District Court New South Wales Medium Neutral Citation: R v Ranasinghe [2024] NSWDC 390 Hearing dates: 12 August 2024, 16 August 2024. Date of orders: 30 August 2024 Decision date: 30 August 2024 Jurisdiction: Criminal Before: Bennett SC ADCJ Decision: See [3] and [74]. Catchwords: CRIME – Dangerous Driving Occasioning death – Negligent Driving Occasioning death – Judge Alone Trial. Legislation Cited: Crimes Act 1900 s52A(1)(c) Criminal Procedure Act 1986 NSW s132, s132A, s133 (2) (3) Cases Cited: Fleming v R (1998) 197 CLR 250 Shepherd v the Queen [1990] HCA 56; (1990) 170 CLR 573 Category: Principal judgment Parties: Diaz Ranasinghe (Defendant) The Crown (Prosecution) Representation: Counsel: D Price (Counsel for the Accused) M Pincott (Crown) Solicitors: R Candelori (Defence) Office of the Director of Public Prosecutions File Number(s): 2021/00348967 Publication restriction: Nil JUDGMENT Introduction 1. This trial arose from a collision between a truck and bicycle about 10:30am on 8 December 2021 on Thyra Road, Moama. 2. The accused appears for trial upon an indictment alleging one count, that he; On the 8th day of December 2021, in Moama in the State of New South Wales, did drive a vehicle, namely, a white Volvo FM 12 Kerosene Tanker bearing Victorian registration XAU-037, when it was involved in an impact occasioning the death of Robert Arnold, and at the time of the impact the said Diaz Ranasinghe was driving in a manner dangerous to another person. S 52A(1)(c) Crimes Act 1900 Law part code 140 [1] 1. For the reasons herein I am not persuaded beyond reasonable doubt of the accused's guilt. I am not persuaded that the combined facts and circumstances lead to the contention advanced by the Crown as the only rational conclusion to draw. The Proceedings 1. On Monday 12 August 2024 the trial was mentioned in the call over of matters listed for hearing in the sittings. The parties agreed that there was one issue in the trial, namely, whether the collision was the result of dangerous driving by the accused, or the product of mere momentary inattention which did not involve unacceptable danger to the deceased. The parties provided a folder containing the representations and opinions upon which they would argue their respective positions. 2. The accused elected to have the trial before a judge alone pursuant to s132 Criminal Procedure Act 1986 to which the Director of Public Prosecutions agreed. The election form signed by the accused and on behalf of the Director became Exhibit A in the trial. 3. Both parties sought trial by a judge alone notwithstanding that it would commence within the 28-day period specified in s132A(1) Criminal Procedure Act 1986. The notice bears the date 30 July 2024. 4. There could be no good reason for refusing leave in the circumstances. Since both parties sought the trial by judge alone the court was mandated to that course, from which it would follow that without leave the trial could not begin until the next sittings at Albury or an undetermined future date if it could not be accommodated then, subject to the availability of a judge to preside and the availability of witnesses. 5. My Associate arraigned the accused, and he pleaded not guilty. General Directions 1. To comply with s. 133(2) and s.133(3), Criminal Procedure Act, 1986, and the decision of the High Court in Fleming v R (1998) 197 CLR 250, I remind myself of the following principles of law. 2. As the accused pleaded not guilty and elected trial by judge alone it becomes my duty and responsibility to consider whether the accused is guilty or not guilty of the charge, and to return my verdict according to the evidence. 3. It is for me to assess the witnesses and decide whether they are reliable. Reliability depends upon two different but overlapping considerations, namely the witness's honesty and the witness's accuracy. The honesty of a witness involves considering not only what the witness said, or did not say, but also the impression that the witness made upon me. 4. I have the benefit of submissions from the Crown and the accused's counsel. I will consider them and give such weight as they deserve. I note that they are not evidence tendered in either case. 5. As the tribunal of fact, I am expected to use my individual qualities of reasoning, my experience, my understanding of people and human affairs, and my common sense. 6. I acknowledge the importance of matters I must decide, not only for the accused but also for the community. I must act impartially, dispassionately, and fearlessly. I must not let sympathy or emotion sway my judgment. I must not act capriciously or irrationally. I am obliged to determine all relevant issues of fact according to the evidence presented during the course of the trial. This includes any oral evidence of witnesses and exhibits. 7. I am not obliged to accept the whole of the evidence of any one witness. I may accept part and reject part of a witness's evidence. The Burden of Proof 1. This is a criminal trial. The Crown has the onus of proof to the standard beyond reasonable doubt in respect of every element of the charge. It is not for the accused to disprove those elements, but for the Crown to prove them beyond reasonable doubt. Suspicion is not a substitute for proof beyond reasonable doubt. 2. The words "beyond reasonable doubt" are ordinary everyday words and that is how I understand them. If at the end of my deliberations I am not satisfied that the Crown has established those essential matters beyond reasonable doubt, having taken into consideration the evidence both for the Crown and for the accused, and the submissions by the Crown and the accused's counsel in their addresses, it is my duty to bring in a verdict of not guilty because the Crown will have failed to do what the law requires. 3. I understand that the accused must be found not guilty if any one of the essential ingredients of the charge has not been proved to my satisfaction beyond reasonable doubt. It follows that if I am left unable to decide whether the Crown has proved its case, even though I might suspect that the accused engaged upon conduct upon which the charge is brought, the accused is entitled to the benefit of that doubt, and I must find him not guilty. 4. The Crown does not need to prove every single fact arising from the evidence in the case beyond reasonable doubt. I am not required to resolve every conflict arising from the evidence. The onus, which rests upon the Crown, is to prove the ingredients of the offence. 5. The element in contest in the trial is whether the accused drove in a manner dangerous to another person. There is no issue that he was the driver of the truck at the time, and that it impacted with Mr Arnold causing his death. The Essential Elements 1. The elements of which the court must be satisfied to return a guilty verdict are, 1. The accused drove the truck at the time of the impact. 2. The truck impacted with the deceased or the bicycle upon which he rode. 3. The impact caused the death. 4. At the time of the impact the accused drove the truck in a manner dangerous to another person. Circumstantial Evidence 1. I may in my role as judge of the facts draw inferences from the direct evidence. Inferences may be valid or invalid, justified, or unjustified, correct, or incorrect. I may only draw an inference adverse to the accused from proven facts if such inference is a reasonable inference that can be properly drawn from the proven facts. 2. This is a criminal trial, and as I noted, I must be satisfied of each essential ingredient beyond reasonable doubt, and, that the accused committed the offence before he may be found guilty. Amongst other things, this means that I should be extremely careful about drawing any inference. I should examine any possible inference to ensure that it is a justifiable inference. I should not draw any inference from the direct evidence as to the existence of an essential ingredient, or as to the guilt of the accused, unless it is the only rational inference in the circumstances. 3. This direction is foundational to what I must understand regarding circumstantial evidence upon which the Crown relies to prove that the accused committed the offence. 4. To prove beyond reasonable doubt the accused's guilt the Crown must first prove that the inference or conclusion it relies upon is a reasonable one to draw from the facts established by the evidence. It then must prove that the only reasonable inference or conclusion that can be drawn from a consideration of all the established facts viewed in combination and not individually or in isolation is that the accused is guilty of the offence. If there is any other reasonable conclusion open on those facts that is inconsistent with the conclusion for which the Crown contends, the Crown's circumstantial case fails. [2] The Accused did not Give Evidence 1. The accused gave no evidence in the trial. 2. The Crown bears the onus of proof that the accused is guilty of the offence. The accused bears no onus of proof in respect of any fact that is in dispute. Although the accused was entitled to give or call evidence, there was no obligation upon him to do so. He is presumed to be innocent unless and until I am satisfied beyond reasonable doubt by the evidence led by the Crown that he is guilty. It follows that the accused was entitled to say nothing and make the Crown prove guilt to the high standard required. 3. The accused's decision not to give evidence cannot be used against him in any way during deliberations. His decision cannot be used as an admission of guilt. I must not draw any inference or reach any conclusion based upon the fact that the accused decided not to give or call evidence. His decision cannot be used to fill any gaps that might exist in the evidence tendered by the Crown. It cannot be used in any way strengthen the Crown case or to assist the Crown to prove its case beyond reasonable doubt. 4. I must not speculate about what might have been said in evidence if the accused had given evidence. 5. The accused did not assume any burden of proof by the manner in which the trial was conducted on his behalf. The Accused's' Interview 1. The accused responded to the police investigating the collision at the scene. The exchange was captured on body worn camera equipment. He later participated in an interview with the police. He was obliged to provide a version of the collision as required by the Australian Road Rules but he need not have participated in the interview or provide any further information and the fact that he did, disregarding the terms of the caution that he was not obliged to say anything further to the police, does not attract to him any burden of proof in this trial. 2. He was clearly and repeatedly advised that he need not answer questions put to him and in response to some questions he did not provide a response, as was his right. 3. The further responses which he did provide in explanation for the collision appear to be to an extent inconsistent considering the version he provided in accordance with his obligations under the Australian Road Rules. Upon my consideration of this document. 1. If I accept the accused's account upon which he relies in the interview with the police, to the extent that it is exculpatory or otherwise causes me to entertain a reasonable doubt that he is guilty of this charge, I must acquit him. 2. If I have difficulty in accepting the account relied on by the accused in his interview with the police but think it might be true and is exculpatory or leaves me with a reasonable doubt of his guilt, I must acquit him. 3. If I do not believe the accused's account in the interview with the police, I must put it to one side, and consider the evidence otherwise presented in the Crown case to determine whether the Crown has proven the accused's guilt beyond reasonable doubt. This will include the import of responses by the accused and whether they are admssions against his interest in the trial. Admissions 1. There is evidence to which the Crown points as admissions made by the accused or representations otherwise against his interest. 2. There are two issues. Were the admissions or statements made, and if so, were they true? 3. A person might not usually admit wrongdoing or make a statement adverse to their interests unless they were intended to be accepted as true, but there may be situations where a person might speak falsely without intending that the representation be accepted as true. This is not the case here. 4. The representations by the accused that might be used by the Crown for these purposes are found in records of conversation at the scene of the collision and in his interview and so there is little doubt that he represented those words captured electronically in each. There is no challenge to the fact that the accused made the representations so recorded. But to be used against the accused the Crown must also prove that the accused made the representations acknowledging facts asserted. 5. If the representations were made and were truthful in the sense that he acknowledged the facts asserted, they may be considered when deciding whether the Crown has proved the accused's guilt beyond reasonable doubt. 6. Standing alone the representations attributed to the accused could not prove guilt. If he said what is attributed to him, and what he said was true in the sense that he acknowledged the facts asserted, the court may bring the evidence into account with the other evidence in the Crown case. 7. The representations to which the Crown invites attention are the admissions that the accused was driver of the truck, the speed at which he acknowledges he was travelling, that he was aware of the presence of the bicycle and rider ahead of him, and his knowledge of the vehicle travelling behind. 8. I accept that the accused was truthful in response to the questions posed by the police officer, and that he provided accurately such information as he had. I accept that he was considerably stressed from this tragedy, and I note that the interview of 47 pages with 473 questions, was commenced at 8:45pm.well after the collision at or about 10:30 am. He must have been fatigued by the time of the interview considering the nature of the event and the tragic consequences. I imply no criticism of the police in this comment. There was much required in the investigation of the event and the timing when the interview commenced is understandable. 9. There were responses by the accused that on their face might suggest prevarication or avoidance of the facts proposed in the questions. For example, * Q78: Yep. But how did you still collide with the cyclist, then, if you slowed down? * A: Don't want to answer that. * Q79: OK. You said that you looked in the mirror briefly. You said you glanced in your mirror. How long did you look in your mirror for? * A: Can't remember. * Q80: OK. How far away from you, how far away was the cyclist from you when you start, when you glanced in your mirror? * A: I'm not sure. 1. However, the interview read as and whole, the accused's presentation during the electronic recording of the interview, and the evidence relevant to the features of the location and the conduct of the driver coming behind the accused does not support this contention. I accept that these and other comparable responses were not prevarication of avoidance and that this was not his purposes in the responses he gave. Read in the context of the whole document I accept that his responses such as those quoted were because he was unable to provide the facts sought in the questions. The Crown Case 1. The Crown contends that the accused drove in a manner dangerous to the bicycle rider ahead of him because he allowed himself to be distracted from the bicycle ahead by the presence of the vehicle travelling behind. 2. The location of the collision was a stretch of straight roadway sealed with bitumen providing a single lane for traffic travelling in each direction. The roadway is flat and straight and the weather was fine. The road surface was dry. The truck and the car behind were travelling south. To the north of the crash site and about 400 metres from it the road curves to the right, such that the truck and the car travelling south were required to negotiate the bend to their left. 3. Evidence was provided by Maxwell Vagg, the driver of the car behind. In his statement made on the day of the collision, asserted the following facts: 1. From behind the truck, and about 300 to 400 metres ahead of it, he saw the cyclist. 2. The truck was travelling about 100 km per hour and he slowed the car to about 80 km per hour. He continued at 80 km per hour about five vehicle lengths to the rear. His statement records (my emphasis): I saw the truck move a bit more over to the edge of the road. I moved over more to the left-hand side, near the edge of the bitumen and flashed my lights of my vehicle at the truck. This was to tell him I was not going to overtake the truck as I knew there was a cyclist in front of the truck. 1. Andrea Vagg made a statement on 12 January 2021. She and Mr Vagg are husband and wife and were travelling together. She confirmed that her husband flashed his lights, and said to himself, I'm not going to overtake you mate. 1. The evidence from police was uncontroversial. There was no mechanical defect in the truck that contributed to the collision. The record of the scene was not challenged. 2. Significant questions and answers from the accused's interview are: Q 31: Tell me what happened. A: So on that place, I was coming around the kerb and a straight road and, um, then I saw (indecipherable) in distance there's a, ah, a cyclist on the road, right, and, ah, and I saw back of my mirror, glass (indecipherable) mirror for that, ah, kerb a, a, a white car behind me, right? So when he come around the, ah, bend, the straight road, so I slowed down, the car passed me so the white car was passing. I was slowing down so I saw the cyclist away ahead, you know, so I slow down and I thought the white car went past me. So I was, like, slowing down. While I was slowing down I was, like, I was expecting the white car to go past me and, um, then I was waiting. I was, ah, I was waiting the white car ah, the car behind me to go past me, like, so I wasn't, like, I don't want to, ah, overtake the rider because just in case the car behind me go past me (indecipherable) gunna have a collision there so I slow ‑ ‑ ‑ Q32: Mm-hmm. A: ‑ ‑ ‑ down as soon as I can, and, ah, he didn't go past me so I slowing down and I look in the mirror, um, the side mirror, the glass at the mirror, right, and, ah, next minute, ah, I (indecipherable) I hit the, the rider. I mean ‑ ‑ ‑ Q33: Yep. A: ‑ ‑ ‑ I wasn't (indecipherable) like, I was kind of, ah, stuck in the, a middle, between the car behind me and the front, the rider, you know? I was ‑ ‑ ‑ Q 83: When you first glanced over into your mirror? You said that you glanced over into your mirror and you took your eyes off the cyclist. How far away was the cyclist from you when you glanced into your mirror? A: I can't answer that. Q 84: OK. Um, do you know the speed limit on that road? A: I can't answer it. Q 85: OK. The road you were driving on, you don't know the speed limit? A: Ah, I was doing the, like, at 80. Q 86: At 80? OK. And so you were doing 80 and when you come out of the bend, do you know how s, how, mmm, what speed you were doing when you slowed down? So you slowed down from 80. Do you know what speed you were doing? A: I can't remember that. Q 87: Can't remember? OK. Now, did the car overtake you? A: No car, no. Q 88: No? So the car that was behind you, that you noticed behind you, and when you slowed down to let that car overtake, did it overtake you? A: No, it didn't ‑ ‑ ‑ Q 89: No? A: ‑ ‑ ‑ overtake me. Q 90: [21:00] Did it come out into the other lane to overtake you? A: I can't answer that. I'm not sure. Q 91: OK. So did you, when you first noticed that cyclist and did you keep your eyes on the cyclist the whole time? A: Except the glancing, yep. Q 92: Except the glancing? So if you kept your eyes on that cyclist the whole time, I'm just struggling to understand how you collided with the back of the cyclist if, if you kept your eyes on him and then glanced away, so I, I need to find out how long did you glance away for? A: I can't answer that. Q122: Um, just a, some clarification around the, the glancing. Um, when you've glanced, was it just at the side mirror or did you look over your shoulder? A: No. Q123: No? A; Side mirror. Q124: Just the side mirror? A: Yep. Q125: Um, and that's, that's enough to show what's happening at the side of the truck? A: Side of the truck? Q126: Yeah. A: (Indecipherable) 1. As I noted the interview was lengthy. The police, as they were entitled to do, tested the representations from the accused seeking more detail, but the responses forthcoming were consistent with the passages quoted above. 2. There is no dispute that the driving of the truck coming into contact with the cyclist was the cause of death. 3. The Crown contends that the accused drove in a manner that posed danger for the cyclist upon the premise that he allowed himself to be distracted by the presence of the vehicle behind at the expense of the cyclist, and although aware of his presence ahead he continued on until the impact when he returned his focus to the cyclist. The Defence Case 1. The defence case did not require further evidence upon which to find facts in this case. The essence of the argument is that the accused was faced with the circumstance of the bicycle ahead, and a car from behind which the accused inferred was intending to overtake him. 2. I agree that this is a reasonable inference in the circumstances. Drawing upon my experience as a driver the flashing of headlights of a vehicle coming from behind indicates the intention of the driver to overtake rather than an indication that they are not intending to do so. 3. Presented with this, the accused could not move to the right to safely pass the bicycle, but remained to the left on the correct side of the road anticipating that the vehicle coming from behind would overtake. Focussed as he was on the vehicle behind and anticipating that it would pass before he was more proximate to the bicycle when he might move to the right, slowing the truck in the process, he miscalculated time and distance and came upon the bicycle. 4. In these circumstances the accused concedes that he was negligent in the choice he made to anticipate the passing of the vehicle coming from behind without keeping a proper lookout for the bicycle ahead so that he might manage the truck to avoid the collision which unfortunately occurred. 5. It is conceded that the cyclist in no manner contributed to the collision other than by his mere presence. Good character 1. There is evidence that the accused, is a person of good character, which bears whether he committed the offence, and also whether his exculpatory statements are truthful. 2. The Crown does not challenge the proposition that the accused is a person of good character and has no blemish against his name other than a driving offence 21 years ago which has no relevance to the determination require of the court. 3. The law provides that the court may consider evidence of an accused's good character in his favour on the question of whether the Crown has proved his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. The fact that the accused is a person of good character is relevant to the likelihood of his having committed the offence alleged. I may consider the accused's good character by reasoning that such a person is unlikely to have committed the offence charged. Further, I may use the fact that the accused is a person of good character to support his credibility. I may reason that a person of good character is less likely to lie or give a false account. None of this means that good character provides the accused with a defence, but it is a factor I must consider in determining whether I am satisfied beyond reasonable doubt of the accused's guilt. Principles 1. The Crown must prove beyond reasonable doubt is that the accused was driving in a dangerous manner at the time of the impact. The manner in which a person drives a vehicle includes all matters connected with the management and control of the vehicle when it is being driven, including its speed. 2. Whether or not the accused's manner of driving was "dangerous" depends on all the circumstances in which it took place, including the time of day, the nature of the road surface, the weather conditions, and the general area in which the vehicle is being driven. 3. A person's management and control of a vehicle may be potentially dangerous to other persons by its very nature, whatever be the circumstances in which the vehicle is being driven. For example, driving without maintaining an appropriate lookout for other road uses proximate or in the vehicle's path of travel. 4. The particular circumstances in which a person is driving the vehicle might make the driving potentially dangerous even though the driving may not be dangerous in other situations, such as driving through a red light in a busy intersection in the middle of a suburban shopping centre on a Saturday morning, dangerous because of the circumstances in which the driving occurs. This may be contrasted with driving through a red light on a country road in the early hours of the morning when it is clear that no other vehicle is in the area. In those circumstances driving through a red light might not be considered to be dangerous even though it may be a breach of the traffic regulations. What distinguishes these examples is the degree of risk of harm to other persons that arises from the manner of driving in the particular circumstances. 5. The manner of driving will be dangerous if the Crown establishes beyond reasonable doubt that there has been a serious breach of the proper management and control of a motor vehicle and the breach is so serious it creates a real danger to another person in the vicinity. The use of a motor vehicle is always potentially dangerous to a degree simply because it can so easily cause injury to another person in its vicinity. This can be minimised where the driver exercises proper control and management of the vehicle so as to avoid an impact with any other person or object. Drivers are subject to human frailties and not every driver always exercises all the care and skill expected, but that does not mean that a driver is driving dangerously simply because of such a failure. 6. The offence of dangerous driving is established where the driver so seriously fails to properly control and manage the vehicle that they create a real danger of harm to other persons in or around the vicinity of the vehicle far exceeding that which arises simply from the normal use of a motor vehicle. There must be a serious breach of the proper management and control of the vehicle that results in a real danger to others. 7. I am concerned with the risk of harm arising from the manner of driving, rather than the result of the driving. I do not consider the fact that there was an impact or the result of the impact, including the death. I am concerned with the risk of harm arising from the manner of driving, rather than the result of the driving when deciding whether the driving in the particular circumstances was dangerous. 8. Whether the conduct of the driver was dangerous is an objective one. The Crown need not prove the accused knew or realised he was driving the vehicle in a dangerous manner. His conduct must be judged according to an objective community standard which applies to all drivers of vehicles. That standard does not consider any personal characteristics of the driver, such as their experience or inexperience as a driver. A person can be driving dangerously even though that person believes that they are doing their best to avoid a collision. 9. Casual behaviour or a momentary lapse of attention by a driver, if it results in potential danger to another person or to other persons, is not outside the offence of dangerous driving merely because it is either casual or momentary. But what must nevertheless be shown in relation to such conduct is that it amounts to a serious breach of the proper management and control by the accused of the vehicle at the time of the impact and in the circumstances in which the driving occurred. Consideration 1. The accused acknowledges that he saw the deceased as he approached from the rear. Upon the description the accused gave, consistent with the inferences which are available as the only rational inferences to draw from the basic facts, he failed to see him until the impact. This was I find because he failed to pay attention to the road ahead in that period where the deceased was to his knowledge. His representations are that he saw the deceased in the high visibility attire in which he rode the bicycle but took his attention to the presence of the vehicle behind him which he anticipated was about to overtake him. 2. He said he slowed the truck, from 80 kilometres per hour. Either way he covered a distance of 400 metres from the end of the bend in the roadway. At 100 kilometres per hour he would have covered 400 metres to the point of impact in 14.4 seconds, and at 80 kilometres per hour he would have taken 18 seconds to cover the same distance. 3. Upon his version he was aware of the presence of the deceased, who must have been travelling much slower, from a point near to the commencement of the straight stretch of roadway but failed to maintain a view of him as he approached. There is no evidence of the vehicle behind overtaking the truck. but the driver signalled with his lights intended to communicate that he would not overtake aware of the presence of the cyclist and remained to the left of the carriageway accordingly. If the accused's focus upon the possibility of the vehicle overtaking distracted him from looking ahead, upon the version he offers it must have been for a period that allowed him to reach the bicycle rider without paying him adequate attention as he approached, such that he failed to appreciate the increasing proximity between the truck and the bicycle to the point where the bicycle was struck. 4. This said I am not satisfied that the admitted negligence that resulted in danger to the deceased was such a serious breach of the proper management and control by the accused of the truck at the time of the impact and in the circumstances in which it was driven so as to attract liability for the offence charged. Verdict 1. I find the accused not guilty of the offence charged, that he, On the 8th day of December 2021, in Moama in the State of New South Wales, did drive a vehicle, namely, a white Volvo FM 12 Kerosene Tanker bearing Victorian registration XAU-037, when it was involved in an impact occasioning the death of Robert Arnold, and at the time of the impact the said Diaz Ranasinghe was driving in a manner dangerous to another person. Endnotes 1. 52A Dangerous driving (1) Dangerous driving occasioning death A person is guilty of the offence of dangerous driving occasioning death if the vehicle driven by the person is involved in an impact occasioning the death of another person and the driver was, at the time of the impact, driving the vehicle— (a) under the influence of intoxicating liquor or of a drug, or (b) at a speed dangerous to another person or persons, or (c) in a manner dangerous to another person or persons. A person convicted of an offence under this subsection is liable to imprisonment for 10 years. 2. Shepherd v the Queen [1990] HCA 56; (1990) 170 CLR 573 DISCLAIMER - Every effort has been made to comply with suppression orders or statutory provisions prohibiting publication that may apply to this judgment or decision. The onus remains on any person using material in the judgment or decision to ensure that the intended use of that material does not breach any such order or provision. Further enquiries may be directed to the Registry of the Court or Tribunal in which it was generated. Decision last updated: 30 August 2024