Civil and Administrative Tribunal New South Wales Medium Neutral Citation: Wang v Hure [2023] NSWCATAP 39 Hearing dates: 8 February 2023 Date of orders: 13 February 2023 Decision date: 13 February 2023 Jurisdiction: Appeal Panel Before: D Charles, Senior Member D Ziegler, Senior Member Decision: 1. Application for extension of time to lodge the appeal refused. 2. Leave to appeal refused. 3. Appeal dismissed. Catchwords: LEASES AND TENANCIES – end of fixed term residential tenancy – no repudiation of tenancy where landlord gives notice of termination in accordance with s 84 of the Residential Tenancies Act – tenant gives ineffective notice of termination before end of fixed term – no rent payable beyond end of fixed term – s 110 of the Residential Tenancies Act applies APPEALS ­­- procedural fairness – leave to appeal – whether against the weight of evidence – whether not fair and equitable – no issue of principle – extension of time refused Legislation Cited: Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2013 (NSW) Civil and Administrative Tribunal Rules 2014 (NSW) Residential Tenancies Act 2010 (NSW) Cases Cited: Ryan v BKB Motor Vehicle Repairs Pty Ltd [2017] NSWCATAP 39 Prendergast v Western Murray Irrigation Ltd [2014] NSWCATAP 69 Collins v Urban [2014] NSWCATAP 17 Secretary, Department of Family and Community Services v Smith [2017] NSWCA 206 Cominos v Di Rico [2016] NSWCATAP 5 Re Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs; Ex parte Lam [2003] HCA 6; 214 CLR 1 Jackson v NSW Land & Housing Corporation [2014] NSWCATAP 22 Texts Cited: None Cited Category: Principal judgment Parties: Yang Wang (Appellant) Craig Hure (Respondent) Representation: Appellant – self represented Respondent – self- represented File Number(s): 2022/00362428 Publication restriction: Unrestricted Decision under appeal Court or tribunal: Civil and Administrative Tribunal Jurisdiction: Consumer and Commercial Division Date of Decision: 02 November 2022 Before: R Titterton, Senior Member File Number(s): RT 22/29105 REASONS FOR DECISION Introduction 1. This is an internal appeal under s 80(2) of the Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2013 NSW (the NCAT Act) against a decision made in the Consumer and Commercial Division of the Tribunal on 2 November 2022 (Decision). 2. The Decision determined a dispute under the Residential Tenancies Act 2010 NSW (RT Act) in relation to a residential tenancy. For convenience, in this appeal decision we will refer to the appellant as the landlord and the respondent as the tenant. 3. In the Tribunal proceeding, the landlord had claimed at the end of the tenancy, an amount of up to $8,705.14, with the following components: 1. For the tenant terminating a fixed term agreement without 2 weeks' notice, an amount commensurate with 10 days' rent - $386, 2. For the tenant failing to return the premises to the landlord in the same condition as they were in at the commencement of the tenancy, amounts for cleaning, repairs to doors and floors, and replacement of missing or damaged furniture - $1,665, 3. For various breaches (nuisance) of the residential tenancy agreement and the RT Act, payment of compensation by the tenant - $6,257, and 4. For excessive electricity costs, payment of compensation by the tenant - $377.14. 1. The Tribunal at first instance was not satisfied that any of the landlord's claims were established to the requisite standard of proof, on the available evidence. 2. The landlord now appeals the Tribunal's order to dismiss the landlord's application for orders under s 187(1)(c) and s 187(1)(d) of the RT Act. 3. For the reasons set out below, we have decided to dismiss the Appeal. Procedural matters 1. The landlord's Notice of Appeal was lodged on 1 December 2022. 2. The Decision, which gave written reasons for the Tribunal's order to dismiss the landlord's application, was received by the parties on 3 November 2022; so, the lodgement of the Notice of Appeal was 14 days outside of the 14-day period specified in cl 25(4) of the Civil and Administrative Tribunal Rules 2014 (NCAT Rules). 3. Therefore, the landlord requires an extension of time pursuant to s 41 of the NCAT Act. 4. Whether we should extend time for the lodgement of the landlord's Appeal is addressed later in this appeal decision. 5. The landlord's Appeal was listed for directions before the Appeal Panel on 14 December 2022. Directions 1(d) and 2(d) were to the effect that if a party wished to rely in the Appeal on what happened at the hearing at first instance, the party was to file and serve the sound recording of the entire hearing, and a typed transcript of the relevant parts of the hearing. 6. The reason for directions 1(d) and 2(d) is so that the Appeal Panel can identify exactly what evidence and submissions were given at the Tribunal hearing, what the Tribunal Member said at the hearing, and what else happened at the hearing. 7. Although there is a contention in the appellant's Appeal that the process of the Tribunal's hearing was "unfair", direction 1(d) made on 14 December 2022 was not complied with. No sound recording of the hearing at first instance, or a typed transcript of the relevant parts of the hearing to support the appellant's contention that the hearing process was unfair, were provided to the Appeal Panel. Background facts 1. On 14 September 2021, the parties entered into a residential tenancy agreement (Agreement) in respect of residential tenancy premises at Homebush NSW (premises). 2. The premises were the second bedroom of a two-bedroom apartment. It was common ground that the tenant was permitted use of the kitchen and living room of the apartment. 3. The term of the Agreement was fixed for six (6) months commencing on 20 September 2021 and ending on 19 March 2022. 4. The weekly rent was $270, or $38.57 per day. 5. The tenant agreed: 1. not to cause or permit a nuisance – see the Agreement, clause 16.2 and the RT Act, s 51(1)(b), 2. not to intentionally or negligently cause or permit damage to the premises – see the Agreement, cl 17.2 and the RT Act, s 51(1)(d), 3. to keep the premises in a reasonable state of cleanliness, having regard to the condition of the premises at the commencement of the tenancy, and to notify the landlord of any damage to the residential premises as soon as practicable after becoming aware of the damage – see the Agreement, cl 17.1, cl 17.2, and cl 18.3 and the RT Act s 51(2)(a) & (b) and s 51(3)(c), 4. to be responsible to the landlord for any act or omission by a person who is lawfully on the residential premises if the person is only permitted on the premises with the tenant's consent and the act or omission would be in breach of the Agreement if done or omitted by the tenant – see the Agreement, cl 17.3, 5. to leave the premises as nearly as possible in the same condition, fair wear and tear excepted, as at the commencement of the tenancy – see the Agreement, cl 18.2 and the RT Act, s 51(3)(b), 6. to remove or arrange for the removal of all rubbish from the residential premises in a way that is lawful and in accordance with council requirements – see the Agreement, cl 18.4 and the RT Act, s 51(3)(d). 1. On 17 February 2022, the landlord gave the tenant a notice to terminate the Agreement pursuant to s 84 of the RT Act (end of residential tenancy at end of fixed term tenancy) and requiring vacant possession of the premises on 20 March 2022. 2. On 15 March 2022, the tenant gave notice to the landlord that he would be vacating the premises on 19 March 2022, and on that date, the tenant vacated the premises. Internal appeals – legal principles 1. Internal appeals may be made as of right on a question of law, and otherwise with permission (or "leave") of the Appeal Panel: s 80 (2) the NCAT Act. 2. Importantly, the appellant must demonstrate to the Appeal Panel an appealable error in the Tribunal's decision, as an appeal is not an opportunity for a dissatisfied or aggrieved party to re-argue a case put at first instance: Ryan v BKB Motor Vehicle Repairs Pty Ltd [2017] NSWCATAP 39 at [10]. 3. As regards an error on a question of law, in Prendergast v Western Murray Irrigation Ltd [2014] NSWCATAP 69 the Appeal Panel set out at [13] a non-exclusive list of questions of law: 1. Whether there has been a failure to provide proper reasons, 2. Whether the Tribunal identified the wrong issue or asked the wrong question, 3. Whether a wrong principle of law had been applied, 4. Whether there was a failure to afford procedural fairness, 5. Whether the Tribunal failed to take into account relevant (i.e., mandatory) considerations, 6. Whether the Tribunal took into account an irrelevant consideration, 7. Whether there was no evidence to support a finding of fact, and 8. Whether the decision is so unreasonable that no reasonable decision-maker would make it. 1. In respect of an error for which leave to appeal is required under the NCAT Act, the principles are well-established and are repeated in many decisions of the Appeal Panel, often quoting Collins v Urban [2014] NSWCATAP 17 (Collins v Urban). They are the same principles applied by the courts, such as is stated by the Court of Appeal in Secretary, Department of Family and Community Services v Smith [2017] NSWCA 206 at [28] (citations omitted): Only if the decision is attended with sufficient doubt to warrant its reconsideration on appeal will leave be granted. Ordinarily, it is only appropriate to grant leave where there is an issue of principle, a question of general public importance, or an injustice which is reasonably clear, in the sense of going beyond what is merely arguable. It is well established that it is not sufficient merely to show that the trial judge was arguably wrong. 1. Where, as in this instance, the Appeal is from a decision made in the Consumer and Commercial Division (other than in respect of interlocutory decisions), there is a further qualification to the possible grant of leave in that we may only proceed in the broader sense (i.e., as to the exercise of the discretion to grant leave to appeal under s 80(2)(b) of the NCAT Act), if we are first satisfied that the elements of cl 12(1) of Sch 4 of the NCAT Act are made out, in that the appellant may have suffered a substantial miscarriage of justice on the basis that: 1. the decision of the Tribunal under appeal was not fair and equitable; or 2. the decision of the Tribunal under appeal was against the weight of evidence; or 3. significant new evidence has arisen (being evidence that was not reasonably available at the time the proceedings under appeal were being dealt with). 1. Relevantly, in Collins v Urban, the Appeal Panel stated at [76] that a substantial miscarriage of justice for the purposes of cl 12(1) of Schedule 4 may have been suffered where: … there was a "significant possibility" or a "chance which was fairly open" that a different and more favourable result would have been achieved for the appellant had the relevant circumstance in para (a) or (b) not occurred or if the fresh evidence under para (c) had been before the Tribunal at first instance. Grounds of Appeal 1. The Notice of Appeal and submissions of the landlord do not clearly express the landlord's grounds of appeal. 2. Nonetheless, as the appellant is not legally trained, and she did not have legal representation, a broad interpretation of her grounds of appeal should be allowed unless it unreasonably prejudices the respondent. In this regard, we are mindful of what the Appeal Panel said in Cominos v Di Rico [2016] NSWCATAP 5 at [13]: 13. It may be difficult for self-represented appellants to clearly express their grounds of appeal. In such circumstances and having regard to the guiding principle, it is appropriate for the Appeal Panel to review an appellant's stated grounds of appeal, the material provided, and the decision of the Tribunal at first instance to examine whether it is possible to discern grounds that may either raise a question of law or a basis for leave to appeal. The Appeal Panel has taken such an approach in a number of cases, for instance, Khan v Kang [2014] NSWCATAP 48 and Prendergast v Western Murray Irrigation Ltd [2014] NSWCATAP 69. However, this must be balanced against the obligation to act fairly and impartially (Bauskis v Liew [2013] NSWCA 297 at [68] citing Hamod v State of New South Wales [2011] NSWCA 367 at [309]-[316]). Relevantly, s 38(2) provides that that Tribunal "may inquire into and inform itself on any matter in such manner as it thinks fit, subject to the rules of natural justice. 1. As far as could be ascertained from the Notice of Appeal and the appellant's other written materials, and from her oral submissions during the Appeal hearing, the landlord submitted that the hearing process before the Tribunal had been "unfair", but particularly because she did not have an opportunity to "correct" assertions in the tenant's case; that the Tribunal Member did not apply the relevant law correctly in respect of a tenant's obligation to provide 14 days' notice to end a fixed term residential tenancy agreement; and that the landlord's evidence was "sufficient however not taken correctly" to establish her various claims for orders under s 187(1)(c) and (d) of the RT Act. 2. Having considered the landlord's written and oral submissions for the Appeal, we understand the grounds of appeal to be as follows: 1. There was a denial of procedural fairness at the hearing before the Tribunal (Ground 1), 2. The Tribunal did not apply the relevant law correctly in respect of the landlord's claim for compensation by reason of the tenant's termination of a fixed term tenancy without 14 days' notice (Ground 2), 3. The landlord may have suffered a substantial miscarriage of justice because the Tribunal's Decision was not fair and equitable and was against the weight of evidence (Ground 3). 1. The other issues raised by the landlord in the Appeal are, in substance, the landlord seeking to re-argue her case at first instance and do not establish an error on a question of law or an error of a type that leave to appeal should be granted. 2. A denial of procedural fairness, and applying the relevant law incorrectly, Grounds 1 and 2, are errors on a question of law for which leave to appeal is not required. Ground 3 does not involve an error on a question of law and therefore the landlord requires leave to appeal on that ground. Consideration of the Grounds of Appeal Ground 1 - Procedural Fairness 1. To substantiate her contention that the hearing process before the Tribunal had been "unfair" to her, the landlord submitted that she did not have a reasonable chance to respond to the tenant's case. 2. However, contrary to direction 1(d) of the Appeal Panel on 14 December 2022, we were not provided with an audio recording of the hearing at first instance, or a transcript of the relevant parts of the hearing. Therefore, we cannot know what happened at the hearing including whether, and if so, at what stage of the hearing, the landlord was deprived unreasonably, as she contended, of the opportunity to state her case in response. 3. As Gleeson CJ in Re Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs; Ex parte Lam [2003] HCA 6; 214 CLR 1 said at [37] in respect of procedural fairness: "...Fairness is not an abstract concept. It is essentially practical. Whether one talks in terms of procedural fairness or natural justice, the concern of the law is to avoid practical injustice." 1. Having considered the written materials for the Appeal, together with the parties' written and oral submissions, we do not find any practical injustice. 2. The Tribunal Member provided comprehensive written reasons for the Decision, which resulted in the order to dismiss the landlord's application for relief under s 187(1)(c) and s 187(1)(d) of the RT Act. Under the heading 'Evidence' in the Decision, the Member observed that the tenant had filed no written evidence for the hearing in opposition to the landlord's application for orders of the Tribunal. To the extent the tenant sought to rely generally on documents he had lodged in other (earlier filed) applications to the Tribunal, the Member did not permit this. The only documents allowed to be tendered in the tenant's case at the hearing were a complete copy of the ingoing condition report (in circumstances where the landlord's documents had provided only two pages of the condition report), and the tenant's annotated version of the document titled 'Furnishing details at Unit 26 … ', being a document (an unannotated version of which was attached to the Agreement) that the tenant had returned during the tenancy, to the landlord. The Tribunal found, and we agree, that the tender of those documents did not prejudice the landlord. 3. The parties augmented the written evidence before the Tribunal with their affirmed oral evidence and with their oral submissions at the hearing. In essence, the Member found on the available evidence, which was largely the evidence the landlord had provided, that the landlord had not established to the standard of proof required (i.e., on the balance of probabilities), an entitlement at law to any of her claims. 4. We do not consider that the landlord was denied a reasonable opportunity to present her case to the Member at the hearing on 2 November 2022, or to respond to the tenant's case. 5. Ground 1 of the Appeal, therefore, is not made out. Ground 2 – Terminating a Fixed Term Agreement without 2 weeks' notice 1. In respect of the end of a fixed term residential tenancy agreement, s 96 of the RT Act provides: 1. A tenant may, at any time before the end of the fixed term of a fixed term agreement, give a termination notice for the agreement that is to take effect on or after the end of the fixed term. 2. The termination notice must specify a termination date that is on or after the end of the fixed term and is not earlier than 14 days after the day on which the notice is given. 1. The landlord submitted that because the tenant had given four (4) days' notice only to terminate a fixed term residential tenancy, she was entitled to compensation in an amount commensurate with 10 days' rent, which is $386. We note that the landlord did not claim the tenant's rent was not paid up to 19 March 2022, which was when the tenant vacated the premises, and in any case, there was no evidence of a rent ledger before the Tribunal. 2. The Tribunal dismissed the claim for $386, on the basis that the landlord, in serving her Notice of Termination to the tenant bearing date 17 February 2022, which required the tenant to deliver vacant possession of the premises on 20 March 2022, had repudiated the Agreement, that a disclaimer had then occurred because the tenant had accepted the repudiation, and that this was a circumstance within s 81(4)(g) of the RT Act, which brought the Agreement to an end, without the tenant being liable for further rent in an amount of $386. 3. In dismissing the landlord's claim for $386, we think that it was appropriate for the Tribunal to consider the fact that the landlord had already served upon the tenant a Notice of Termination dated 17 February 2022 requiring vacant possession on 20 March 2022, being the day after the end of the fixed term. However, in our view, s 81(4)(g) of the RT Act did not apply in the circumstances before the Tribunal. In fact, there was no repudiation of the Agreement, as the landlord's Notice of Termination dated 17 February 2022 was given in accordance with s 84 of the RT Act. 4. The tenant gave Notice of Termination to the landlord on 15 March 2022, but this was not effective to terminate the (fixed term) Agreement. This is because the tenant's Notice did not specify, as required by the RT Act in s 96(2), a termination date not earlier than 14 days after the day on which the tenant's Notice was given. 5. Nonetheless, in the events which occurred, the ineffectiveness of the tenant's Notice of 15 March 2022, is of no moment. In circumstances where the tenant had already received the landlord's Notice of Termination of the Agreement (in accordance with s 84 of the RT Act), and the tenant had vacated the premises at the end of the fixed term (19 March 2022) and not before, no right to rent, whether in an amount commensurate with 10 days' rent or otherwise, arose in the landlord's favour, whether by way of order for the payment of an amount of money (RT Act, s 187(1)(c)), or by way of an order as to compensation (RT Act, s 187(1)(d)). The landlord gave the tenant her Notice of Termination of the (fixed term) Agreement on 17 February 2022. Thereafter, the tenant was entitled to give vacant possession of the premises at any time before the termination date (20 March 2022) on the landlord's Notice. Furthermore, the tenant had no liability to pay rent to the landlord after 19 March 2022, because he did not give vacant possession of the premises until the end of the fixed term: see RT Act, s 110. 6. We find no error in the ultimate outcome, which was the Tribunal's dismissal of the landlord's claim in the amount of $386. 7. For those reasons, Ground 2 fails. Ground 3 – Decision not fair and equitable or against the weight of evidence 1. The landlord submitted that she may have suffered a substantial miscarriage of justice because there were findings and conclusions of the Tribunal which were not fair and equitable, and which were against the weight of evidence. The findings and conclusions of the Tribunal challenged by the landlord, were: 2. That the landlord's claims for various end of tenancy expenses such as cleaning, repairs to doors and floors, and replacement of missing or damaged furniture, were not supported by the available evidence, i.e., not supported by the undated and unsigned ingoing condition report (the only condition report, there being no outgoing condition report), not supported by the landlord's photographs which did not relate to the particular items claimed in the landlord's case, and not supported by the landlord's quotations which were based largely upon the landlord's assessment of the cost of repairing or replacing items, 3. That there was no independent persuasive or corroborative evidence to establish the premise(s) on which the various claims for breaches of the Agreement in nuisance were based, and that the claims were otherwise improper or misconceived, 4. That while there may have been a proper basis for the claim for excessive electricity costs in an amount of $377.14, given that there was a term in the Agreement providing that the landlord would pay for 'all bills under $20/week', there was insufficient evidence to support a claim in that amount and the landlord's calculations were not rational. 5. A decision under appeal can be said to be against the weight of evidence where the evidence in its totality preponderates so strongly against the conclusion found by the Tribunal at first instance that it can be said that the conclusion was not one that a reasonable Tribunal Member could reach: Collins v Urban at [77]. 6. The landlord's submissions to support Ground 3 are, in essence, a commentary inviting this Appeal Panel to substitute the landlord's preferred factual findings for those made by the Tribunal at first instance. There is no cogent explanation as to how the Tribunal's findings were not findings that a reasonable Tribunal Member could reach based on the totality of the evidence available at the hearing. 7. In any case, having reviewed the evidence which was before the Tribunal at first instance (and which has been made available to the Appeal Panel), in our view there is no reason to disturb the Tribunal's findings and conclusions in relation to the landlord's allegations as to end of tenancy losses and as to breaches of the Agreement and the RT Act. 8. The findings and conclusions of the Tribunal were clearly open on the evidence before the Tribunal. 9. We are therefore not persuaded that the Decision was against the weight of evidence. 10. Furthermore, we are not satisfied that the Tribunal's findings and conclusions as set out in the Decision, were not fair and equitable. We find that the landlord has not pointed to where a significant possibility or chance was "fairly open" (Collins v Urban at [76]) to her for a more favourable result based on the evidence that she placed before the Tribunal Member. 11. Accordingly, the landlord has not established that she may have suffered a substantial miscarriage of justice based on this ground of appeal. Leave to Appeal 1. For the reasons given, we are not satisfied that the landlord may have suffered a substantial miscarriage of justice on any of the three grounds specified in cl 12(1) of Schedule 4 to the NCAT Act, and therefore the Appeal Panel's discretion to grant leave to appeal is not enlivened. 2. Accordingly, it is not necessary to consider whether leave to appeal should be granted. 3. However, even if our discretion had been enlivened, we would have refused to grant leave for the following reasons. 4. Firstly, the Appeal involves no issue of principle or question of public importance or policy which might have general application. 5. Secondly, the Decision makes plain that the Tribunal carefully considered the available evidence. Nothing in the landlord's submissions satisfies us that the findings and conclusions of the Tribunal disclose a factual error which was unreasonably arrived at, or that there is a finding or conclusion which was clearly mistaken. 6. Finally, there is nothing before us to suggest that the Tribunal has gone about the fact-finding process in such an unorthodox manner or in such a way that it was likely to produce an unfair result so that it would be in the interests of justice for it to be reviewed. Extension of time for the Appeal 1. As referred to, the Appeal was lodged out of time under the NCAT Rules and therefore, the landlord requires an extension of time in which to lodge the Appeal. 2. The Appeal Panel has power to extend time under s 41 of the NCAT Act. 3. The principles on which an extension of time to bring an appeal would be granted were set out by the Appeal Panel in Jackson v NSW Land & Housing Corporation [2014] NSWCATAP 22 (Jackson) at [21]-[22], drawing on earlier orthodox principle and authority: "Time limits, including the specification of the time within which an appeal from an internally appealable decision to the Appeal Panel of the Tribunal must be lodged, are established by legislation for the purpose of promoting the orderly and efficient conduct of proceedings in the Tribunal, providing certainty for the parties to proceedings, especially the party in whose favour orders have been made, and achieving finality in litigation. For these reasons, these time limits should generally be strictly enforced. That is not to say, however, that exceptions should not be made where the interests of justice so require. The express power in s 41 of the Act to grant extensions of time allows the Tribunal to prevent the rigid enforcement of time limits becoming an instrument of injustice." 1. The criteria for assessing an extension application can be summarised from Jackson as follows: 1. the appellant must demonstrate that strict enforcement of the time limit will work an injustice on the appellant, 2. the respondent, having obtained a favourable primary decision, can be thought of as having a "vested right" to retain the benefit of that decision after the normal time for appeal has expired, 3. Consistent with the foregoing, the factors to be considered are the length of the delay, the reason for the delay, the prospects of success ("that is usually where the applicant has a fairly arguable case"), and the extent of any prejudice suffered by the respondent to the appeal, 4. It may be appropriate to go further into the merits of an appeal if the explanation for the delay is less than satisfactory or if the opponent has a substantial case of prejudice and, in such a case, it may be relevant whether the appellant seeking an extension of time can show that his or her case has more substantial merit than merely being "fairly arguable". 1. In this case, applying the factors identified in Jackson: 1. The appeal was lodged 14 days out of time. This is a significant delay in circumstances where the time limit for lodgement of the appeal was 14 days. 2. The landlord's principal explanation for her delay in lodging the Notice of Appeal is that she assumed a 28-day time frame within which to lodge the appeal. However, the NCAT Guideline 1 – Internal Appeals issued September 2022, which is accessed readily on the NCAT website, makes clear in paragraph 38 that the time for lodging an appeal in respect of residential proceedings is 14 days from the day on which the appellant was notified of the decision under appeal. The only reasonable explanation for the landlord's delay in filing the Notice of Appeal is that she made a mistake and did not read thoroughly, or at all, the NCAT Guideline. In the circumstances, we find the appellant's explanation for the delay less than satisfactory. 3. There would be significant additional time, cost, and inconvenience, to the tenant if this matter was remitted to the Tribunal for the issues in dispute to be re-litigated. 4. For the reasons we have given, the landlord's grounds of appeal are ill-founded and lack any real merit. 1. For these reasons, we refuse to extend time. Orders 1. Accordingly, we make the following orders: 1. Application for extension of time to lodge the appeal is refused. 2. Leave to appeal refused. 3. Appeal dismissed. ********** I hereby certify that this is a true and accurate record of the reasons for decision of the Civil and Administrative Tribunal of New South Wales. Registrar DISCLAIMER - Every effort has been made to comply with suppression orders or statutory provisions prohibiting publication that may apply to this judgment or decision. The onus remains on any person using material in the judgment or decision to ensure that the intended use of that material does not breach any such order or provision. Further enquiries may be directed to the Registry of the Court or Tribunal in which it was generated. Decision last updated: 13 February 2023