Civil and Administrative Tribunal New South Wales Medium Neutral Citation: FFO v Cumberland Council [2022] NSWCATAP 164 Hearing dates: 29 April 2022 Date of orders: 18 May 2022 Decision date: 18 May 2022 Jurisdiction: Appeal Panel Before: Cole DCJ, Deputy President Coleman SC ADCJ, Principal Member Decision: (1) The application for an extension of time within which to file an appeal is refused. (2) Should Cumberland Council wish to make submissions with respect to costs, those submissions should be filed in the Tribunal and served upon FFO within 14 days of the publication of these reasons. Those submissions should include submissions under s 50 of the Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2013 as to whether a hearing can be dispensed with in relation to the question of costs. (3) FFO has 14 days from the service upon him of any submissions by Cumberland Council to file in the Tribunal and serve upon Cumberland Council his submissions with respect to costs. Those submissions should include submissions under s 50 of the Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2013 as to whether a hearing can be dispensed with in relation to the question of costs. (4) Cumberland Council has 7 days from the date of service upon it by FFO of his submissions with respect to costs to file in the Tribunal and serve upon FFO any submissions in reply. Catchwords: APPEALS — Leave to appeal — Principles governing – Extension of Time – Grounds of Appeal Legislation Cited: Privacy and Personal Information Protection Act 1998 (NSW) Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2013 (NSW) Court Suppression and Non-publication Orders Act 2010 (NSW) Civil and Administrative Tribunal Rules 2014 (NSW) Cases Cited: Champion Homes Pty Ltd v Guirgis [2018] NSWCATAP 54 Commissioner of Police, NSW Police Force v Robinson [2022] NSWCATAP 121 Collins v Urban [2014] NSWCATAP 17 Dominic Dep v Busakorn Chentrens [2015] NSWCATAP 124 Frost v TAFE NSW (No 2) [2019] NSWCATAD 129 DRJ v Commissioner of Victims Rights [2020] NSWCA 136 Category: Principal judgment Parties: FFO (Appellant) Cumberland Council (Respondent) Representation: Appellant (self-represented) Storey & Gough Lawyers File Number(s): 2022/00016169 Publication restriction: The disclosure of the name of the appellant is prohibited pursuant to s 64(1)(a) of the Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2013 (NSW) Decision under appeal Court or tribunal: Civil and Administrative Tribunal Jurisdiction: Administrative and Equal Opportunity Division Citation: N/A Date of Decision: 21 December 2021 Before: K Ransome, Senior Member File Number(s): 2021/00205873 REASONS FOR DECISION 1. On 19 July 2021, FFO made an application to the Tribunal, under the Privacy and Personal Information Protection Act 1998 (NSW) ('the PPIP Act'), to which the Cumberland Council ('the Council') is the respondent. 2. On 17 November 2021, well prior to the hearing of the substantive application, FFO applied for orders from the Tribunal under s 64(1)(d) of the Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2013 (NSW) ('the CAT Act'). FFO sought an order prohibiting the disclosure to Ms Z, Ms C and Ms A of his summary of legal argument and all of his evidence. Ms Z, Ms C and Ms A are officers of the Council. FFO also sought an order prohibiting the disclosure of evidence bundles 1b, 2a and 2b to Mr McFadzean, who is the General Counsel of the Council and is responsible for briefing Ms Lennox in this matter. 3. On 21 December 2021, FFO's application for orders under s 64(1)(d) of the CAT Act was heard and dismissed. On 18 January 2022, FFO lodged an appeal against that decision with the Tribunal, but did not pay the applicable filing fee until 19 January 2022. On 2 February 2022, the reasons of the Tribunal at first instance were emailed to the parties. These reasons deal with FFO's appeal. 4. The substantive matter was heard on 18 January 2022 and the Tribunal has reserved its decision. Nature of the decision appealed from 1. The CAT Act, in s 4, defines 'interlocutory decision' to include: 4 Definitions (1) In this Act— … interlocutory decision of the Tribunal means a decision made by the Tribunal under legislation concerning any of the following— … (b) the prohibition or restriction of the disclosure, broadcast or publication of matters, … 1. FFO's application for orders under s 64(1)(d) of the CAT Act is an application for interlocutory orders. Internal appeals under the CAT Act 1. The CAT Act, in s 80, provides as follows: 80 Making of internal appeals (1) An appeal against an internally appealable decision may be made to an Appeal Panel by a party to the proceedings in which the decision is made. Note— Internal appeals are required to be heard by the Tribunal constituted as an Appeal Panel. See section 27(1). (2) Any internal appeal may be made— (a) in the case of an interlocutory decision of the Tribunal at first instance—with the leave of the Appeal Panel, and (b) in the case of any other kind of decision (including an ancillary decision) of the Tribunal at first instance—as of right on any question of law, or with the leave of the Appeal Panel, on any other grounds. (3) The Appeal Panel may— (a) decide to deal with the internal appeal by way of a new hearing if it considers that the grounds for the appeal warrant a new hearing, and (b) permit such fresh evidence, or evidence in addition to or in substitution for the evidence received by the Tribunal at first instance, to be given in the new hearing as it considers appropriate in the circumstances. 1. FFO seeks to appeal to the Appeal Panel under s 80 of the CAT Act against an interlocutory decision of the Tribunal, namely a decision concerning the matters set out in the extract from the definition of interlocutory decision in the CAT Act set out in [5], above. FFO requires the leave of the Appeal Panel in order to appeal. Leave to Appeal 1. Leave to appeal should only be granted when there are substantial reasons to allow an appellate review. These reasons would ordinarily include the presence of an error of principle at first instance, resulting in substantial injustice. Leave should not be granted unless substantial injustice would otherwise arise, and the decision at first instance should be attended with sufficient doubt to warrant its consideration on appeal (see Champion Homes Pty Ltd v Guirgis [2018] NSWCATAP 54 at [35] and Commissioner of Police, NSW Police Force v Robinson [2022] NSWCATAP 121 at [36]). 2. The Appeal Panel in Collins v Urban [2014] NSWCATAP 17 at [84] set out the principles applicable to consideration of whether leave to appeal should be granted: 1. In order to be granted leave to appeal, the applicant must demonstrate something more than that the primary decision maker was arguably wrong in the conclusion arrived at or that there was a bona fide challenge to an issue of fact: BHP Billiton Ltd v Dunning [2013] NSWCA 421 at [19] and the authorities cited there, Nakad v Commissioner of Police, NSW Police Force [2014] NSWCATAP 10 at [45]; 2. Ordinarily it is appropriate to grant leave to appeal only in matters that involve: a. issues of principle; b. questions of public importance or matters of administration or policy which might have general application; or c. an injustice which is reasonably clear, in the sense of going beyond merely what is arguable, or an error that is plain and readily apparent which is central to the Tribunal's decision and not merely peripheral, so that it would be unjust to allow the finding to stand; d. a factual error that was unreasonably arrived at and clearly mistaken; or e. the Tribunal having gone about the fact finding process in such an unorthodox manner or in such a way that it was likely to produce an unfair result so that it would be in the interests of justice for it to be reviewed, BHP Billiton Ltd v Dunning [2013] NSWCA 421 at [20] and the authorities cited there, SAB v SEM [2013] NSWSC 253 at [8] and [9] and the authorities cited there, Nakad v Commissioner of Police, NSW Police Force [2014] NSWCATAP 10 at [45]; 3. In relation to an application for leave to appeal relating to a question of practice and procedure, the application is to be approached with the restraint applied by an appellate court when reviewing such decisions, especially if the application is made during the course of a hearing: BHP Billiton Ltd v Dunning [2013] NSWCA 421 at [21] and the authorities cited there. 1. In his Notice of Appeal, FFO set out the following basis for his application for leave to appeal: On 21 December 2021, I wrote to the Tribunal for the Written Reasons for Senior Member Ransome's decision to dismiss the s 64(1)(d) application. The Tribunal wrote to me, and advised that the Written Reasons would be provided within 28 days, but as of COB today (28 days later) I have not yet received them. Also, today, Senior Member Christie ordered that his decision on the substantive matter will be reserved. The outcome of the orders requested in this appeal application may impact Senior Member Christie's consideration of the substantive matter. If it will impact the substantive matter, granting leave may prevent the need for an appeal in the substantive matter. Regardless of the Tribunal's decision on granting leave, it is important to me to have the requested orders considered by the Tribunal. 1. In the document entitled 'Grounds of Appeal' ('Grounds of Appeal') lodged as part of his Notice of Appeal, FFO said: Additionally, of relevance is that today, 18 January 2022, during the Hearing in the substantive matter (2021/205873), Member Ransome's decision to dismiss my s 64(1)(d) application was used in oral legal submissions by the Respondent's solicitor to justify the respondent's (admittedly irrelevant) disclosure of my financial, medical, TFN and various confidential correspondence of a very serious and sensitive and inflammatory nature to several individuals without my consent or knowledge. 1. In his submissions, FFO said that he wished the Council to be held accountable for its dealings with his personal information. He said that he sought the orders under s 64(1)(d) of the CAT Act because he was apprehensive that the three named Council officers would misuse information about him if they came into possession of it. He was also concerned as to the way in which Mr McFadzean may use his information, including the possibility that Mr McFadzean may provide that information to the named Council officers. FFO alluded to issues that he has experienced in other proceedings with the Council in which he has been unhappy with the manner in which he believes that his information was used. 2. The merits of the appeal are relevant to the question of whether leave to appeal should be granted. We will, therefore, consider the question of whether leave to appeal should be granted below, after the discussion of the merits of the appeal. Time within which to appeal 1. Proceedings are filed in the Tribunal when the appropriate document is filed together with the applicable filing fee (if any). 2. The Civil and Administrative Tribunal Rules 2014 (NSW) provide, relevantly, in rule 25: (4) Unless the Tribunal grants an extension under section 41 of the Act, an external or internal appeal must be lodged— (a) in the case where the enabling legislation specifies the period within which the appeal is to be made—within the period specified, or (b) in the case of an internal appeal against a decision made in residential proceedings—within 14 days from the day on which the appellant was notified of the decision or given reasons for the decision (whichever is the later), or (c) in any other case—within 28 days from the day on which the appellant was notified of the decision to be appealed or given reasons for the decision (whichever is the later). (4A) For the purposes of subrule (4), the day on which reasons are given is the day on which reasons are first given, whether orally or in writing. 1. Oral reasons were given on 21 December 2021 for the decision to dismiss FFO's application for orders under s 64(1)(d) of the CAT Act, so the time within which an appeal could be lodged expired on 18 January 2022. The appeal was not instituted by the filing of a Notice of Appeal together with the applicable filing fee until 19 January 2022. The appeal is one day out of time. 2. The principles relevant to the question of whether an extension of time within which to appeal to the Appeal Panel should be granted are set out succinctly in Dominic Dep v Busakorn Chentrens [2015] NSWCATAP 124 at [5]: … the relevant principles relating to extensions of time were set out in Jackson v NSW Land and Housing Corporation [2014] NSWCATAP 22. That decision states at [22] that generally, in an application for an extension of time to appeal the Appeal Panel will be required to consider the length of the delay, the reason for the delay, the appellant's prospects of success (usually being whether the applicant has a fairly arguable case) and the extent of any prejudice suffered by the respondent to the appeal. That decision confirmed that the discretion to extend time should only be exercised upon proof that strict compliance with the rules will work an injustice upon the applicant. 1. From FFO's submissions, we understand that he made the decision to file this appeal on the day that the substantive matter was heard by the Tribunal. FFO was prompted to appeal because he became concerned, in the course of the hearing of the substance of his application under the PPIP Act that the refusal at first instance of the orders sought by him under s 64(1)(d) of the PPIP Act might have an adverse impact upon the decision in the substantive matter. He was unable to say precisely what that adverse impact might be. 2. FFO emailed his Notice of Appeal to the Tribunal after office hours on 18 January 2022 and did not pay the filing fee until the following day, one day out of time. The hearing of the substantive application took place on 18 January 2022. 3. The Council did not oppose the granting of an extension of time for the filing of this appeal. 4. As FFO's prospects of success in this appeal are relevant to the question of whether the time for the filing of the appeal should be extended, we will consider the question of whether time will be extended below. Grounds of appeal and FFO's submissions 1. In the Grounds of Appeal, FFO said that he was concerned, on the basis of his experience in another matter, that the documents he provided to the Tribunal might be provided to the officers of the Council whose handling of his information formed the conduct he complains of in his substantive application. 2. FFO said, in the Grounds of Appeal: In the substantive matters (both 2020/355032 and 2021/205873), I have already provided evidence to the Tribunal that shows that there are extenuating circumstances of multiple (alleged) breaches of my privacy by the respondent, and the detrimental, tangible and psychological impact this has had, and is having, on me. 1. Further, FFO said, in the Grounds of Appeal: I do not seek to withhold all evidence I have provided to the Respondent. I understand that a level of disclosure is necessary for the Respondent to answer the allegations. I do not believe my personal information should be disclosed without careful consideration, without security safeguards to protect it from misuse, and definitely not without my knowledge or consent. I seek to withhold personal information that is irrelevant and inappropriate for certain individuals to have. 1. In the Grounds of Appeal, FFO characterised the hearing on 21 December 2021 as a directions hearing and said that he had assumed, based on his past experience, that the hearing was for the purpose of setting down a date and timetable to 'produce and swap evidence and submissions by both parties, in response to my s 64(1)(d) application'. We reject that submission. The listing on 21 December 2021 was made by a direction of SM Mulvey issued on 17 December 2021, which was provided to FFO and the Council, and which said: The proceedings are listed to determine the Application for miscellaneous matters on 21 December 2021 at 12:30pm (30 minutes) by telephone. 1. In his written submissions, FFO argued that there was a need for the orders sought under s 64(1)(d) of the CAT Act. 2. FFO cited a passage from the transcript of the hearing on 21 December 2021 in which Ms Lennox said that the Council officers in question, apart from Mr McFadzean, would not be witnesses in the proceedings and that it was not her intention to show those Council officers the documents provided by FFO. 3. FFO argued that the order ought to be made anyway, as a 'security safeguard' in case Ms Lennox disclosed the documents to the Council officers, despite saying that she did not intend to. 4. FFO also argued that the orders ought to be made to safeguard against the misuse of his documents in other proceedings, in which the Council officers are likely to be called as witnesses, or in general. 5. In his written submissions, FFO sought to argue that the Tribunal was wrong, on 21 December 2021, to have refused to make an order under s 55(2)(b) of the PPIP Act. 6. In his written submissions, FFO argued that: SM Ransome's argument lacks knowledge of the actual documents disclosed to each witness, nuance and the principle of disclosure on a need-to-know-only basis. 1. FFO argued that the documents in question contained evidence that one of the Council officers misused his personal information. 2. In his written submissions, FFO asserted that SM Ransome's reasons were vague and general in nature and did not apply to the specific orders he had sought. In the text following this assertion, FFO sought to make a distinction between a party to an action (in this matter, the Council) and an individual staff member of that party. FFO cited the following passage from SM Ransome's decision: In Bellamy v Bellamy [2018] NSWSC 534 Parker J, with respect to s 64(1)(d) stated at [30]: Section 64(1)(d) is a provision which applies generally to proceedings in the Tribunal. Most proceedings in the Tribunal are ordinary adversarial proceedings and in those proceedings the rules of natural justice apply so as to require the Tribunal to afford various procedural safeguards to the parties. One elementary safeguard is that, except in extraordinary circumstances, the rules of natural justice prevent a party from being deprived of an opportunity to make full submissions on the issues to be decided by not being deprived of all of the evidence which is before the Tribunal. 1. FFO argued, in effect, that it cannot have been intended that a party to litigation, upon receiving the evidence to be used by another party to that litigation, could therefore disclose it to all of that party's employees. 2. FFO said, of SM Ransome's reasons: SM Ransome does not identify or consider what level of discernment could be exercised in separating what personal information was necessary to be disclosed to what witnesses. 1. In his oral submissions, FFO emphasised his belief that his information should not be able to be shared without his consent and knowledge. He also emphasised that his mental health was being adversely impacted by his concerns about the use of his information. 2. At the hearing on 21 December 2021, after SM Ransome announced her decision not to make the orders under s 64 sought by FFO, FFO asked if he could provide two letters from his treating doctor explaining "the impacts that this is all having on my mental health". SM Ransome declined to allow the tender of the letters. FFO argued, in effect, that because of this he was denied procedural fairness in that he was denied the chance to put his case. 3. In his written submissions, FFO complained that SM Ransome did not go through his document entitled 'Summary of legal arguments and submissions' and his document entitled 'Evidence – Annotated Points of Claim' and extract allegations in relation to the use of FFO's information by one of the Council officers, together with other events, and the information about the asserted impact the alleged use by Council of FFO's information upon FFO. The Council's submissions 1. The Council pointed to the following orders made in this matter at a directions hearing on 12 October 2021: 6. The Tribunal notes: (1) Ms Lennox informed the applicant that she proposed to show the evidence served by him to the Council's witnesses. (2) The applicant stated that he had no problem with that if it was relevant to the case and if he can cross examine the witnesses. 1. It has been acknowledged by FFO that Mr McFadzean has already been provided with a copy of FFO's evidentiary material, in the context of another matter. FFO does not wish Mr McFadzean to have another copy of the material. 2. In the transcript of the hearing before SM Ransome on 21 December 2021, the following exchange took place: Ms Lennox: The other documents in other proceedings are not documents in these proceedings. I don't act for council in those proceedings…and I don't have access to those documents…It is essential that Mr McFadzean have the actual documents which have been filed and served in the proceedings, as there is some difference…so I can seek and obtain instructions quickly in order that the hearing can proceed. FFO: I have no problem with that. 1. Most, if not all, of FFO's documents in this matter were also provided by him to the Council and the Tribunal in action number 2021/185000, which is between the same parties. 2. In the Council's written submissions, it pointed to the following words said by FFO in the course of an application for a stay in this matter on 4 February 2022: One of the reasons why I have submitted the application for miscellaneous orders is so that, even though it is a few months too late, it may assist to stem the flow of inappropriate information or at least give Council cause to stop and think before they disclose my information or use my information. 1. In her affidavit sworn on 13 April 2022, Ms Lennox said: 22 I appeared for the Council in the hearing of the proceedings on 19 January 2022, the appellant represented himself. The proceedings were conducted by telephone and Senior Member Christie indicated that there were appearances from the both the parties' representatives and Mr McFadzean. Mr McFadzean was present for the entirety of the hearing. The appellant repeatedly took the Tribunal to the Bundle of documents and took Mr McFadzean to a number of sections during his cross examination of Mr McFadzean in order to draw the Tribunal's attention to matters which he said were irrelevant to the proceedings 2021/185000. 23 The appellant sought remedies in the Substantive Proceeding which included that the Council apologise and to pay undisclosed financial compensation for injury caused by the disclosure. The disclosure complained of was the release of documents to Council's witnesses. 24 I made the submission to Senior Member Christie that had the appellant sought an order under 64(1)(d) in the original proceedings, the Court would have declined to make such an order. This submission was based on the two decisions of Senior Member Ransome, including the decision which is the subject of this appeal. 25 Both decisions of Senior Member Ransome were decisions on applications made by the appellant that the bundle of documents the subject of the Substantive Proceedings should not be disclosed to Council witnesses. It was my submission that the Tribunal would have refused a s 64(1)(d) order if it was sought and the disclosure would have occurred in any event. 26 I took Senior Member Christie to the decisions of Ransome SM of 3 December 2021 and explained the effect of her (then oral) decision on 21 December 2021. I understand that the documents referred to in both those decisions were practically identical. The decision of Ransome SM of 3 December 2021 was also referred to in my written submissions served in the Substantive Proceedings on or about 14 December 2021. The principles applicable to applications for orders under s 64 of the CAT Act 1. In Frost v TAFE NSW (No 2) [2019] NSWCATAD 129, PM Britton discussed the principles applicable to an application for an order under s 64 of the CAT Act at [10]-[12]: 10 The principles governing the operation of the discretion to make orders under s 64 under were considered in DLH v Nationwide News Pty Ltd [2018] NSWCATAD 92. In that decision, the Tribunal cited with approval State of New South Wales (Justice Health) v Dezfouli [2008] NSWADTAP 69, in which an Appeal Panel of one of NCAT's predecessors, the Administrative Decisions Tribunal, considered in some detail the principles governing the exercise of the power conferred by s 75(2) of the Administrative Decisions Tribunal Act 1997 (NSW), which is broadly equivalent to s 64 of the NCAT Act. The Appeal Panel in Dezfouli summarised at [81] the factors relevant to the exercise of the discretion to make a non-disclosure order: ... (a) the presumption in favour of open justice; (b) the need for an applicant for a suppression order to establish good grounds for making the order; (c) the comparative breadth of the criterion of 'desirability'; (d) the important differences between the types of suppression order that may be made – between (for instance) an order (as in this case) prohibiting disclosure of the identity of a participant and an order that a hearing occur in closed session, without notice to a party; (e) the undoubted breadth of the range of purposes that may be served ('any other reason'); (f) the possibility that the purposes to be served may be a mixture of private and public interests; and (g) the possibility that, although generally speaking the prospect of damage to reputation or 'embarrassment' affecting a participant in the proceedings will not provide sufficient grounds for a suppression order, there may be unusual circumstances where this is the principal consideration underlying an order. 11 The "presumption in favour of open justice" referred to by the Appeal Panel is a common law principle. In John Fairfax Group Pty Ltd v Local Court of New South Wales (1991) 26 NSWLR 131 at 142-143 Kirby P explained (citations deleted): It has often been acknowledged that an unfortunate incident of the open administration of justice is that embarrassing, damaging and even dangerous facts occasionally come to light. Such considerations have never been regarded as a reason for the closure of courts, or the issue of suppression orders in their various alternative forms ... 12. Commenting on that principle the Appeal Panel in Dezfouli stated at [61]: [It] is unthinkable that the word 'desirable' in section 75(2) should be interpreted without regard to the basic common law precept of open justice. What is 'desirable' under a statutory provision must be determined in accordance with consistent standards and values, not the particular preferences of the court or tribunal applying the provision. The values that have informed judicial decisions about the issues raised in section 75 have consistently attributed considerable importance to the desirability of hearings being open to the public and fully reportable unless good reasons are advanced for restricting public access and/or full reporting. 1. The objects of the CAT Act are set out in s 3 of the Act. The Act provides, in s 3(f): 3 Objects of Act The objects of this Act are— … (f) to ensure that the Tribunal is accountable and has processes that are open and transparent, 1. The Court of Appeal, in DRJ v Commissioner of Victims Rights [2020] NSWCA 136, pointed out that the principles of open justice are more prominent in the consideration by the higher courts of applications under the Court Suppression and Non-publication Orders Act 2010 (NSW) than they are in the consideration by the Tribunal of applications under s 64 of the CAT Act. 2. The principles of open justice are, however, relevant to the Tribunal, even when hearing matters under the PPIP Act, to the extent that those principles require processes that are open and transparent, by virtue of s 3(f) of the CAT Act. Consideration of the merits of the appeal FFO's concern about the potential for the misuse of his information/documents 1. The Tribunal at first instance set out FFO's concerns about the potential for the misuse of his information/documents in some detail, and clearly had regard to them, together with other competing factors, such as the principles of open justice. 2. FFO's argument about this issue really amounts to a protest that his concerns about the potential for the misuse of his information did not prevail in the decision at first instance. 3. No error of law has been identified with respect to this issue. FFO does not believe that his personal information should be disclosed without careful consideration, without security safeguards to protect it from misuse and without his knowledge or consent 1. When reviewing the conduct of an agency under the PPIP Act, the Tribunal has no obligation and no power to supervise the preparation of the agency's case before it in the manner sought by FFO. 2. The purpose of the Council having possession of the information in question is to enable it to prepare for the review to be conducted by the Tribunal, which was necessitated by the application lodged by FFO. In these circumstances there is no requirement for the Council to inform FFO or seek his consent when making use of the information to prepare its case. The Council is entitled to use the information to the extent necessary to prepare its case. FFO can only expect such 'security safeguards' as the PPIP Act provides for. It would be inappropriate, and a misuse of s 64 of the CAT Act, for the Tribunal to interfere in the Council's preparation for the review in the manner FFO suggests. 3. No error of law has been identified with respect to this issue. FFO sought the order under s 64 of the CAT Act as a safeguard against the misuse of the documents in other proceedings 1. As we understand it, a substantially similar set of documents was provided to the Council by FFO in other proceedings. The Tribunal at first instance was aware of this. FFO's application for orders under s 64 of the CAT Act in those other proceedings was refused. 2. FFO did not advance this ground to the Tribunal at first instance. 3. In any event, an order under s 64 could relate only to the documents provided by FFO to the Council in the present action. It could not cover the disclosure of documents by FFO in other proceedings. 4. Ms Lennox assured FFO and the Tribunal that, in this matter, Ms Z, Ms C and Ms A had not been shown the documents and would not be shown the documents. Procedural fairness required Mr McFadzean to see the documents because he was responsible for instructing Ms Lennox in the Council's case. 5. No error of law has been identified with respect to this issue. FFO drew a distinction between the Council, on one hand, and its employees on the other hand, and said that it cannot be right that when a Council comes into possession of documents for the purposes of a review under the PPIP Act, that it can show the documents to all of the employees of the Council. 1. The Tribunal did not suggest that the Council could show the documents to all of its employees. The PPIP Act allows the Council to use the information for the purpose for which it was collected, namely the preparation of its case in relation to an application by FFO for a review of the Council's conduct under the PPIP Act. 2. No error of law has been identified with respect to this issue. FFO asserted that past alleged breaches of his privacy have had a detrimental psychological impact upon him, and that the Tribunal at first instance should have permitted him to tender medical reports. 1. FFO sought to tender medical reports after the Tribunal at first instance had announced its decision with respect to the application for an order under s 64 of the CAT Act. It would not have been appropriate for the Tribunal to accept evidence at that point in time. As the Tribunal at first instance noted in its reasons, FFO had been given notice that his application for orders under s 64 of the CAT Act would be heard that day, and he had not sought to put forward the reports either leading up to the hearing or during the hearing, but only after his application was refused. 2. In any event, as the Tribunal at first instance said, that evidence would not have assisted him. Having read the evidence, we agree with that finding. 3. We appreciate that FFO's desire to control the sharing of his information is very strong, and that, when he is unable to exercise that control, it has a negative impact upon him. This does not override the obligation of the Tribunal to enable the Council to prepare its own case, without interference, in the usual way. 4. No error of law has been identified with respect to this issue. There is no basis for us to conduct a fresh hearing with respect to the issues raised by FFO in his grounds of appeal and in his submission. FFO is apprehensive that his failure to obtain orders under s 64 CAT Act will have a negative impact upon the Tribunal's decision in relation to his substantive application 1. This submission does not amount to an error of law by the Tribunal at first instance. It was not raised before the Tribunal at first instance. Does this Appeal have merit? 1. None of the grounds or submissions made show that any error was made by the Tribunal at first instance. 2. The appeal has no merit. Consideration of the application for an extension of time 1. FFO's decision to appeal was prompted by his understanding of submissions made in the hearing of the substantive review, which took place on the day on which the time allowed under the CAT Act for the lodgement of an appeal expired. He ran out of time to lodge the appeal within time on that day. 2. In the absence of any objection by the Council, we would have extended the time for the filing of the appeal had the appeal had merit. However, the appeal does not have merit, so the application for an extension of time will be refused. 3. The refusal to extend time brings the matter to an end. Consideration of the application for leave to appeal 1. As the extension of time within which to appeal is to be refused, it is unnecessary to consider the question of leave to appeal. Nevertheless, we will consider it. 2. None of the matters set out in Collins v Urban as prerequisites for a grant of leave to appeal are present in this matter (see [10], above). 3. FFO's concern about the impact of the refusal of his application for orders under s 64 of the CAT Act, and the strength of his desire to control the dissemination of his information do not constitute grounds for the grant of leave (see [11], above). 4. Had an appeal been filed within time, leave to appeal would have been refused. Costs 1. The Council indicated its intention to apply for costs. However, submissions were not developed on the point, and FFO did not address the issue of costs. Orders 1. We make the following orders: 1. The application for an extension of time within which to file an appeal is refused. 2. Should Cumberland Council wish to make submissions with respect to costs, those submissions should be filed in the Tribunal and served upon FFO within 14 days of the publication of these reasons. Those submissions should include submissions under s 50 of the Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2013 as to whether a hearing can be dispensed with in relation to the question of costs. 3. FFO has 14 days from the service upon him of any submissions by Cumberland Council to file in the Tribunal and serve upon the Council his submissions with respect to costs. Those submissions should include submissions under s 50 of the Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2013 as to whether a hearing can be dispensed with in relation to the question of costs. 4. Cumberland Council has 7 days from the date of service upon it by FFO of his submissions with respect to costs to file in the Tribunal and serve upon FFO any submissions in reply. ********** I hereby certify that this is a true and accurate record of the reasons for decision of the Civil and Administrative Tribunal of New South Wales. Registrar DISCLAIMER - Every effort has been made to comply with suppression orders or statutory provisions prohibiting publication that may apply to this judgment or decision. The onus remains on any person using material in the judgment or decision to ensure that the intended use of that material does not breach any such order or provision. Further enquiries may be directed to the Registry of the Court or Tribunal in which it was generated. Decision last updated: 18 May 2022