R v Robertson [2024] NSWDC 258

District Court New South Wales

Medium Neutral Citation: R v Robertson [2024] NSWDC 258 Hearing dates: 12 April 2024 Date of orders: 12 April 2024 Decision date: 12 April 2024 Jurisdiction: Criminal Before: Sutherland SC DCJ Decision: [57] – [82] Catchwords: CRIME — Child sex offences — Child abuse material — Possession of child abuse material obtained using carriage service CRIME — Child sex offences — Fail to comply with reporting obligations under Child Protection (Offenders Registration) Act 2000 SENTENCING — Mitigating factors — Plea of guilty — Prospects of rehabilitation — Offender attempted to access mental health services immediately before subject offences Legislation Cited: Child Protection (Offenders Registration) Act 2000 (NSW) Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act (NSW) Crimes Act 1900 (NSW) Crimes Act 1914 (Cth) Cases Cited: Callaghan v R [2006] NSWCCA 58 Delzotto v R [2024] HCA 8 Veen v The Queen (No 2) (1988) 164 CLR 465 Texts Cited: Nil Category: Sentence Parties: Rex (Crown) Paul Anthony Robertson (Offender) Representation: Counsel:

Mr K Ng (Crown) Mr J Lang (Offender)

Solicitors:

Commonwealth Director of Public Prosecutions (Crown) Legal Aid Commission of NSW (Offender) File Number(s): 2022/00221898 Publication restriction: Nil

JUDGMENT 1. Paul Anthony Robertson appears for sentence with respect to one substantive matter for sentence and a second matter brought before this Court pursuant to s 166 as a related offence. The circumstances of Mr Robertson's appearance for a third occasion in relation to similar offending is a matter of considerable regret both to himself, I am certain, and also to the community. 2. In short, he had been sentenced historically to a suspended term of imprisonment in 2015, which I will refer to shortly, and then in 2020 he was arrested and charged with possession of child abuse material in respect of which he was sentenced in 2022 by Bright DCJ of the District Court sitting at Gosford. The effective aggregate of the sentences imposed by Bright DCJ for both State offences and a Commonwealth Criminal Code offence was, in practical terms, 4 years with a 2 year minimum term required to be actually served, that outcome being effected by the partial overlapping of a Commonwealth sentence with a State sentence in respect of which there had been a non-parole period. 3. Mr Robertson was released pursuant to the Commonwealth recognizance and also on parole with respect to the State charge on 21 June 2022. 4. The circumstances attending his psychological state at that particular point in time were less than satisfactory. Mr Robertson, recognising the difficulties that he felt at the time, attended upon the Calvary Mater Hospital Mental Health Service the day after he had been released and indicated to them that he did not feel safe, that he had suicidal thoughts, he was teary and clearly was exhibiting a history of depression about which there had been considerable evidence placed before Bright DCJ at the time that she passed sentence earlier that year. 5. I do not propose to read onto the record the full detail of the material which is contained in the discharge referral from the psychiatric section at James Fletcher Mater Mental Health Service, but it suffices to observe that Mr Robertson was in a state of not inconsiderable distress within 48 hours, or less, of the time of his release from custody. He had indicated that he did not feel ready for his release at the time and was clearly having difficulty coping. 6. He spent some two weeks in the Mental Health Unit and then was discharged to temporary housing in the Newcastle region for a period which was intended to be of some weeks. He was clearly struggling with his mental health and depression and indeed with the desires which had caused him in the first place to have embarked upon exploration on the internet, and the downloading and retention of images which comprise sexual abuse material. He indicated that he was endeavouring to cope by going on long walks and described doing 22-kilometre walks on the day before he went to the Mental Health Unit. 7. In due course, he appears to have relapsed and to have got onto the internet and looked at images which are pornographic in nature. It is appropriate to observe that he was not using any of the customary means of camouflage. He was not on the dark net. He was not using VPNs to avoid potential detection. He simply had done that which is all too easy, namely, used the Google search engine to look at images, the possession of which constitutes a crime. 8. He had downloaded and had on his mobile phone five images which it must be said, whilst constituting a criminal offence, were not of real people. They were cartoon images indicating various states of nakedness or nudity, and there were some aspects which had been obtained as a consequence of undertaking searches such as "flat-chested nude hentai" and "IMSRU bikini girls". The number of the images and the degree of depravity are correctly described as relatively low in the Crown's written submissions with which, of course, Mr Lang on behalf of the offender does not disagree. It is conceded that no real children were involved and, therefore, not harmed in the production nor was there any sophistication in the offender's storing of the images nor his storage of the video files. 9. The fact that he had such material was discovered by police in the course of an attendance to compulsorily check on what he was up to, pursuant to the relevant legislation. It is fair to observe that, despite there being a degree of necessary compliance and obligations under the relevant legislation, he fully cooperated and confessed to the police regarding his activities and just what it was that he had. 10. The offending conduct is a contravention of s 474.22A(1) of the Commonwealth Criminal Code. Possession or control of child abuse material as defined or having access to a carriage service carries a maximum penalty of 15 years imprisonment. In circumstances where there is a prior offending pursuant to the legislation, the mandated statutory minimum of 4 years is an applicable minimum term. 11. It is appropriate at this juncture to make reference to the background of Mr Robertson and the matters that have been dealt with previously. In the somewhat unusual circumstances of this case, I do not propose to recite his entire subjective background. It is well documented in, particularly, the judgment of Bright DCJ on 11 March 2022. 12. It suffices to observe that he is a man of limited formal education who has worked most of his adult life, who was married with children and who went through a stage of both lack of sexual interaction within his marriage, according to accounts provided by him to a clinical psychologist, and a delving into the observations available on the internet readily regarding pornography. He gave an explanation way back in 2015 of that interest, or at least activity, involving pornography available, as I say, on the worldwide web, to a consideration of images of younger children. He first came to notice when his wife at the time discovered images on his home computer and, as a consequence, she reported it to the police. In due course, that has led over time to a complete breakdown of the marriage and divorce and, subsequently, a complete breakdown, it would seem, of the relationship between Mr Robertson and the children of the marriage. 13. At all events, the matter first came before the District Court at Newcastle in early 2015 when the matter came before Berman DCJ. There were something in the order of a thousand photographs contained in image files, a very small proportion of which fell within the more serious categories of child exploitation categorisation at the time, and the majority of the images being of a less serious or less depraved categorisation. His Honour noted that the case was unusual, the images were at the less serious end of the scale, both in number and nature, and his Honour, after going through the detail of the psychological circumstances attending Mr Robertson's commission of the crime, came to a view that in relation to the use of the carriage service to access child pornography it was appropriately dealt with by recording a conviction and ordering the performance of a substantial quantity of community service, namely 400 hours. 14. In relation to the related offence of possessing child abuse material, his Honour determined that the relevant threshold for imprisonment was crossed and that an appropriate term would be 18 months. However, his Honour had the ability to utilise the then provisions of s 12 of the Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act (NSW) and the sentence was wholly suspended. He was required to enter into a bond and was to receive treatment under the direction of a nominated psychologist. 15. It would appear that that bond was completed without transgression and, as time went on, it appears that the circumstances of the marriage went, to use a colloquial description, from bad to worse and between late 2019 and early or mid-2020, when Mr Robertson descended yet again into the murky world of getting images of pornographic nature and sexual abuse nature from the internet. 16. I do not propose to detail the full circumstances of the matter that went before Bright DCJ, but suffice to say that in due course, he was found to have a number of memory cards on which various images and videos had been recorded and an android tablet on which there were similarly various images and videos. In relation to the android tablet, there were some 56 images and 36 videos, all of which were reviewed. It was found that four of them were Category 1 child abuse material and one video was Category 2 child abuse material. None of the images which had been retained were properly described as child abuse material. However, on the substantial memory cards, four of them, each of 16 gigabytes, there were very large numbers of files and images. There were some almost 14,000 images on one of the memory cards, more than 6,000 on another, 11,500 on a third, and then some 22 videos on the last of the memory cards. 17. Bright DCJ in dealing with pleas of Guilty in relation to the matters and taking into account the not-insubstantial psychological problems which were presented in an extensive report from Dr Paul Pusey, clinical psychologist, her Honour in due course passed sentences of 2 years and 6 months as an aggregate in relation to the six offences brought under the provisions in the Crimes Act 1900 (NSW) and her Honour determined a non-parole period of 1 year and 3 months. Both that sentence and the non-parole period was backdated to commence on the date that he had gone into custody, namely 22 June 2020, and accordingly, the non-parole period was due to expire on 21 September 2021. 18. With respect to the Commonwealth offence in relation to possession of child abuse material, her Honour came to the view that the matters were below the mid-range and determined that an appropriate sentence, and her Honour made no reference to mandatory minimum terms, but her Honour found an appropriate starting term was 4 years. She discounted it by 25% for the plea of guilty, leading to a term of 3 years. 19. Her Honour directed that the offender should be released on a Commonwealth recognizance after serving 12 months. However, significantly, her Honour placed the commencement date of that sentence and minimum term of 12 months after the commencement of the term imposed for the State matter. The net effect of those sentences was, as I have already indicated, in real terms, 4 years with a 2 year non-parole period. 20. The offender was then released following the completion of the 2 years and, in effect, dropped into the community with the outcome to which I have already made some reference. He explained that his suicidal ideation became worse and he found himself, in effect, dropped in Sydney with no means of getting anywhere and had to wait for a train and make his own way to temporary accommodation up here at Newcastle, tried to make contact with his ex-wife, who hung up on him, and he came to the realisation that the relationship with, in particular, his daughter had changed irrevocably, at least at that stage. 21. Against that background, these offences have occurred. I should add that the related offence is brought pursuant to s 17(1) of the Child Protection (Offenders Registration) Act 2000 (NSW) and it derives from the circumstances when the police attended at his temporary premises on 28 July 2022 and discovered the material on the mobile phone to which I have made reference and, in broad terms, got a full confession. 22. In producing his wallet to show various things to the police, it was seen that he had a Wyong Library membership card which he indicated in due course he had had since before he went into custody in 2020 and that he told police he had completely forgotten about. Notwithstanding that, and the clear circumstance that it had not been obtained in the short period of time that he had been back in the community, he has been charged pursuant to s 17(1) with failing to comply with the reporting obligations which are a mandatory obligation following his previous conviction and that matter has been brought to this Court to be dealt with as if one were dealing with it in the Local Court pursuant to a s 166 certificate. Accordingly, the maximum penalty is 2 years imprisonment for that matter. I will return to that shortly. 23. It is clear that in addition to the assistance that he got during his time in the Mental Health Unit here in Newcastle that he was taking some steps towards getting some self-help, as it were, for the urges that he was feeling to distract himself from the troubles of this world by descending into looking at pornography and, in particular, child abuse material. Indeed, on the day that police came to his home, 28 July, he had had a consultation with a supervisor with respect to gaining the assistance from the University of New South Wales Forensic Psychology Clinic. That is a training facility run by the University of New South Wales School of Psychology and he had been referred to that service by a clinical psychologist from the Mater Mental Health Unit on 5 July. 24. The referral was for treatment to address adjustment disorder, chronic suicidal ideation, major depressive disorder and anxiety symptoms. The referral note indicated his presentation at the local Emergency Department the day after his release from custody which led to his admission to the Mental Health Unit. He attended an intake interview via a Zoom meeting with a forensic psychologist from that service, Ms Kylie Finlayson, and also a student intern psychologist. He indicated a desire to engage in regular therapy sessions and was assessed as suitable for the services which were to be provided. 25. Little did Mr Robertson or the forensic psychologist know that the police were about to knock on his door after that one hour intake interview and he was to be arrested later that afternoon and taken into custody where he has remained ever since. 26. Somewhat ironically, the report for presentation to this Court indicates that following that intake interview where he was assessed as suitable, there were numerous attempts to contact him by email and phone, which failed, of course, because he was in custody. They were advised on 10 August that he had been arrested and was in custody and, accordingly, the referral was closed. 27. That matter is both unusual and significant. It indicates that, despite his ongoing and repeated difficulties, that Mr Robertson was taking positive steps towards appropriate assistance which no doubt would have facilitated and helped in ongoing rehabilitation. 28. A very extensive report from Dr Paul Pusey was presented to Bright DCJ. In the circumstances, I do not propose to revisit what was in that particular report other than to indicate that it is of considerable assistance to the Court to see that the same psychologist has been retained to give an updated report or at least a fresh report for the assistance of this Court. 29. Dr Pusey deals with similar matters that he dealt with in the earlier report from 2022 and indicated that his reassessment confirmed the existence of a major depressive disorder and a generalised anxiety disorder. He also undertook a detailed analysis of both static and dynamic risks of reoffending. Somewhat unsurprisingly when one looks at the difficulties which have been analysed by many other psychologists, both inside and outside Corrective Services, the static factors led to a conclusion that the risk of recidivism fell within the low average to average range. 30. Dr Pusey, who presents as an appropriate and well-informed and well-qualified expert, expressed a different view and said that, in effect, despite the static risk of recidivism recording that outcome, he himself had come to a view to the contrary of that and that there was a high risk of recidivism. 31. In the face of that recognition, Dr Pusey recommended that there be considerable assistance provided to Mr Robertson which could take place in one of two ways. In the event of him being continued to be incarcerated, he was of the view that there should be an assessment of his suitability for admission to what previously was known as the CUBIT programme. There is no doubt that that now renamed and revamped programme is unlikely to be available to Mr Robertson unless one took the course of imposing him to a longer term of imprisonment than in my view is appropriate, purely so he could be given the assistance inside custody which he would be entitled to in the event of a term of imprisonment of the length that would allow him to do that programme. 32. I make it abundantly clear that in my view that is not an appropriate way in which to determine a sentence, nor an appropriate reason to lengthen an appropriate sentence. Dr Pusey went on to say that: "Should he be released to the community," 1. and I take that to mean either immediately or in the near future, "I would recommend that he be referred to an appropriately qualified clinical or forensic psychologist with expertise in the treatment of mood and anxiety disorders and sexual offending such as the clinicians at LSC Psychology in Sydney or through forensic psychology services run by Corrections New South Wales in the community." 1. I respect Dr Pusey's opinion regarding the risk of recidivism and I take that into account as part of the overall instinctive synthesis which it falls upon me to determine an appropriate outcome. 2. The Court has been considerably assisted by two able and competent counsel in their submissions, both orally and in writing. Mr Ng on behalf of the Commonwealth has directed the Court to the appropriate considerations and there is little of substance in difference between the approach by the Crown and Mr Lang on behalf of the accused, save and subject to one matter in particular to which I will make reference. 3. The position adopted by the Commonwealth Director and relying in particular on the remarks and judgment of the majority in Delzotto v R [2024] HCA 8 focus on the triggering mechanism for the imposition of the mandated minimum term being the recording of a conviction and the circumstance of the person having been convicted previously. Section 16A(AAB) applies in circumstances where the mechanism in 16AAB is brought into play. It applies (a) if the person is convicted of a Commonwealth child sexual abuse offence, namely as a current offence, and (b) the person has at an earlier sitting been convicted previously of a child sexual abuse offence. It goes without further restatement that Mr Robertson has at an earlier sitting been convicted of the relevant type of offence. 4. As the majority judgment in Delzotto observed, namely Edelman, Steward and Gleeson JJ, at [99] of the joint judgment when their honours - well, it started at [98]. Their Honours were dealing - in fact, I will go back, sorry. I will go back before that to [97]. Their Honours were dealing with the submission put on behalf of Mr Delzotto and the co-appellant Mr Hurt that the prescribed minimum sentences could not be used as a yardstick in the same way that a maximum sentence is a yardstick because there were exceptional situations in which the Court was not bound by the minimum sentence. Their Honours went on to deal with those submissions and, in rejecting that submission or that joint submission, described the exercise of the power under s 19B to discharge an offender without proceeding to conviction as not being an exception to 16AAB(2) at all. The Court described it as simply a circumstance where the provision does not apply and their Honours said this: "Section 16AAB(2) will only apply if the requirements of 16AAB(1) are satisfied, including that the person is convicted." 1. Of course, the second matter that would need to be established is that there is a previous conviction from an earlier sitting. Whilst not necessary for me to determine it, and I am very conscious of the jurisdiction in which I sit, I should indicate that I accept the submission on behalf of the Director on the interpretation of s 16AAB(1) that in circumstances where there has been at an earlier sitting a conviction for a child sexual abuse offence, the second prerequisite, which is in fact the first in 16AAB(1)(a), namely that they are convicted here, would operate to trigger the minimum term. I say that with no disrespect to Mr Lang's able submissions to the contrary but, to the extent that any utterance from this Court at first instance has any particular significance, I make it clear that I accept that submission. 2. The distinction drawn as to whether it is an exception to a minimum term or whether it simply does not bring the provision into play is a distinction which the Chief Justice did not specifically advert to and in the circumstances I consider not only that the majority judgment is binding but it accords with my reading and interpretation of the statutory provision. 3. The Court has a very wide discretion for a number of reasons in this particular matter. The first aspect is, of course, a determination of whether the s 5 threshold is crossed or s 17A of the Crimes Act 1914 (Cth). 4. The factors which play into a consideration of that include, on the one hand, the circumstance that the objective seriousness of this particular offence is very, very close to the least that one could imagine constituting the commission of the offence. However, it needs to be borne in mind significantly that the offender was subject to conditional release and indeed had been for a very short period of time at the time that the offending occurred. His prospects for rehabilitation are not simply guarded but are extremely contentious, given his background. The circumstance, while Veen v The Queen (No 2) (1988) 164 CLR 465 is not brought into play, in my view, but the circumstance of conviction not once but on two prior occasions for similar offending albeit that the factual circumstances of those matters, even though considered as under the midrange, were substantially worse than what is before this Court, all bring into play a consideration of whether or not there is an alternative in real terms to a term of imprisonment. 5. Notwithstanding the description of the minimum term as a yardstick, it is clear that it is one of the considerations that the Court must bear in mind together with the maximum penalty in determining whether or not the relevant threshold is crossed. When one breaks it down to first principles, and in light of my view about the application of s 16AAB, posing the question of whether the threshold for a term of imprisonment is crossed is in one sense, to use the vernacular, putting the cart before the horse, because the real question here is whether in the circumstances it would be appropriate to not record a conviction so that the triggering provision of the imposition of a minimum term is not thereby brought into play. Viewed in that way, in my considered view and judgment, it would be completely inappropriate for the Court to reach a conclusion that it did not require a conviction to be recorded. 6. That having been said, I should make it clear that were I considering whether the threshold has been crossed as a question at large, I would in the circumstances of the commission of this offence, and bearing in mind the dim prospects for reoffending or potential reoffending and recidivism, and bearing in mind the prior background, I would come to the view that the threshold has indeed been crossed. 7. However, taking into account the objective seriousness of the matter, it seems appropriate, or I am of the opinion that it is appropriate, to view the minimum term in this particular matter as described by both the judge at first instance in Delzotto and other of the Court of Criminal Appeal, and in due course, by the High Court, as the yardstick which represents the least worst possible case warranting imprisonment. 8. Accordingly, it is appropriate in my view to commence with a term of imprisonment of 4 years. There is no doubt, and it is without contention in the proceedings, that the appropriate discount for the guilty plea and assistance in cooperating, notwithstanding the mandatory requirement, would be a discount of 25%. To the extent that Mr Lang's submissions in writing invited the Court to consider a further discount, I do not, in the circumstances, consider that that is appropriate but a 25% discount would lead to an appropriate head sentence of 3 years. 9. I note that Bright DCJ, in determining what objectively were more serious offences, determined the recognizance release order should be brought into play after 12 months. However, her Honour was dealing there with a question of totality, superimposing that sentence or at least partly superimposing that sentence with the State sentence that she had imposed, leading ultimately to a determination, however expressed, that the minimum term that should be served in custody was 2 years. 10. Bearing in mind the single offence, and I will come to the related offence in a moment, but dealing with the single substantive offence, I would be of the view that the minimum term that should be served of such a Commonwealth offence would be a period of 18 months. 11. I turn briefly to the s 166 matter. As I discussed with counsel in the course of the oral submissions, the factual reality of which this Court is aware is that Wyong Public Library closed many years ago. I do not intend that that observation, which I refer to in the interests of full disclosure because I raised it in the course of oral submissions, plays any specific determination in the appropriate outcome. What does play into the consideration of the appropriate outcome in respect of that matter is that I am completely satisfied that the existence of that card in the wallet of Mr Robertson predated his sentence by Bright DCJ in 2022 in respect of which he had been in custody since 2020. Accordingly, I am satisfied without any real doubt but certainly bearing in mind to the extent that it is a factor in mitigation, I would need to be satisfied on the balance of probabilities (see the observations of the High Court in R v Olbrich [1999] HCA 54 which simply restated first principles) that on the balance of probabilities I have no reservation at all in concluding that that card had been in his possession most likely from some considerable time before his arrest in 2020 but at least from that time. 12. The obligation to report, if it continued at any time after around about 2016, was one which was in breach of the orders imposed by Berman DCJ back in 2015 and, leaving aside considerations as to whether the offence was stale or otherwise not continuing in July of 2022, but recognising that he was charged with it and he has admitted his guilt by virtue of the entering of a plea of guilt, in all of the circumstances I am of the view that it would be inappropriate to have a conviction recorded on his record in relation to that matter. 13. Accordingly, in all of the circumstances, I propose that that charge be dismissed pursuant to s 10(1)(a) of the Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act (NSW). 14. The next matter of consideration is that Mr Robertson, following his arrest in July of 2022 for the current matters, served the balance of parole for the New South Wales State matter until 21 December 2022 when that sentence expired. This Court has been asked to deal with the breach of the Commonwealth recognizance which he was subject to in addition to the conditions of parole and the matter has been brought, albeit at the eleventh hour, before this Court for determination. 15. There is no doubt that the breach is proved. Pursuant to s 20A(5)(c) of the Crimes Act 1914 (Cth) the Court has a number of options. First, it can impose a monetary penalty; second, it can amend the order to extend the period for which the offender is required to give security to be of good behaviour, not exceeding 5 years; third, it may revoke the order and make a Community Service Order, Intensive Correction Order or similar order such as a Home Detention Order; fourth, it can revoke the order and direct that the offender be imprisoned for such part of the sentence which had not been served at the time that he had been released; or last, take no action. 16. Whilst the Court needs to recognise the fact that there is a breach, in the circumstances where there is a simultaneous breach of the parole conditions and a breach of the Commonwealth conditions of the recognizance release order, I propose to take into account the fact that there is a Commonwealth breach in determining the appropriate start date for the sentence which I propose regarding the Commonwealth criminal matter. I do that because the Court has clearly a wide discretion regarding the service of, firstly, the non-parole period as to whether all, some or none of that period should be dealt with cumulatively or concurrently with the sentence which is about to be imposed. 17. The Court was referred to a number of cases in the written submissions by Mr Lang and it is not inappropriate to make reference to the first of those in time, Callaghan v R [2006] NSWCCA 58. Mr Lang referred to that case, and there are others, of course, listed in the Bench Book, to indicate that the Court does have a discretion and indeed a wide discretion in relation to the commencement date. Perhaps ironically, that was an appeal in which English DCJ had indeed made the sentence which her Honour passed totally cumulative on the non-parole period, the balance of parole, rather, which was being served and Simpson's J remarks in relation to the existence of the discretion indicated clearly that there was a discretion to determine where within the balance of parole period a sentence would commence and dealt with the argument that had been developed by Ms Francis of counsel that there was in effect a double punishment where the offence had been committed on parole to totally accumulate the sentence. I say "somewhat ironically" because in determining that there was an exercise of discretion at play, the Court found that English DCJ had not fallen into any error by totally accumulating the sentence on the balance of parole period. 18. Were it not for the Commonwealth recognizance breach, I would have been likely inclined to have some degree of overlap with the balance of parole period. It is customary, to the extent that there is any perceptible general practice, to overlap to a period of approximately 50% in determining where a subsequent sentence should start where a balance of parole has been served. That is tempered in some cases by how long the balance of parole in fact was but in a case such as this, a 50% starting point would be not unlikely. 19. However, bearing in mind the consideration of the recognizance release order being breached, it being subject of a longer period that would have continued past the balance of parole, I propose in those circumstances, and taking into account the breach of the Commonwealth recognizance, to backdate the sentence to 21 December 2022. 20. The net effect of all of that is that the sentence which I pass is that there should be a minimum term served of 18 months to date from 21 December 2022. That period will accordingly expire on 20 June 2024. I direct the release of the offender on that date, subject to his - I need to fix a surety, don't I? The surety in the sum of $500. 21. NG: There's a surety and there are four mandatory conditions that your Honour has to make— 22. HIS HONOUR: Yes, can you just remind me what they are, please? 23. NG: I can. Just if I could turn them up. They're contained in section, this is for my friend's benefit, contained in s 20— 24. HIS HONOUR: Hang on, I've got that here. 25. NG: --subsection 1B. 26. HIS HONOUR: Yes, thank you, I've got that. 27. NG: (a), (b), (c), (d). 28. HIS HONOUR: The conditions pursuant to s 20(1B) are as follows. Mr Robertson is to be subject to the supervision of a probation officer appointed in accordance with this order; second, he is to obey all reasonable directions of the probation officer; third, he is not to travel interstate or overseas without the written permission of the probation officer; and fourth, he is to undertake such treatment or rehabilitation programmes that the probation officer reasonably directs. 29. Now, I'm required to specify a sum for the surety, am I not? 30. NG: At least one dollar, your Honour. 31. HIS HONOUR: I will make it $500. 32. I direct that a copy of Dr Paul Pusey's reports from 2022 and 2024 be forwarded to Justice Health for consideration by them with respect to the need for assistance following his release in due course. 33. Are there any other orders required? 34. NG: One further one that's not related to the sentence. It's the forfeiture order. 35. LANG: Your Honour, I've seen a copy of those proposed minutes and it's consented to. 36. NG: I'll hand that up now, thank you. 37. HIS HONOUR: Thank you. 38. NG: Your Honour, there's one other matter that your Honour needs to determine, which is the length of time that Mr Robertson needs to be of good behaviour whilst the subject of the recog order that your Honour— 39. HIS HONOUR: Of course, because it's not simply a balance of parole. 40. NG: That's right. 41. HIS HONOUR: I think in the circumstances a period of 18 months supervision is adequate. So, I direct that he be of good behaviour for that period of the recognizance. 42. I will just sign this order. Application is made for forfeiture of the Samsung mobile phone that was seized by police back in July of 2022. Pursuant to s 23ZD of the Crimes Act 1914, in respect of the conviction of Mr Robertson of the offences set out in the second schedule and to which I have made reference in the course of judgment, the property specified in the first schedule is forfeited, namely the Samsung mobile phone, the details of which are set out in that schedule. 43. There is to be no order as to costs. 44. I will just enter this. I was going to say, not since the late Judge Garling, this jurisdiction used to stamp orders, have I ever seen it done but apparently I now have a multifaceted ability to multitask. 45. Mr Robertson, sir, you need to understand that your steps to help yourself, which you had started back in July of 2022 and which were cut short, you need to adhere to. I did not make reference to it in my judgment but I was very cognisant of what the chaplain had to say and in the circumstances you are going to need to undertake the courses which will assist you in the community rather than in custody. I hope for your sake and for the community's sake that you can commit to that in the community rather than back in a green tracksuit. Good luck. 46. OFFENDER: Thank you.