Civil and Administrative Tribunal New South Wales Medium Neutral Citation: Council of the New South Wales Bar Association v Waterstreet (No 2) [2024] NSWCATOD 51 Hearing dates: 2 April 2024 Date of orders: 12 April 2024 Decision date: 18 April 2024 Jurisdiction: Occupational Division Before: Cole DCJ H Dixon SC, Senior Member M Bolt, General Member Decision: (1) All previous non-publication and non-disclosure orders made in this matter under s 64 of the Civil and Administrative Act 2013 are revoked. (2) Pursuant to s 64(1) and s 64(4) of the Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2013, the publication or disclosure of the names of the following persons, and any information or material which identifies or is likely to lead to the identification of any of the following persons, is prohibited: [C3] [The Paralegal] [C2] [An employee] [The Client] [The Solicitor] [AA] [C1] (3) Pursuant to s 64(1)(c) of the Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2013, the publication of any of the material contained in Exhibit A 12 and Exhibit A 16 is prohibited. Catchwords: OCCUPATIONS — Legal practitioners — Barristers – application for non-publication order with respect to two complainants Legislation Cited: Administrative Decisions Tribunal Act 1997 (NSW) Anti-Discrimination Act 1977 (NSW) Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2013 (NSW) Legal Profession Uniform Law (NSW) Legal Profession Uniform Conduct (Barristers) Rules 2015 Cases Cited: Chief Health Officer, NSW Health v FRC (application for continuation of public health order [2023] NSWCATAD 76 Council of the Bar Association of New South Wales v Waterstreet [2024] [2024] NSWCATOD 47 State of New South Wales (Justice Health) v Dezfouli (2008) NSWADTAP 69 Category: Consequential orders Parties: Council of the New South Wales Bar Association (Applicant) Charles Waterstreet (Respondent) Representation: Counsel: P Griffin SC / N Evans (Applicant) P Strickland SC / R Withana (Respondent) Solicitors: Hicksons Lawyers (Applicant) Bartier Perry Lawyers (Respondent) File Number(s): 2021/00304647 Publication restriction: An order under s 64 of the Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2013 prohibiting the publication of disclosure of the names of specified witnesses and complainants is in force. An order prohibiting the publication of specified medical evidence and Exhibits A 12 and A 16 are also in force. REASONS FOR DECISION 1. The Council of the Bar Association of New South Wales has taken disciplinary action pursuant to the Legal Profession Uniform Law (NSW) ('the Uniform Law') against Mr Waterstreet, who was a practising barrister prior to 2019. The disciplinary action involves complaints made against Mr Waterstreet with respect to his conduct. A decision in relation to those complaints, dealing with the issue of culpability (Stage 1) has been published (see Council of the Bar Association of New South Wales v Waterstreet [2024] [2024] NSWCATOD 47 ('the Stage 1 decision'). In the Stage 1 decision, the complainants are referred to as C1, C2 and C3. Other people are also referred to in ways other than by their names. A further hearing is listed for August 2024, following which a further decision will be published in relation to protective orders. 2. A number of non-publication orders were made under the Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2013 (NSW) ('the CAT Act') in the course of the hearing of the disciplinary action. One of those orders prohibited the publication of the names of the three complainants, and material tending to identify them, prior to them giving evidence. Non-publication orders were also made in relation to the identity of a number of other witnesses in the proceedings who were employees associates or clients of Mr Waterstreet. 3. The parties were provided with draft final non-publication orders which were proposed to replace the previous orders and simplify the non-publication orders in existence in this matter. Among other things, the draft non-publication orders would maintain the protection of the name and identity of C1, C2 and C3 and others. The parties were asked to make submissions with respect to the draft non-publication order. 4. Mr Waterstreet has now applied for the non-publication order in relation to C1 and C2 to be lifted. Mr Waterstreet does not seek to have the non-publication orders in relation to C3 or any of the other witnesses lifted. 5. Mr Waterstreet also sought to have the proposed order providing for the non-publication of the complainants and some of the witnesses amended to permit him to disclose the names as required for purposes in connection with his treatment by treating psychiatrists and medical practitioners. CAT Act s 64 1. The CAT Act provides, in s 64: 64 Tribunal may restrict disclosures concerning proceedings (1) If the Tribunal is satisfied that it is desirable to do so by reason of the confidential nature of any evidence or matter or for any other reason, it may (of its own motion or on the application of a party) make any one or more of the following orders— (a) an order prohibiting or restricting the disclosure of the name of any person (whether or not a party to proceedings in the Tribunal or a witness summoned by, or appearing before, the Tribunal), (b) an order prohibiting or restricting the publication or broadcast of any report, including a sound recording or transcript, of proceedings in the Tribunal, (c) an order prohibiting or restricting the publication of evidence given before the Tribunal, whether in public or in private, or of matters contained in documents lodged with the Tribunal or received in evidence by the Tribunal, (d) an order prohibiting or restricting the disclosure to some or all of the parties to the proceedings of evidence given before the Tribunal, or of the contents of a document lodged with the Tribunal or received in evidence by the Tribunal, in relation to the proceedings. (2) The Tribunal cannot make an order under this section that is inconsistent with section 65. (3) The Tribunal may from time to time vary or revoke an order made under subsection (1). (4) For the purposes of this section, a reference to the name of a person includes a reference to any information, picture or other material that identifies the person or is likely to lead to the identification of the person. The Council's submissions 1. The Council pressed for the inclusion of the names of C1 and C2 in the final non-publication order. 2. The Council referred to the decision of the Appeal Panel of the Administrative Decisions Tribunal in State of New South Wales (Justice Health) v Dezfouli [2008] NSWADTAP 69 at [50] and [81] in relation to the equivalent provision to s 64(1) of the CAT Act in the Administrative Decisions Tribunal Act 1997 (NSW), namely s 75(2) : 50 Within the opening words of section 75(2) of the ADT Act (and indeed of section 35(2) of the AAT Act), three elements of prime importance are the word 'desirable', the phrase 'for any other reason' and the word 'may'. These indicate that the purpose (or purposes) to be served by a suppression order may be 'any … reason' (or reasons) whatever, that the power arises when the Tribunal is satisfied that the order is 'desirable' and that the actual making of the order is not mandatory but within the Tribunal's discretion. … 81 It is difficult if not impossible to set out in short form all the matters that, according to the case law just discussed, should be taken into account in deciding whether an order should be made under section 75(2). It must suffice here simply to draw attention to the following points of relevance to our decision in this case: (a) the presumption in favour of open justice; (b) the need for an applicant for a suppression order to establish good grounds for making the order; (c) the comparative breadth of the criterion of 'desirability'; (d) the important differences between the types of suppression order that may be made – between (for instance) an order (as in this case) prohibiting disclosure of the identity of a participant and an order that a hearing occur in closed session, without notice to a party; (e) the undoubted breadth of the range of purposes that may be served ('any other reason'); (f) the possibility that the purposes to be served may be a mixture of private and public interests; and (g) the possibility that, although generally speaking the prospect of damage to reputation or 'embarrassment' affecting a participant in the proceedings will not provide sufficient grounds for a suppression order, there may be unusual circumstances where this is the principal consideration underlying an order. 1. The Council accepted that the allegations made by C1 and C2 were not strictly confidential because they had been given some publicity in 2017 and 2018. The Council submitted that it is "desirable" in all of the circumstances to include C1 and C2 in a non-publication order under s 64(1) of the CAT Act 'for any other reason', namely, to ameliorate any adverse impact on the mental health of both C1 and C2 and to assuage C2's concern about the potential adverse impact on her career of disclosure and the possible activities of online "trolls" if she is identified. 2. The Council referred to C1's affidavit of 1 February 2024, in which she said the following: 14. It was my decision to go to the media, but that didn't mean it was an experience I relished. Many people at my workplace and from previous workplaces contacted me to talk about my experience. Even though many people did offer their support, it was emotionally difficult to be obliged to speak to many people repeatedly about what was a very difficult experience in my life. My symptoms of insomnia worsened, and I had exacerbated feelings of anxiety. I saw a mental health counsellor at the time to help me through this difficult time. 15. My involvement in these proceedings, as well as the investigation into my complaint has contributed to poor mental health, including insomnia, anxiety and depression. I have sought medical treatment for these conditions. 1. C1 also said, in her affidavit, that she made the complaint against Mr Waterstreet thinking that it was important to "contribute to the effective regulatory oversight of the legal profession and that the only way standards would change in the profession was if people like me stood up and raised complaints". She said that, in making that decision, she underestimated both the time that it would take for the complaint to be investigated, and the extent of the adverse impact that the process would have on her mental health. 2. C1 said "I do not wish to continue to relive my experience from 2017 in a public way as I believe that it will be detrimental to my wellbeing and mental health and exacerbate my conditions". She said that she had considered withdrawing from the case in the lead up to the hearing because she was experiencing heightened anxiety and insomnia. She said "If I had not secured the temporary non-publication order, I would not have chosen to give evidence. I understand that this order was only made on a temporary basis, but it gave me hope that I would continue to have the protection over my identity once the decision was published". 3. A report in relation to C1 from a GP specialist in psychological medicine was provided to us. The report disclosed that C1 has been diagnosed with generalised anxiety disorder. The doctor said that it was her opinion that, if C1's identity was disclosed, it would exacerbate her ongoing generalised anxiety disorder. 4. C2 also provided an affidavit dated 25 July 2022 in relation to the issue of non-publication. C2 said that she had begun employment in a legal context and that she did not want these proceedings, and her evidence in them, to be "one of the first things my colleagues and clients associate with me". She said: 6. …the Tribunal proceedings, as well as the investigation undertaken by the applicant, has had a significant negative toll on my mental health. The making of a non-publication order would assist me by not exacerbating my current anxiety associated with the potential publishing of my name. This anxiety is largely fuelled by my current employment status. 7. I am also concerned about the publicity this proceeding may attract, which in turn may have the potential of inciting online "trolls", which may have a detrimental effect on both my mental health and my career. 8. Whilst I understand some aspects of my evidence are already in the public domain, if my identity was to be published, those media articles would likely resurface again, potentially impacting my mental health and career progression. 1. The Council submitted that the Uniform Law is protective in nature, and that s 64(1) of the CAT Act, when applied to proceedings under the Uniform Law, should be construed "in a beneficial fashion, with general public interest considerations at the fore". 2. The Council submitted that the public interest would not be advanced in any way by the publication of the identity of the complainants. The Council submitted "It is, however, in the public interest that individuals who see, or are the subject of, conduct which may be appropriately dealt with by way of disciplinary proceedings be encouraged to come forward and provide the best evidence they can to an adjudicating body. It would have a chilling effect on many potential complainants if they believed (rightly or wrongly) that their name may be published in any decision connected with their complaints". 3. The Council submitted that it would not be consistent with the public interest and the overall protective nature of the Uniform Law to identify C1 and C2 whilst making a non-publication order in relation to C3. Mr Waterstreet does not oppose a final non-publication order in relation to C3. Mr Waterstreet's submissions 1. Mr Waterstreet opposed the making of a final non-publication order with respect to C1 and C2. 2. Mr Waterstreet submitted that the identity of C1 and C2 is not "confidential" within the meaning of s 64(1), because the identity of both of them was disclosed by a news website and otherwise published online in 2017 and 2018. As we have said, this was conceded by the Council. 3. Mr Waterstreet submitted that the prospect of reputational damage or embarrassment is not sufficient grounds for a non-publication order. Further, that there is no evidence of actual reputational harm or career damage having arisen for either C1 or C2 in the context of the disclose or their names in 2017 and 2018. 4. Mr Waterstreet argued that C2's concern about online trolls is difficult to reconcile with "her voluntary, active cultivation of publicity when she went public with her identity and allegations against the respondent…". It was submitted that there was no evidence of any online harassment of C2 occurring to date. 5. With respect to C1's reference to the comfort given to her by the interim non-publication order when she gave evidence, Mr Waterstreet submitted that the circumstances which prevailed at the time when she gave evidence no longer prevail and do not justify a final order. 6. Mr Waterstreet accepted that the proceedings have, in the past, contributed to C1's "poor mental health", but argued that there was no evidence that she was "currently seeking medical assistance for current mental health problems occasioned by the proceedings and its implications". We reject that submission. C1 refers, in her affidavit, to continuing to see a medical professional in relation to her mental health on an ongoing basis, and the medical report provided supports this. 7. It was submitted by Mr Waterstreet that any sensitive material about either C1 or C2 which is before the Tribunal could be kept confidential under s 64(1)(c) of the CAT Act, allowing the identification of C1 and C2. 8. Mr Waterstreet relies upon the presumption in favour of open justice. In written submissions he said: 32 …It is an incident of open justice that the respondent is entitled, having been vindicated in parts of his defence of the alleged particulars, to rebut the earlier public allegations made in the press by [C1] and [C2] that align with those particulars. 1. Mr Waterstreet also sought a modification to the proposed non-publication order to allow him to disclose the names of all of the persons referred to "in connection with the respondent's treatment with his treating psychiatrists and medical practitioners". He pointed out that Dr Ryan and Dr Sippe already knew some of the names. He submitted that this would not be equivalent to disclosure to the world at large. 2. In his submissions in reply, Mr Waterstreet argued that the evidence relied upon by C1 and C2 in relation to their mental health did not comprise a sufficient evidentiary basis on which the Tribunal could assess the calculus of risk and assess the nature, imminence and degree of likelihood of harm to them so that it could be determined that it is "desirable" to make the non-publication order. The decision in Chief Health Officer, NSW Health v FRC (application for continuation of public health order [2023] NSWCATAD 76 at [11] was referred to. Paragraphs [10]-[12] are also relevant: 10. Before we can make a non-publication order, s 64 of the Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act requires us to be "satisfied that it is desirable to do so" [our emphasis]. This is a less onerous requirement than the requirement which appears in s 8 of the Court Suppression and Non-publication Orders Act 2010 (NSW), which requires a finding that the non-publication order is "necessary" to achieve the outcomes listed. Those outcomes include "to prevent prejudice to the proper administration of justice", "to protect the safety of any person" and "or embarrassment to a party to or witness in criminal proceedings involving an offence of a sexual nature" or that the order is "otherwise necessary in the public interest … and that public interest significantly outweighs the public interest in open justice" (see DRJ v Commissioner of Victims Rights [2020] NSWCA 136; Misrachi v Public Guardian [2019] NSWCA 67 at [13]). 11. Although the requirement for the Tribunal is less onerous than the requirement which applies in the Courts when considering an application for a non-publication order, the process for considering the application is similar. The process, in so far as the impact upon the party seeking the non-publication order is concerned, was described succinctly in Council of the New South Wales Bar Association v EFA [2021] NSWCA 339 at 228: 228. …The "calculus of risk" approach requires a more nuanced consideration, taking into account the nature, imminence and degree of likelihood of harm to occur to the relevant person. The "calculus of risk" approach appears, in the decided cases, to have gained ascendency as the preferred approach: see AB (a pseudonym) v CD (a pseudonym); EF (a pseudonym) v CD (a pseudonym) [2019] HCA 6; AB (No 3) (NSWCCA); Wilson v Basson [2020] NSWSC 512 at [18]. 12. The potential impact of publication upon the person whose name is sought to be the subject of the non-publication order, together with the public interest, must be weighed against the object set out in s 3(f) of the Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2013, which is that the Tribunal have processes which are open and transparent (see Corlett v Moubarak (no 2) [2023] NSWCATAP 54). 1. It was argued that the report from C1's treating doctor did not set out the doctor's reasoning in a manner that was explicable and capable of testing. The factual background upon which the doctor gave her opinion was not stated in the report; it was not clear whether she was aware that C1's identity had previously been published. 2. Mr Waterstreet submitted that C2's mental health issues were all self-reported, and there was no evidence of any mental health condition or treatment. It was suggested that the Tribunal could infer from the absence of such evidence that evidence from C2 on those topics would not assist her. 3. Mr Waterstreet accepted that the Uniform Law is protective in nature. He accepted that the phrase "any other reason" encompasses a broad range of purposes, which may include the public interest. However, it was submitted that the Tribunal should reject the contention that the public interest considerations put forward by the Council, namely the chilling effect on witnesses or victims coming forward with complaints of sexual harassment if non-publication were not ordered, and the inconsistency in protecting C3's identity but not the identity of C1 and C2, would be to adopt a view of "public interest" that, in the words of Mr Waterstreet's written submissions, "goes beyond the central judicial policy for the law to be coherent and the proper role of courts and tribunals in construing legislation". 4. It was submitted that the aspects of public interest put forward by the Council "are not public purposes or interests sufficient to render it "desirable" to make an order under s 64 without breaching the need for coherence in the law". This was so, it was argued, because complainants alleging sexual harassment under the Anti-Discrimination Act 1977 (NSW) in claims before the Tribunal do "not have the benefit of an order under s 64 as a matter of course to achieve the public purpose contended for by the applicant". 5. It was argued that C3 was in a different position from C1 and C2 because her name had never been made public, and C1 and C2's identities had been published. An order could therefore be made in relation to C3 on the basis of "the confidential nature" of her identity. It was argued that "other grounds" have not been established in relation to C1 and C2. 6. It was argued that it is "not appropriate" for the Tribunal to construe "other grounds" as being sufficiently wide to encompass the public interest in having complainants come forward. It was argued that the public interest in having complaints come forward could not be "other grounds" so as to satisfy the Tribunal that it is desirable to make an order under s 64(1) of the CAT Act. It was submitted that: … to endeavour to resolve complex tensions between public and private interests of the kind the applicant identifies [in its written submissions] goes beyond what the Tribunal should legitimately do. In this regard, it is instructive that the legislature has not (yet) sought to introduce a statutory provision to protect the identity of complainants in the context of sexual harassment claims/allegations. A provision of that kind does exist to protect the anonymity of complainants in sexual offences: see s 578A Crimes Act 1900 (NSW). The public policy identified by the applicant in [its written submissions] is best left to the legislature to resolve rather than for the Tribunal to achieve through the vehicle of an (overly) broad construction of "other grounds" in s 64. Consideration C1 and C2 1. In order for the Tribunal to make a non-publication order in relation to C1 and C2, it is necessary for us to be satisfied that it is desirable to do so "for any other reason". 2. In relation to C1, we are satisfied that she has been diagnosed with generalised anxiety disorder. We are satisfied that she experiences periodic insomnia, and that both the symptoms of her anxiety disorder and her insomnia are aggravated when she turns her attention to the events the subject of her complaint in relation to Mr Waterstreet. Although the report annexed to her affidavit of 1 February 2024 was brief, it was sufficient for present purposes, and we accept the opinion expressed within it, which is wholly consistent with C1's own evidence. We reject the submission that the report was so inadequate that is should be given no weight. The aggravation of C1's symptoms is obviously detrimental to her and undesirable. We accept that, in the event that C1's name is published in association with this matter, she is highly likely to receive unwanted attention and approaches to discuss the events the subject of her complaint. We accept that this would be distressing for her and would have an adverse impact on her mental health. 3. In relation to C2, we accept that she has a genuine fear that being associated with these proceedings as a complainant would colour the perception of her in the context of her employment. This fear may be less acute now than it was in 2022 when she was starting in a new position, but the fear is nevertheless relevant. It is notorious that to be a complainant in a matter involving sexual harassment has the potential to attract unfair negative attention. We do not consider C2's apprehension about possible on-line attacks by "trolls" to be fanciful. It is true that the evidence concerning C2's mental health was confined to her own account of her feelings. However, we believe C2 when she says that this matter has provoked anxiety in her. We noted that she was anxious when giving evidence. There is no legal basis for the suggestion implied in Mr Waterstreet's submissions that a person must be diagnosed with a mental health disorder before they can seek a non-publication order to protect their mental health. We accept that C2's concerns about the potential for the publication of her association with this matter to have a negative impact upon her mental health and her career progression are not fanciful. 4. The previous publication of the identities of C1 and C2 occurred between six and seven years ago. Although it was more than fleeting, the publicity was not very high profile. We reject Mr Waterstreet's suggestion that actual reputational or career damage would need to be shown in relation to C1 and C2 to form part of the basis for the granting of a non-publication order. Likewise, it is not necessary for C2 to prove that she had been the subject of activity by online "trolls" to make that a realistic fear. 5. We reject Mr Waterstreet's submission that the granting of a non-publication order over sensitive material in relation to C1 and C2 would suffice. Such an order would do very little to overcome their concerns. 6. Our task is to weigh the potential impact of publication upon each of C1 and C2, together with the public interest and the object in s 3(f) of the CAT Act that the Tribunal have processes which are open and transparent. 7. We do not accept Mr Waterstreet's contention, in his written submissions, that "it is an incident of open justice that the respondent is entitled, having been vindicated in parts of his defence of the alleged particulars, to rebut the earlier public allegations made in the press by [C1] and [C2] that align with those particulars". In the Stage 1 decision we found that some of the allegations made by both C1 and C2 of sexual harassment by Mr Waterstreet had been proven. Others were not proven. We found Mr Waterstreet guilty of unsatisfactory professional conduct and professional misconduct under s 297(1)(a) of the Uniform Law. Overall, the Stage 1 decision could not fairly be said to have vindicated Mr Waterstreet. The public interest does not accord Mr Waterstreet an entitlement to relitigate the matter in the press by reference to people he has been found to have sexually harassed. An attempt to do so would have the potential (had Mr Waterstreet still been a barrister) to constitute a further breach of rule 8(c) of the Legal Profession Uniform Conduct (Barristers) Rules 2015, in that it may bring the legal profession into disrepute. 8. In a matter such as this, and in most matters, where non-publication orders are sought by the victims of sexual harassment, the task of establishing "other reasons" which satisfy the Tribunal that a non-publication order is desirable is likely to be less onerous than that task would be were it the perpetrator of sexual harassment seeking the non-publication order. The Uniform Law is protective in nature. It seeks to protect the public from miscreant legal practitioners, rather than seeking to protect the public from their victims. 9. We reject the submission by Mr Waterstreet that to accept that the public considerations of deterring potential complainants or witnesses of sexual harassment from coming forward with complaints would adopt a view of public interest that "goes beyond the central judicial policy for the law to be coherent and the proper role of course and tribunals in construing legislation". We reject the submission that, because complainants under the Anti-Discrimination Act 1977 are not granted non-publication orders in relation to their identity under s 64 of the CAT Act "as a matter of course", to grant C1 and C2 non-publication orders would somehow be "incoherent". It is not suggested that the non-publication orders in all cases involving allegations of sexual harassment generally, or in this matter specifically, be made "as a matter of course". Each application for a non-publication order must be decided in the context of the circumstances and the legal framework in which it arises. 10. The fact that parties or witnesses in other kinds of litigation are accorded anonymity as a matter of course has no bearing on this matter. Clearly, the legislature intended that the Tribunal be given the power to make non-publication orders in the circumstances set out in s 64(1) of the CAT Act. 11. Mr Waterstreet's submission that it is "not appropriate" for the Tribunal to determine that the potential for other victims of sexual harassment to be deterred from coming forward constitutes "other grounds" for the purpose of s 64 has no legal foundation and is simply an evaluative assessment. In any event, the Council does not put forward the public interest as the sole consideration. 12. The Council requests the making of a non-publication order in relation to C1 on the basis of the risk to her mental health should disclosure of her identity occur. That risk is the risk of aggravating the symptoms of her generalised anxiety disorder and insomnia. A further consideration is the public interest in indicating that a victim of sexual harassment, or a witness to sexual harassment, may be able to come forward with a complaint and not necessarily have their identity disclosed. We balance those factors together with the need for the Tribunal to have processes which are open and transparent. Open justice is an aspect of public interest. We determine that open justice will not be undermined by the making of a non-publication order in relation to C1's identity. We determine that matters put forward by the Council in relation to C1 constitute "any other reason" within the meaning of s 64(1) of the CAT Act, and we are satisfied that it is desirable to make a non-publication order in relation to C1's identity on that basis. 13. The Council requests the making of a non-publication order in relation to C2 on the basis of her feelings of anxiety in relation to the matter, her fear that being associated with the matter might have an adverse impact upon her career and her apprehension that she might be targeted by on-line "trolls" if her identity is disclosed. The public interest described in [45] above is also relevant to the balancing exercise in relation to C2. We also take into account the need for the Tribunal to have processes which are open and transparent. We determine that open justice will not be undermined by the making of a non-publication order in relation to C2's identity. We determine that the matters put forward by the Council in relation to C2 constitute "any other reason" within the meaning of s 64(1) of the CAT Act, and we are satisfied that it is desirable to make a non-publication order in relation to C2's identity on that basis. Should Mr Waterstreet be permitted to disclose the identity of the persons covered by the non-disclosure orders to his psychiatrists and medical practitioners? 1. It was asserted that allowing Mr Waterstreet to identify the persons covered by the non-publication order to his psychiatrists and medical practitioners would somehow be beneficial to him. No evidence whatsoever was advanced to support his submission. We reject it. The persons covered by the order have all been given anonymised names in the Stage 1 decision. Should Mr Waterstreet need to refer to them, he can simply use those anonymised names. 2. The Council did not object to Mr Waterstreet's request, but we will not grant it. Mr Waterstreet sees many medical practitioners who would be exempted from the non-publication order, and no reason has been established to permit the names to be disseminated in this way. Orders 1. For the reasons above, on 12 April 2024, we made orders to the following effect: 1. All previous non-publication and non-disclosure orders made in this matter under s 64 of the Civil and Administrative Act 2013 are revoked. 2. Pursuant to s 64(1) and s 64(4) of the Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2013, the publication or disclosure of the names of the following persons, and any information or material which identifies or is likely to lead to the identification of any of the following persons, is prohibited: [C3] [The Paralegal] [C2] [An employee] [The Client] [The Solicitor] [AA] [C1] 1. Pursuant to s 64(1)(c) of the Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2013, the publication of any of the material contained in Exhibit A 12 and Exhibit A 16 is prohibited. ********** I hereby certify that this is a true and accurate record of the reasons for decision of the Civil and Administrative Tribunal of New South Wales. Registrar DISCLAIMER - Every effort has been made to comply with suppression orders or statutory provisions prohibiting publication that may apply to this judgment or decision. The onus remains on any person using material in the judgment or decision to ensure that the intended use of that material does not breach any such order or provision. Further enquiries may be directed to the Registry of the Court or Tribunal in which it was generated. Decision last updated: 18 April 2024