores for ammonium nitrate. 6. The Queensland Department of Natural Resources, Mining and Energy has published Information Bulletin 53 titled Storage requirements for security sensitive ammonium nitrate (Qld IB53) which specifies quantity-based consequence distances that apply from all ammonium nitrate facilities to exposed sites such as transport routes, inhabited buildings and vulnerable facilities. 7. The Western Australian Department of Mines, Industry Regulation and Safety has published a Code of Practice for Safe Storage of Solid Ammonium Nitrate, third edition (the WA Code). This document specifies quantity-based consequence distances from ammonium nitrate facilities to various community sites. In addition, the industry association, SAFEX International, has published GPG02 Good Practice Guide for the Safe Storage of Solid Technical Grade Ammonium Nitrate (referred to above) which includes guidance for separation of ammonium nitrate facilities from various community sites. 8. Dr Massey states that the method of applying quantity-based consequence distances is a standard and long-standing approach to public safety around sites storing energetic materials such as explosives and explosive precursors. He states that it is a feature of explosives regulations in civilian and military jurisdictions around the world. 9. Dr Massey states that in NSW, quantity-based consequence distances are applied to facilities handling explosives through Australian Standard 2187.1 Explosives – Storage, transport and use. Part 1: Storage (AS 2187.1). He also states that quantity-based consequence distances are also applied to facilities handling ammonium nitrate emulsion in NSW and that solid ammonium nitrate is the only substance regulated by the Explosives Regulation that is not currently subjected to quantity-based consequence distances. In his view, this has occurred through a failure to implement a policy that meets the expectations of AS 4326 and COAG Ammonium Nitrate Guide Note No. 4. 10. Andrew Battye, Manager, Dangerous Goods & Explosives Team, SafeWork NSW refers to the development of a position paper by SafeWork NSW on the storage of solid and ammonium nitrate which, he states, is intended to be applied in addition to the requirements of AS 4326. He states that the intention of the position paper is to apply separation distances for ammonium nitrate in quantities exceeding 10 tonnes. Mr Battye indicates that the position paper, once approved, will be released for consultation prior to implementation, although progress has been delayed by a range of factors. 11. The position of SafeWork NSW is that, as the Explosives Act and Regulation do not define separation distances, it is open to the regulator to consult various sources of information to provide guidance in deciding the application. It is therefore permissible to reference standards from other Australian jurisdictions and an international standard along with the risk assessments provided by Crawfords in support of the application. 12. Crawfords argues that the material to be taken into account in determining the licence application is in fact more limited. Crawfords refers to cl 65 of the Explosives Regulation which provides: 65 Duty to comply with certain standards or codes A person who carries out an activity to which any of the following standards or codes applies must ensure the activity is carried out in compliance with that standard or code— (a) in relation to explosives— (i) AS 2187, and (ii) the Australian Explosives Code, (b) in relation to explosive precursors— (i) the ADG Code, and (ii) the Australian Standard AS 4326 The storage and handling of oxidizing agents, as in force from time to time. Maximum penalty—250 penalty units. 1. Of relevance to this application is cl 65(b). ADG Code means the Australian Code for the Transport of Dangerous Goods by Road and Rail, as published by the Australian Government, and as in force from time to time and generally known as the Australian Dangerous Goods Code. 2. Clause 66 of the Explosives Regulation states: 66 Application of codes and standards (1) If any code or standard referred to in this Division imposes a duty or responsibility but does not indicate clearly the person, or class of people, on whom that duty or responsibility falls or lies, the duty or responsibility must be observed or discharged (as the case requires) by the person undertaking the relevant activity. (2) If, under any code or standard referred to in this Division, a duty or some other form of responsibility is placed on more than one person or class of people, the duty or obligation must be observed or discharged (as the case requires) by each person or each person in that class only in relation to those matters for which the person has management or control and whether or not any other person is also responsible for undertaking the duty. (3) A provision of this Regulation prevails over any inconsistent provision of a standard or code. 1. Crawfords states that the only codes or standards referred to in the Explosives Regulation applicable to the storage of explosive precursors with which a licensee must comply are the ADG Code and AS 4326. Crawfords argues that in those circumstances, particularly where clauses 65 and 66 have not been amended even though other parts of the Explosives Regulation have been amended from time to time since 2013, SafeWork NSW when determining a licence application to store explosive precursors must not look beyond the ADG Code and AS 4326 obligations for handling and storing explosive precursors. Crawfords submits that there is no legislative authority for SafeWork NSW to apply codes and guides in its assessment of its application other than those with which an applicant is required to comply pursuant to the Explosives Regulation. 2. Crawfords states that there is no evidence that it does not comply with AS 4326. Crawfords notes that AS 4326 (with which it must comply) does not specify separation distances between vulnerable facilities and critical infrastructure and ammonium nitrate stores but simply notes that "the regulatory authority shall be consulted with regard to any separation distances relating to stores for ammonium nitrate". 3. Crawfords submits that SafeWork has purported to apply SAFEX, the WA Code and Qld IB53 when considering its application without any legal authority to do so. Crawfords states that each of these codes and guides has a different approach to the assessment of the risks of storing ammonium nitrate, separation distances to be applied between stacks of ammonium nitrate, separation distances between a stack of ammonium nitrate and other facilities, calculation of TNT equivalence factors, overpressure assessment, and definition of adjacent facilities. It is further stated that the position of SafeWork NSW that Crawfords comply with the requirements of codes and guides from all jurisdictions is implausible, unjust and unfair and without legislative basis. Crawfords asserts that in order for these codes or guides to apply it would be necessary for them to be referred to in the Explosives Act or Regulation or in the conditions attached to any licence. 4. It is apparent that neither the Explosives Act nor the Regulation set out what factors may be taken into account by the regulator in considering whether it is satisfied that the applicant has the appropriate facilities, systems and procedures in place for the safe and secure handling of ammonium nitrate as required by cl 37(1)(b) of the Explosives Regulation. I do not accept Crawfords argument that the only matters that can be taken into account are AS 4326 and the ADG Code as contained in cl 65 of the Explosives Regulation. Clause 65 imposes a duty on the person carrying out the activity and is applicable to a person who has in fact been granted a licence. In accordance with cl 65(b), specific obligations are placed upon the licence holder who must comply with AS 4326 and the ADG Code. The failure to do so may expose them to sanction. Clause 65 does not concern the criteria to which the regulator must have regard in making a decision about the grant of a licence. In my view the obligations imposed upon a licence holder by cl 65(b) may, of course, be highly relevant to the making of any assessment of the considerations which must be taken into account by the regulator under cl 37 when making a decision to grant a licence, but they are not the only factors that may be taken into account. 5. The question remains then what considerations should underpin cl 37(1)(d) in particular. The clause itself does not enumerate any particular factors that can be taken into account in determining whether an applicant has the appropriate facilities, systems and procedures in place for the safe and secure handling of ammonium nitrate. In these circumstances the factors that must be considered are to be determined by implication from the subject matter, scope and purpose of the statute (Minister for Aboriginal Affairs v Peko-Wallsend Ltd (1986) 162 CLR 24; 66 ALR 299). 6. The long title of the Explosives Act is "An Act to provide for the regulation and control of the handling of explosives and explosive precursors; to provide for the regulation of certain other dangerous goods; and for related purposes". Not a great deal can be gleaned from this wording as to the purpose and scope of the statute. The Explosives Act does not contain an objects clause which may have been of some assistance in construing clause 37. SafeWork NSW made a novel submission that I should take into account objects set out in other legislation which it regulates relating to work health and safety. It is neither necessary nor permissible for me to do so. 7. A reading of the Explosives Act clearly demonstrates that its purpose is to regulate dangerous substances in order to ensure the security of these substances and the protection and safety of the public. Under the legislation licenses are required to handle such materials and in certain circumstances security clearances must be held by persons handling the explosive or explosive precursor concerned. It is an offence to contravene provisions of the Act. In the second reading speech for the Explosives Bill 2003 the then Minister for Fair Trading stated: Explosives have been separated from other dangerous goods requirements proposed for regulation under Occupational Health & Safety legislation because of the particular public safety issues related to explosives and explosive precursors. Dealing with explosives under a separate Act recognises the particularly high risks associated with explosives and the potential for the misuse of explosives. 1. The factors which therefore must be taken into account in making a determination under cl 37(1)(b) will have at their basis matters concerning public safety. It would be contrary to the scope and purpose of the Explosives Act if the matters that could be taken into account remained static and did not take account of developments in other jurisdictions both within Australia and internationally in relation to the safe storage and handling of a potentially dangerous material. Given the subject matter and the primary consideration of public safety which is inherent in the legislation, a regulator would be derelict if it did not keep abreast of developments and, where appropriate, incorporate those factors into its decision-making, particularly as new or changed facilities, systems or procedures would enhance public safety. 2. Indeed, it is well-settled that a government may change its mind (see Attorney-General (NSW) v Quin [1990] HCA 21, (1990) 170 CLR 1). As was said by Mason CJ in that case, government may adopt a new policy, so long as the new policy is one that falls within the ambit of the relevant duty or discretion. In my view, the enhanced approach by SafeWork NSW to the assessment of licence applications by taking into account separation distances or consequence distances clearly falls within the parameters of what the regulator is required to do in reaching the requisite level of satisfaction required by cl 37(1)(d). 3. Indeed, adequate separation distances effectively protect the safety of the public irrespective of reliance upon: * the low likelihood of an explosion of ammonium nitrate occurring at the facility; * emergency procedures and evacuation plans; and * the quality, implementation and enforcement of site controls. 1. Crawfords make the point that SAFEX, the WA Code and Qld IB53 each take somewhat different approaches to a range of matters, including separation distances. As a result, Crawfords states that it would be unjust and unfair to apply these codes. As I understand it, NSW is moving towards having such a code in this state and that is clearly the preferable outcome in terms of transparency and consistency across the industry. However, the principles underpinning each of the codes are not so contradictory or uncertain to prevent a decision-maker from taking them into account in reaching the requisite level of satisfaction as to the matters in cl 37(1)(d). 2. Before continuing, one other matter raised by Crawfords needs to be dealt with. The company points out that what is being considered is a variation or amendment to its existing licence to store ammonium nitrate at the Sandgate facility. Crawfords states that the proposed variation to the licence must be considered in light of the previous consultation with the respondent which resulted in the issue of the licence. Crawfords implies that no other considerations should be relevant than those that were taken into account in approving the original licence. The argument appears to be one of legitimate expectation, although it was certainly not characterised in that way. 3. In Quin at [23] Mason CJ referred to a line of cases in support of the following proposition: The executive cannot by representation or promise disable itself from, or hinder itself in, performing a statutory duty or exercising a statutory discretion to be performed or exercised in the public interest, by binding itself not to perform the duty or exercise the discretion in a particular way in advance of the actual performance of the duty or exercise of the power. 1. As was acknowledged in that case, there may be certain limited circumstances where a legitimate expectation might possibly arise, but that is generally in the nature of a promise concerning procedural fairness. In any event, the issue does not arise in this case. While the addition of Shed C with a capacity to store 4,500 tonnes of ammonium nitrate may be characterised as a variation to the licence, it is apparent that any such variation must be assessed in accordance with the requirements of the Explosives Act and Regulation to ensure compliance with the regulatory regime applicable to the storage of an explosive precursor. That is, a new assessment must be undertaken to ensure compliance in relation to the proposed addition of capacity. Furthermore, Crawfords were provided every opportunity to respond to the notice sent to it by SafeWork NSW that it proposed to refuse the application. The company was also able to seek internal review of the refusal decision and to make further submissions. 2. In summary, SafeWork NSW was entitled to and, indeed, required to take into account all relevant considerations concerning public safety, including separation distances or consequence distances, in determining whether Crawfords has the appropriate facilities, systems and procedures in place for the safe and secure handling of ammonium nitrate. Conditions on license 1. A good deal of the evidence at the hearing was taken up with issues concerning the separation distance between stacks stored in Shed C (and, indeed, the other sheds) and whether the distance complied with the planning approval granted to Crawfords. Another issue which generated discussion was the debagging of ammonium nitrate and loading of trucks within the sheds and whether this activity is permitted. 2. Crawfords suggests that if the amendment to the license is granted, the following conditions be imposed on the licence: 1. Debagging of ammonium nitrate and loading of trucks with ammonium nitrate must not occur in Shed A, B or C. 2. Ammonium nitrate must be stored in Shed A, B or C with stack separation distances for medium great technical ammonium nitrate specified in the SAFEX International Good Practice Guide – Storage of Technical Grade Ammonia Nitrate as varied from time to time, except for a short period of time while stacks are being moved. 1. Crawfords states that debagging and loading trucks inside sheds at the Sandgate facility was required from the Environmental Protection Authority from 2017. Mr Crawford gave evidence that he believed these activities should always have been carried on outside and has reached agreement with the Environmental Protection Authority for them to be done in an outside area separated from the sheds under a covered facility which he described as an igloo. Crawfords ceased debagging ammonium nitrate and loading trucks in sheds at the Sandgate facility in October 2020. 2. The Development Consent for the facility requires Crawfords to maintain "the appropriate ammonium nitrate stack separation distance recommended by SAFEX International Good Practice Guide – Storage of Technical Grade Ammonia Nitrate or better, to prevent involvement of more than half the storage capacity of each storage building in an explosion, except for a short period of time when the storage is at maximum capacity". SAFEX recommends 9 m separation distances between stacks of medium density ammonium nitrate in normal stack configuration to prevent sympathetic detonation of adjacent stacks. 3. The distances between Shed A, Shed B and Shed C are more than 9 metres. Crawfords proposes that an additional stack separation distance of 9 metres be required between each stack in each of Sheds A, B and C. Crawfords relies on the opinion Mr Dennison that, with the existing separation distances between the sheds and the implementation of 9 m stack separation distances there is no relevant additional risk presented when Shed C is combined with shed A and shed B storage at the Sandgate facility as there will be 9 metre all-round stack separation is in each shed. It is then necessary to only consider a single stack detonation when assessing the risks for the Sandgate facility. Consequence/separation distances 1. The decision of SafeWork NSW was primarily based on the fact that a number of facilities are located within the vicinity of the Sandgate site. In various documents and evidence the distances between these facilities and the site are referred to as consequence distances, separation distances or quantity distances. 2. Set out below is the distance from Shed C to various sites surrounding the Crawford's facility. The distances are taken from the expert report of Ronald Peddie dated 20 March 2020 and includes those facilities which are within 1000 m of Shed C. In addition to the facilities below, the passenger and freight railway line is some 30 m away. Site Name Distance from Shed C Sibelco (industrial) 210 m St Joseph's aged care 590 m Residential west 888 m Residential east 540 m Residential south 720 m Sandgate Cemetery 390 m Hunter Expressway 329 m Golf Practice Centre 343 m Adbri Masonry (industrial) 345 m Mullane (industrial) 484 m The evidence 1. In an affidavit dated 20 March 2020, Peter Crawford, Managing Director, Crawfords states that the company ensures the configuration of ammonium nitrate storage in all sheds at Sandgate incorporates 9 m separation distances between 500 tonne stacks which complies with SAFEX guidelines. 2. Crawfords relies upon the risk assessment carried out by Julie Green and the steps it has taken to prevent or to mitigate the effect of any incidents at Sandgate. Mr Crawford notes that there have been no incidents since 2009 directly attributable to the storage of ammonium nitrate at Sandgate that required any response under the Sandgate Site Emergency Plan. In his affidavit Mr Crawford sets out details of the mitigation strategies in place. These include various methods for dealing with any fire, including automatic fire sprinklers. He also stresses staff training, the maintenance of equipment and communication plans. Video of the fire sprinkler system in operation is attached to a statement by Robert Tracey. 3. Mr Crawford states that the continued storage of ammonium nitrate at Sandgate at full capacity is imperative to the continued secure supply of ammonium nitrate to the mining industry in NSW. This is primarily due to the demand for ammonium nitrate in the Hunter region and the fact that ammonium nitrate is supplied through the Newcastle port. He notes that if Sandgate cannot meet capacity through the addition of Shed C, the mining industry is likely to require a significant proportion of ammonium nitrate to be delivered through Port Alma in Queensland and transported by road. This would introduce greater risks for road users. Mr Crawford has supplied letters from a number of mining companies which in general support the application. 4. A significant part of the material relied upon by Crawfords to support its application relates to the granting of consent in 2013 by the Department of Planning for the storage of ammonium nitrate at the Sandgate site and developments since then, including the granting by SafeWork NSW of a Major Hazards Facility licence in 2016. This material is attached to the affidavit of Paul McGrath dated 20 March 2020. Mr McGrath was formerly the Compliance Manager employed by Crawfords and has been engaged as a consultant by the company since he left its employ in August 2017. Similarly, SafeWork NSW has provided a significant number of historical records. These records, while they establish that Crawfords has complied with regulatory requirements to obtain its consents and licences, are of limited assistance in this matter. 5. There is no question that Crawfords has operated with appropriate licences in the regulatory environment pertaining in NSW up to the present time. The only issue before me is whether Crawfords should now be granted a licence to store 4,500 tonnes of ammonium nitrate in Shed C. 6. Crawfords relies upon expert reports from Julie Green, Michael du Plessis, Ronald Peddie and Ian Dennison. Julie Green 1. Julie Green is a civil engineer with particular expertise in explosive storage and blast and ballistic technical advice. She has provided three reports in this matter – dated 10 July 2019, 9 September 2019 and 8 May 2020. (Ms Green is also known by her married name of Quinn but for the purposes of these proceedings I shall continue to refer to her as Ms Green.) 2. The July and September reports prepared by Ms Green are risk reviews using IMESAFR, which is a quantitative risk assessment program designed to assess risks for commercial explosives storage. The purpose of the risk review was to identify the level of risk of fatality or injury to people outside the storage facility for a variety of scenarios related to the explosion of ammonium nitrate at the Sandgate facility. Both reports were prepared for the purpose of dealing with planning issues. The July report was prepared for Crawfords while the September report was prepared at the request of the Department of Planning and included removal of some assumptions contained in the first report. Ms Green said at the hearing that, as a result, the assessment of risk in the September report is as conservative as it can be. (I note that there was some discussion during the proceedings about the reliability and credibility of the IMESAFR quantitative risk assessment tool, but this issue can be taken no further.) 3. Ms Green's report considered the effects and risk of the explosion of a single 500 tonne stack of ammonium nitrate from fire, detonation of 2,250 tonnes (half a shed) through fire and detonation of a full shed through fire and shock. It also considered the explosion of truck and rail carriages delivering and dispatching ammonium nitrate from the site. The report considered four likely scenarios for an explosion involving ammonium nitrate. These are the same scenarios referred to by SafeWork NSW as set out above: fire, contamination, shock impact with high velocity projectile and malicious act. As the reports were prepared for planning purposes they referenced in particularly HIPAP 4 (Hazardous Industry Planning Advisory Paper No 4 Risk Criteria for Land Use Safety Planning). 4. It is not necessary for the purposes of this decision to go into the detail of the modelling used by Ms Green. The IMESAFR modelling software is based upon the probability of an event occurring multiplied by the consequences if the event does occur. The modelling demonstrated that the probability of an event occurring was extremely low. In terms of consequences, HIPAP 4 uses a benchmark of the risk of a fatality being greater or less than one in a million. There were some differences between the July and September reports of Ms Green. In the September report she concluded that for the 500 tonne and half shed explosions, the risks were found to be below the individual risk criteria listed in HIPAP 4 and close to the As Low as Reasonably Practicable line for group risk. The risk profile and consequences for a full shed explosion scenario, however, was found to be unacceptable and she concluded that it is critical that a separation distance across the centre of the shed should be maintained to prevent sympathetic detonation of more than half a shed event of a fire. 5. Using the results of the model and in particular the assessment of risk in the event of an explosion, Ms Green made the following recommendations: * In the event of a 500 tonne stack exploding, an evacuation distance of around 1000 m from the site should be affected. This includes closure of the Pacific Highway, Newcastle bypass and rail lines. Evacuation of St Joseph's aged care facility is recommended as there is a higher risk of injury or death due to glass. Residential buildings surrounding the site (in particular the houses near the Sandgate Cemetery and along the Pacific Highway) need to be evacuated as they are at risk from vertical (falling) debris. The golf club will need to be closed and access to the club restricted during the evacuation period. * In the event of a shed fire where there is a risk of an ammonium nitrate stack fire and causing sympathetic detonation of adjacent stacks, an evacuation distance of at least 1000 m from the site should be affected. This includes closure of the Pacific Highway, Newcastle bypass and rail lines. Particular attention should be made to evacuating the St Joseph's aged care facility and the residential buildings surrounding the site (in particular the houses near the Sandgate cemetery and along the Pacific Highway). Please note that the evacuation zone is for persons in the open – people in buildings may still be at risk from glass breakage at a greater distance of the minimum 1000 m exclusion zone should be maintained. The golf club will need to be closed and access to the club restricted during the evacuation period. * In the event of a truck fire where there is a risk of explosion, an evacuation distance similar to that of the 500 tonne half shed explosion should be maintained. This is because a vehicle explosion will generate more debris. Therefore, the same considerations as for 500 tonne explosions apply. 1. Ms Green also noted that in the event of a major explosion, it is likely that there will be property damage to surrounding buildings and infrastructure – including the railway line and that this needs to be considered as part of the Site Emergency Response Plan. 2. Ms Green stated that there have been no reports of ammonium nitrate detonating without warning as a result of a fire. In her view, in the event of an uncontrollable fire in one of the sheds at Sandgate, there will be enough time to evacuate the surrounding areas to prevent injury or fatalities. She stated that based on industry experience with ammonium nitrate fires, evacuation would be required with a minimum of 45 minutes. Michael du Plessis 1. Michael du Plessis is the Managing Director of Greenice Pty Ltd, a management consulting firm which provides specialist services to the explosives industry. He is an expert panel member for SAFEX, the international explosives safety organisation. 2. Dr du Plessis provided a Summary of Risk Assessment Findings in July 2019 which contained a summary of Ms Green's July 2019 report. Based on the findings contained in that report, Dr du Plessis concluded that ammonium nitrate of the type stored at Sandgate will not explode without warning. As a result, should a fire in a shed be detected, there will be sufficient time to evacuate people from surrounding areas. Dr du Plessis also stated that the fire sprinkler system in the sheds at Sandgate will help to cool the fire and increase the evacuation time. He stated that it is therefore critical that the Sandgate Emergency Plan incorporates detailed procedures if an emergency situation requires evacuation of surrounding areas, including road closures and closure of the rail line. He supported Ms Green's conclusion that within 45 minutes of the evacuation being initiated there should be no person in a building or in the open at a distance of less than 1000 m. 3. Dr du Plessis also provided a copy of an independent hazard audit he had conducted at Sandgate as required by the 2013 development consent conditions. He found that the facility was well managed and the sheds maintained to a high standard. Overall he found that the storage complied with the requirements of AS 4326 but made a number of recommendations for improvements at the site. One of these concerned the relocation of the debagging operation from inside Shed A to outside. 4. Dr du Plessis states that, in considering risk, contamination of the stored ammonium nitrate and projectile attack can be rejected as they are not plausible scenarios. 5. In March 2020 Dr du Plessis provided an expert report for the purpose of these proceedings. In his report he assumed that there was a separation distance of 9 m between each stack of ammonium nitrate and took into account the revised Site Emergency Plan for the site dated 16 March 2020. This plan includes evacuation plans for the St Joseph's aged care facility. Dr du Plessis was of the view that, taking into account the increased separation of the ammonium nitrate stacks to 9 m and the revised Site Emergency Plan, the risk profile for Sandgate had reduced to an acceptable level. He stated that the Site Emergency Plan provided a credible evacuation scenario with a high likelihood that within 45 minutes of the evacuation being initiated occupants in St Joseph's can be evacuated to a place of safety. 6. Dr du Plessis stated that the Sandgate site is fully compliant with AS 4326, which he noted only requires a minimum stack separation distance of 3 m. He said that the maximum quantity of ammonium nitrate that would explode since moving to 9 m separation would be one stack (500 tonnes). He also noted that the fire suppression system is an important control system that will prevent an uncontrollable fire taking hold in the ammonium nitrate store. Dr du Plessis stated that, in his opinion, the Sandgate facility fully complies with the requirements of SAFEX, and the West Australian and Queensland standards. 7. Dr du Plessis provided a further report in May 2020, largely in response to comments made by Dr Massey on his March report. In that report he noted that, since the earlier version of the Site Emergency Plan, Crawford's had had additional discussions with the St Joseph's aged care facility which identified the availability of a bunker. He stated that this change means that there is a greater likelihood that within 45 minutes of the evacuation being initiated occupants of the facility can be evacuated to a place of safety. 8. In his reports Dr du Plessis said that Crawfords having in place a number of best practice controls serves to eliminate the possibility of an explosion of ammonium nitrate stored on-site. When questioned at the hearing, Dr du Plessis acknowledged that many of the controls were administrative and that administrative controls can break down. He said, however, that the controls are multilayered so that if one mechanism falls over or somebody does the wrong thing there are other controls that will come into play. He said that these controls cannot eliminate the possibility of an explosion but certainly do reduce the possibility. He said that if a number of controls are not complied with then there could be an incident that could lead to an explosion of ammonium nitrate. He noted that failure of fire protection systems 5 to 10% of the time is a general proposition of any fire system. In addition, the fire must be detected quickly enough so that a warning can be conveyed to permit evacuation. 9. Dr du Plessis also conducted a review, based on a search of the SAFEX incident database for events reported relating to ammonium nitrate. He concluded that there is not a single incident report where a storage facility of the type operated by Crawfords at Sandgate has exploded. He also referred to an article in the Journal of Hazardous Materials in 2016 which contained a review of ammonium nitrate storage incidents. The author of that article, Vytenis Babrauskas, concluded that explosions of ammonium nitrate storages will not occur if uncontrollable fires do not occur. Mr Babrauskas discussed a range of measures that could be implemented to prevent uncontrollable fires from occurring, including design and construction of buildings and the installation of an automated sprinkler system. Dr du Plessis stated that, in his opinion, the management procedures, the fact that the buildings are made of non-combustible material and the heat activated fire water deluge system implemented at Sandgate provide a safe storage such that the risk of explosion is remote. He noted that the water deluge system is attached to the main water supply pipeline for Newcastle and will continue to operate in the event of loss of power. Ronald Peddie 1. Ronald Peddie is a Fellow of the Institute of Chemical Engineers with a lengthy experience in the ammonium nitrate, nitric acid and explosive industries. He is also an expert panel member for SAFEX and has provided several reports in these proceedings. The report primarily relied upon by Crawfords is that of 20 March 2020 in which Mr Peddie provides a risk assessment of the Sandgate facility if Shed C is added to the licence. This was a follow up to a quantitative hazard analysis report of 18 December 2019. His report relies upon 9 m separation between ammonium nitrate stacks. 2. Mr Peddie identified various hazards and undertook an assessment of risk using the HIRAC (Hazard Identification Risk Assessment and Control) method. The hazards he identified are: fire in warehouse; contamination in warehouse; projectile impact on warehouse (excluding sabotage and malicious acts); transport and forklift incidents; movement into the warehouse and stacking incident; transport rail wagon incident; Shed D (which does not store ammonium nitrate) incident leading to fire; and hopper fire. He concluded that the only way the ammonium nitrate stored at Sandgate would explode would be because of fire. 3. In relation to the possibility of a fire resulting from contamination, Mr Peddie did not consider that to be a credible scenario as there is no known instance worldwide of such a cause in a dedicated bagged ammonium nitrate store. He stated there is only one known chemical which can react with ammonium nitrate to cause an explosion. Any other contamination would be dealt with as a fire. In relation to the consequences of a projectile causing detonation of ammonium nitrate in the warehouse, Mr Peddie stated that a projectile such as a truck, plane or rocket launcher does not have enough kinetic energy to detonate solid ammonium nitrate and any impact is not expected to cause a fire as there are no fuels present in the warehouse. He said that it is possible that an explosion could occur as a result of sophisticated sabotage but the probability of that occurring is very low. 4. Mr Peddie stated that, with 9 m separation between stacks, there will not be sympathetic detonation of other stacks and modelling was therefore done on the basis of a single 500 tonne stack explosion. He undertook a consequence analysis of the identified hazards and estimated the impact of overpressure from a blast at various distances from the Crawfords site and then assessed risk. In general, he used the SAFEX guide in his analysis to generate data for use in a risk assessment against the criteria from HIPAP 4. HIPAP 4 identifies different risk thresholds for different types of land uses in relation to the risk of injury or fatality. For example, the risk threshold for hospitals, schools, child care centres and aged care facilities is much lower than for industrial sites. As a result, industrial sites may be located closer to the site of a potential blast than sensitive or vulnerable facilities such as residential areas or aged care facilities. In assessing consequences and risk, Mr Peddie took into account a range of risk reduction factors based on controls in place at Crawfords. 5. Mr Peddie said that the most important risk control measures in place at the Sandgate facility, in addition to the fact that ammonium nitrate itself is a stable material with only external fire being able to cause an incident, are that the building is constructed of non-flammable material, there is no fuel in the store and a high integrity fire suppression system is present. In his analysis Mr Peddie referred to a number of other administrative controls in place but said that these do not have the same value as those cited above. At the hearing Mr Peddie acknowledged that administrative controls could break down through non-compliance but said that this would lead to only a minor incident at the Sandgate stores because of the other controls in place. 6. Mr Peddie concluded that the individual risk of injury or fatality at the various sites surrounding the Sandgate store is below the thresholds in HIPAP 4. He reached this conclusion as his analysis showed that the maximum overpressure (the shock wave from the blast) at sensitive and residential sites near Crawfords would be less than 7 kPa. 7. Mr Peddie disagrees with the findings of Ms Green and Dr du Plessis and states that the approach of Ms Green is far too conservative. He said that Ms Green's calculations were out by a factor of 10, making her 10 times more conservative in her approach to risk that is required by HIPAP 4. In his opinion, the controls in place at the Sandgate facility achieve the equivalence of separation distances as required by the WA Code and Qld 1B53. 8. TNT equivalence is a method for calculating properties of an explosive to TNT to give a standardised result which, in this case, is then used to calculated overpressure. Mr Peddie relied upon a TNT equivalence of 10% in his assessment which he states is derived from SAFEX. SAFEX also uses 32 % equivalence in certain circumstances. Mr Peddie did not apply 32% equivalence as is applied in QLD IB53 as he said that that is only for a very high impact explosion which he said his risk assessment showed to be of low probability. He did not expect an equivalency of 32% and used 10% as that was in line with actual risk to the community. Ms Green in her assessment applied 32% equivalency. The WA Code uses 20% to 25% equivalency. In his overpressure calculations Mr Peddie used a figure of 5% which he states derives from SAFEX for fire. He agreed at the hearing that a higher equivalency would change the results of his analysis as would a higher assessment of the risk probability. Mr Peddie stated that his findings are based on actual risk and actual frequency or probability to calculate overpressure at particular distances. Ian Dennison 1. Ian Dennison is an engineer with a lengthy worldwide experience in heavy industry, including the mining industry. He has particular expertise in explosives and associated materials, site location, safety distances and risk assessment. Mr Dennison provided an expert report in July 2020 and gave evidence at the hearing. 2. Mr Dennison stated that the grade of ammonium nitrate stored in bags at Sandgate will only explode under extreme circumstances of total and prolonged fire engulfment, heavy and well mixed contamination, or a powerful adjacent explosion. He said that if these three mechanisms can be eliminated ammonium nitrate can be stored with no risk of explosion. In his opinion the likelihood of total and prolonged fire engulfment at the Crawfords site is extremely low, and the likelihood of the other two mechanisms occurring is negligible. He also stated that no dedicated store containing bagged ammonium nitrate has ever exploded. 3. Mr Dennison stated that globally there are several standards, codes and guidance relating to the storage of ammonium nitrate. Most have similar guidance against the dangers of fire, contamination and adjacent explosions, but he states that there is a wide divergence in managing the off-site risk arising from the potential for explosion. He states that most codes recommend a risk assessment approach or are silent on the matter. He said there are only two jurisdictions globally, WA and Queensland, which recommend quantity distances for ammonium nitrate. He stated that those two jurisdictions also allow deviation from the recommended distances based on risk assessment. 4. Mr Dennison carried out an inspection of the Sandgate site and referred to various publications and codes. He noted that, while ammonium nitrate can support combustion, this occurs in certain circumstances only. Mr Dennison said that the fact that the store itself is not combustible is very significant, as is the presence of the sprinkler system. He stated that any fire which did occur could be readily extinguished in its early stages with a fire hose or by a sprinkler system (around 40 minutes for a burning pallet or equivalent). It was also his view that a fire could probably be extinguished by the same means even after a significant quantity of the ammonium nitrate had started to melt and decompose. In addition, Mr Dennison said that the effect of the sprinklers would also be to keep the ammonium nitrate cooler than it otherwise would be thus delaying or preventing an explosion. He therefore concluded that it would be extremely unlikely that there would be any explosion at the Crawfords ammonium nitrate stores if the sprinklers were operating. 5. In relation to the sprinkler system, Mr Dennison said that in his risk assessment he gave it an effectiveness of 90%, that is, that there would be at 10% failure rate of system, but in his view the system would in fact work effectively much more frequently. In his analysis Mr Dennison also set out a range of administrative controls in place at Crawfords to prevent or mitigate the effects of any incident. 6. Mr Dennison assessed the Crawfords site against a number of codes and guidelines, including HIPAP 4, SAFEX, the WA Code, Qld IB53, AS 4326 and AS 2187 which applies to the storage and transport of Class 1 explosives (of which none are stored at the Crawfords site). He notes that, in relation to codes etc which specify separation or quantity distances, there is a good deal of variation and some inconsistency. Mr Dennison also states that each of the codes that prescribes distances allows for some relaxation of distances or flexibility based on risk assessment. In his opinion, a risk-based approach such as the SAFEX or IMESAFR approaches, is the best way to determine appropriate separation distances for ammonium nitrate storage rather than set prescriptive distances. 7. Mr Dennison's assessment concentrated on the risk to off-site populations arising from an explosion in Shed C. He stated that his analysis shows that the site fully complies with the Explosives Act and Regulation, AS 4326, the SAFEX recommended risk criteria for a new site and HIPAP 4 recommended risk criteria. Mr Dennison was also of the opinion that the site would be accepted by both the WA and Queensland authorities based on his SAFEX risk assessment, a conventional quantitative risk assessment (HIRAC based), and/or an IMESAFR, especially as an existing site. 8. Mr Dennison also reviewed the other risk assessments submitted by Crawfords in these proceedings. He largely agreed with the reports of the other experts that the granting of the licence for Shed C would not impose unacceptable risks to off-site populations. Mr Dennison is of the view that the site presents acceptable risk to off-site populations without relying on evacuation. He states that in an extremely unlikely event of a fire that could lead to explosion, the priority for evacuation should be the railway. Mitigation 1. The Qld IB53 states that "Where the separation distance cannot be achieved the license holder must put in place stringent housekeeping requirements, additional security requirements and an emergency response plan that ensures minimum effect on personnel and property." The WA Code also states that deviations from the recommended practice will be justified if it can be demonstrated that the use of alternative risk control measures provide an equivalent or lower level of risk. It was generally accepted at the hearing that, in circumstances where separation distances can't be achieved, steps may be taken to reduce the risks to the same or similar level as if the separation distances were in place. 2. Crawfords relied upon its Site Emergency Plan, as revised, to demonstrate that an effective evacuation could be conducted in the event of a critical incident involving the ammonium nitrate at the Sandgate facility. 3. In her July 2019 report Ms Green refers to the importance of a site emergency plan, including evacuation plans. Evacuation may be one of the steps taken to mitigate the consequences of an explosion. Ms Green also states that in the event of an uncontrollable fire, the fire suppression system installed by Crawfords in the storage sheds at Sandgate would have the effect of cooling the fire, thereby increasing the length of the warning period before detonation would occur. She states that this would increase the time available to evacuate surrounding areas. At the hearing Ms Green said that mitigation would rely upon the effectiveness of the evacuation plan itself and how effectively it was implemented. 4. Ms Green also submitted a report dated 8 May 2020. In that report she provides advice on the blast overpressure effects to "an evacuation bunker" within the St Joseph's aged care facility in the event of detonation of an ammonium nitrate stack at Shed C. From the drawings provided, the evacuation bunker is in fact three areas (hallways) within the facility which have thick concrete walls and ceilings and no exposure to glass. Ms Green modelled two scenarios – 1) fire contributing to 10% of a 500 tonne stack exploding resulting in 3.6 kPa side on blast pressure, and 2) 100% contribution of a 500 tonne stack explosion resulting in 9.8 kPa side on blast pressure. She did not undertake a detailed structural analysis of the building but conducted a desktop review of blast effects guidance from a number of sources in order to estimate the consequence of a blast load on the building. 5. Ms Green stated that the only way injury can occur to people in the bunker is from collapse of the building. She found that in the event of either a 50 tonne or 500 tonne explosion it is highly unlikely that the bunker would be significantly damaged to cause injury or death to people who were in the bunker. 6. At the hearing Ms Green clarified that her findings were based upon the assumption that all residents and staff made it to the bunker location prior to any explosion and overpressure wave. She also said that her findings in relation to the risk of fatal injury to persons within blast zones other than St Joseph's still apply. 7. In a letter dated 11 May 2020 Dr du Plessis agreed with Ms Green's conclusions that it is highly unlikely that the evacuation bunker will be significantly damaged to cause death or injury in the event of an explosion of 50 or 500 tonnes of ammonium nitrate. In his opinion, the results demonstrate a credible level of risk reduction to St Joseph's and meet the key requirements and intent of SAFEX , the WA Code and Qld IB53 in a case where a storage facility is unable to meet the recommended separation distances to vulnerable facilities. 8. Dr du Plessis said at the hearing that he accepted that the emergency plans put in place by Crawfords are credible. He said that the Plan now deals with evacuation of St Joseph's aged care facility so that persons can be evacuated to a place of safety. He did acknowledge that the Plan does not specifically deal with everybody else who may be within the 1000 m such as people in residential areas, industrial areas, on the train, in the cemetery or at the golf course. Dr du Plessis said that it was his understanding that if there was a fire for example, the emergency services would be notified as well as Transport NSW and those agencies would swing into action to deal with other sites. He conceded that if emergency services did not think it was credible that within 45 minutes of a fire commencing evacuation of all people within 1000 m could be realistically done the risk profile may not be reduced to an acceptable level. He also agreed that if all residents of St Joseph's were not able to be evacuated to a place of safety within 45 minutes, even with a single stack explosion, they would be exposed. 9. In relation to St Joseph's, Mr Dennison stated that even without evacuation the fatality and major injury risk at St Joseph's is low from any possible explosion, although minor injury (minor cuts and abrasions) risk would be quite high. He said that the bunker would provide an excellent evacuation point and would obviate the need for evacuation to an outside area. Mr Dennison is also of the view that the Emergency Response Plan put in place by Crawfords is appropriate and adequate to deal with any incident. He also states that Crawfords safety management system is appropriate for managing the hazards and risks to safety associated with storing ammonium nitrate. 10. Mr Peddie also agreed that the bunker at St Joseph's is an appropriate evacuation point and satisfies all relevant codes, standards and guides. Daniel Massey 1. Daniel Massey is a State Inspector with SafeWork NSW. Dr Massey made four statements in these proceedings dated 2 April 2020, 28 July 2020, 30 September 2020 and 2 October 2020. Dr Massey did not give evidence at the hearing as he was not required for cross-examination. 2. Much of Dr Massey's statements are a critique of the reports submitted by the Crawford's experts. He does not support the contention that steps taken to reduce the risk of an explosion occurring so that the likelihood of an explosion occurring is low can be seen to provide equivalent protection to the community. This is because consequence based distances such as those applied by the WA Code and Qld IB53 provide protection to the community even in the low likelihood that an explosion occurs. 3. Dr Massey is particularly critical of the reports by Mr Peddie and his view is that Mr Peddie relies substantially on administrative controls to prevent a fire and explosion. He states that previous incidents in other facilities has demonstrated that administrative controls are not sufficiently robust or reliable as they depend on people implementing them correctly and consistently. In his opinion, control such as separation distances provide continuous and effective consequence mitigation in all circumstances. Dr Massey also refers to what he believes are errors in Mr Peddie's approach to the calculation of risk and notes that he reaches a significantly different outcome to that of Ms Green and Dr du Plessis. Dr Massey disputes the low value for TNT equivalence included in Mr Peddie's assessment. 4. Dr Massey is also very critical of Mr Dennison's assessment and questions the underlying assumptions in that report. He states that of the experts engaged by Crawfords, Mr Dennison's quantitative risk assessment employed the most generous assumptions which led to a conclusion that Shed C would be an acceptable risk in any highly populated location. Dr Massey contrasts Mr Dennison's conclusions with those of Ms Green and Dr du Plessis which found the risk was not tolerable according to HIPAP 4 criteria and evacuation of all persons within 1000 m was an essential safety measure. 5. Dr Massey expresses the view that the exclusion from any risk assessment of the possible initiation of ammonium nitrate by projectiles or explosives, such as by sabotage or terrorist activity, is not warranted as it is a valid concern that must be assessed. 6. Dr Massey refers to the reports of Ms Green and Dr du Plessis and their conclusion that in the event of a 500 tonne stack exploding an evacuation distance of 1000 m from the site should be affected within 45 minutes. He notes that, for a fire involving a 500 tonne stack of ammonium nitrate, QLD IB53 requires evacuation to a distance of 966 m and the WA Code requires evacuation to a distance of 1110 m which is broadly consistent with the 1000 m recommended by Ms Green and Dr du Plessis. 7. Dr Massey states that the emergency plan prepared by Crawfords does not substantively describe procedures to evacuate neighbouring persons and facilities to a 1000 m distance. In relation to the plan to evacuate people at St Joseph's to the bunker, Dr Massey expresses considerable doubt that such an evacuation could be achieved within 45 minutes, particularly as some residents are non-ambulant and additional issues would be encountered if an incident occurred at night. Dr Massey states that other issues, such as medical issues and the ongoing need to provide care to residents who are in the bunker are not addressed. He also estimates that the area described as the bunker is too small to accommodate all residents at St Joseph's and staff of St Joseph's and Crawfords (who, under the plan, would muster at St Joseph's). 8. Dr Massey also comments that the photographs and videos attached to the affidavit of Mr Tracy dated 12 May 2020 do not clearly show where the proposed evacuation areas begin and end. He also states that the videos depict multiple objects in the hallways typical of an aged care facility which could represent obstacles during an evacuation, particularly for non-ambulant residents, to the proposed evacuation point. 9. In Dr Massey's opinion, the complexity of evacuating an aged care facility under emergency conditions and within tight timeframes emphasises the superiority of separation distances as a control measure when assessing the safety of facilities at risk from a potential explosion. Dr Massey states that separation provides a higher level, more robust control than can be achieved by the existing risk controls at Crawfords. In his view, separation provides effective protection to the community irrespective of historical likelihood, irrespective of assumptions made in modelling, irrespective of emergency planning and irrespective of the quality of administrative controls like policies and procedures. He concludes that separation provides effective protection irrespective of any unforeseen or unexpected series of events that may occur. 10. Dr Massey states that it is appropriate to consider alternative measures to separation where they are reasonable and offer equivalent safety to separation. He cites credible evacuation as an example measure permitted in other contexts. He notes that the number and nature of sites within 1000 m of the Sandgate facility makes evacuation of all persons in a 1000 m radius within 45 minutes are highly complex and demanding task. In his view the material provided to date by Crawfords does not demonstrate that evacuation can credibly and safely occur within 45 minutes. His comments in relation to evacuation to the bunker at St Joseph's are noted above. Dr Massey further states that even if evacuation to the bunker at St Joseph's was deemed credible, no detailed evidence has been provided about how all other persons within a 1000 m radius of the facility could be evacuated within 45 minutes. NSW Police and Fire and Rescue NSW 1. Reports have been provided in these proceedings by NSW Police and Fire and Rescue NSW in relation to evacuation plans if an incident were to occur at the Sandgate site. Neither officer who provided the report appeared at the hearing. 2. Chief Superintendent Michael Morris is the Chief Superintendent, Community Safety and Research within Fire and Rescue NSW. He has extensive experience in emergency management in NSW. Chief Superintendent Morris was asked by SafeWork NSW for his opinion on the suitability and effectiveness of the Site Emergency Plan developed for Crawfords and the evacuation plans. 3. In his report Chief Superintendent Morris referred to various sections within the Site Emergency Plan and stated that the Plan contains internally inconsistent and conflicting advice. He noted that the Plan includes secondary evacuation points that are within the 1000 m evacuation radius for Crawfords staff and others from neighbouring facilities. Chief Superintendent Morris states that the Plan "proposes actions inconsistent with achieving the stated evacuation objective and is therefore not suitable or effective for achieving the stated evaluation objective". 4. In Chief Superintendent Morris' opinion, the Plan does not demonstrate that evacuation of all persons to 1000 m within 45 minutes can credibly be achieved. He stated that the fact that the 1000 m radius includes an aged care facility with up to 130 residents, the majority of whom are non-ambulatory, a residential/commercial area to the east, Sandgate Cemetery, a residential area and sections of the commercial district to the south and some residential areas to the west, will require a significant and coordinated response from police and emergency services. He states there would be a significant number of ambulances needed to evacuate the 130 residents from St Joseph's and that it is unlikely that this outcome could be achieved within the evacuation timeframe. He states that there is no evidence that suitable and effective plans to evacuate patients, staff and other personnel from the St Joseph's facility have been put in place. 5. In relation to the proposed evacuation point within the hallways at St Joseph's (the bunker), Chief Superintendent Morris stated that in terms of location the evacuation points may be suitable, but stated that they were not suitable to receive up to 130 non-ambulant residents, up to 134 St Joseph's and Crawfords staff and an unknown number of staff from other facilities and to hold them there for the duration of an emergency. He also does not consider that evacuation to the bunker could be achieved within the timeframe allowed. 6. Detective Superintendent Wayne Humphrey, NSW Police Force, is attached to the Newcastle City Police District. He has specialised knowledge and experience in emergency management and evacuations within the NSW Police Force. In his opinion, an evacuation of all people in the open or in a building within 1000 m of the Sandgate site within 45 minutes is highly unlikely to be achieved. 7. Detective Superintendent Humphrey states that the 1000 m exclusion and evacuation zone consists primarily of urban areas including a large aged care facility of approximately 130 residents, potentially 153 residential and commercial buildings and the implementation of 12 major traffic control points. He states that because of the vulnerability of the residents at St Joseph's, evacuation would require specialist care and triage by NSW Ambulance. Detective Superintendent Humphrey states that, allowing for initial attendance by NSW Police from notification of an incident, briefing from Fire and Rescue NSW and Crawfords staff, police would have 20 to 25 minutes to implement traffic control points, prepare, plan and execute the evacuation removing all persons from within the 1000 m zone. He notes that the incident would completely absorb available resources within the Newcastle City Police District and there would likely be a need for additional resources. He states that a response of this scale would also be significantly affected by the time of the incident, police rostered staffing levels, vehicular traffic and weather. 8. Detective Superintendent Humphrey estimates that it would take 1 to 6 hours to move affected persons to assembly areas. Hence, he concludes that evacuation within 45 minutes is highly unlikely to be achieved. Consideration 1. All experts were closely questioned about the assumptions underlying their assessments. There is no doubt that the outcome of the modelling is dependent on the validity of the inputs. SafeWork NSW focussed particularly on issues associated with separation distance between stacks of ammonium nitrate in the sheds and on whether ammonium nitrate was unloaded or dispatched using trucks and hopper bins inside or outside the sheds. SafeWork NSW expressed considerable concern that, although these measures are deemed to be best practice (see the audit report of Dr du Plessis), they had not been implemented from 2013 when development consent was given up to 2019 or 2020. I am satisfied, based upon the evidence of Mr Crawford, that the hopper operations have in fact been moved outside the sheds and that a separation distance of 9 m between stacks is being implemented. I also note that Mr Crawford is willing to have these matters imposed as conditions on the licence should it be granted. The assessment should therefore be made on this basis and, if a licence granted, such conditions can be included with some specificity. 2. The experts who gave evidence at the hearing were also questioned about the significance of the Beirut explosion which occurred during the preliminary stages of this matter before the Tribunal. Their evidence, which I accept, is that there are significant differences between the dedicated ammonium nitrate store at Sandgate and what occurred in Beirut where there was little stack separation and various fuels, including fireworks, oils and kerosene along with other materials, were stored with ammonium nitrate. The Beirut facility was not a dedicated bagged ammonium nitrate warehouse. There were also reported deficiencies in the emergency response to the incident. 3. There was general agreement amongst the experts that the only way ammonium nitrate will detonate is if it is engulfed by fire. According to Mr Peddie, this means that every effort must be made to eliminate fire. He said that stores around the world work towards this aim. Mr Peddie referred to incidents at West, Texas and Beirut and said these fires resulted from breaches of regulations. Dr Massey and Dr du Plessy also detailed incidents which have occurred around the world over the past 100 or so years. These incidents are not of great relevance other than to demonstrate that explosions involving ammonium nitrate can happen. 4. Dr Massey was critical of the exclusion of contamination and projectile impact as means by which a fire could take hold leading to explosion of ammonium nitrate. I accept, however, that the risk profile for these events is very low, although they cannot be completely discounted. 5. Crawfords was very critical of the fact that SafeWork NSW did not undertake its own quantitative risk analysis and is of the view that the evidence of Dr Massey is inferior to that of its qualified experts. Crawfords states that, in the absence of a quantitative risk assessment from a qualified expert engaged by SafeWork NSW, the technical opinions of its experts, including assessment of risk, should be accepted. As SafeWork NSW points out, however, it is up to Crawfords to demonstrate that it has appropriate facilities, systems and procedures in place to store 4,500 tonnes of ammonium nitrate safely and securely in Shed C. 6. In any event, based on the evidence of the experts and taking into account the evidence of the controls in place at Crawfords, I am satisfied that the risk of an explosion occurring at the Sandgate facility is very low. Ms Green's assessment is that, based on SAFEX, the probability of a fire leading to detonation of a 500 tonne stack of ammonium nitrate is 25 times in 1 million operating years (although this does not include any mitigating factors and IMESAFR provides a lower probability). Mr Dennison's assessment is that the risk is in fact far lower than this. I note SafeWork NSW's criticism of administrative controls, but these are a necessary feature of any safety or security system. In the case of Sandgate, these are backed up by stronger controls such as the non-flammable nature of the building, the fact that there are no contaminants in the sheds and the sprinkler system which is connected directly to the water main, is powerful and is well maintained. These controls are therefore afforded greater weight in any assessment when compared to administrative controls which may be subject to the vagaries of human behaviour. 7. Crawfords submits that, in assessing risk, it is wrong to look at only the consequences of an explosive event. It is stated that the likelihood of property damage, injury and fatality from an explosive event must all be considered. Crawfords states that its expert witnesses have each demonstrated that the storage of ammonium nitrate at the Sandgate facility represents an acceptable risk having regard to the nature of other facilities surrounding the ammonium nitrate store. In particular, Crawfords states that the risks meet the risk criteria in HIPAP 4. 8. However, having accepted that it is open to SafeWork NSW to consider the consequences of an explosion (in addition to matters concerning the likelihood of such an explosion occurring) when determining whether Crawfords has the appropriate facilities, systems and procedures in place for the safe and secure handling of the ammonium nitrate it wishes to store in Shed C, the effect of an explosion on the surrounding area (however unlikely an event that might be) must be considered. 9. I accept the evidence of Dr Massey that applying quantity-based consequence distances (separation distances) is a standard and long-standing approach to public safety, particularly in relation to explosives. It is also apparent that SAFEX, AS 4326, the WA Code and Qld IB53 all reference separation distances, albeit to a different degree. Separation distances are based on ensuring that in the event of a store of ammonium nitrate exploding, the effects would not result in significant fatalities, injuries or property damage. Out of all the material placed before the Tribunal in this matter, the WA Code best describes the relationship between controls put in place to prevent an incident occurring and the use of separation distances to reduce community consequences if an event does occur. The Code states: Separation distances are intended to give additional backup protection to the community and are a consequence reduction control – they do not replace the need for the diligent application of the prevention controls of this Code. 1. In an article by Francois Le Doux attached to the 11 May 2020 report of Mr Peddie ("How to assess the probability risk of explosion in AN storage?", SAFEX Newsletter No 72 April 2020), Mr Le Doux states: In a deterministic risk assessment study, let us say a QD approach (QD quantity distance), the occurrence of the explosion is simply assumed. It is not related to possible accident scenarios or the sensitivity of the material. Still the sensitivity of the material must be considered in evaluating the fraction of product that actually would explode, and the possibility or not of sympathetic detonation to other stacks. In a probabilistic risk assessment, let us say a QRA (quantitative risk assessment), the probability of occurrence of the unwanted event (here an explosion) is taken into account. Credits are considered for the safeguards in the best practices being applied. Performing a QRA involves estimating both the Probability of the event occurring, and the Consequences if it does occur. 1. I have accepted that separation distances should be taken into account in determining whether a license should be granted. Crawfords correctly points out that there are differences between the various guidelines and codes referred to above about the separation distances required between an ammonium nitrate store and certain facilities. Crawfords is required to comply with AS 4326 which, at paragraph 9.3.2 provides: 9.3.2 Separation distances to vulnerable facilities and critical infrastructure The regulatory authority shall be consulted with regard to any separation distances relating to stores for ammonium nitrate. 1. The codes and guides referred to in these proceedings in general categorise surrounding buildings and facilities according to their purpose, for example, industrial, residential and vulnerable facilities. Vulnerable facilities usually include healthcare facilities, childcare facilities, schools, major traffic terminals and major public utilities among other things. Much of the evidence in these proceedings related to vulnerable facilities near the Sandgate storage facility and, in particular, St Joseph's aged care facility. 2. Ammonium Nitrate Guidance Note No. 4, Council of Australian Governments states that any new ammonium nitrate storage/manufacturing facilities should be located away from vulnerable facilities to be determined by consulting AS 2187.1 – 1998: Explosives – Storage, transport and use, Part 1: Storage and the relevant table within the standard. SafeWork NSW calculates that in accordance with the relevant table in AS 2187.1 vulnerable facilities should be at least 1913 m from a 250 tonne stack of ammonium nitrate. 3. IB53 issued by the Queensland regulator provides that a facility storing 500 tonnes of ammonium nitrate will need to be placed 2410 m away from vulnerable facilities and 966 m away from protected works such as houses, churches, schools, hospitals, public buildings, theatres, shops, factories and warehouses among other things. The distance from an undivided 2000 tonne stack is 3826 m. 4. The WA Code recommends that the separation distance from vulnerable facilities and critical infrastructure for a 500 tonne stack of ammonium nitrate is 1110 m. For an undivided 2000 tonne stack of ammonium nitrate, the distance is 1762 m. The SAFEX International Good Practice Guide provides that the prescribed distance from an undivided 2000 tonne stack of ammonium nitrate is 2628 m. 5. Based on the expert evidence provided by Crawfords, I accept that the most likely risk to surrounding facilities would arise from the explosion of a single 500 tonne stack of ammonium nitrate. There was unanimity of view amongst the experts that moving to 9 m stack separation would prevent sympathetic detonation of other stacks in Shed C. Shed C is separated by more than 9 m from the other sheds and so sympathetic detonation of other sheds is not an issue. 6. The experts differed on the quantity of ammonium nitrate which would contribute to an explosion. Ms Green and indeed Dr Massey were more conservative in their estimates referring to a 32% equivalence while Mr Dennison assessed only a 5% or 10% contribution. Ms Green also stated in her evidence to the Tribunal that her report, particularly that of September 2019, was based on a worst-case scenario at the request of the Department of Planning. Crawfords submits that because that report contained assumptions which are not applicable to the actual situation at the Sandgate facility, the later reports of Mr Peddie and Mr Dennison should be preferred. 7. As Mr Le Doux states in his article referred to above, the separation distance approach assumes an explosion will occur. In my view Ms Green's approach should be preferred as it deals with what could happen, even though that is unlikely. This led her to consider that an evacuation zone at 1000 m should be implemented in the event of an explosion. As noted above, Mr Dennison and Mr Peddie did not agree with Ms Green's approach but in my view a more conservative approach is desirable and warranted when dealing with issues of public safety. I therefore accept her conclusions that evacuation to 1000 m in the event of an explosion (however unlikely that might be to occur) is necessary. 8. Crawfords in its submissions states that Ms Green in her subsequent report, that is, the 8 May 2020 report, found that the risk was acceptable. I note, however, that that report dealt with the evacuation of St Joseph's to the bunker and the assessments were made in relation to people in the bunker. This report did not deal with people in the open or in other parts of the building or in other locations within the 1000 m evacuation zone. 9. The evidence put before the Tribunal is generally to the effect that, if separation distances are unable to be met, action can be taken to mitigate the effects of any blast to ensure an equivalent level of safety. 10. In its submissions Crawfords states that the WA Code and Qld IB53 specifically make provision for risk assessment when suggested separation distances are not possible, including consideration of mitigating factors such as the composition of the storage facility itself, the presence of a fire suppression system, stack size and separation, 24-hour security, and other matters identified for example in Crawfords security, emergency and safety management plans. Contrary to this submission, the WA Code and Qld IB53 do not contain details of what matters may be considered as mitigating factors. As the WA Code notes, separation distances are in addition to other prevention controls and both it and Qld IB53 set out requirements for the construction of facilities and fire equipment along with stack separation distances and security requirements as part of their licensing requirements. I agree with SafeWork NSW the matters put forward by Crawfords as mitigating factors all relate to the low likelihood of an explosion of the ammonium nitrate at the Sandgate facility occurring, rather than factors which may mitigate the effects of an explosion which has occurred. 11. A distinction needs to be made between steps which can be taken by a licensee to reduce the likelihood of an incident occurring and steps which can be taken to reduce the consequences of such an incident should it occur, even if that is unlikely. It is in this context that separation distances provide an extra level of protection to the public in addition to steps taken to reduce the likelihood of a fire leading to an explosion occurring. As was acknowledged at the hearing by the Crawfords experts, administrative controls can fail and, indeed, on Mr Dennison's assumptions built into his assessment, the sprinkler system itself could fail 10% of the time (although, to be fair, he stated that was unlikely in this situation). In my view, therefore, steps which can be taken to ensure an equivalent level of safety if separation distances can't be met must relate to steps which can be taken if the controls which are put in place to prevent an explosion fail. 12. In this case the only credible scenario is an ability to evacuate persons in the vicinity of the Sandgate facility within an appropriate timeframe. As noted above, there was some acceptance of that at the hearing and I see no need to deviate from the findings of Ms Green that evacuation of persons in the open or in a building within 1000 m of the site within 45 minutes would provide equivalent protection. 13. In its submissions Crawfords submits that its Site Emergency Plan meets all requirements and refers particularly to St Joseph's. The submission states that St Joseph's and other residents closest to the facility will not experience over pressure of 7kPa or greater in the event of an explosion at the Sandgate facility. The submission notes that an over pressure of 7kPa gives rise to a 10% risk of injury and no fatality according to HIPAP 4. In these circumstances, Crawfords submits that evacuation or evacuation to the bunker at St Joseph's are mitigation measures which reduce the risk of injury to persons present at St Joseph's in the event of an explosive event. 14. SafeWork NSW submits that Crawfords has not put forth a credible, feasible or convincing evacuation plan. As can be seen from the table set out earlier in these reasons there are a number of facilities within 1000 m of Crawfords. These include other industrial sites, residential areas, a cemetery, a golf club and St Joseph's aged care facility. The material submitted by Crawfords to SafeWork NSW and to the Tribunal deals with evacuation of St Joseph's. There is little reference to the evacuation of any other residential homes, businesses or other facilities. The evidence of Detective Superintendent Humphrey and Chief Superintendent Morris is that evacuation of all persons to 1000 m within 45 minutes cannot credibly be achieved. Their evidence is set out above need not be repeated here. Both have considerable experience in emergency management and evacuation and I accept their views. 15. Crawfords argues that its Site Emergency Plan has been accepted in the past in relation to its licenses and so should be again. It is not clear to me why that should be so, particularly as this assessment is a new assessment and involves the consideration of separation distances along with other issues formerly taken into account. 16. Crawfords has proposed that, instead of evacuating all persons from St Joseph's, which includes Crawfords staff who have gone there to a muster point, to another location, evacuation to an internal bunker could occur. As explained above, the bunker is in fact three separate hallway areas. Chief Superintendent Morris is of the view that the areas could be suitable evacuation points in terms of their construction. The only substantial evidence in relation to the bunkers has been provided by photographs and videos attached to the statement of Mr Tracey. This information however does not deal with how 130 residents, many of whom are non-ambulatory or may have other medical conditions, plus staff can be accommodated in the relevant areas or moved there within the required timeframe. 17. The experts engaged by Crawfords have all commented that the bunker would be a suitable evacuation site. None, however, have expertise in evacuation or have provided any detailed, credible evidence about how evacuation to these areas could be achieved. There is also no evidence before the Tribunal from the St Joseph's facility itself as to the feasibility of moving all residents and staff to the bunker areas within 45 minutes. 18. I am not satisfied, particularly in light of the evidence from Chief Superintendent Morris and Detective Superintendent Humphrey, that evacuation of all persons in the open or in buildings within a 1000 m radius could be achieved. Even if I were satisfied that evacuation to the bunker within St Joseph's was reasonably practicable, this would not deal with the residences, businesses and other facilities which would also need to be evacuated. 19. Before concluding, I note that Mr Crawford, Mr Peddie and Mr Dennison all made comments about the enhanced risk of transporting ammonium nitrate by trucks from other locations rather than from the storage facility at Sandgate. This Is not a matter relevant to my consideration. Nor might I add is any adverse impact the refusal of a licence may have on the Crawfords business. 20. Overall, I am satisfied that it has not been demonstrated that Crawfords have in place the appropriate facilities, systems and procedures for the safe and secure handling of 4,500 tonnes of ammonium nitrate to be stored in Shed C. The decision to refuse to amend the licence must therefore be affirmed. Orders 1. The decision under review is affirmed. ********** I hereby certify that this is a true and accurate record of the reasons for decision of the Civil and Administrative Tribunal of New South Wales. Registrar DISCLAIMER - Every effort has been made to comply with suppression orders or statutory provisions prohibiting publication that may apply to this judgment or decision. The onus remains on any person using material in the judgment or decision to ensure that the intended use of that material does not breach any such order or provision. Further enquiries may be directed to the Registry of the Court or Tribunal in which it was generated. Decision last updated: 16 February 2022