Civil and Administrative Tribunal New South Wales Medium Neutral Citation: Streater v Tamworth Regional Council [2024] NSWCATAD 195 Hearing dates: 20 June 2024 Date of orders: 18 July 2024 Decision date: 18 July 2024 Jurisdiction: Administrative and Equal Opportunity Division Before: EA MacIntyre, Senior Member Decision: (1) The decision of the Respondent is set aside. (2) Documents 9, 37, 39, 47, 48, 49, 88 and 113 to be disclosed to the Applicant within 28 days of the date of this decision, subject to the redactions set out below. (3) The decision of the Respondent is otherwise affirmed. (4) Pursuant to ss 64(1)(c) and 64(1)(d) of the Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2013, the contents of all paragraphs in these reasons marked NOT FOR PUBLICATION are not to be published or disclosed to the Applicant or the public. Catchwords: ADMINISTRATIVE LAW - administrative review - government information - access application - enforceable right to access government information - presumption in favour of the disclosure of government information - overriding public interest against disclosure - public interest considerations against disclosure - public interest considerations in favour of disclosure - balance - term 'could reasonably be expected' - risk of harm - risk of intimidation - risk of harassment - commercial in confidence information - local authority ADMINISTRATIVE LAW - reviewable decision - correct and preferable decision - Civil and Administrative Tribunal Legislation Cited: Administrative Decisions Review Act 1997 (NSW) Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2013 (NSW) Government Information (Public Access) Act 2009 (NSW) Local Government Act 1993 (NSW) Privacy and Personal Information Protection Act 1998 (NSW) Cases Cited: AEZ v Commissioner of Police NSW Police Force [2013] NSWADT 90 Commissioner of Police, NSW Police Force v Camilleri (GD) [2012] NSWADTAP 19 DRP v Orange City Council [2020] NSWCATAD 220 Flack v Commissioner of Police, New South Wales Police [2011] NSWADT 286 Leech v Sydney Water Corporation [2010] NSWADT 298 Office of Finance and Services v APV and APW [2014] NSWCATAP 88 Tallawoladah Pty Ltd v Department of Planning, Industry and Environment [2021] NSWCATAD 248 Turnbull v Strange [2018] NSWCA 157 Texts Cited: Nil Category: Principal judgment Parties: Matthew Streater (Applicant) Tamworth Regional Council (Respondent) Tamworth Area Radio Model Aircraft Club ((TARMAC (appeared pursuant to s 104(3) of the Government Information (Public Access) Act 2009)) Representation: Applicant (Self-Represented) Counsel: A Hannam (Respondent) Solicitors: Shaw Reynolds Lawyers (Respondent) File Number(s): 2024/00125220 Publication restriction: Pursuant to ss 64(1)(c) and 64(1)(d) of the Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2013, the contents of all paragraphs in these reasons marked NOT FOR PUBLICATION are not to be published or disclosed to the Applicant or the public. REASONS FOR DECISION 1. This is a review of a decision made by Tamworth Regional Council ("Respondent") to refuse access to certain information. The information sought by the applicant, Mr Matthew Streater ("Applicant") concerns the use of a property adjoining his own property and the impact of that use on the Applicant. He sought certain correspondence between the user of the adjoining property and the Respondent. Background 1. The Applicant owns property at Somerton in New South Wales. He carries on certain primary production activities on that property. 2. The Tamworth Area Radio Model Aircraft Club ("TARMAC") operates a model aircraft club on land that adjoins the property of the Applicant. It uses that adjoining land to operate model aircraft controlled by radio. The Applicant has concerns surrounding TARMAC's compliance with conditions of the development approval under which it carries out these activities. One of the concerns was the level of noise produced by the model aircraft when being flown. 3. There was evidence of a long history of disagreement between the Applicant and members of TARMAC, arising out of the impact of TARMAC's activities on the Applicant. The period of disagreement spans some 14 years. These disagreements have resulted in various allegations being made over the period, by members of TARMAC against the Applicant and also by the Applicant against members of TARMAC. 4. The allegations made by members of TARMAC included the use by the Applicant of a radio frequency jamming device to interfere with the operation of their model aircraft. The Applicant, for his part, denied using a radio frequency jamming device. He gave evidence that proceedings dealing with the alleged use of such a device by him did not result in any conviction. 5. [NOT FOR PUBLICATION] 6. The Applicant denied making threats of violence against members of TARMAC. He indicated that he held a licence to use firearms. The Applicant gave evidence that he had never been accused of any crimes involving verbal or physical threats. The Applicant produced a copy of a digital national police certificate issued on 6 June 2024, certifying that there were no disclosable court outcomes or outstanding matters concerning the Applicant within the records of police services in Australia. 7. The Applicant for his part made his own allegations against members of TARMAC. He gave evidence that there were warnings posted on the gates of his property prohibiting entry without prior approval. The notice of warning stated that a biosecurity management plan applied and set out a mobile number to be called to obtain permission before entering. He gave evidence that numerous members of TARMAC entered his property without permission, despite the notices prohibiting entry without prior approval. He also indicated that he had never been asked by members of TARMAC to return any model aircraft that had landed or crashed on his property but that they simply entered his property to retrieve model aircraft. The Applicant also expressed concerns about fire risk from model aircraft crashing on his land. 8. The Applicant also alleged that his cattle had strayed onto the adjoining land used by TARMAC and that members had let the cattle out onto the road instead of returning the cattle to him. 9. There was no allegation or evidence of actual violence by any party to the person of another. There was evidence, however, of police involvement in the past in dealing with the dispute between the parties, but no current matters involving the police. 10. The Applicant expressed a particular concern about whether the levels of noise produced by the operation of TARMAC's model aircraft complied with the applicable development approval. He indicated that the information he wished to obtain included information on this issue, in particular, whether levels of noise exceeded what was permissible under the development approval. 11. By application dated 13 October 2023, the Applicant sought the information he wanted from the Respondent. The information sought was correspondence between TARMAC and the Respondent between 1 January 2016 and 13 October 2023. 12. Following correspondence between the Applicant and the Respondent as to the scope of his application, the Respondent made a decision in response to the application on 29 January 2024. The Applicant sought internal review of that decision. A decision was made, following that review on 15 March 2024. The decision was to provide access to part of the information sought and refuse access to other parts. That refusal was based on a position taken by the Respondent that there was an overriding public interest against disclosure of the information withheld. The Applicant sought review of that decision by the Civil and Administrative Tribunal ("Tribunal") by application dated 22 March 2023. 13. The Respondent filed a schedule of documents on 30 April 2024. There were 119 documents described in that schedule. An amended schedule of documents was prepared by the Respondent setting out of a description of 116 documents. I adopt the numbering set out in that schedule to identify documents the subject of these proceedings. 79 of those documents remain in contention. 14. On 18 May 2024, a representative of TARMAC wrote to the Respondent's legal representative objecting to the release of any documents or files held by the Respondent concerning TARMAC and the Respondent. That correspondence referred to the "stress" felt by TARMAC members as a result of the Applicant's alleged conduct towards them. 15. Representatives of TARMAC appeared at the hearing of the matter. They did so pursuant to s 104(3) of the GIPA Act. That provision gives any person who could be aggrieved by a decision of the Tribunal on a relevant review a right to appear and be heard in any proceedings before the Tribunal in relation to the review and made submissions. Representatives of TARMAC attended by audio-visual link and made submissions. The Applicant also appeared by audio-visual link. Applicant's right to information 1. The Government Information Public Access Act 2009 ("GIPA Act") gives members of the public an enforceable right to access government information, subject to the provisions of that Act. That right is given for the stated object of maintaining and advancing "a system of responsible and representative democratic Government that is open, accountable, fair and effective" (s 3(1)(b) of the GIPA Act). 2. A person who makes an access application for government information has a "legally enforceable right to be provided with access to the information" (s 9(1) of the GIPA Act). Access applications are to be dealt with in accordance with Part 4 of the GIPA Act. 3. An agency may determine an access application under the GIPA Act in a number of ways, as relevantly set out in s 58(1), including: "(a) deciding to provide access to the information …. (d) deciding to refuse to provide access to the information because there is an overriding public interest against disclosure of the information." 1. There is a presumption in favour of the disclosure of government information unless there is an overriding public interest against disclosure (s 5 of the GIPA Act). There is a general public interest in favour of the disclosure of government information (s 12(1) of the GIPA Act). However, the right to access will not be available where "there is an overriding public interest against disclosure of the information" (s 9 of the GIPA Act). 2. There is an overriding public interest against disclosure of government information for the purposes of the GIPA Act if (and only if) there are public interest considerations against disclosure and, on balance, those considerations outweigh the public interest considerations in favour of disclosure (s 13 of the GIPA Act). It is to be conclusively presumed that there is an overriding public interest against disclosure of any of the government information described in Schedule 1 of the GIPA Act (s 14(1) of the GIPA Act). The considerations listed in the Table under s 14 of the GIPA Act are the only other considerations that may be taken into account in determining whether there is an overriding public interest against disclosure (s 14(2) of the GIPA Act). 3. The power of the Tribunal to review a decision of the Respondent arises where a person is aggrieved by a "reviewable decision" of an agency. Such a person may apply to the Tribunal for administrative review under the Administrative Decisions Review Act 1997 (NSW) ("ADR Act") of that decision (s 100 of the GIPA Act). 4. What are "reviewable decisions" of an "agency" is set out in s 80 of the GIPA Act. They include a decision to provide access or to refuse to provide access to information in response to an access application (s 80(d) of the GIPA Act). 5. An "agency" is defined in s 4(1) of the GIPA Act to include a "local authority". A "local authority" means a council, county council or joint organisation within the meaning of the Local Government Act 1993 (NSW). The Respondent is a council within the meaning of that Act. 6. An agency has made a "reviewable decision" within s 80 of the GIPA Act, the agency being the Respondent and the "reviewable decision" being a decision to refuse to provide access to information in response to an access application. 7. The Tribunal under s 63 of the ADR Act is to determine the matter, based on the material before it, including any relevant factual material and any applicable written or unwritten law. It must decide what is the correct and preferable decision. It may decide to affirm, vary or set aside the decision and make a substitute decision, or set aside the decision and remit the matter to the agency in accordance with any directions or recommendations of the Tribunal. 8. The provisions of the GIPA Act referred to above apply where the Applicant has made a valid "access application" seeking "government information". It is not in issue that the Applicant made an "access application" under Part 4 of the GIPA Act and that the information requested was "government information" (see definition of these terms in s 4 of the GIPA Act). 9. The Respondent has the onus of establishing that the decision is justified (s 105(1) of the GIPA Act). 10. Evidence at the hearing was given by the Respondent in two affidavits. The first was an affidavit sworn by Ms Tracey Carr on 24 May 2024. She was an employee of the Respondent holding the position of Coordinator Governance and Executive Services. She no longer held that position and was no longer an employee of the Respondent at the time she swore her affidavit. She was not present at the hearing. The second affidavit the Respondent relied on was an affidavit of Ms Karen Litchfield sworn on 22 May 2024. She was, at the time of swearing, employed by the Respondent in the role of an internal auditor. A further affidavit sworn by Ms Litchfield on 13 June 2024 was also in evidence. Ms Litchfield attended the hearing and gave evidence by audio visual link. The Applicant gave evidence set out in an affidavit sworn on 7 June 2024. 11. Representatives of TARMAC were present at the hearing and made oral submissions. The hearing of this matter was conducted partly in private for the Respondent to make submissions on the material it had refused to disclose. Neither the Applicant nor representatives of TARMAC were present during that part of the hearing conducted in private. Consideration 1. There is an obligation upon the Respondent to undertake such reasonable searches as may be necessary to find the requested information (s 53(2) of the GIPA Act). There was no dispute as to the reasonableness of the searches undertaken. The question for determination is whether or not the public interest considerations in favour of disclosure of the identified information outweigh the public interest considerations against disclosure. 2. The Tribunal is to determine where the balance lies between the public interest considerations for and against disclosure. In Tallawoladah Pty Ltd v Department of Planning, Industry and Environment [2021] NSWCATAD 248, the balancing exercise required to be carried out was described in the following terms: "The test in section 13 requires the Tribunal as decision-maker to attribute weight to each consideration for and against disclosure, and determine whether the balance of the public interest lies in favour of, or against, disclosure of government information: Hurst v Wagga Wagga City Council [2011] NSWADT 307; Flack v Commissioner of Police, NSW Police [2011] NSWADT 286. The GIPA Act provides no set formula for calculating the weight of considerations for determining whether one set of considerations outweighs the other, and the Tribunal has stated that "any reasonable approach that follows section 15 principles seems to be acceptable ... it is really a matter of placing identified considerations in order of priority or importance": Place v Department of Finance, Services and Innovation [2016] NSWCATAD 278 at paragraph [96]. The balance is always weighted in favour of disclosure: Taylor v Destination NSW [2017] NSWCATAD 272 at paragraph [17].The balancing exercise "is a question of fact and degree, requiring the weighing of competing matters, and is a task not amenable to mathematical calculation" (Battin v University of New England [2013] NSWADT 73 at [74]; Else v Transport for NSW [2021] NSWCATAD 59, at [18])". 1. In Flack v Commissioner of Police, New South Wales Police [2011] NSWADT 286, the task of the Tribunal was described as follows: "…. in all cases other than those falling under the terms of Schedule 1, the public interest test under the GIPA Act involves the following: (a) identifying the public interest in favour of disclosure; (b) identifying the public interest against disclosure; and (c) determine where the balance lies". 1. See also Commissioner of Police, NSW Police Force v Camilleri (GD) [2012] NSWADTAP 19, at [24] – [25]. 2. Section 15 of the GIPA Act sets out the principles that apply when determining whether there is an overriding public interest against disclosure: "(a) Agencies must exercise their functions so as to promote the object of this Act. (b) Agencies must have regard to any relevant guidelines issued by the Information Commissioner. (c) The fact that disclosure of information might cause embarrassment to, or a loss of confidence in, the Government is irrelevant and must not be taken into account. (d) The fact that disclosure of information might be misinterpreted or misunderstood by any person is irrelevant and must not be taken into account. (e) In the case of disclosure in response to an access application, it is relevant to consider that disclosure cannot be made subject to any conditions on the use or disclosure of information". 1. The Respondent identified the following considerations in favour of disclosure of the relevant information. 1. Disclosure of the information could reasonably be expected to promote open discussion of public affairs, enhance Government accountability or contribute to positive and informed debate on issues of public importance. 2. Disclosure of the information could reasonably be expected to inform the public about the operations of agencies and, in particular, their policies and practices for dealing with members of the public. 3. Disclosure of the information could reasonably be expected to reveal or substantiate that an agency (or a member of an agency) has engaged in misconduct or negligent, improper or unlawful conduct. 1. The Respondent identified the following public interest considerations against disclosure, set out in s14 of the GIPA Act. "2 Law enforcement and security There is a public interest consideration against disclosure of information if disclosure of the information could reasonably be expected to have one or more of the following effects (whether in a particular case or generally)— ….. (e) endanger the security of, or prejudice any system or procedure for protecting, any place, property or vehicle, … 3 Individual rights, judicial processes and natural justice There is a public interest consideration against disclosure of information if disclosure of the information could reasonably be expected to have one or more of the following effects— (a) reveal an individual's personal information, …… (c) prejudice any court proceedings by revealing matter prepared for the purposes of or in relation to current or future proceedings, …… (f) expose a person to a risk of harm or of serious harassment or serious intimidation, ……. 4 Business interests of agencies and other persons There is a public interest consideration against disclosure of information if disclosure of the information could reasonably be expected to have one or more of the following effects— …… (b) reveal commercial-in-confidence provisions of a government contract, (c) diminish the competitive commercial value of any information to any person". 1. The relevant considerations in the Table under s 14 may be satisfied where it "could reasonably be expected" to have the relevant effect. What this means was described in Leech v Sydney Water Corporation [2010] NSWADT 298 in the following terms, at [25]: "The term 'could reasonably be expected' has been considered in a number of cases. The words have their ordinary meaning: Searle Australia Pty Ltd v PIAC (1992) 108 ALR 163. The test to be applied is an objective one, approached from the view point of the reasonable decision-maker: Neary v State Rail Authority. Something which could reasonably be expected is something which is more than a mere possibility, risk or a chance. It must be based on real and substantial grounds, and it must not be purely speculative, fanciful, imaginary or contrived: Searle Australia Pty Ltd v PIAC". 1. I will first consider the evidence put before the Tribunal relevant to whether disclosure "could reasonably be expected" to have the effect identified in relation to each of the considerations identified above. I will then go on to consider specifically the required balance between public interest considerations for and against disclosure, in respect of each of the documents remaining in dispute. Security or prejudice - clause 2(e) of the Table under s 14 of the GIPA Act 1. The Respondent's submission was that there was a public interest consideration in respect of Documents 16 and 44 against disclosure. The relevant ground was that disclosure could reasonably be expected to endanger the security of or prejudice any system or procedure for protecting any place, property or vehicle or facilitate the commission of a criminal act. Documents 16 and 44 included information about the protection of TARMAC's property and the Respondent's property. 2. No evidence was provided to say how disclosure could reasonably have the effect of endangering the security of, or prejudice any relevant system or procedure. Merely asserting that this would be the effect of disclosure is not sufficient to establish the relevant ground. To the extent that any of the matters considered at [62] and [63] below going to the conduct of the Applicant are relevant, I refer to and rely on my findings at [63] below. Based on my findings below, I am unable to give much weight to this public interest consideration against disclosure set out in clause 2(e) but give it some weight. Personal information – clause 3(a) of the Table under s 14 of the GIPA Act 1. The question for determination is whether disclosure could reasonably be expected to have the effect of revealing "personal information". The Respondent relied on clause 3(a) in respect of the following documents: 4, 5, 8, 9-16, 21-26, 28, 30-31, 37- 38, 47-50, 53-69, 72-73, 75-81, 83-85, 87-94, 98-102, 106-108 and 113-115. In the end, not all these documents were in contention. 2. What is personal information is defined in clause 4 of Schedule 4 of the GIPA Act in the following terms: "Personal information (1) In this Act, personal information means information or an opinion (including information or an opinion forming part of a database and whether or not recorded in a material form) about an individual (whether living or dead) whose identity is apparent or can reasonably be ascertained from the information or opinion. (2) Personal information includes such things as an individual's fingerprints, retina prints, body samples or genetic characteristics. (3) Personal information does not include any of the following— (a) information about an individual who has been dead for more than 30 years, (b) information about an individual (comprising the individual's name and nonpersonal contact details, including the individual's position title, public functions and the agency in which the individual works) that reveals nothing more than the fact that the person was engaged in the exercise of public functions, (c) information about an individual that is of a class, or is contained in a document of a class, prescribed by the regulations for the purposes of this subclause". 1. What is personal information within this definition is relevantly "information or an opinion" about an individual. Left as such, what is personal information has a wide reach. However, there is a further requirement that needs to be satisfied for something to be "personal information". The individual in question must be someone whose "identity is apparent or can reasonably be ascertained from the information or opinion". A comparable definition is found in s 4 of the Privacy and Personal Information Protection Act 1998 (NSW). Considering the reach of that definition, in Office of Finance and Services v APV and APW [2014] NSWCATAP 88, the Appeal Panel of the Tribunal said, at [4]: "To be "personal information" the information or opinion must be about an individual "whose identity is apparent or can reasonably be ascertained from the information or opinion." We have decided that this phrase does not mean that the individual's identity must be apparent or reasonably ascertainable solely from the information or opinion. Depending on the circumstances, other information may be consulted in order to ascertain the identity of the person concerned. In the circumstances of this case where APV's and APW's identity could be ascertained from the information or opinion in combination with information on a website controlled by the agency itself, the information was personal information". 1. The following observations of the New South Wales Court of Appeal in Turnbull v Strange [2018] NSWCA 157 are also relevant: "The phrase "about an individual" provides an essential qualification of the subject matter of the definition, namely "information or an opinion". It may be that the content of a telephone conversation, including statements made by one party, will constitute "opinions" about the other party to the conversation. However, statements by the relevant individual will not constitute opinions about himself or herself, in most circumstances. On the other hand, statements made by the individual may identify "information" about that individual, in that they may reveal that he or she held a particular opinion or knew certain things at a particular time. It is unlikely that the whole of the records apparently sought by the subpoena would constitute "personal information" in relation to the deceased. The importance of giving weight to information or an opinion "about" an individual was explained in relation to the equivalent Commonwealth legislation in Privacy Commissioner v Telstra Corporation Ltd [(2017) 249 FCR 24; [2017] FCAFC 4 at [3] (Dowsett J) and [60]-[65] (Kenny and Edelman JJ)]". 1. The following observations of the Tribunal in DRP v Orange City Council [2020] NSWCATAD 220 as to telephone numbers also have a bearing on the question at issue: "The Administrative Decisions Tribunal found that the mobile, home and work telephone numbers, and email addresses of an objector to a prospective development application was personal information (see Donnellan v Ku-ring-gai Council (2013) NSWADT 115 (at [39]-[43]). However, not all of the information contained in emails by objectors to the agency is their personal information. Where informed comprised expressions of opinion, it was opinions about the development application and not about an individual. The fact that information was sent from the objector's email addresses did not make the information personal information". 1. The following principles may be derived from the above cases about when information is "personal information": 1. the information must be information or an opinion about an individual; 2. that individual's identity must be apparent or must reasonably be ascertainable from the information or opinion; 3. other information may be consulted in order to determine whether the identity of the person concerned can reasonably be ascertained; 4. statements made by an individual may identify "information" about that individual, in that they may reveal that they held a particular view; 5. where information comprises expressions of opinion about some matter external to an individual, such as a development application, this may not be an opinion about an individual; 6. mobile, home and work telephone numbers, and email addresses may be personal information. 1. I accept that names, telephone numbers and email addresses of individuals on documents sought by the Applicant, in the circumstances of the matter, amount to personal information. The decision of the Respondent to make redactions of information of this kind to documents it has disclosed is therefore the correct and preferable decision. 2. The evidence was that the identity of some of the members of TARMAC is already known to the Applicant. They include the two representatives of TARMAC attending the hearing of this matter. The evidence was that he has, in the past, observed members of TARMAC when they arrived near his property. The question arising from these circumstances is whether this knowledge is other information that may be used in order to ascertain the identity of a person sending or receiving the correspondence the Applicant seeks and views they hold. 3. In my view, once the relevant redactions described at [48] above have been made, removing the names and contact details of senders and recipients of correspondence, disclosure to the Applicant of the information he seeks should not reasonably be expected to reveal an individual's personal information, even taking into account what he already knows. Both the recipients and the senders of the relevant correspondence were multiple persons and not a single person. There is therefore no individual as such who, on the evidence, can be identified as the sender or recipient of correspondence, once the required redactions are made. 4. The Applicant will be able to ascertain information in the nature of the opinions of members of TARMAC and the Respondent concerning the terms of the development approval under which TARMAC carries out its activities and its compliance record. This, however, is not an information about an individual. 5. Even if a risk of identification arises, once the required redactions have been made to information that the Respondent has not disclosed, the public interest considerations under clause 3(a) against disclosure of the correspondence sought by the Applicant, should not be allowed significant weight in the overall balancing exercise I need to carry out, for the reasons set out at [77] to [82] below. 6. The reach of what is "personal information" also includes "opinions ….about an individual". To the extent that what the Applicant seeks includes information in the nature of opinions about members of TARMAC or officers or employees of the Respondent, public interest considerations against disclosure may arise. On the evidence before me, I find little or no information of this kind in the documents that have not been disclosed. To the extent that what is sought to be disclosed includes personal information about the Applicant himself, this will be a matter in favour of disclosure. Court proceedings – clause 3(c) of the Table under s 14 of the GIPA Act 1. The Respondent had submitted that a public interest consideration against disclosure arose under clause 3(c) of the Table under s 14 of the GIPA Act in respect of 4 documents. They were documents 39, 40, 41 and 42. The Respondent has relied on this reason in conjunction with other reasons for documents 37, 38 and 44. The consideration set out in clause 3(c) against disclosure is a relevant risk of disclosure prejudicing to any court proceedings by revealing a matter prepared for the purposes of or in relation to current or future proceedings. As there were no relevant Court proceedings identified by the Respondent, the Respondent did not press its objection to the release of the above four documents on the ground set out in clause 3(c). Harm, harassment or intimidation – clause 3(f) of the Table under s 14 of the GIPA Act 1. The grounds against disclosure set out in clause 3(f) is that disclosure of information could reasonably be expected to expose a person to a risk of harm or of serious harassment or serious intimidation. The Respondent argued that these grounds applied in respect of documents 9, 53, 54, 55, 57, 63, 66, 78, 90 and 107, in combination with the other reasons in s 14. 2. There are three matters which could fall within clause 3(f). They are a risk of: 1. harm 2. serious harassment; or 3. serious intimidation. 1. Any one of these factors could give rise to relevant public interest considerations against disclosure. In the case of harassment or harm, the relevant risk must be "serious". 2. The Tribunal in AEZ v Commissioner of Police NSW Police Force [2013] NSWADT 90 considered the reach of clause 3(f). Firstly, in considering the meaning of "harm", the Tribunal said: "The GIPA Act does not contain a definition of harm, serious harassment or serious intimidation. It is to be noted that harm is not qualified by the adjective serious. The Macquarie Dictionary online defines harm thus - noun 1. injury; damage; hurt: to do someone bodily harm. 2. moral injury; evil; wrong. -verb (t) 3. to do harm to; injure; damage; hurt. -phrase 4. in harm's way, in danger. 5. out of harm's way, out of danger. [Middle English; Old English hearm] Harm is a concept frequently used by the law. The criminal law prohibits assaults occasioning bodily harm. This has been interpreted in its ordinary meaning to" include any hurt or injury calculated to interfere with the health or comfort of [the injured person]": see R v Donovan [1934] 2KB 498. "Serious harm" is a concept used in criminal defamation, which requires proof of an intent to cause serious harms. Section 40 of the Civil Law (Wrongs) Act 2002 (ACT) on the other hand defines "harm" to be harm of any kind, including personal injury, damage to property and economic loss. Harm is also a concept in child protection: in section 9 of the Child Protection Act 1999 (Qld) it is defined as "as any detrimental effect of a significant nature on the child's physical, psychological or emotional wellbeing." In the context of s 14 of the GIPA Act I am inclined to the view the meaning of harm should be confined to a real and substantial detrimental effect on a person, rather than on their business interests. This is so given the juxtaposition of the word "harm" with the concepts of serious harm and intimidation, and the fact that economic and business interests are the subject of public interest consideration against disclosure in part 4 of the section 14 Table. A detrimental effect may be to a person's physical, psychological or emotional wellbeing". 1. Whether clause 3(f) can apply does not depend on whether a person has a subjective fear of the risks in question. Although the particular circumstances of the person in question and their views may be taken into account, the question for the Tribunal is whether the evidence objectively allows for the conclusion to be drawn that the considerations set out in clause 3(f) arise (AEZ, at [95]). Once that determination is made, the task of the Tribunal is to then weigh those considerations alongside other considerations, in carrying out the balancing exercise required of the Tribunal. 2. I accept and adopt the reasoning of the Tribunal in AEZ, noting in particular that, harm should be confined to a "real and substantial detrimental effect on a person". While there has been a history of conflict between the Applicant and the members of TARMAC, with allegations of various kinds made by each against the other, it is not clear to me, that on the evidence, these circumstances create a risk of "harm" in the sense intended by clause 3(f). 3. [NOT FOR PUBLICATION] 4. Clause 3(f) does not expressly deal with risks of harm to property. The property in question, in the present case, is the model aircraft of the members of TARMAC that enter or land on the Applicant's land. There were allegations of harm to property of this kind in the past. I accept that harm to property or threats of such harm, may, in certain circumstances, evidence a risk of future harm to the owner of the property. However, I am not satisfied that the evidence establishes a risk of the required kind. 5. Evidence of the alleged conduct of the Applicant was provided in private without any opportunity given to the Applicant to challenge that evidence and present his own evidence in reply. These circumstances, as matter of fairness, affect the weight I can allow to that part of the Respondent's evidence provided in private. The Tribunal put to the Respondent at the hearing that this may be a consequence of providing evidence in private. The Applicant, for his part, denied making any threats of violence. He also provided evidence in the form of a copy of a digital national police certificate issued on 6 June 2024, certifying that there were no disclosable outcomes or outstanding matters against the Applicant within the records of police services in Australia. The evidence also was that no judgments or other decisions have been made against the Applicant in any court or tribunal and that there are no current proceedings against him arising out of the disagreements between the members of TARMAC and the Applicant. Although there was evidence of police involvement in the past in relation to the dispute between the Applicant and members of TARMAC, the only evidence from the NSW Police Force put before the Tribunal was the digital national police certificate issued on 6 June 2024. 6. Having weighed and considered the evidence, I am unable to come to any reliable conclusion as to how real and substantial the risks of harm alleged by the Respondent are. I am unable to find, on the balance of probabilities, that disclosure could reasonably be expected to expose a person to a risk of the required kind. Even so, in light of the history of mutual antagonism and conflict between the parties, I will allow some weight to the considerations going to the risk of harm, described in clause 3(f). 7. The next matter is whether a risk of "serious harassment" within the meaning of clause 3(f) arises. The Tribunal described what was "harassment" in the following terms: "Serious harassment is a separate and distinct concept. The Macquarie Dictionary online defines harass - verb (t) 1. to trouble by repeated attacks, incursions, etc., as in war or hostilities; harry; raid. 2. to disturb persistently; torment. [French harasser, from Old French harer set a dog on] The concept of harassment is one familiar to anti-discrimination law, with sexual harassment being prohibited and subject to remedies. A consideration of those laws reveals that a common element in most jurisdictions is that the person harassed would be offended, humiliated or intimidated by the conduct in the circumstances: see Sex Discrimination Act 1984 (Cth), s 28A(1); Anti-Discrimination Act 1977 (NSW), s 22A; and Equal Opportunity Act 1984 (SA), s 87(9). In Henderson v McKenzie [2009] ACTSC 39 Higgins CJ was considering a charge of stalking with intent to harass contrary to s 35(1)(c) of the Crimes Act 1900 (ACT). His Honour said, at [6-8] - 6. Harassment is not defined in the Crimes Act, nor, indeed, in the Criminal Code 2002 (ACT) (Criminal Code). However, it does seem in context to bear its usual meaning, ie "to trouble by repeated attacks; harry; (1) to worry or unnerve (an enemy) by continuous small attacks; (2) to disturb, worry, torment, distress with annoying labour, care or misfortune" (World Book Dictionary); "Vex by repeated attacks; trouble, worry" (Concise Oxford Dictionary). All of the definitions of harassment require a consideration of how the conduct complained of is experienced by the person alleged to be harassed, and are concerned with whether that person was offended, worried, tormented, distressed or harassed by the conduct. In the context of the GIPA Act where the decision maker has to be satisfied that, if the information is disclosed, it could reasonably be expected that the disclosure would expose a person to serious harassment, the assessment of the impact of the conduct on the individual concerned is an objective one, although particular circumstances and vulnerabilities relating to that individual may be taken into account when making that assessment". 1. I agree with and accept the views of the Tribunal, noting that the impact on the person in question is to be assessed objectively and that the conduct in question may involve that person being offended, worried, tormented or distressed. The effect in question must be "serious". 2. Whether disclosure could reasonably be expected to expose persons to risks of serious harassment requires an assessment of future risks, consequent upon disclosure. What has transpired in the past is relevant to determination of the question. There is no doubt that members of TARMAC have felt "stress" as a result of conflict with the Applicant. I accept that they felt "offended, worried, tormented, distressed or harassed" as a result of the situation of conflict over many years. Whether the effect on the persons in question could be "serious", however, is less certain. Though stressed, there was no evidence that the members' concerns with the Applicant's alleged conduct had materially impaired, deterred or stopped them in carrying out their activities on the land adjoining that of the Applicant. Whether there is an objective basis to allow a conclusion to be drawn that disclosure could reasonably be expected to expose members to risks of "serious harassment" is not clear, in light of the uncertain evidence at [63] above concerning the Applicant's conduct. Nevertheless, I am prepared to allow moderate weight to this consideration in light of the long history of mutual antagonism between the Applicant and members of TARMAC. 3. The third ground arising under clause 3(f) is a risk of "serious intimidation". The Tribunal in AEZ said: "The GIPA Act makes specific mention of serious intimidation as another element of the public interest consideration against disclosure in point 3(f) of the Table to s 14, despite the fact that the two concepts of intimidation and harassment are clearly related. Intimidation is defined by The Macquarie Dictionary online as - verb (t) (intimidated, intimidating) 1. to make timid, or inspire with fear; overawe; cow. 2. to force into or deter from some action by inducing fear: to intimidate a voter. [Medieval Latin intimidātus, past participle, made afraid. See TIMID] Intimidation is defined in s 7 of the Crimes, Domestic and Personal Violence Act 2007 (NSW) thus - (1) For the purposes of this Act, intimidation of a person means: (a) conduct amounting to harassment or molestation of the person, or (b) an approach made to the person by any means (including by telephone, telephone text messaging, e-mailing and other technologically assisted means) that causes the person to fear for his or her safety, or (c) any conduct that causes a reasonable apprehension of injury to a person or to a person with whom he or she has a domestic relationship, or of violence or damage to any person or property. In PE V MU [ 2010] NSWDC 2 William DCJ referred to that definition and said - 15...intimidatory conduct... is conduct amounting to harassment or molestation or contact by one person with another such as would cause the other person to fear for their safety. 16 Harassment is not defined in the Act but in its legal sense refers to ongoing behaviours that are found to be threatening or disturbing. ... Importantly the intimidation or harassment referred to in point 4(f) is required to be serious intimidation or serious harassment, requiring that the decision maker be satisfied that release of the information could reasonably expose a person to intimidation or harassment that is heavy, weighty or grave, and not trifling or transient". 1. There remains the question of whether there is a risk of intimidation within the meaning of clause 3(f), understood as a risk that is "heavy, weighty or grave, and not trifling or transient". The evidence does not indicate that the risks in question were trifling or transient. There has been a long history of conflict between the Applicant and members of TARMAC. However, I am not able to conclude that the risks are heavy, weighty or grave in light of the uncertainties surrounding the evidence, as set out at [63] above. However, I give some weight to the considerations surrounding the risks described in clause 3(f) as regards intimidation. 2. The conclusions I have reached as to application of clause 3(f) does not mean that I have made any adverse findings as to the conduct of the Applicant. Nor does the evidence at hand allow me to do so. Further, I do not make any findings as to whether or not TARMAC has complied with the conditions of the relevant development approval. I am also unable to do so on the evidence. Clause 4(b) - commercial-in-confidence provisions of a government contract 1. The Respondent submitted that disclosure of certain documents would reveal commercial in confidence provisions of a government contract. The documents so identified by the Respondent were documents 9, 53-69, 72, 73, 75-81, 83- 85, 87-94, 98-102, 106-108, and 113-115. 2. What are "commercial-in-confidence" provisions of a contract are defined in clause 1 of Schedule 4 of the GIPA Act as follows: "commercial-in-confidence provisions of a contract means any provisions of the contract that disclose— (a) the contractor's financing arrangements, or (b) the contractor's cost structure or profit margins, or (c) the contractor's full base case financial model, or (d) any intellectual property in which the contractor has an interest, or (e) any matter the disclosure of which would place the contractor at a substantial commercial disadvantage in relation to other contractors or potential contractors, whether at present or in the future". 1. The Respondent applied clause 4(b) in combination with other reasons in s 14 in support of its submissions. The Respondent submitted that any relevant disclosure would place contractors at a substantial commercial disadvantage in relation to other contractors or potential contractors, whether at present or in the future. 2. I accept that certain information concerning the value of contracts and costs of work should not be disclosed. I set out my findings in this regard under consideration of each individual document in issue below. Subject to the redaction of this information, I do not place significant weight on the public interest considerations against disclosure set out in clause 4(f). Clause 4(c) – diminution of commercial value 1. The Respondent submits that access to certain documents should be refused on the basis that disclosure of the information could reasonably be expected to diminish the commercial value of relevant information to any person. Specifically, the submission is that the information has significant commercial value to TARMAC which would be diminished if revealed to the public. These submissions are made in respect of documents 26, 44, 50, 53 -55, 57, 60-69, 73, 75-81, 83 to 85, 87-94, 87-94, 98-102, 107-108, 113 and114. These documents include details of specific activities of TARMAC, financial and other details, compliance and reporting requirements and other information relevant to how TARMAC conducts its activities. I attach some weight to the public interest considerations against disclosure set out in clause 4(c). I deal specifically with each relevant document remaining is issue below. Balancing considerations for and against disclosure 1. Balancing the public interest considerations in favour of disclosure against the public interest considerations against disclosure, I find that the balance favours disclosure, subject to the findings made below in relation to particular documents considered at [86] to [126] below. I place significant weight upon the consideration that disclosure could reasonably be expected to promote open discussion of public affairs, enhance Government accountability or contribute to positive and informed debate on issues of public importance. The issues surrounding the use of land in accordance with development approvals and the impact of that use on the community is an issue of public importance. Regulation of the use of airspace is also an issue of public importance, especially in light of the increasing use of drone technologies. Disclosure of the documents dealing with these matters could reasonably be expected to contribute to positive and informed debate on the matter. 2. I also place significant weight to the consideration that disclosure of the information in question could reasonably be expected to inform the public about the operations of local government and, in particular, their policies and practices for dealing with members of the public, such as their responses to complaints about land and airspace use. 3. I agree that weight should be given to the public interest consideration against disclosure in relation to the revelation of an individual's personal information. Personal information included in any of the documents in issue ought not to be disclosed, including names, addresses, emails, telephone numbers for landlines and telephone numbers for mobile phones. Personal information should be redacted from the documents the Applicant seeks. Subject to such redaction, I consider that the public interest considerations against disclosure going to the revelation of an individual's personal information do not displace the public interest considerations in favour of disclosure set out above. 4. I attach some weight to the matters considered at [63], [64], [67] and [69] above, going to the risks of harm, serious harassment and serious intimidation, in light of the history of conflict between the Applicant and members of TARMAC. However, I am unable to place significant weight on these matters based on the evidence before the Tribunal for the reasons stated above. Even if risks of the relevant kind were sufficiently proved, it is unclear that the considerations arising out of such risks would outweigh the considerations in favour of disclosure. 5. As regards commercial dealings by local government, while some weight needs to be given to maintaining the confidentiality of agreements between local government and businesses by reason of clause 4(b), there is a countervailing public interest consideration in favour of disclosure in informing the public about what arrangements local government makes with service providers and the costs to the public. Disclosure of the documents dealing with these matters could reasonably be expected to contribute to positive and informed debate on the matter. In my opinion, when the countervailing considerations are weighed up against each other, the correct balance in favour of disclosure is reached, in the matter at hand, where details of monetary payments are redacted in this matter. 6. Public interest considerations against disclosure, though carrying some weight, in my opinion, do not displace the greater weight carried by the public interest considerations in favour of disclosure. I take into account TARMAC's objection to disclosure. I do not, however, consider that TARMAC's objection shifts the balance of public interest considerations so as to favour non-disclosure, especially if the necessary redactions of personal and commercial information are made. 7. In determining whether there is an overriding public interest against disclosure of information in response to an access application, an agency is entitled to take a number of factors set out in s 55 of the GIPA Act into consideration. They include the Applicant's identity and relationship with any other person and also the Applicant's motives for making the access application. The history of conflict between the Applicant and members of TARMAC are relevant considerations that can be taken into account by reason of s 55(3) of the GIPA Act. These considerations may go against disclosure. The Applicant's motives in seeking information about compliance with conditions of the relevant development approval are also relevant. This is a consideration that favours disclosure (s 54(2) of the GIPA Act). However, I do not think that s 55 affects the overall balance that favours disclosure. 8. I set out below my specific findings in respect of each of the documents remaining in dispute, applying to each document the conclusions I have reached as to the balance between public interest considerations for and against disclosure. Documents 1. There were 116 documents described in the schedule produced by the Respondent relevant to these proceedings. The Applicant did not press for release of some of these documents. They are documents 1, 2, 3, 6, 7, 17,18, 19, 20, 27, 29, 32, 33, 34, 35, 36, 43, 45, 46, 51, 52, 70, 71, 74, 82, 86, 95, 96, 97, 103, 104, 105, 109, 110, 111, 112 and 116. Other documents were identified as being beyond the scope of the Applicant's application. They were documents 24, 25, 26, 38, 40, 50, 53-69, 72, 73, 75-81, 83-85, 87, 89, 90, 92, 93-101,107 and 114. The remaining documents were in contention. 2. The following redactions are to be made to documents to be disclosed to the Applicant. The names, street addresses, email addresses, telephone numbers (both landlines and mobile) and titles of individuals belonging to TARMAC and other third parties are to be redacted from the remaining documents in contention, including where specifically indicated below. The street address and PO Box of TARMAC (other than that of the land where flying occurs adjoining the Applicant's land) and any telephone numbers (both landlines and mobiles) are to be redacted, including where specifically indicated below. The Respondent's street address, PO Box, and telephone numbers available to the public for general access and not attributable to any particular individual need not be redacted. Email addresses and telephone numbers attributable to personnel of the Respondent are otherwise to be redacted, unless already provided to the Applicant. Commercial information setting out specific monetary amounts for contracts and names and contact details of third party contractors, including estimates, are to be redacted, including where specifically indicated below, unless already provided to the Applicant. I deal with each specific document in contention below. Document 4 1. This document was provided to the Applicant in redacted form. Disclosure of the redacted parts was refused on the basis of clause 3(a) (personal information). All redacted names and email addresses are to remain redacted. Subject to that redaction, the public interest considerations set out at [76] and [77] above in favour of disclosure outweigh those against. The Respondent's decision to provide this document to the Applicant in redacted form is affirmed. Document 5 1. This document was provided to the Applicant in redacted form. Disclosure of the redacted parts was refused on the basis of clause 3(a) (personal information). All redacted names of individuals and their email addresses are to remain redacted. Subject to that redaction, the public interest considerations set out at [76] and [77] above in favour of disclosure outweigh those against. The Respondent's decision to provide this document to the Applicant in redacted form is affirmed. Document 8 1. This document was provided to the Applicant in redacted form. Disclosure of the redacted parts was refused on the basis of clause 3(a) (personal information). All redacted names of individuals, email addresses and telephone numbers of individuals are to remain redacted. Subject to that redaction, the public interest considerations set out at [76] and [77] above in favour of disclosure outweigh those against. The Respondent's decision to provide this document to the Applicant in redacted form is affirmed. Document 9 1. This document was provided to the Applicant in redacted form. Disclosure of the redacted parts was refused on the basis of clause 3(a) (personal information) and clause 3(f) (harm, harassment or intimidation). All redacted names of individuals (including first names) and email addresses of individuals, are to remain redacted. The 6th paragraph onwards is not to be redacted, other than redaction of the names of individuals including first names. 2. Commercial information, being specific monetary amounts of costs or estimated costs, are to remain redacted. Doing so achieves the required balance when considerations against disclosure in clause 4(b) are brought to bear on the matter. 3. Subject to these redactions, disclosure is to be made. The public interest considerations set out at [76] and [77] above in favour of disclosure outweigh those against. The Respondent's decision to provide this document to the Applicant in redacted form is set aside and replaced with a decision to provide document 9 in a form that is redacted in accordance with paragraphs [89] and [90]. Document 10 1. This document was provided to the Applicant in redacted form. Disclosure of the redacted parts was refused on the basis of clause 3(a) (personal information). All redacted names of individuals (including first names) and email addresses are to remain redacted. Redacted commercial information is also to remain redacted. Subject to these redactions, the public interest considerations set out at [76] and [77] above in favour of disclosure outweigh those against. The Respondent's decision to provide this document to the Applicant in redacted form is affirmed. Document 11 1. This document was provided to the Applicant in redacted form. Disclosure of the redacted parts was refused on the basis of clause 3(a) (personal information). All redacted names of individuals (including first names), email addresses and telephone numbers are to remain redacted. Subject to these redactions, the public interest considerations set out at [76] and [77] above in favour of disclosure outweigh those against. The Respondent's decision to provide this document to the Applicant in redacted form is affirmed. Document 12 1. This document was provided to the Applicant in redacted form. Disclosure of the redacted parts was refused on the basis of clause 3(a) (personal information). All redacted names, email addresses and mobile telephone numbers of individuals are to remain redacted. Subject to these redactions, the public interest considerations set out at [76] and [77] above in favour of disclosure outweigh those against. The Respondent's decision to provide this document to the Applicant in redacted form is affirmed. Document 13 1. This document was provided to the Applicant in redacted form. Disclosure of the redacted parts was refused on the basis of clause 3(a) (personal information). All redacted names of individuals (including first names) and email addresses are to remain redacted. The redacted mobile telephone number is to remain redacted. Subject to these redactions, the public interest considerations set out at [76] and [77] above in favour of disclosure outweigh those against. The Respondent's decision to provide this document to the Applicant in redacted form is affirmed. Document 14 1. This document was provided to the Applicant in redacted form. All redacted names of individuals (including first names) and email addresses are to remain redacted. Subject to these redactions, the public interest considerations set out at [76] and [77] above in favour of disclosure outweigh those against. The Respondent's decision to provide this document to the Applicant in redacted form is affirmed. Document 15 1. This document was provided to the Applicant in redacted form. Disclosure of the redacted parts was refused on the basis of clause 3(a) (personal information). All names of individuals (including first names), their email addresses and telephone numbers are to remain redacted. Details of the postal information of TARMAC are also to remain redacted. Subject to these redactions, the public interest considerations set out at [76] and [77] above in favour of disclosure outweigh those against. The Respondent's decision to provide this document to the Applicant in redacted form is affirmed. Document 16 1. This document was provided to the Applicant in redacted form. Disclosure of the redacted parts was refused on basis of clause 3(a) (personal information) and 2(e) (security). All redacted names of individuals (including first names), their email addresses and telephone numbers are to remain redacted. Subject to these redactions, the public interest considerations set out at [76] and [77] above in favour of disclosure outweigh those against. The Respondent's decision to provide this document to the Applicant in redacted form is affirmed. Document 21 1. This document was provided to the Applicant in redacted form. Disclosure of the redacted parts was refused on the basis of clause 3(a) (personal information). All redacted names of individuals, email addresses (including first names) and details of TARMAC are also to remain redacted. Subject to these redactions, the public interest considerations set out at [76] and [77] above in favour of disclosure outweigh those against. The Respondent's decision to provide this document to the Applicant in redacted form is affirmed. Document 22 1. This document was provided to the Applicant in redacted form. Disclosure of the redacted parts was refused on the basis of clause 3(a) (personal information). All redacted names of individuals (including first names) and contact details for TARMAC are to remain redacted. Subject to these redactions, the public interest considerations set out at [76] and [77] above in favour of disclosure outweigh those against. The Respondent's decision to provide this document to the Applicant in redacted form is affirmed. Document 23 1. This document was provided to the Applicant in redacted form. Disclosure of the redacted parts was refused on the basis of clause 3(a) (personal information). All redacted names of individuals (including first names) and their email addresses are to remain redacted. The redacted information on the certificate forming part of this document is also to remain redacted. The amounts of the estimated cost or value related to contracts and other contract information is also to remain redacted. 2. Subject to these redactions, the public interest considerations set out at [76] and [77] above in favour of disclosure outweigh those against. The Respondent's decision to provide this document to the Applicant in redacted form is affirmed. Document 28 1. Disclosure of this document is to be made. The public interest considerations set out at [76] and [77] above in favour of disclosure outweigh those against. The Respondent's decision to provide this document to the Applicant is affirmed. Document 30 1. This document was provided to the Applicant in redacted form. Disclosure of the redacted parts was refused on the basis of clause 3(a) (personal information). All names of individuals (including first names) and their email addresses are to remain redacted. Subject to these redactions, the public interest considerations set out at [76] and [77] above in favour of disclosure outweigh those against. The Respondent's decision to provide this document to the Applicant in redacted form is affirmed. Document 31 1. This document was provided to the Applicant in redacted form. Disclosure of the redacted parts was refused on the basis of clause 3(a) (personal information). All redacted names of individuals (including first names) and email addresses are to remain redacted. Subject to these redactions, the public interest considerations set out at [76] and [77] above in favour of disclosure outweigh those against. The Respondent's decision to provide this document to the Applicant in redacted form is affirmed. Document 37 1. This document was not provided to the Applicant. Disclosure was refused on the basis of clause 3(a) (personal information) and clause 3(f) (harm, harassment and intimidation). The Respondent also referred to clause 1(e), although it was not clear whether this should have been a reference to clause 2(e). All names of individuals (including first names), their titles, email addresses and telephone numbers are to be redacted, other than the name of the Applicant. The street address, email address and mobile telephone number of TARMAC is also to be redacted. Subject to these redactions, disclosure is to be made. The considerations set out in the Table under s 14 of the GIPA Act (including clauses 1(e) and 2(e)) are outweighed by the public interest considerations set out at [76] and [77] above in favour of disclosure. Document 39 1. This document was not disclosed by the Respondent on the basis of clause 1(e). It is not clear whether this was meant to be a reference to clause 2(e). All names of individuals (including first names), their titles, email addresses and telephone numbers are to be redacted. The contact details of TARMAC are also to be redacted. Subject to these redactions, disclosure is to be made. The public interest considerations set out at [76] and [77] above in favour of disclosure outweigh those against set out in the Table under s 14 of the GIPA Act, including under clauses 1(e) and 2(e). Document 41 1. This document was provided to the Applicant in redacted form. Disclosure of the redacted parts was refused on the basis of clause 3(a) (personal information). All redacted names of individuals (including first names) and email addresses are to remain redacted. Subject to these redactions, the public interest considerations set out at [76] and [77] above in favour of disclosure outweigh those against. The Respondent's decision to provide this document to the Applicant in redacted form is affirmed. Document 42 1. This document was provided to the Applicant in redacted form. Disclosure of the redacted parts was refused on the basis of clause 3(a) (personal information). All names of individuals (including first names), and email addresses are to remain redacted. Subject to these redactions the public interest considerations set out at [76] and [77] above in favour of disclosure outweigh those against. The Respondent's decision to provide this document to the Applicant in redacted form is affirmed. Document 44 1. The Respondent has decided to release this document to the Applicant. The public interest considerations set out at [76] and [77] above in favour of disclosure outweigh those against. The Respondent's decision to provide this document to the Applicant is affirmed. Document 47 1. This document was not provided to the Applicant. Disclosure was refused on the basis of clause 3(a) (personal information) and 3(f) (harm, harassment and intimidation). All names of individuals (including first names), and email addresses are to remain redacted. Subject to these redactions, disclosure is to be made. The public interest considerations set out at [76] and [77] above in favour of disclosure outweigh those against. Document 48 1. This document was not released to the Applicant on the basis of clauses 3(a) and 3(f). All names of individuals (including first names), their titles, email addresses and telephone numbers are to be redacted, except the name of the Applicant. Subject to these redactions, disclosure is to be made. The public interest considerations set out at [76] and [77] above in favour of disclosure outweigh those against. Document 49 1. This document was not released to the Applicant on the basis of clauses 3(a) and 3(f). All names of individuals (including first names), their titles, email addresses and telephone numbers are to be redacted, except the name of the Applicant. Amounts showing the value of property are to be redacted. Subject to these redactions, disclosure is to be made. The public interest considerations set out at [76] and [77] above in favour of disclosure outweigh those against. Document 88 1. This document was not released to the Applicant on the basis of clauses 3(a) and 3(f). The Respondent later agreed to do so partially. 2. The grounds under clause 3(a) carry weight. All names of individuals (including first names), their titles, email addresses and telephone numbers are to be redacted, except the name of the Applicant. 3. I do not see any matters of a commercial in confidence nature or commercial value in this document of sufficient weight to displace the public interest considerations in favour of disclosure. 4. Subject to the redactions set out above, disclosure is to be made. The public interest considerations set out at [76] and [77] above in favour of disclosure outweigh those against. Document 91 1. This document was provided to the Applicant in redacted form. Disclosure of the redacted parts was refused on the basis of clause 3(a) (personal information). All redacted names of individuals (including first names and email addresses and telephone numbers are to remain redacted. Subject to these redactions, the public interest considerations set out at [76] and [77] above in favour of disclosure outweigh those against. The Respondent's decision to provide this document to the Applicant in redacted form is affirmed. Document 94 1. This document was provided to the Applicant in redacted form. Disclosure of the redacted parts was refused on the basis of clause 3(a) (personal information). All redacted names of individuals (including first names), email addresses and telephone numbers are to remain redacted. Subject to these redactions, disclosure is to be made. 2. I do not see any matters of a commercial in confidence nature in this document of sufficient weight to displace the public interest considerations in favour of disclosure. 3. The public interest considerations set out at [76] and [77] above in favour of disclosure outweigh those against. The Respondent's decision to provide this document in redacted form to the Applicant is affirmed. Document 102 1. This document was provided to the Applicant in redacted form. Disclosure of the redacted parts was refused on the basis of clause 3(a) (personal information). All redacted names of individuals (including first names) and email addresses are to remain redacted. Certain information concerning TARMAC was also redacted. Subject to these redactions, the public interest considerations set out at [76] and [77] above in favour of disclosure outweigh those against. The Respondent's decision to provide this document to the Applicant in redacted form is affirmed. Document 106 1. This document was provided to the Applicant in redacted form. Disclosure of the redacted parts was refused on the basis of clause 3(a) (personal information). All redacted names of individuals (including first names), email addresses and telephone numbers are to remain redacted. The contact details for TARMAC are also to remain redacted. Subject to these redactions, the public interest considerations set out at [76] and [77] above in favour of disclosure outweigh those against. The Respondent's decision to provide this document to the Applicant in redacted form is affirmed. Document 108 1. Disclosure has been made without redaction. The public interest considerations set out at [76] and [77] above in favour of disclosure outweigh those against. The Respondent's decision to provide this document to the Applicant is affirmed. Document 113 1. The Respondent agrees to release this document, subject to redactions by reason of clause 3(a). All names of individuals (including first names), their titles, email addresses, street addresses and telephone numbers are to be redacted. The contact details for TARMAC are also to be redacted. I do not see any matters of a commercial in confidence nature or affecting commercial value in this document, having sufficient weight to displace the public interest considerations in favour of disclosure. Subject to these redactions, disclosure is to be made. The public interest considerations set out at [76] and [77] above in favour of disclosure outweigh those against. Document 115 1. This document was provided to the Applicant in redacted form. Disclosure of the redacted parts was refused on the basis of clause 3(a) (personal information). All contact details for TARMAC are to remain redacted. Subject to these redactions, disclosure is to be made. The public interest considerations set out at [76] and [77] above in favour of disclosure outweigh those against. The Respondent's decision to provide this document to the Applicant in redacted form is affirmed. 2. The correct and preferable decision is that decision of the Respondent is set aside in accordance with the orders set out below. Orders 1. The decision of the Respondent is set aside. 2. Documents 9, 37, 39, 47, 48, 49, 88 and 113 to be disclosed to the Applicant within 28 days of the date of this decision, subject to the redactions set out above for each document. 3. The decision of the Respondent is otherwise affirmed. 4. Pursuant to ss 64(1)(c) and 64(1)(d) of the Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2013, the contents of all paragraphs in these reasons marked NOT FOR PUBLICATION are not to be published or disclosed to the Applicant or the public. ********** I hereby certify that this is a true and accurate record of the reasons for decision of the New South Wales Civil and Administrative Tribunal. Registrar I hereby certify that this is a true and accurate record of the reasons for decision of the Civil and Administrative Tribunal of New South Wales. Registrar DISCLAIMER - Every effort has been made to comply with suppression orders or statutory provisions prohibiting publication that may apply to this judgment or decision. The onus remains on any person using material in the judgment or decision to ensure that the intended use of that material does not breach any such order or provision. Further enquiries may be directed to the Registry of the Court or Tribunal in which it was generated. Decision last updated: 18 July 2024