Civil and Administrative Tribunal New South Wales Medium Neutral Citation: Deputy Secretary, Local Government, Planning and Policy v Garrard (No 3) [2022] NSWCATOD 35 Hearing dates: 11 March 2022 Date of orders: 17 March 2022 Decision date: 17 March 2022 Jurisdiction: Occupational Division Before: The Hon Jennifer Boland AM, Deputy President Decision: Pursuant to s 482A (2) (c) of the Local Government Act 1993 (NSW) Councillor Paul Garrard is suspended from civic office for a period of two months from the date of these orders. Catchwords: LOCAL GOVERNMENT – councillors – offences relating to civic office Legislation Cited: Local Government Act 1993 (NSW) Cases Cited: Deputy Secretary, Local Government and Planning and Policy v Bryne (No 2) [2021] NSWCATOD 112 Deputy Secretary, Local Government, Planning and Policy v Garrard (No 2) [2021] NSWCATOD 189 Deputy Secretary, Local Government, Planning and Policy v Garrard [2021] NSWCATOD 75 Mehajer v Chief Executive of the Office of Local Government [2014] NSWSC 1804 Office of Local Government v Neville [2013] NSWCATOD 31 Office of Local Government v Smith [2014] NSWCATOD 92. Texts Cited: None cited Category: Principal judgment Parties: Deputy Secretary, Local Government and Planning (Applicant) Paul Garrard (Respondent) Representation: Counsel: M Cobb-Clark (Applicant) Solicitors: Office of Local Government (Applicant) Belling Legal (Respondent) File Number(s): 2020/00348023 Publication restriction: Nil REASONS FOR DECISION Introduction 1. On 22 November 2021 the Tribunal's decision in Deputy Secretary, Local Government, Planning and Policy v Garrard (No 2) [2021] NSWCATOD 189 was published to the parties, and after revocation of non-publication order made by the Independent Commission Against Corruption (the ICAC), the decision was published, as in the usual practice, on NSW Caselaw. The decision set out the Tribunal's findings that Councillor Paul Garrard (the respondent) had breached s 440 (5) of the Local Government Act 1993 (NSW) (the LGA) and was guilty of misconduct (as defined in the LGA). 2. The Tribunal determined the proceedings brought by the Deputy Secretary, Local Government Planning and Policy (the applicant) "on the papers" and made orders for filing evidence and submissions by the parties in respect of Stage 2 proceedings. The matter was then listed for a hearing to be conducted, because of COVID 19 restrictions, by audio visual link on 11 March 2022. 3. These reasons explain why orders are now made suspending the respondent from civil office for a period of two months pursuant to s 482A (2) (c) of the LGA. The Stage 1 decision 1. The applicant's General Law application filed in the Tribunal asserts that the respondent, while a councillor of Parramatta City Council (now Cumberland Council) contravened the Council's Code of Conduct by his participation in consideration of a development application on 26 August 2013 and committed "misconduct" within the meaning of s 440F of the LGA in respect of his participation in consideration of the relevant development application. 2. At [26] of the Stage 1 decision I identified the issues to be decided in the Stage 1 proceedings namely whether the respondent had breached the Code of Conduct and whether he was guilty of misconduct. 3. The respondent admitted he had a non pecuniary interest by reason of a payment he made to Mr Allan Chrara of $28,000 on 15 February 2013 and other cash payments (in respect of which no corroborative evidence exists). The payments, said to total $50,000, were, according to the respondent, to be used, together with funds to be contributed by others as a syndicate, to purchase a racing horse 4. It was not in dispute that the respondent did not declare his financial arrangements with Mr Chrara when, on 26 August 2013, he voted in favour of Mr Chrara's development application for the construction of 51 units on land at Rosehill (the Rosehill property). There is some dispute in the evidence about when the respondent told Mr Chrara that he no longer wished to participate in the horse syndicate and required repayment of his funds. Mr Chrara paid the respondent, by bank cheque, the sum of $50,000 on 2 July 2014 being the same day that Mr Chrara received the sum of $365,500 by way of deposit for the sale of the Rosehill property. Mr Chrara received approximately $6M for the Rosehill property. 5. The respondent says he initially did not perceive he had a conflict of interest in voting in favour of the development application for the Rosehill property, but later, on reflection, acknowledges that he did have a conflict. In his submissions in the Stage 1 proceedings his solicitor said on the respondent's behalf: Importantly, the submissions proceed on the basis of the recognition by Clr Garrard that, to put the matter colloquially, daylight is the best antiseptic and that he should have, at material times, declared a non-pecuniary conflict of interest [Report 79-81] 1. The evidence in the departmental report relied on by the applicant established, to the requisite civil standard, that the respondent had breached the relevant Code of Conduct and was guilty of misconduct (as defined in the LGA). The Legislation and relevant authorities 1. The LGA sets out the type of disciplinary action which may be taken by the Tribunal if it finds the conduct alleged about a councillor proved in proceedings brought under s 438HA or, as in this case, s 440J of the LGA. 2. Section 482A provides as follows: 482A Decision of NCAT—misconduct matters (1) This section applies where a matter has been referred to the Civil and Administrative Tribunal under section 438HA or 440J. (2) The Tribunal may, if it finds that the behaviour concerned warrants action under this section— (a) counsel the councillor, or (b) reprimand the councillor, or (c) suspend the councillor from civic office for a period not exceeding 6 months, or (c1) disqualify the councillor from holding civic office for a period not exceeding 5 years, or (d) suspend the councillor's right to be paid any fee or other remuneration, to which the councillor would otherwise be entitled as the holder of the civic office, in respect of a period not exceeding 6 months (without suspending the councillor from civic office for that period). (3) In determining which action, if any, to take against a councillor, the Tribunal may take into account any previous incidents of misconduct by the councillor, any disciplinary action previously taken against the councillor and any other relevant matters. (4) In this section, councillor includes a former councillor. 1. In interpreting this provision, I respectfully agree with and adopt the reasoning in Deputy Secretary, Local Government Planning and Policy v Byrne (No 2) NSWCATOD 112 (Byrne) at [89]-[91] namely that the provision of s 482A (2) (a) – (d) should be read disjunctively. 2. The authorities on the purpose and effect of disciplinary proceedings are also comprehensively and carefully examined in Byrne at [55]-[59]. In summary, while there are similarities to the principles applicable to disciplinary proceedings in respect of health and legal professionals, the outcome of those proceedings is based on statutory definitions of professional misconduct and differing regimes of practice relative to particular professions. But aspects of these decisions do have relevance to elected officials, particularly public interest considerations. 3. The actions which may be taken under s 482A, serve a number of purposes. First, they have a protective function ensuring that rate-payers and the community's interests are protected and decisions of councillors are made with integrity in the public interest. This accords with the objects of the LGA. Secondly, the authorities note the deterrent effect on the councillor the subject of the proceedings as well as the wider deterrent to other councillors against engaging in like conduct. Finally, orders made uphold the reputation of those councillors who act properly, including in accordance with Codes of Conduct applicable under the LGA and demonstrate delinquent conduct is unacceptable (see Office of Local Government v Neville [2013] NSWCATOD 31). 4. In determining, in the exercise of a broad discretion, which, if any, of the remedies provided in s 482A should apply in a particular case, it is important to consider whether suspension of a councillor will deprive constituents of appropriate representation (see Mehajer v Chief Executive of the Office of Local Government [2014] NSWSC 1804 (Mehajer)) but at the same time weighing that factor against the seriousness of the conduct engaged in by the councillor. 5. Consideration must also be given to matters such as insight, remorse, and the particular circumstances of the councillor including his or her experience as a councillor. The parties competing positions about appropriate orders 1. The applicant, for reasons explained more fully below, submits that the appropriate disciplinary order to be made is under s 482A (2) (c) namely that the respondent be suspended from office for a period of two months. 2. The respondent's position is that no order should be made, or if the Tribunal determines that some order is necessary, that he be reprimanded under s 482A (2) (b). The applicant's submissions 1. Mr Cobb-Clark, counsel for the applicant, provided extensive and helpful written submissions dated respectively 21 December 2021 and 2 February 2022. 2. On behalf of the appellant, Mr Cobb-Clark submits that the nature of the misconduct committed by the respondent requires the Tribunal to take action under s 482A. The submissions emphasise the serious nature of the respondent's misconduct, and after taking into account mitigating factors, submit that a suspension of 2 months is an appropriate action. 3. At para 13 to 21 of his first submissions, Mr Cobb-Clark addresses the seriousness of the respondent's conduct. 4. The submissions note first that for the good administration of local government that councillors "declare and manage" their conflict of interest in accordance with the LGA and the Code. 5. At para 15, it is submitted that the respondent's conduct in not declaring his significant non pecuniary conflict of interest was exacerbated by the fact that "Mr Chrara was indebted to Clr Garrard in the amount of $50,000." Because the development approval permitted Mr Chrara to sell the Rosehill property it is submitted that this increased Mr Chrara's capacity to repay the respondent. 6. The submissions also point out that one of the agreed facts in the statement of agreed facts provided for the Stage 1 proceedings is that Mr Chrara told the respondent the horse to be purchased by a syndicate would only be purchased once the Rosehill property was sold. 7. The submissions also highlight the friendship or quality of the relationship between Mr Chrara and the respondent, as well as the respondent's attendance at two pre-lodgement meetings with Mr Chrara. It is submitted that this "shows that this development application received Clr Garrard's personal attention." 8. At para 21 it is submitted: Councillor Garrard's participation in achieving the approval of Mr Chrara's development application was a net positive for the friendly relationship between him and Mr Chrara, and this is a further benefit that flowed to Clr Garrard from the approval of the development application. 1. Mr Cobb-Clark's submissions very fairly point out mitigating factors to be taken into account in the respondent's favour. His extensive service as a councillor without any prior incidents of inappropriate conduct is noted. However, the submissions point out that the respondent, because of his extensive experience, should have had a greater understanding of his responsibilities than a less experienced councillor. 2. The submissions also note that the conduct the subject of these proceedings occurred in August 2013 and that the respondent has not engaged in any misconduct since that date. It is also noted that the respondent admitted responsibility for his failure to disclose his non pecuniary interest at an early date. 3. The submissions then refer to a number of other disciplinary cases involving local government counsellors. In his oral submissions Mr Cobb-Clark acknowledged the care which must be applied drawing analogy from other cases, but referred to the decision in Office of Local Government v Smith [2014] NSWCATOD 92. In that case the councillor was an employee of Whitehaven Coal Pty Ltd and had voted in favour of an application by his employer to establish a water monitoring bore in a road reserve. Although the councillor said his failure to disclose his employment was inadvertent and he acknowledged and apologised for his conduct, which was the second occasion on which he failed to disclose his employment, the Tribunal imposed a suspension of one month. 4. The submissions seek to distinguish the facts and outcome in Byrne where orders were made suspending the councillor's right to payment for a period of three months. 5. The submissions advance the proposition that the very serious nature of the respondent's misconduct means any action short of suspension would not provide the necessary degree of general deterrence. It is further submitted that, but for mitigating factors, a period of six months suspension would be appropriate. 6. The submissions address the concerns raised by Adams J in Mehajer about the effect of suspension on the needs of constituents. It is pointed out that there are 15 councillors on the council with three councillors for each of five wards. This information was confirmed by the respondent at the hearing. It is submitted that any needs of constituents can be addressed by the remaining 14 councillors during any period the respondent is suspended. 7. In his submissions in reply, Mr Cobb-Clark discounts as a mitigating factor the fact that although the respondent was unable to make an initial response to the complaint because a letter was addressed to an email address he no longer used, he did have the opportunity to make submissions to the Tribunal about whether or not it should conduct proceedings (see Deputy Secretary, Local Government, Planning and Policy v Garrard [2021] NSWCATOD 75). 8. The submissions in reply fairly note that it is not submitted that the respondent interfered with the independent review of the Rosehill development, and that he was entitled to have regard to the outcome of the independent assessment process. However, it is submitted because the council was the ultimate decision maker, it was not "simply applying a rubber stamp" for approving the development application if the independent assessment was favourable. 9. The submissions go on to point out that it is the respondent's evidence that the council did debate whether or not the development application should be approved or whether it should be deferred until further heritage advise was obtained. It is not in dispute, as the submissions record, that the respondent proposed the motion to approve the development application and voted in favour of that application. 10. The submissions conclude by noting that the respondent did receive a personal benefit from the approval of the development application namely the repayment to him of the $50,000 from Mr Chrara. 11. The submissions explain that a reprimand is not an appropriate outcome as it would not properly reflect the seriousness of the misconduct, or be consistent with other decisions. The respondent's affidavit and oral evidence 1. At the commencement of this hearing, the respondent swore to the truth of the contents of a document described as his affidavit asserted to have been sworn on 20 January 2022. 2. The respondent gave oral evidence that, at the date of the relevant council meeting, his sole income was approximately $27,000 per annum and that his present income is $33,000 per annum together with a part aged pension of $37.50 per week. I confirmed that the sum of $28,000 which he paid to Mr Chrara by cheque was borrowed. 3. In his affidavit the respondent explained that he had not received a letter dated 23 October 2020 from the Deputy Secretary, Office of Local Government because he had not access the email to which the correspondence was sent from June 2020. He says had he been aware of the correspondence he would have urged the applicant to resolve the matter by alternate dispute resolution or to take no further action. 4. The respondent notes that he voluntarily engaged in an interview with the ICAC on 16 March 2017, made a statement to the Office of Local Government on 25 March 2019 and was interviewed by that office on 28 June 2019. He also explains that he provided a statement and made submissions to the Office of Local Government on 18 April 2020. 5. The respondent puts in issue the nature and quality of his relationship with Mr Chrara although he explains that he has known Mr Chrara since the 1970's and had met with him from time to time alone, but more often in the company of others. 6. The respondent asserts his involvement in the pre-lodgement meetings with Mr Chrara was minimal and that he was present because the Rosehill site was a controversial one with respect to zoning and other issues on and from 2005. He states "I did not agitate for any outcome concerning the subject site in these processes". He further deposes that, in his view, the first pre-lodgement meeting did not afford Mr Chrara "due process" concerning the height restrictions imposed by the zoning and that "I caused the matter to be reconsidered after I made a direct representation to Ms Sue Weatherley the Group Manager Outcome and Development at the council". He explains at a subsequent meeting on 24 August 2013 height adjustments were allowed "within the authority of that meeting". 7. The respondent notes that the development application was referred to an Independent Design Review Committee and by that committee to the Design Excellence Panel. He says he had no involvement with the development application's referral to the Design Excellence Panel 8. At para 29 of his affidavit, the respondent refers to the process which occurred at the council meeting of 23 August 2013 when he moved the motion to approve the development proposal. He notes that there was some debate, that an amending motion was put and lost. He deposes "I did not speak for or against the amending motion. I did not pause to reflect on the making the disclosure I concede I was legally, and duty bound to make". 9. The respondent deposes that he made three payments to Mr Chara between 15 February 2013 and 18 February 2013 including two cash payments of $15,000 and $7,000. He deposes to the arrangements for the proposed syndicate and that he understood Mr Chrara would source funds from the sale of the Rosehill property. He says "I understand eventually and after I withdrew from the venture in 2014, that is what occurred". The respondent also deposes to having no knowledge that Mr Chrara had applied some of the money he had advanced to him to fund, amongst other things, his development application lodgement fee. 10. At para 39 the respondent deposes: I have earlier conceded whether an interest is substantial or non-substantial it should be disclosed, in the circumstances applicable to these proceedings its disclosure would have raised innocent and importantly guilty inferences of the kind identified in investigations, such that such inferences could be exposed to debate and inquiry. In so saying I contend the inferences were in fact innocent rather than guilty in that I have been motivated by my desire to achieve due process and not afford Mr Chrara an undeserved outcome to which he was not otherwise entitled in the ordinary course. 1. The respondent goes on to depose that, at the time of the council meeting, he was "firmly of the opinion that the passing of the Motion with respect to the DA was a foregone conclusion and that controversies had been resolved following due processes of Council". He goes on to state that he thought "the adjournment debate did not concern any substantive merit issue", and that he thought council should move to resolve the matter on the basis of expert planning recommendations which occurred as a matter of due process. He concludes: I was, and I remain of the opinion that (apart from my non-disclosure) I had at all times acted in good conscience. I thought my disclosure would make no material difference. 1. The respondent's concluding paras of his affidavit are important to consideration of the appropriate protective orders. At para 43 – 46 the respondent deposes: 43. The view I took, wrongly as I came to appreciate, was that I was acting as I believe an elected official should. I was not acting to secure an underserved or otherwise proscribed outcome but an outcome consistent with the community interest having regard to the peculiarities at the subject site. I was certainly of the belief I was not acting for personal gain, or corruptly. 44. The guilty inferences, if correct, include that I was directly funding Mr Chrara's DA application and in consequence I had a substantial non- pecuniary, if not pecuniary interest in the DA approved. Those guilty inferences raise a suspicion that I had a direct interest in the DA being approved including as security against the repayment of the $50,000 I had advanced with respect to the horse syndicate. 45. I reiterate that I was unaware that monies provided by me to Mr Chrara were disbursed by Mr Chrara at all, and certainly not in support of the DA until my interview with ICAC on a date in March 2017 at the earliest. I was questioned about this aspect at interview on 28 June 2019 [Report: p A187] but a direct question to that effect was not put to me. Mr Chrara confirmed that he did not inform me he had used monies I paid to him in part to fund the DA. [Report 64] 46. I apologise to the Applicant, the Tribunal and to the Parramatta City Council and to my fellow City Councillors and staff for my failure to disclose my conflict or potential conflict of interest arising out my dealings concerning Mr Chrara and the subject DA. I better understand including from the Foundation of Directorship Program and from the experience I have gained in these inquiries and in these proceedings the value inherent in making a full disclosure. Irrespective of an ability to participate in debates or to vote the balance between the private and public interest can only be created and maintained by protection of the integrity of decision making in public office. Ultimately and paradoxically private interests are best served when public officials avoid actual potential conflict of interest. The respondent's submissions 1. Mr Billings, the respondent's solicitor, also provided extensive and helpful written submissions in support of his client's position that no order should be imposed, or if I was against that position, that the respondent be reprimanded. 2. At para 14 of his submissions Mr Billings draws attention to the duties of councillors under s 223 of the LGA including the requirement to consult with community organisations and other key stakeholders and to keep them informed of the council's decisions and activities. 3. The submissions advance the proposition that the inference to be drawn about the respondent's conduct is that his actions were innocent and that his concern was to see that Mr Chrara was accorded due process. It is submitted that the outcome that Mr Chrara achieved by reasons of the respondent's dealings "is that the discretionary height variations within the discretions available under the then LEP were granted. Those variations were subsumed by the Committee (including the DEAP) recommendations. In other words, the outcome Mr Chrara achieved were materially as a consequence of the Committee's 3 August report and the DEAP recommendations as distinct from anything the respondent did or did not do up until 26 August 2013". 4. The submissions, I would say very properly, acknowledge that when the development application came before "the PCC" on 26 August 2013 the respondent was "duty bound" to disclose that he had a conflict of interest. It is again very fairly acknowledged that the conflict of interest was a significant one and accordingly he was duty bound to make a disclosure under the then provisions of the LGA. 5. In addressing matters of mitigation and penalty, in his oral submissions Mr Bellings conceded that the applicant's counsel had fairly put matters relevant to mitigation in favour of the respondent, albeit that the written submissions also rely on the fact that the respondent has since undertaken a course with the Australian Institute of Company Directors Foundation of Directorship program. 6. The submissions conclude by noting that the respondent has given more than 47 years of blameless civic service and advance the proposition that suspension from civil office would be a dissonant outcome. Consideration Seriousness of conduct 1. Even discounting the respondent's actions in attending the pre-development meetings, there can be no doubt that his failure to disclose his relationship with Mr Chrara, that he had advanced him the sums asserted, and that a proposed horseracing syndicate was formed on the sale of the Rosehill property, was a significant departure from the requirements of the Code of Conduct. The respondent was well aware that any syndicate would not be formed until the sale of the Rosehill property. The undisputed evidence is that he received the sum of $50,000 by way of bank cheque on the day Mr Chrara received the deposit from the sale. 2. I am satisfied that this conduct was of a different quality to that found by the Tribunal in Smith, where the councillor, an employee of Whitehaven Coal, said he had not carefully read the relevant papers. It may also be distinguished from the inexperienced councillor's failures in Mehajer. 3. The respondent, in 2013, was a very experienced long serving councillor. It is hard to accept that he did not, at the relevant time, perceive he had a conflict of interest and act appropriately by disclosing that conflict. Mitigating factors Respondent's history 1. I have given careful consideration to the fact that the respondent has given a lengthy period of service to the community in his role as a councillor. That fact is a "two edged sword" as discussed above. His long service means he was an extremely experience councillor who no doubt was, or should have been, acutely aware of his responsibilities under the Code of Conduct. I also give considerable weight to the fact apart from these proceedings the respondent has an unblemished record in his civil office. I find there is merit in the submissions of counsel for the applicant, but for this factor, a longer period of disqualification could have been considered to be appropriate. 2. I have also given some weight to the fact that the respondent of his own violation has undertaken and completed the company director's foundation course. Early admissions 1. I have also taken into account and given weight to the respondent's admissions, particularly his admission that his failure to disclose his non-pecuniary interest was a significant matter requiring disclosure. I also taken into account that he voluntarily participated in interviews and provided statements and submissions to the applicant and was active in assisting the Tribunal by contributing to an agreed statement of facts. Delay in proceedings 1. I do not give any significant weight to the fact that the respondent did not originally receive the correspondence sent by email by the applicant. He was well aware that the matter was subject of investigation; he had further opportunity to put his position including in particular the opportunity to make submissions under s 470 of the LGA to the effect this Tribunal should not accept a referral. 2. I do however give some weight to the fact that matters the subject of this complaint occurred in 2012 and 2013 and there has been a considerable lapse of time even from the investigation phase of this matter. The uncertainty about the outcome of the proceedings has no doubt been very stressful for the respondent. Interpretation of s 482A of the LGA 1. I have earlier noted that I agree with and adopt the Tribunal's reasoning in Byrne that each of the separate sanctions which may be imposed under s 482A (2) (a) - (d), having regard to the effect of the word "or" between the available sanctions, should be read disjunctively. Effect of proposed orders 1. The orders proposed by the applicant are more onerous than those proposed by the respondent. I am satisfied that the objects of the LGA require, in the circumstances of this case, that a sanction be imposed. Notwithstanding the mitigating factors I have set out above and which are expanded in the respondent's submissions, I am not satisfied that a reprimand would adequately satisfy public interest considerations or act as a general deterrent to other councillors from engaging in like conduct. A significant non pecuniary benefit, as was the case in this matter, if not disclosed means a lack of transparency in any approval process by a council. 2. In the circumstances of this case, it is not in dispute that the development of the Rosehill land was, for some considerable period of time, one of controversy. I accept the submissions of the applicant that the moving of the motion to approve the development application, notwithstanding the report of the Design Excellence Panel, was not one of a mere "rubber stamp", and that the nature of the respondent's relationship with Mr Chrara, and their intertwined financial arrangements, required disclosure. 3. I have given careful consideration as to whether imposing an order suspending the respondent's right to payment for a period under s 482A (2) (b) should be made rather than the imposition of a suspension as provided in s 482A (2) (c). I am conscious of the reasoning of Adams J in Mehajer that any action suspending a councillor from office must be carefully considered having regard to the seriousness of the conduct and other relevant facts, and that not only will the councillor the subject of such order be precluded from attending council meetings and decision making, but constituents will also be precluded from consulting with their elected representative. In weighing those factors against all other relevant factors in this case I have given weight to the fact that constituents can access any councillor and may, in particular, approach the two other ward councillors during any period of the respondent's suspension. 4. Here, as the respondent has conceded, his non pecuniary interest was a significant one. The sum advanced to Mr Chrara was almost twice the respondent's total income at the relevant time. The requirement for disclosure was self-evident particularly where the respondent knew the institution of the horse racing syndicate, from which he hoped to gain profits, was only to be formed on the sale of the Rosehill property. Mr Chrara's evidence before the ICAC is that it was only after the sale of the property that the respondent told him that he no longer wished to continue in the syndicate. The requirements of the Code of Conduct were matters which this long standing experienced councillor must have been, or should have been, full cognizant. His lack of disclosure could not be said to be one of mere carelessness. 5. Overall, balancing all the relevant factors, I find that the orders proposed by the applicant are proportionate and appropriate. While I accept that these proceedings of themselves will have constituted a specific deterrence to the respondent, the importance of general deterrence, transparency in council decision making and the maintenance of public confidence in local government decision making warrant the making of orders suspending the councillor from civic office for a period of two months. ORDERS 1. Pursuant to s 482A (2) (c) Councillor Paul Garrard is suspended from civic office for a period of two months from the date of these orders. ********** I hereby certify that this is a true and accurate record of the reasons for decision of the New South Wales Civil and Administrative Tribunal. Registrar I hereby certify that this is a true and accurate record of the reasons for decision of the Civil and Administrative Tribunal of New South Wales. Registrar DISCLAIMER - Every effort has been made to comply with suppression orders or statutory provisions prohibiting publication that may apply to this judgment or decision. The onus remains on any person using material in the judgment or decision to ensure that the intended use of that material does not breach any such order or provision. Further enquiries may be directed to the Registry of the Court or Tribunal in which it was generated. Decision last updated: 17 March 2022