Court of Appeal Supreme Court New South Wales Medium Neutral Citation: Kearney v Amirbeaggi [2022] NSWCA 130 Hearing dates: 27 June 2022; 20 July 2022 Date of orders: 20 July 2022 Decision date: 20 July 2022 Before: Brereton JA Decision: (1) Grant leave to the applicant to amend the summons for leave to appeal, by adding a claim for leave to appeal from the orders of the Common Law Division made on 10 June 2022; (2) Order that the amended application for leave to appeal be adjourned to 31 October 2022; (3) Stay the proceedings in the Common Law Division pending the hearing of the application for leave to appeal. Catchwords: APPEALS – Leave to appeal – Appeal against multiple interlocutory orders, relevantly including an order declining to adjourn proceedings after applicant sought and was granted expedition – Where new psychiatric evidence suggests continuance of proceedings would adversely impact applicant's mental health – Appellate court may interfere with case management decision of trial judge to prevent possible miscarriage of justice – In interests of justice, proceedings below stayed pending hearing of application for leave to appeal; hearing of application for leave to appeal adjourned Legislation Cited: Civil Procedure Act 2005 (NSW), s 64(3) Supreme Court Act 1970 (NSW), s 46(2)(b). Supreme Court Rules 1970, Pt 51, r 10 Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 (NSW), r 51.44 Cases Cited: Kearney v Amirbeaggi [2020] NSWSC 1035 Kearney v Amirbeaggi [2022] NSWSC 130 Kearney v Amirbeaggi [2022] NSWSC 805 Raybos Australia Pty Ltd v Tectran Corporation Pty Ltd (No 4) (1986) 6 NSWLR 674 Category: Principal judgment Parties: Brian Raymond Kearney (Applicant) Farshad Amirbeaggi (First Respondent) ACN 111 804 383 Pty Limited (formerly Yates Beaggi Lawyers Pty Ltd) trading as Yates Beaggi Lawyers (Second Respondent) Representation: Counsel: Mr B R Kearney, in person (Applicant) Ms F T Roughley (Respondents 27.06.2022) Ms M Hamdan (Respondents 20.07.2022) Solicitors: YPOL Lawyers (Respondents) File Number(s): 2022/059224; 2022/100066 Decision under appeal Court or tribunal: Supreme Court of NSW Jurisdiction: Common Law Citation: [2022] NSWSC 130; [2022] NSWSC 805. Date of Decision: 10 June 2022 Before: Beech-Jones CJ at CL File Number(s): 2019/96321; [Note: The Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 provide (Rule 36.11) that unless the Court otherwise orders, a judgment or order is taken to be entered when it is recorded in the Court's computerised court record system. Setting aside and variation of judgments or orders is dealt with by Rules 36.15, 36.16, 36.17 and 36.18. Parties should in particular note the time limit of fourteen days in Rule 36.16.] Judgment 1. This application for leave to appeal comes before me upon referral from the Registrar for the applicant to show cause why the proceedings should not be dismissed for want of due despatch. The applicant Brian Kearney is the plaintiff in proceedings in the Common Law Division against the respondents Farshad Amirbeaggi and ACN 111 804 383 Pty Limited (formerly Yates Beaggi Lawyers Pty Ltd) trading as Yates Beaggi Lawyers, in which he sues lawyers who had acted for him in an earlier commercial dispute, for damages for professional negligence. To the extent necessary, the substance of Mr Kearney's claim is explained by Ierace J in a judgment declining to dismiss it as an abuse of process. [1] Background 1. In the proceedings below, Mr Kearney on or about 28 June 2021 filed a Notice of Motion seeking inter alia an order expediting the hearing of the proceedings. The matter was case managed by Cavanagh J, who ultimately fixed it for hearing for 15 days commencing on 5 September 2022, reserving leave to apply for an earlier hearing date. Such an application (that is, for an earlier hearing date) was heard by Beech-Jones CJ at CL on 15 February 2022. His Honour acceded to that application, vacating the hearing date of 5 September 2022 and instead fixing the matter for hearing on 1 August 2022 with an estimate of seven days. His Honour's essential reasoning and orders were as follows: [2] "[7] In relation to the expedition of the hearing, I accept for the purposes of deciding the notice of motion that the conduct of these proceedings is causing Mr Kearney significant psychological stress and his present condition is "fragile". As explained to Mr Kearney, it is not appropriate on an interlocutory application to determine whether the defendant is somehow responsible for this. However, in considering the position of Mr Kearney, vis‑a‑vis the defendants and other litigants, four related matters should be borne in mind. First, almost all litigation is stressful for the parties and often extremely so. Second, Mr Kearney is the moving party to the litigation; he has commenced and is conducting, in his own right, complex civil litigation. Third, numerous other litigants in the Common Law Division have experienced and continue to experience physical and psychological harm and many of them suffer more extreme harm than Mr Kearney. Fourth, as noted, the interests of other litigants in this Division include persons facing trial on serious criminal charges, some of whom have been awaiting trial in custody for some years. [8] Were it not for one matter, these considerations would have compelled me to decline to advance Mr Kearney's hearing date. However, it emerged at the directions hearing on 15 February 2022 that the estimated length of the hearing for the matter had reduced to seven days. In those circumstances, it can be allocated an earlier hearing. In fixing that date I have had some regard to the availability of counsel for the defendants, even though Mr Kearney submitted that little weight should be afforded to that factor given the impact of the proceedings on him. However, on this issue the second point just noted is of significance. Mr Kearney has commenced this litigation and not the defendants. A decision to alter a hearing date must also consider their interests. Otherwise, the parties should understand that, if the hearing of the matter exceeds the seven day estimate, then it will be a matter for the presiding judge as to whether the hearing will continue or be adjourned to another date. [9] With the future conduct of the matter, given his psychological state, Mr Kearney has requested ongoing case management that minimises court attendances prior to the hearing. The defendant does not oppose this course. On 15 February 2022, I made directions to facilitate this occurring although I will list the matter before me if it becomes necessary. [10] Accordingly, the Court orders that: (1) The hearing date of 5 September 2022 be vacated. (2) The matter be fixed for hearing on 1 August 2022 with an estimate of seven days. (3) There be liberty to apply to the Associate to Beech-Jones CJ at CL on one day's notice. (4) The plaintiff's notice of motion filed 28 June 2021 be otherwise dismissed. (5) The costs of the motion be reserved." 1. On 1 March 2022, Mr Kearney purported to file a Notice of Appeal (2022/59224). As amended on 18 March 2022, it relevantly sought orders setting aside orders (2) to (5) of 17 February 2022, and directions to lead to new pre-trial directions culminating in an expedited hearing of the trial. The twelve proposed grounds of appeal in essence complain that the judge erred in failing to give proper weight or consideration to evidence of Mr Kearney's mental health and the desirability in that regard of having the proceedings heard earlier. The purport of Mr Kearney's complaint at that stage appears to have been that the judge had erred in failing to grant a greater degree of expedition to the proceedings. I do not suggest that this encapsulates the whole of Mr Kearney's complaints, but it is a sufficient summary for present purposes. 2. Meanwhile, at first instance, on 12 April 2022, Beech-Jones CJ at CL made directions standing the proceedings over for directions on 3 May 2022, and directing the defendants to file an affidavit explaining their non-compliance with earlier directions of the Court. Further directions – none of them adverse to Mr Kearney – were made on 3 May 2022. On 20 May 2022, his Honour made orders that, relevantly: "(1) The defendant be disentitled to recover the costs of any appearances in the Court, in this matter, for the period from 20 August 2021 to 31 December 2021, and any costs incurred in and about the preparation of any affidavit from Mr Amirbeaggi in that period. (2) The defendant's notice of motion filed 2 May 2022 be otherwise dismissed." 1. On 23 May, his Honour granted leave to the defendants to rely on a late affidavit, and otherwise dismissed the defendants' motion. 2. In this Court, the requirement for leave to appeal from an interlocutory judgment having been brought to Mr Kearney's attention, he filed a summons for leave to appeal, together with a white folder, on 7 April 2022. On 12 April 2022 he filed an outline of argument which summarised and explained the grounds of appeal, and while referring to the emergence of "significant new medical evidence and serious adverse events" since 17 February 2022, maintained in substance the position that the judge had erred in failing to grant (further) expedition of the substantive proceedings. By motion filed on 22 April 2022, Mr Kearney sought an expedited determination of the application for leave and any consequent appeal. 3. On 16 May 2022, the Registrar extended time for the respondents' reply to 13 May 2022, and granted leave to Mr Kearney file an amended motion, which was stood over for further directions on 23 May 2022. Mr Kearney was subsequently offered, but did not accept, an expedited hearing on 25 May. On 23 May, the application was adjourned for further directions on 6 June. On 6 June, Mr Kearney filed notices of intention to appeal from the orders of 12 April 2022 and from the orders of 20 May 2022. Before the Registrar, Mr Kearney referred to a medical certificate of Dr Grace dated 9 May 2022, which relevantly stated: "Brian is currently in a highly anxious and depressed state. Not only has his mental health deteriorated significantly but his physical health is deteriorating as well. When I saw him today, I advised him that he needs to disengage from all Court related tasks for a minimum of three months and focus on regaining his mental health. My recommendation to him is that he comes into hospital for intensive psychiatric treatment as soon as possible." 1. The Registrar adjourned the proceedings to 27 June to show cause before a judge why the summons for leave to appeal should not be dismissed for want of due dispatch, with the applicant directed to serve any affidavit in that respect by 23 June. 2. On 10 June 2022, Beech-Jones CJ at CL considered an application made by Mr Kearney for vacation of the hearing date, in circumstances where the defendants below had defaulted in timely service of their evidence, and also because Mr Kearney's mental health was said to have deteriorated to an extent that his conduct of the proceedings would be seriously compromised. The judge declined to vacate the hearing, and made the following orders: [3] "(1) The plaintiff's lay and expert evidence in reply is to be filed and served by 8 July 2022. (2) The defendants are to serve a court book consisting of all pleadings and evidence, the exhibits to all affidavits to be dismembered and placed in chronological sequence by 15 July 2022. (3) The parties to file and serve any further documentary material to be relied upon at the trial by way of supplementary tender bundle by 25 July 2022. (4) The parties to exchange submissions not exceeding 15 pages, chronologies and objections to evidence by 28 July 2022. (5) The defendants deliver the court book and supplementary tender bundles to my associate by 29 July 2022. [Defendants sought costs of the application]. (6) Costs of today are reserved." 1. On 27 June, Mr Kearney filed a notice of intention to appeal from the orders of 10 June 2022. 2. Shortly before the hearing before me, Mr Kearney served and subsequently provided to the court a document entitled amended notice of motion which seeks a stay of orders 2, 3, 4, and 5 made on 17 February 2022, a stay of the orders made on 20 May 2022, setting aside of the orders made on 10 June 2022 and various other orders and directions. Following the conclusion of the hearing, at his request, I directed that he may make further, written, submissions by 11 July, with the respondents permitted to respond by 18 July. For reasons which are acceptable, Mr Kearney lodged submissions on 17 July. The respondents promptly indicated that they did not wish to make further submissions and relied on their written submissions of 13 July (in opposition to the application for leave to appeal) and their oral submissions on 27 June. 3. Were the circumstances upon which Mr Kearney was required to show cause only his conduct of the proceedings in this Court on the summons for leave to appeal, I would not dismiss the proceedings. His summary of argument was filed in a timely manner; a white folder has been filed; it is not apparent that he is in breach of any direction of this Court. He can hardly be criticised for failing to accept the offer of an expedited hearing at quite short notice. His request for an adjournment on 6 June was based on medical advice to which I have referred. In my judgment, Mr Kearney has in those respects shown cause why the proceedings should not be dismissed for want of prosecution. Indeed, it would be extraordinary to dismiss for want of due despatch an application by an applicant who is not in default of any direction. 4. On one view, the matter could be simply left there and returned to the Registrar for further directions. However, adopting that course would fail to address the real issues that now arise. 5. At the hearing, what most concerned me was that it appeared that Mr Kearney's essential position now was that he wished to have the trial adjourned on account of his health and welfare, and that that position was inconsistent with prosecuting an appeal from Beech-Jones CJ at CL's declining to grant further expedition to the proceedings on 17 February 2022. 6. While my judgment was reserved – and before his written submissions were lodged – he requested that the matter be urgently relisted, because if the trial proceeded on 1 August it would have "unthinkable medical and legal ramifications" for him. The President's chambers responded, indicating to all parties that when disposing of the show cause question, I would if appropriate consider making directions for the further conduct of the application for leave to appeal, proposed amended summons and notice of motion. For that purpose, I reconvened the court to enable the parties to address what directions should be made, and drew their attention specifically to Raybos Australia Pty Ltd v Tectran Corporation Pty Ltd (No 4), [4] referred to more fully below. Ultimately, the respondents did not consent to, but did not oppose, the course which I have decided, for the reasons that follow, to adopt. 7. Mr Kearney's written submissions contain much that is irrelevant, or misconceived. For example, the fact that some interlocutory judgments have not included a medium neutral citation (MNC) nor been published on Caselaw, has no effect whatsoever on their status. More fundamentally, and as I endeavoured to point out during the hearing, appeals lie from orders, not from reasons. While I understand that Mr Kearney disputes some of the matters recorded and observations made by Beech-Jones CJ at CL in his Honour's reasons of 17 February and 12 April 2022, it is only against orders that appeals lie, and his Honour's observations in the course of the reasons are of no consequence for any final hearing of the matter. If it is not or no longer sought to disturb the orders actually made by his Honour, it does not matter that there may be misstatements in the reasons. 8. In circumstances where there is now no prospect that the Court could or would fix an earlier hearing than 1 August, and indeed Mr Kearney does not seek an earlier hearing, an appeal from the orders of 17 February would be futile, and there is no prospect that leave to appeal would be granted. While the reasons of 12 April 2022 contain some observations critical of Mr Kearney's engagement with the Court by email correspondence, there is no order adverse to Mr Kearney, and there is no prospect that leave to appeal would be granted from the orders of that date. And although it appears from Mr Kearney's submissions before me that he has some complaints about the "disentitled to costs" order made against the defendants on 20 May 2022, it is an order substantially favourable to him, and one in respect of which, due to its trial management character, there is in my opinion no prospect that leave to appeal would be granted. 9. However, Mr Kearney's real complaint is about the more recent directions made in the proceedings below on 10 June 2022, requiring him to serve his evidence by 8 July and maintaining the hearing date of 1 August. His present position is that he is not mentally or physically fit and cannot be ready to proceed with a hearing commencing on 1 August, and that pressing on with such a hearing would be further deleterious to his health. In short, he seeks (as he sought before Beech-Jones CJ at CL on 10 June) that that hearing should be adjourned, to allow him a period of respite in which to regain his mental health. If that were achieved, then it is difficult to see that he would have any other tenable basis for any of his pending applications for leave to appeal. 10. Although in the course of the hearing I suggested that if Mr Kearney wished to challenge the orders of 10 June 2022, a new summons for leave to appeal would be required as they post-dated the extant summons, that suggestion overlooked that, as it now seems to me, Civil Procedure Act 2005 (NSW), s 64(3), would permit the amendment by leave of the extant summons to add applications for leave to appeal from the later interlocutory orders. It is clear from the amended notice of motion that that is in substance what Mr Kearney now seeks. 11. In declining to vacate the hearing, Beech Jones CJ at CL, who had before him the psychiatrist's report which I have set out above, said: "[16] The letter recounts the psychiatrist's advice that Mr Kearney needs to "disengage from all Court related tasks for a minimum of three months and focus on regaining his mental health." It includes a recommendation that he be admitted into hospital for intensive psychiatric treatment as soon as possible. In his oral submissions, Mr Kearney made it clear that he has not had himself admitted to hospital. He did not elaborate on whether he is receiving any ongoing intensive treatment. Mr Kearney did not put forward anything to suggest any period of time in which his psychiatric health may improve or outline any treatment that he is receiving that is likely to lead to that occurring. [17] One difficulty with the psychiatrist's report is that when it says that Mr Kearney is in a highly anxious and depressed state, it does not state why. I am prepared to assume that it is related to the conduct of the litigation and the impending hearing date. Assuming that is correct, that is a reason for the hearing to be conducted earlier and not later. [18] In her submissions, counsel for the defendants noted that Mr Kearney has placed the Court, her client, and her instructing solicitors in a difficult position by his continued stream of correspondence that repeatedly refers to his difficult mental state and asserts that his position is particularly grave, perhaps potentially "fatal". These statements are made in the context of Mr Kearney making some request, bordering on a demand, concerning the conduct of the litigation. This difficulty is compounded by the fact that those requests, sometimes demands, are often inconsistent, as demonstrated by the fact that he so passionately sought an earlier hearing date, yet now seeks to vacate it. [19] There is considerable force in counsel's contention. It leads me to be in a position where there does seem to be a basis for concern about Mr Kearney's mental state and the effect of the litigation. However, as I have just indicated, the difficulty is that there is no reason to believe that anything will be advanced in that regard by vacating the hearing. At the risk of repetition, there is nothing to suggest that over some particular timeframe his mental health will improve, so as to later allow him to conduct the hearing. [20] All litigation is stressful. Litigation conducted by a lay person on their own behalf is particularly stressful. Complex litigation of the kind initiated here by a lay person on their own behalf, is especially stressful. The simple conclusion is that there is no likelihood of the position improving at any point if the hearing is vacated. This is all in the context, of course, where Mr Kearney is the plaintiff, ie, the party who chose to bring the proceedings. It was his choice to sue the defendant. It is his case. [21] The Court and the other litigants cannot be placed in a position where the conduct of proceedings is unilaterally devolved to a lay plaintiff who is suffering adverse mental health effects. [22] In considering an adjournment, a significant matter is to consider the prejudice that would be occasioned by the vacation of the hearing to the defendants. The affidavit sworn on the defendants' behalf that I have referred to, outlines a series of matters which concern Mr Amirbeaggi's position personally and which would not otherwise be compensated by a costs order. They include the fact that the proceedings have been "hanging over his head" since 2019, and concerns over his reputation and professional standing. The affidavit notes that the proceedings are a distraction from his professional activities and his professional life. The affidavit states that the proceedings are often the subject of inquiries by other members of the profession, given that they involve relatively serious allegations about his conduct. His solicitor recounts as follows: "He is concerned that any vacation of the hearing date will lead to an indefinite extension of these proceedings and additionally or alternatively, result in the parties continuing to be distracted by satellite litigation and interlocutory contests, rather than addressing the real issues, the subject of the pleadings. The plaintiff has foreshadowed but not provided a proposed amended pleading and has commenced or indicated an intention to commence appeals or applications to appeal interlocutory decisions in the nature of directions. The hearing date provides some level of certainty that the proceedings will resolve and the parties focus their efforts on the real issues in dispute." [23] I consider that that paragraph properly describes the position, not only faced by the defendants, but by the Court and even by Mr Kearney. The short answer to all the stress that is being occasioned to everyone is not to prolong the proceedings, but to bring them into focus. In so stating, I acknowledge that one of the issues that has caused the current level of grief was the delay by the defendants in the provision of their evidence. [24] To this time, I have not considered the position of the Court in terms of the interests of justice for the positions of the parties. The vacation of the hearing date will affect the position of other litigants. However, in my view, the crucial determinate is, as I have indicated, that a vacation of the hearing date will not solve any of the problems that appear to be faced at the moment, but only exacerbate them. Accordingly, I decline to vacate the hearing." 1. This Court has been provided with a further report of Dr Grace, of 5 July 2022, which states: "Brian Kearney has been a patient of mine since 28/07/2017. I saw him earlier today. Brian remains in a highly anxious and depressed state. He is currently so anxious that he would be unable to comply with 10 June 2022 Court Orders that entail his Reply Lay Affidavit, locate and brief a forensic psychiatrist and await his report due by 8 July 2022. He would also be unable to file and serve any supplementary documents that he needs to rely upon by 25 July 2022. Additionally, he would be unable to prepare written submissions, his chronology and objections to evidence by 28 July 2022. He is certainly in no state to review defendants' documents as well as to prepare for and participate in a main hearing on 1 August 2022. I have now advised Brian to make immediate contact with his local Adult Mental Health Crisis Team as I am concerned about his current state of mental health and risk of suicide." 1. This report, in my judgment, significantly strengthens the applicant's case for an adjournment of the trial, and highlights the level of risk involved in not doing so. 2. While the Court rarely interferes with case management decisions of trial judges, it is not unprecedented for it to do so to prevent a possible miscarriage of justice. [5] Circumstances somewhat similar to the present arose in Raybos Australia Pty Ltd v Tectran Corporation Pty Ltd (No 4), [6] in which Raybos (of which the principal was Dr Rajski) applied for leave to appeal from a trial judge's refusal to adjourn an interlocutory application that was set down for seven days, where Dr Rajski, who was appearing as a self-represented litigant in litigation of a highly complex nature, claimed to be incapacitated from continuing to represent himself because of mental and physical exhaustion. The Court of Appeal held that in circumstances which included its own observations of the behaviour of Dr Rajski in the Court, the unseemly record of conduct in the court below, and the nature of the psychiatric evidence available, the exceptional circumstances of the litigation and the likelihood otherwise of further applications, appeals and stays of proceedings, evidence of a psychiatric opinion on Dr Rajski's condition of health should be admitted. The Court further held that it had jurisdiction to grant a stay of the proceedings before the trial judge in support of a part heard application for leave to appeal, under then Supreme Court Rules 1970, Pt 51, r 10 (see now UCPR r 51.44, which provides that subject to the filing of a relevant originating process – here, a summons for leave to appeal – the Court may order that the decision below or the proceedings under the decision be stayed). In the exceptional and unusual circumstances of the case, the application for leave to appeal was adjourned part heard, and the proceedings at first instance were to be stayed, pending a final determination of the application for leave to appeal, in order to secure "a brief respite in the litigation and that principally because of the evidence of the effect on the health of the claimant which continuance of the proceedings would probably cause". [7] 3. The power to grant a stay under UCPR r 51.44 can be exercised by a single judge of appeal. [8] 4. It is now less than two weeks from the appointed commencement of the hearing. Theoretically it might be possible for an expedited application for leave to appeal to be heard, concurrently with any consequent appeal, before then. However, such a course would leave to an unacceptably late stage resolution of whether the hearing at first instance would proceed. It would also require Mr Kearney to engage with the litigation, at a time when it appears to be firmly against the interests of his mental health to do so. 5. If an appeal is not heard before 1 August, it will be rendered futile unless a stay is granted in the interim. On the other hand, if a stay is granted, the applicant will achieve his purpose of an adjournment of the trial without his appeal being heard. Neither of these is an attractive proposition, although the second scenario is comparable to the situation in Raybos, where the effect of granting a stay was similar. 6. Because of the practical consequences of granting a stay, it is appropriate to apply a stricter than usual standard when considering whether an appeal has prospects of success. In my judgment, in what I consider to be the unusual circumstances of this case, I consider that an appeal from the refusal to vacate the hearing has real prospects of success. The new evidence of Dr Grace, which was not before Beech-Jones CJ at CL, contributes significantly to this conclusion. As in Raybos, the circumstances are such that such evidence can be received on an application for leave to appeal. Moreover, it is in my respectful opinion arguable that it is not quite correct that Mr Kearney did not put forward anything to suggest any period of time in which his psychiatric health may improve, as Beech-Jones CJ at CL said, since the first report of Dr Grace suggests disengagement for a period of three months. His Honour's view that, if his anxiety is associated with the litigation, it is better to get it over sooner than later, is also contestable, especially if the risk of forcing him to trial in the short term is suicide. If there is a prospect that a period of respite will result in an improvement in his mental health, as might be inferred from Dr Grace's report, then, contrary to his Honour's reasoning, there may be some reason to think that something will be gained by vacating the hearing. The prejudice of a deferral to the respondents, in circumstances where, as his Honour rightly acknowledged, they have been responsible for considerable delay to date, pales into insignificance when weighed against the risk that the trial might be a charade with no plaintiff (if Mr Kearney acts on the advice, as he has indicated he will, not to engage), or that he would be required to conduct the trial seriously handicapped by his current condition. In my respectful view, it is very strongly arguable that it is in the interests of justice that the trial be adjourned. 7. Accordingly, in my view, on the basis that Mr Kearney is seeking leave to appeal from the orders of 10 June 2022 refusing to adjourn the trial, I would stay the proceedings below pending the hearing of the application for leave to appeal. In order to provide the respite which Mr Kearney requires, I would adjourn the hearing of that application for three months. 8. My orders are: 1. Grant leave to the applicant to amend the summons for leave to appeal, by adding a claim for leave to appeal from the orders of the Common Law Division made on 10 June 2022; 2. Order that the amended application for leave to appeal be adjourned to 31 October 2022; 3. Stay the proceedings in the Common Law Division pending the hearing of the application for leave to appeal. ********** Endnotes 1. Kearney v Amirbeaggi [2020] NSWSC 1035. 2. Kearney v Amirbeaggi [2022] NSWSC 130. 3. Kearney v Amirbeaggi [2022] NSWSC 805. 4. (1986) 6 NSWLR 674. 5. Raybos Australia Pty Ltd v Tectran Corporation Pty Ltd (No 4) (1986) 6 NSWLR 674 at 685F-686A, 691A, 692G-693D. 6. (1986) 6 NSWLR 674. 7. (1986) 6 NSWLR 674 at 689B. 8. Supreme Court Act 1970 (NSW), s 46(2)(b). DISCLAIMER - Every effort has been made to comply with suppression orders or statutory provisions prohibiting publication that may apply to this judgment or decision. The onus remains on any person using material in the judgment or decision to ensure that the intended use of that material does not breach any such order or provision. Further enquiries may be directed to the Registry of the Court or Tribunal in which it was generated. Decision last updated: 20 July 2022