Supreme Court New South Wales Medium Neutral Citation: R v Ridgeway [2022] NSWSC 684 Hearing dates: 27 May 2022 Date of orders: 27 May 2022 Decision date: 27 May 2022 Jurisdiction: Common Law Before: Wilson J Decision: 1. Lily Ridgeway is sentenced to imprisonment for 7 years and 7 months to date from 29 November 2020 and expiring on 28 June 2028 with a non-parole period of 5 years, expiring on 28 November 2025. Catchwords: CRIME - Sentence following trial – manslaughter – self-defence rejected by jury – facts found – question of offender's disadvantaged background – relevance to act causing death – reduction in moral culpability – reduced need for sentence to reflect principle of general deterrence Legislation Cited: Crimes Act 1900 (NSW) Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act 1999 (NSW) Evidence Act 1995 (NSW) Cases Cited: Bugmy v The Queen (2013) 249 CLR 571; [2013] HCA 37 Hayek v R [2016] NSWCCA 126 Imbornone v R [2017] NSWCCA 144 R v Henry (1999) 46 NSWLR 346; [1999] NSWCCA 111 R v MD & Ors (2005) 156 A Crim R 372; [2005] NSWCCA 342 R v Qutami (2001) 127 A Crim R 369; [2001] NSWCCA 353 Category: Principal judgment Parties: Regina (Crown) Lily Ridgeway (Accused) Representation: Counsel: B Costello (Crown) E McLaughlin (Accused) Solicitors: Solicitors for Public Prosecutions (NSW) (Crown) Aboriginal Legal Service (Accused) File Number(s): 2020/68218 Publication restriction: Nil JudgmenT 1. HER HONOUR: The offender, Lily Ridgeway, appeared for trial before this Court on 31 January 2022, arraigned upon a charge that, on 29 February 2020 at Raymond Terrace in this State, she unlawfully killed Jason Adams. On 8 February 2022, the jury empanelled to hear the trial returned a verdict of guilty to the charge on indictment. Today, the offender is to be sentenced for that crime. Manslaughter is an offence contrary to s 18(1)(b) of the Crimes Act 1900 (NSW) and it carries a maximum sentence upon conviction of 25 years imprisonment. The Facts of the Offence 1. The facts of the offender's crime fall to be determined by the Court. Those factual conclusions which are adverse to the offender must be proved beyond reasonable doubt; favourable conclusions are assessed against the lesser standard of proof on the balance of probabilities. 2. The Crown, whilst accepting the evidence that Mr Adams was verbally abusive, including by uttering race-based taunts to the offender, argues that the Court should conclude Ms Ridgeway acted from hostility, and not because of any perception of danger. The offender contends that it should be concluded that she acted from a belief that she had to defend herself, even though her response was not a reasonable one. On the Court's conclusions, the facts establish something of a middle position between those extremities. 3. The events that led to the death of Mr Adams began with his introduction to Nikita Hanson, in February 2020. Very soon after meeting Ms Hanson Mr Adams was arrested for a driving offence and subsequently remanded in custody. He was unable to enter bail because of his homelessness. In those circumstances, and although Ms Hanson was little more than a stranger to him, Mr Adams prevailed upon her to allow him to use her address for the purposes of bail, and he was thereafter allowed conditional bail that required him to reside at her home in Payton Street at Raymond Terrace. 4. Within a couple of days of moving to Ms Hanson's address the brief friendship between Mr Adams and her had broken down, and Ms Hanson asked Mr Adams to leave. As he was bailed to her address, he was unwilling to do so and refused. It was into this fraught atmosphere that the offender inserted herself when she arrived at Ms Hanson's house, probably on 27 February 2020. 5. Nikita Hanson deposed that the offender was present on occasions when she asked Mr Adams to leave her house, and heard both his refusal to go, and threats Ms Hanson claimed he made to destroy her and her son if forced to leave her home. Ms Hanson was, however, a singularly unimpressive witness who I do not doubt comprehensively lied in her evidence. It was apparent to the Court that, having been called as a witness in the Crown case, Ms Hanson made every effort to, where she could, assist the offender and, where she could not assist her, to do her the least harm possible. Further, she was clearly using prohibited drugs at around the time of the offence, likely having acquired some on her short excursions to a service station during the night of 28 – 29 February 2020 where she obtained cash, and to two nearby houses during the course of the evening (T55:41 – 49; T56:17 - 27), and intoxication would necessarily have had an impact upon both the clarity of her contemporaneous perceptions, and her later recall. I would not accept Ms Hanson's testimony on important matters unless some other, credible, information supports it. 6. Nor do I accept the offender's account of the death of Mr Adams given to police on 2 March 2020 as reliable, even on balance. Firstly, it is an account devoid of detail of the actual stabbing, of which the offender asserts she has no memory. Secondly, although counsel for the offender described that account as the offender's "evidence", it is not evidence of what occurred on 29 February 2020, but only of what she said occurred in a hearsay account which could not be tested. Finally, Ms Ridgeway's perceptions were likely significantly affected by her consumption of drugs, and by her own traumatised state. I have had regard to what she said in her interview and accept what she said of her history and background but, as with the evidence of Nikita Hanson, I do not accept the truth of what the offender said to police as to the circumstances surrounding Mr Adams' death unless some objective support can be found for it in other credible evidence. 7. The most that the Court can conclude about the day or so leading up to Mr Adams' death is that there was disharmony between Ms Hanson and Mr Adams, probably because of their differing understandings of the nature of the relationship between them, which led to intervention by the offender to the extent of causing her relative, Mark Russell, and another man, Adam Garvie, to come to the Payton Street house on 28 February 2020 and physically eject Mr Adams from it. The offender assisted the men in evicting Mr Adams (T170), and he left the premises, during the evening on 28 February 2020. 8. On the account of witnesses who exchanged text messages or conversation with Mr Adams that night, he does not seem to have been angry about having been ejected from the premises, telling one friend that he was "not one to sit and cry" (T160:38) and "shit happens I guess" (T161:38). Such an attitude is consistent with what others have described as his manner generally, he being, in the offender's words, a "bubbly guy […] not really a fighter" (Ex. K; Q&A50). 9. It is also consistent with his early exchanges of text messages with Ms Hanson which focused - on his part - on the need to amend the bail conditions to which Mr Adams was subject, so as not to be in breach of them. For example, at 18:13:26 on 28 February 2020, Mr Adams sent Ms Hanson the following Short Message Service text message ("SMS"), reproduced as in the original (as are all text messages quoted in this judgment): "U know I was here cause I wanted to be here I was here to help you but you got so much going on and I'm just making ya angry […] all is good but we will have to go to cop shop or something to see if we can temporarily change bail so I dnt breach over weekend" (Ex. D). 1. Mr Adams had nowhere to go, and it is apparent that he spent most of what remained of the night of 28 February 2020 between a friend's home and a fast food café that was open 24 hours a day. He returned to Payton Street briefly at some stage after 2:50am on 29 February 2020 to collect some of his property, including a mobile telephone charger and drugs. 2. Trial Exhibit D establishes that, despite Mr Adams' relatively peaceful departure from Payton Street, Ms Hanson was in frequent contact with him thereafter by SMS, abusing and denigrating him. Mr Adams replied in a measured tone for most of the hours of the text exchanges, despite the vituperative nature of Ms Hanson's messages to him. He told her, for example, that there was "no point fighting", at 1am on 29 February 2020; and that he had not answered a telephone call from her because of his expectation that she would "end up just screaming" (at 1:19:31 on 29 February 2020). 3. Ms Hanson continued to subject Mr Adams to abuse by text message, notwithstanding his mild replies until, by about 4:19 that morning, he asked her to "go away" and, at 4:25am, he told her not to send any more messages to him. Ms Hanson's response to this was a tirade of spiteful text messages which eventually led to a response from Mr Adams that contained the first hint of real anger, when he sent a message at 4:51:15 saying: "U have spoken to me like a gronk all day night call me a dog yep we'll see" (Ex. D). 1. After a few more unpleasant messages from Ms Hanson, Mr Adams told her via SMS, at 4:52:57 and 4:53:49: "Now I'm pissed now we will turn it on see you soon trust me Get ya crew there now I'm on my way". 1. Even after those messages and Ms Hanson's abusive responses Mr Adams clearly wanted to draw back from any threat of conflict, telling Ms Hanson by SMS, at 5:12:17: "U think I fucking like fighting huh I fucking hate it now I've tried very hard to keep my calm now please leave me alone and I will do the same ok". 1. As she had with every other peaceable approach from Mr Adams, Ms Hanson responded with vitriol, goading, and insulting him. After receiving those responses, Mr Adams answered with a series of messages between 5:12:45 and 5:19:17 on 29 February 2020, messages interspersed with Ms Hanson's offensive replies, not quoted here. 5:12:45 "2min weak dag […] 5:13:37 On watt st now […] 5:16:53 Let's do this than aye […] 5:19:12 Yep look down ya st now 5:19:17 Who's first" (Ex. D). 1. It is evident from the messages sent by Mr Adams that he was walking towards Payton Street as he dispatched them, and it is reasonable to conclude that he must have arrived outside Ms Hanson's house at about 5:20 that morning. Precisely what happened thereafter will probably never be known because none of those who were involved are reliable witnesses, and there is enough difference and self-interest in the various accounts to reject each of them as unlikely to be accurate or credible. 2. Present in the Payton Street house at about this time were Ms Hanson, the offender, and the offender's cousin or uncle, Mark Russell. Ms Hanson deposed that she heard Mr Adams yelling out, and it is likely that, consistent with his last text messages, he did call out to Ms Hanson as he approached her house. She asserted that both the offender and Mark Russell were with her in her bedroom, which faced the street, and there is no real reason not to accept that the three were together at this time. Ms Hanson told the jury that Mark Russell and the offender both ran to the front of the house, and this is consistent with other evidence that places both in the street with Mr Adams soon after his arrival there. The offender held a knife in her hand (T87) that had a blade of between 5 – 10 centimetres in length (T88:08), or perhaps longer. 3. Ms Hanson claimed that there was an argument and Mr Adams became "angrier and angrier" (T83:04). Whilst there must have been a dispute, Ms Hanson's implicit assertion that it was only Mr Adams who became angry is not credible and I do not accept it. He may have used the offensive language Ms Hanson attributed to him in exchanges with the offender, but the Court cannot be satisfied of that, even on balance. It is not without significance that those residents of Payton Street who heard something of the incident did not confirm that an angry male was audible at any stage. Jamie Warner heard a female voice yelling and a second voice speaking quietly. Douglas Stewart, who heard arguing coming from inside the premises at 3 Payton Street on the morning of 29 February 2020, heard a male voice out in the street that sounded "kind of calm" (T182:43). The voice was not yelling and did not sound angry. Naomi Green heard a female yelling and saw a male and female having an argument in the street, although neither spoke loudly enough for her to hear what was said. Julie Lamey heard screaming coming from the direction of Payton Street at about the relevant time but could distinguish only a female voice. Craig Comyns heard voices in the vicinity of Payton Street, with a female voice yelling "in an abusive tone" (T188:24). Mr Comyns heard a male voice, but it was neither as "boisterous" nor as "loud" as the female voice. Skye Dendle lived further away on Watt Street and heard what she thought were male voices swearing. On looking out she saw what she thought were three men. It is not possible to reconcile Ms Dendle's account with the evidence of other neighbours; it was likely adversely affected by the greater distance over which she made her observations. 4. What can be accepted about events in Payton Street is that there was an argument involving the offender and Mr Adams, and the offender, who had gone out into the street armed with a knife, stabbed Mr Adams. 5. Although Ms Hanson gave an account in her evidence (at T86:45) of Mr Adams advancing onto the knife without any movement by the offender of the arm in which she held the knife, I do not accept that evidence. Her account of Mr Adams seeing the knife in the offender's hand, asking if the offender was going to stab him, and then walking forwards so that the knife entered his body is implausible at best. It entirely contradicts the ordinary experience of life that suggests that most people would take steps to avoid being stabbed, rather than to knowingly advance onto an outstretched knife, impaling the body upon it. The claim that Mr Adams did so is an absurd proposition likely invented by Ms Hanson to avoid giving evidence adverse to the offender, with all of the negative consequences that could thereafter flow to her as a person who had assisted the police. It also contradicts an earlier account given by her to police (Ex. F) and is further confirmed as unlikely by the evidence of injury. 6. Had the offender held the knife by her side in the way Ms Hanson described her as having done when the offender went from the house into the street, Mr Adams could not have been impaled upon it, even had he walked or run into Ms Ridgeway. Had she not advanced the knife in the way Ms Hanson demonstrated to police in Ex. F, it would be highly unlikely that Mr Adams would have sustained the fatal penetrating injury to the heart that he did. 7. Dr Alan Cala performed the autopsy upon Mr Adams' body and described to the jury a wound which penetrated the skin, passed through muscle on the chest wall, and went between the fifth and sixth ribs, causing injury where the knife had cut through the lower part of the fifth rib as it passed. The wound tracked through deep tissue, into the pericardial sac, and into the front of the left ventricle of the heart (T205; Ex. N). The wound continued for an observable 50 millimetres from the skin into the front wall of the heart, ending in a blood filled chamber or space, where it may have continued some further distance (T208:07 -12). The wound tracked from the left side of Mr Adams' body to the right, and slightly upwards. At least moderate force was necessary to cause such a wound (T208:42). 8. Whilst Dr Cala conceded in his evidence that it was "theoretically possible" that Mr Adams walked onto the knife, his opinion was that the injury was consistent with "some forward thrusting", and consistent with the forward thrust demonstrated by Ms Hanson in the excerpt from her interview with police that was Ex. F (T209:43 – T210:04; T210:21 – 46). The Court is satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that the offender did thrust the knife forward in the way Nikita Hanson described at a time only hours after the events, when she appeared to be making an effort to be truthful, in stark contrast to when giving evidence before the jury. 9. A statement from Mark Russell was read to the jury but I do not accept any part of his account of events as reliable. Mr Russell is a relative of the offender's and he cannot be regarded as independent of her. He was involved in the events earlier in the evening and is likely to have had his own interests in mind when he made his statement on 6 March 2020, prioritising those over the truth. Finally, his account of the stabbing is at odds in significant regards with both the account of Nikita Hanson and that of the offender. His claim to have run to Nikita Hanson's house after Mr Adams was stabbed to ask her to call an ambulance is contradicted by the limited independent eye-witness testimony. As that evidence suggests, it is probable that he simply fled, again prioritising his own interests, in this instance over the need of immediate help of a man he said was his friend. It is noted that Mr Russell's presence could not be secured as a witness at trial. 10. The motivation for the offender's act in stabbing Mr Adams, which was the direct and almost immediate cause of Mr Adams' death, was the subject of dispute at trial, and I will return to it shortly. 11. After the offender stabbed Mr Adams, she returned to Ms Hanson's house. Mark Russell, who had been standing nearby when this act occurred, ran off. Neither he nor the offender did anything to assist Mr Adams, who staggered along Payton Street and out onto nearby Watt Street. He collapsed in Watt Street, tragically dying there before any aid could come to him. In that way a young life was lost to his family and his community. 12. It is possible that the offender, running into Ms Hanson's house, made some comment about what she had done, although the evidence on that, coming as it does only from Nikita Hanson, an unreliable witness, cannot be accepted as proved to the criminal standard. It was perfectly obvious at trial that, prior to giving her evidence before the jury, Ms Hanson had given some thought about how she might avoid giving an account of the words she had attributed to the offender in an earlier statement, being intent on damaging the offender's case as little as was possible. Despite being permitted to refresh her memory in evidence pursuant to s 32 of the Evidence Act 1995 (NSW), and despite being cross-examined by the Crown as an unfavourable witness pursuant to s 38 of the same Act, Ms Hanson did not acknowledge the truth of her statement made on 10 March 2020 on this subject. The evidence concerning a comment made by the offender as she ran in the door of 3 Payton Street is too unreliable to accept it, and I put it aside. 13. Like the offender and Mark Russell, Nikita Hanson did nothing to assist Mr Adams in a timely way. She took the time to speak to the offender and arrange for a taxi to collect her from a nearby street, thus aiding her in her escape, before picking up her mobile telephone and telephoning for an ambulance, at 5:24:56am. Even then, she did nothing to convey the urgency of the situation to the Operator, simply stating that "a gentleman" seemed to be "bleeding out of the stomach or something" (Ex. G). She told the Operator very little that could have assisted in ensuring that a properly informed ambulance crew was quickly dispatched to Mr Adams' location. 14. Having left Ms Hanson's house following the stabbing the offender made her way to a nearby street where she got into the taxi arranged for her by Nikita Hanson. The driver, Mr Newman, drove the offender to Brown Street, Raymond Terrace, where the offender left the taxi without paying for her fare and ran off. Mr Newman thought that the offender was intoxicated; this was probably from the drugs it is reasonable to infer she and Nikita Hanson had obtained the previous night. 15. After leaving the taxi the offender made her way to the highway and walked along the highway before moving off into bushland. After having walked for some distance, she disposed of the knife used to kill Mr Adams by throwing it into bushland near a creek. She disposed of her jacket, likely stained with blood, in the same way. Neither object was ever found, despite an extensive police search. The offender contacted her mother who drove from Taree to collect her. The offender then travelled with her mother to Laurieton, near Port Macquarie, where she checked into a motel under her mother's name, staying there for two nights until she was arrested shortly after midnight on 2 March 2020. 16. Upon her arrest, the offender was interviewed by police. She gave an account of arguments between Nikita Hanson and Mr Adams when the three were together at Payton Street and, as earlier noted, the Court accepts that there was disharmony between them. The offender told police that, subsequently, Mr Adams threatened Ms Hanson, but the only objective and reliable record on that subject is found in Ex. D. It is notable that, insofar as Nikita Hanson may have told the offender that Mr Adams had threatened her, the offender said to interviewing detectives that "We didn't really think much of it", as Mr Adams was not a fighter. 17. Ms Ridgeway's account to police that Mr Adams "kept coming back" is contrary to the reliable evidence, which establishes that he went to Payton Street once after his ejection from the premises and before 5:20am on 29 February 2020; there is no credible foundation for the offender's account of Mr Adams having caused a "ruckus" on attending there every half hour (Ex. K, Q&A57). 18. When he did return to Payton Street on the second occasion after his eviction it is clear from Mr Adams' final text messages that he was angry, after many hours of provocation from Nikita Hanson, and ready for a confrontation of some sort. However, he was alone and unarmed and could not have posed much of a threat to three adults with the protection of a house about them. 19. In her interview, the offender told the police that, when Mr Adams arrived, she had stood on the veranda for a time watching him, and he had called her a "slut". Since she voluntarily left the security of the house and was, as she said to police, willing to descend the veranda stairs to "meet him half way" and to tell him to "fuck off" (Ex. K, Q&A64), it is reasonable to conclude that Ms Ridgeway was not frightened of Mr Adams, at least at that point. 20. The offender claimed in her interview that Mr Adams took hold of her jacket (at Q&A64 of Ex. K); it is impossible to say whether that is true or might possibly be true. Whatever happened, the offender stabbed Mr Adams shortly thereafter. She claims to have no memory of the incident, having "blacked out", becoming aware shortly afterwards that "old mate" was "walking and holding his chest" (Ex. K; Q&A65), an injury she told police she "assumed" she had inflicted. 21. The offender referred to Mr Adams immediately prior to the stabbing having his phone in one hand – improbably, the hand she said he grabbed her with – and something shiny in the other. He was unarmed and it is very unlikely that he had anything in his hand. Ex. 1 was tendered to demonstrate that Mr Adams may have had his watch in his hand but, since he came to Payton Street knowing there would likely be a dispute with Ms Hanson, and he could have had no need to check the time, as it would have been displayed on his mobile phone, there could have been no reason for him to have been holding his watch. The watch was later found underneath Mr Adams' body; it may have fallen from a pocket as he himself fell to the roadway. 22. It is notable that the offender did not say anything to anyone about Mr Adams having a "shiny thing" or a knife in his hand prior to giving her account to police on 2 March 2020. To Hayley Ridgeway in a conversation at about 7:47am on 29 February 2020 the offender said only, "I didn't mean to, he ran at me first" (T162:25). On 1 March 2020, she told James Carmody, "Sorry I fucked up" (T179:31). Ordinary experience would suggest that, had the offender genuinely believed that Mr Adams had been holding a knife or possibly holding a knife, she would have mentioned that, at least to Hayley Ridgeway. 23. The offender's assertion to the effect that she believed Mr Adams may have had a knife is a self-serving one made days after the event in circumstances where there is no credible evidence to support it. I do not accept it on balance. 24. The offender did not give evidence and has not provided an account of how she came to stab Mr Adams; she described "blacking out". It is difficult to know what the Court is to make of this claim in circumstances where there is no suggestion that the offender acted without volition. She said that she went into what she described as "survival mode", an experience familiar to her because of her (then) very recent experiences of domestic violence at the hands of a former partner, and that may be a more credible assertion than is her claim to have "blacked out". It is reasonably possible that the offender, traumatised by the violence to which she had been subjected by her previous boyfriends, reacted in an extreme way to the confrontation with Mr Adams, perceiving there to be danger that was not objectively there. On balance, the Court accepts that this is what occurred. 25. That is, the Court concludes that, in leaving the safety of the house when armed with a knife, the offender intended to confront Mr Adams, and to ensure that he left the area. She was neither too fearful nor too intimidated at that point to take that action, and I am satisfied that she intended to display the knife to Mr Adams to encourage him to leave, motivated by a desire to assist Nikita Hanson. At some point however, perhaps when Mr Adams moved forwards or took hold of her jacket, if he did, her own traumatised background caused her to perceive a threat that was not real and she responded spontaneously if unnecessarily by deliberately stabbing Mr Adams in a short forward and upward thrusting movement, without any particular intent other than her own defence. That unlawful and plainly highly dangerous act was the direct cause of his death. Having fatally wounded Mr Adams, she fled, doing nothing to try to assist him. 26. It is not irrelevant that she did not check on Mr Adams' condition or telephone an ambulance, even though she had a mobile telephone and could have done so easily. It is accepted, however, that the offender's flight occurred against a background of panic in a young and emotionally distraught woman. 27. Ms Ridgeway's crime is a serious one, involving as it does an assertive act employing a lethal weapon against an unarmed man who was outnumbered, and who posed little or no real threat to the offender or her companions. The Impact of the Crime 1. Because of the offender's crime a young man is dead and all of the potential of his life, all that which he could have been and done, is lost. The family of Jason Adams and others who loved him are left to bear the grief caused by his death, exacerbated as that grief is by its violence and suddenness. The Court has had the benefit of hearing from Mr Adams' mother, sister, and father, who each gave a victim impact statement, in person or with assistance, and their loss is an overwhelming one. They describe a good-natured boy and young man who enjoyed football and surfing and other outdoor activities, and who could always be relied upon to lend a helping hand to others. Mr Adams' mother, Simone Percival, referred to the hearts broken by the death of a much-loved young man. She had to endure what must have been the overwhelming pain of having to identify the body of her son. Kristy Adams, Jason's sister, referred to her grief at the loss of her brother's opportunity to meet her young son, and to have his own children at some point. She mourns what might have been and the future that her brother will never have, the chance taken from him. Mr Steven Adams described his grief as akin to the tearing of his soul. Each has been forever saddened by the loss of Jason, and I extend the sympathy of the Court to them. 2. There is no question that the unlawful taking of Mr Adams' life has had a terrible impact. A life has been lost to violence, and the community is the poorer. Other Features Relevant to Sentence 1. Ms Ridgeway has a criminal history, which is before the Court as part of the evidence on sentence. Her first encounter with the criminal justice system was for an offence of affray, dealt with in the Children's Court in November 2014. She was again before that court for larceny, in February 2017, receiving a fine by way of penalty. Driving matters and some drug offences were finalised in the Local Court later in 2017. 2. On 28 November 2018, she was convicted and sentenced before the District Court at Newcastle for an offence of Aggravated Break, Enter, and Commit Serious Indictable Offence. She was sentenced to a term of imprisonment for 2 years and 2 months, with a non-parole period ("NPP") of 1 year and 1 month. The offender was subject to parole for that offence at the time of Mr Adams' death, having been released only a few months before it, on 28 November 2019. Parole was revoked on 3 March 2020, with revocation backdated to 29 February 2020, and the offender served the balance of the parole period of 10 months and 1 day in custody. 3. In addition to having been subject to parole when she killed Mr Adams, Ms Ridgeway was also at large on 29 February 2020, having been charged with offences of driving whilst cancelled and common assault, and convicted in her absence after failing to appear at the Forster Local Court for those matters on 25 February 2020. A warrant pursuant to s 25(2)(a) of the Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act 1999 (NSW) was issued on that date for the offender's apprehension. Her breach of conditional liberty and freedom whilst at large is a feature of aggravation. 4. Later, on 20 May 2020, the offender was sentenced for the common assault of which she had been convicted to a Community Corrections Order for 2 years, its term having recently expired. The Offender's Case 1. Ms Ridgeway relies upon reports from Dr Richard Furst, Forensic Psychiatrist, and Dr Rebecca Smith, Forensic Psychologist. She has also written what was described as a letter of apology; provided correspondence from her grandmother, Ms Bailey; and tendered information concerning her role as a witness in a criminal prosecution in 2020 and 2021. 2. Although the offender did not give evidence on sentence, and the histories provided to the authors of the two reports, Dr Furst and Dr Smith, must be approached with caution, consistent with authority such as R v Qutami (2001) 127 A Crim R 369, there is no real reason to doubt the information given to the experts as to the offender's childhood circumstances, and the Crown does not argue that it should be doubted. Dr Furst referred to documentation held by the Department of Community Services that supports some of what the offender said, and the histories Ms Ridgeway gave to Dr Furst and Dr Smith were consistent. 3. The factual scenario provided to each of the doctors setting out the circumstances surrounding the death of Mr Adams was, to quote the reports, "drafted by defence", and is unlikely to accord wholly with the facts as found by the Court. That provides some qualification to the foundations of the opinions of Dr Furst and Dr Smith, although to a minimal extent only, since the Court accepts that the offender perceived Mr Adams posed a threat to her, even where no serious threat existed, and she acted on that basis. 4. What is known of the offender's circumstances is drawn from the reports, and evidence that was before the jury concerning the violent relationships in the offender's past together with the evidence in exhibits S3 and S4 on sentence. 5. Dr Furst consulted Ms Ridgeway via an audio-visual link on 22 March 2022. She told him that she was born in Newcastle and grew up there and in Nymboida and Karuah. She enjoyed school and continued at school until Year 12, doing reasonably well, until she began a relationship with Colin Glass when she was 16 years old. 6. The offender's childhood was one of dysfunction and disadvantage. Her father was an alcoholic and her mother had issues with gambling, drug use and mental illness. Ms Ridgeway was exposed to domestic violence in the family home, and violence more broadly in the Aboriginal community in which she was raised. She was sexually assaulted regularly as a very young child by a family member over a period of two or three years, and her younger siblings were later the victims of similar abuse at the hands of her mother's boyfriend, something the offender feels that she failed to prevent. When Ms Ridgeway was a teenager, her parents separated and she was left alone in the family home, attending school but without adult support or supervision. She began to use alcohol and drugs regularly. 7. On entering a relationship when she was 16 years old with a man more than twice her age, Colin Glass, she became the victim of violence at his hands, with a serious assault occurring on 2 April 2018 (T247 – T248). She was also introduced to heroin by this man, another sort of abuse. 8. After Mr Glass was gaoled for assaulting Ms Ridgeway, she took up with another violent man, and went with him to Queensland, where he too seriously assaulted her, on 28 January 2020 (T248). He too was gaoled. Ms Ridgeway turned to methylamphetamine use as a means of dealing with the trauma of what had happened to her. 9. The offender said that she had been using methylamphetamine and cannabis heavily in the days before Mr Adams was killed and had been without sleep for some 10 days. 10. Dr Furst concluded that it was probable the offender had an acute stress reaction or disorder because of the assault upon her in late January 2020, and that this disordered state continued until the time of the commission of the offence. 11. He observed that: "Childhood trauma, abuse, neglect and abandonment are well known to increase the risk of mental disorder, drug abuse and violence in later life, especially when coupled with negative, drug-using and pro-criminal family models". […] "[…] it is likely that Ms Ridgeway's experiences of emotional dysregulation, anxiety and drug use in her teenage years and adolescence were not just maladaptive emotional responses, but were responses driven by these type of brain pathways and deficits caused by the effects of long-term exposure to trauma, abuse and neglect in her childhood and teenage years, trauma networks in the brain reinforced then exacerbated by domestic violence victimisation". 1. Dr Furst concluded that the offender was emotionally dysregulated at the time of Mr Adams' death, because of the acute stress disorder from which she was likely suffering, probably exacerbated by the effects of drug use and lack of sleep. Her experiences of being the victim of serious violence in the past "probably made her much more sensitive than the average person" to the threat she perceived Mr Adams to offer. 2. The doctor regarded the offender as remorseful, insightful, and wishing to do better. 3. Dr Smith obtained a history from Ms Ridgeway that accords with that given to Dr Furst. The doctor described the offender's upbringing as occurring in "a particularly unstable environment characterised by parental detachment" where there was: "[…] systemic and intergenerational violence, neglect, abuse (including sexual abuse), and drug and alcohol abuse associated with inherent aboriginal disadvantage". 1. Sadly, the offender described having been "molested a fair bit" from a very young age, speaking of this abuse as if it were an ordinary part of childhood. It was her father and his partner who introduced Ms Ridgeway to methylamphetamine use at what must have been about age 15 or 16; the neglect by her parents of the younger children caused the offender to take over their care at a time when she was herself yet a child. Overall, Ms Ridgeway described her life as one where there had never been any "positives", but only "negatives". 2. Dr Smith, in common with Dr Furst, considered Ms Ridgeway had been significantly affected at the time of Mr Adams' death by her own traumatic background and feelings of being unsafe and vulnerable. She regards the offender as motivated to address her drug use issues and past trauma, displaying a positive attitude towards change. 3. In her letter dated this month Ms Ridgeway expressed her remorse for her actions on 29 February 2020. 4. Ms Ridgeway said (with any unorthodox spelling corrected): "I am so sorry for what happened that night as it all really affects me knowing that I am responsible for the loss of someone's life. It is something that will always affect me and will never sit right with me. A major contributor to that night and how it played out was that I wasn't myself mentally, emotionally, or spiritually. I had a lot of recent trauma that impacted my drug issues and I think I was just trying to numb myself and escape reality. I feel sick with sadness about what happened that night as it's not the woman I ever set out to be and a situation that I never thought I would see myself in. I hope that you can take into consideration that I was not myself that night". 1. Having explained the steps she has taken in an effort to better herself, Ms Ridgeway returned in her letter to her regret and remorse for what had happened. She said: "I understand that what happened that night has really affected a lot of people, especially Jason's loved ones and for that I would like to apologise for your loss and your heartache. Knowing that I am responsible for the loss of someone's life affects me a lot, it makes me feel very ashamed and sick to my stomach. I have read the victim impact statements and the poem, my lawyer gave me copies last week. I have sat them by my bedside in my cell and have been re-reading over them a lot". 1. Upon release from prison Ms Ridgeway will have family support and, in her grandmother, assistance where she will most need it – with drug rehabilitation. Ms Bailey has been a moving force in the establishment of a residential drug rehabilitation facility for aboriginal women, and she will be able to provide practical support to the offender in entering a rehabilitation programme. 2. The final evidence in the offender's case, Ex. S5, is directed to establishing that the offender has, in 2020 and 2021, provided assistance to the authorities with respect to the prosecution of an individual charged with serious child sexual assault offences. She made a witness statement in April 2020 and was prepared to give her evidence at trial in 2021, although she could not be found. It is submitted that the evidence provides a basis for a reduction on the sentence that would otherwise have been imposed upon her, pursuant to s 23A of the Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act. The Sentence to be Imposed 1. The determination of the sentence to be imposed upon the offender requires the reconciliation of features that demand quite opposite outcomes, to meet the purposes of sentencing set out by s 3A of the Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act. The sentence must punish the offender adequately for her crime and hold her accountable for it; it must recognise the harm done and denounce the offender's conduct; but it must also promote her rehabilitation. Specific and general deterrence must be considered, as must the protection of the community. 2. The starting point is that a human life was wrongly taken, and great harm has been done. As the Crown reminded the Court in submission, that is a feature that cannot be lost sight of, no matter how compelling the offender's case on sentence: R v MD & Ors (2005) 156 A Crim R 372; [2005] NSWCCA 342. 3. That great wrong is to be punished bearing in mind, and giving full weight to, the offender's personal circumstances. Whilst this was an entirely needless killing, the offender's act was the culmination of long years of trauma, violence, and abuse. Even though, on the objective and reliable evidence, Mr Adams posed no real threat to her, Ms Ridgeway was primed to see danger around her because her life had so often been lived in dangerous circumstances. Her perceptions could only have been further distorted by the drugs she had been abusing over the previous days. Her response, which she described as "blacking out" or going into "survival mode", must have been almost an instinctive one. 4. I accept that Ms Ridgeway was in the emotionally dysregulated state Dr Furst considered was likely and which, to some extent, common sense suggests, given her history as a victim of domestic and other violence and the evidence of the terrible violence she suffered just one month before: that is, she was suffering from an acute stress disorder, and she was hypersensitive to any threat. 5. That state of emotional dysregulation had its origins in the significant disadvantage of the offender's upbringing, where she endured a chaotic lifestyle surrounded by, and the victim of, drug use and violence. As Dr Furst observed, such a childhood likely had a damaging impact upon the core structures of the offender's brain and neural connections, leaving her less able than an individual without that adverse developmental history to regulate emotion. 6. Intoxication further twisted Ms Ridgeway's perceptions and, whilst intoxication is not ordinarily a feature that mitigates sentence, it can have that effect in some, very limited, circumstances, as here: R v Henry (1999) 46 NSWLR 346 at [273], Hayek v R [2016] NSWCCA 126 at [76]. The use of drugs by the offender was a habit inculcated in her as a child by adults who should have protected her from such harm, including her own father. It is little wonder that she thereafter relied upon illicit drugs as a means of coping with the distress of her past as a victim of emotional, physical, and sexual violence, and turned to drugs in the weeks following the abuse to which she was subjected in January 2020. Her drug use only made her more vulnerable to conflict. 7. The offender's moral culpability, her blameworthiness for her conduct must, in these circumstances, be reduced, and considerably so: Bugmy v The Queen (2013) 249 CLR 571; [2013] HCA 37 at [44]. Where her moral culpability is reduced, the application of the principle of general deterrence must have lesser weight. 8. Whilst an offender's compromised capacity to control a violent response to life events can require the sentence imposed to give greater weight to the protection of the community, I do not think it has that impact in the offender's case. Dr Furst referred to Ms Ridgeway's level of intelligence and good school performance, together with the educative courses she has completed, and work undertaken in custody, to conclude that she has good prospects of further educating herself and obtaining useful employment in the future. He did not think she posed an ongoing threat to others, stating that: "Ms Ridgeway does not appear to be a violent person by nature, her criminal history being relatively short / light compared to other conduct disordered youth and young adults coming before the courts in NSW. Her individual risk factors mostly relate to her trauma history, emotional dysregulation and addiction issues, factors she has been addressing in treatment/ counselling whilst in custody". 1. I accept Dr Furst's opinion in this regard, the Court concluding that, as long as the applicant can maintain abstinence from drugs, and she avoids the company of drug users and criminals in the future, her prospects are positive. She will have the practical aid her grandmother can provide to break her habit of drug use, a path the offender has already walked some distance along, by remaining abstinent from illicit drugs in custody. 2. Her prospects are further evidenced by the vocational courses the offender has undertaken, underlined by her previous good school record. She has the personal qualities to live a law-abiding life, and one free from violence. She appears also to have the determination to do so. 3. Ms Ridgeway will need assistance and a longer than usual period of supervision to that end, and I make a finding of special circumstances pursuant to s 44 of the Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act. 4. Although she entered a plea of not guilty to the crime of Mr Adams' manslaughter, that does not axiomatically mean that the offender feels no regret. I am persuaded that she was and remains distressed by the consequences of her actions, both for Mr Adams's death and for the grief occasioned to his family. She told Dr Furst that: "I have remorse. I do care about the victim and his family. The impacts… […] I do feel for his family a lot". 1. In her letter, Ms Ridgeway made similar statements of regret for the harm done to Mr Adams and his loved ones. Although the Crown submits the letter should be given little weight, consistent with the authority such as Quatami and Imbornone v R [2017] NSWCCA 144, I am persuaded that it is a genuine account of the offender's feelings, and she is remorseful for her crime. As counsel for the offender pointed out, the contents of the letter are consistent with other evidence, notably the reports of Drs Furst and Smith. There is nothing in Ms Ridgeway's words that strikes a discordant note, or points to invention or exaggeration. It reads as a true acknowledgment of responsibility for Mr Adams' death, grief at the terrible impact on others of that death, and an attempt to understand her own role in it. 2. The Court accepts her sentiments as real, and deeply felt, and accepts that the offender is remorseful for her offence. 3. The assistance to authorities, whilst not of a high order, should be recognised. Although it is the sort of assistance that any citizen who sees or hears something relevant to the prosecution for a criminal offence is expected to provide, there was no obligation upon the offender to provide her statement, or to agree to give evidence. Her willingness to do so, even in circumstances where adverse consequences could have flowed to her as a prisoner in a correctional facility, has value. It should be recognised by a modest 5% discount on the sentence that would otherwise have been imposed. 4. Ms Ridgeway has already spent a period of time in custody referable to this matter, although the position is complicated by the revocation of parole for an unrelated offence following her arrest. Although not in custody on 29 February 2020, the revocation of parole commenced on that date, with the parole period expiring on 2 January 2021. In the period 2 March 2020 (when Ms Ridgeway was arrested) to 2 January 2021 the offender was both serving balance of parole and on remand relating to this matter, a period of 306 days. From 3 January 2021 to 12 June 2021, and from 20 December 2021 until today, a total period of 320 days, her incarceration has been solely connected with the present matter. Including the 306 days when the offender was both serving balance of parole and on remand, she has spent 626 days in custody. 5. Although the Court can commence the sentence on any appropriate date before today in compliance with s 47 of the Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act, there should in my view be some discrete portion of the 626 days the offender has spent in custody which reflects only the balance of parole. The offender was in breach of her parole not only through the killing of Mr Adams, but also by her acknowledged use of prohibited drugs in this period. Full credit against sentence for the whole of the parole period is not appropriate, although it must be recognised that the offender's parole was revoked only because she was charged with respect to Mr Adams' death. The sentence imposed today will commence on 29 November 2020, a starting date that allows for a modest discrete period after the offender began to serve the balance of her parole. Conclusion 1. The task of the Court is to have regard to all the matters to which I have referred and impose a sentence which properly reflects each of them. I acknowledge that Mr Adams' family may find it difficult to understand why the sentence imposed upon Ms Ridgeway should have regard to her background and personal circumstances, or be mitigated by them in any way, or even why she should receive credit for time served that related to revocation of parole. 2. Ms Perceval said in her victim impact statement that it had seemed to her that the court proceedings were all about the offender, and one sided. Her experience of them has been one of disempowerment. It is understood that the families of victims of crime may feel that their lost one has been forgotten, or disregarded, and that the process employed by the criminal courts advantages the offender. That may be the perception, but I assure Ms Percival that Mr Adams has not been forgotten. 3. I hope Ms Perceval, Mr Adams and their family can understand that no sentence this Court could impose can ever make up for the loss of their son, brother, and loved one; and nor can the value of Mr Adams' life be measured by the sentence to be imposed. Nothing the Court can do can address the magnitude of their pain. The imposition of sentence serves quite different purposes, provided by s 3A of the Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act. The immeasurable grief occasioned to the Adams family by the death of Jason Adams is acknowledged. Perhaps the finalisation of these proceedings can bring, at least, some lessening of the pain and distress they have undoubtedly caused. orders 1. Lily Ridgeway, having been convicted on 8 February 2022 of the manslaughter of Jason Adams, on 29 February 2020 in this State, is sentenced to imprisonment for 7 years and 7 months to date from 29 November 2020 and expiring on 28 June 2028. There will be a non-parole period of 5 years, expiring on 28 November 2025, that being the earliest date upon which the offender may be released to parole. ********** DISCLAIMER - Every effort has been made to comply with suppression orders or statutory provisions prohibiting publication that may apply to this judgment or decision. The onus remains on any person using material in the judgment or decision to ensure that the intended use of that material does not breach any such order or provision. Further enquiries may be directed to the Registry of the Court or Tribunal in which it was generated. Decision last updated: 24 June 2022