District Court New South Wales Medium Neutral Citation: R v Begg [2025] NSWDC 13 Hearing dates: 13 February 2025 Date of orders: 13 February 2025 Decision date: 13 February 2025 Jurisdiction: Criminal Before: Abadee DCJ Decision: See [113]–[115] Catchwords: CRIME – sentence – serious personal violence offences – offender relies upon childhood disadvantage and mental disorders (Borderline Personality Disorder, Intermittent Explosive Disorder and substance use disorder) – whether moral culpability reduced on account of those matters – whether causal connection with offences – offender has poor rehabilitation prospects and there is a likelihood of re-offending – weighing of competing sentencing principles Legislation Cited: Crimes Act 1900 (NSW), ss 27, 59, 195 Crimes (Domestic and Personal Violence) Act 2007 (NSW), s 13(1) Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act 1999 (NSW), s 21A Cases Cited: Aslan v R [2014] NSWCCA 114 Binnie v R [2010] NSWCCA 14 Bugmy v The Queen (2013) 249 CLR 571 Director of Public Prosecutions (Cth) v De La Rosa (2010) 79 NSWLR 1 DR v The Queen (2022) 300 A Crim R 116 Muldrock v The Queen (2011) 244 CLR 120 Perkins v R [2018] NSWCCA 62 R v Amati [2019] NSWCCA 193 R v Bloomfield (1988) 44 NSWLR 734 R v Kirkland [2005] NSWCCA 130 R v Macadam-Kellie [2001] NSWCCA 170 Veen v The Queen (No. 2) (1988) 164 CLR 465 Texts Cited: Nil Category: Sentence Parties: Office of the Director of Public Prosecutions (ODPP) Ms Krystal Lee Begg Representation: Counsel: G Whitaker for the Crown Mr K Prince for the offender Solicitors: ODPP Legal Aid NSW File Number(s): 2023/00230679; 2023/00267105 Publication restriction: Nil SENTENCING REMARKS (Edited after ex tempore verbal remarks) Introduction 1. Ms Krystal Begg (the offender) is before the Court following pleas of guilty for multiple offences, involving two different complainants, committed in August 2022 and July 2023. The offender adhered to those pleas of guilty in this sentencing proceeding. 2. In chronological sequence, the nature of the offences, the maximum penalties and applicable standard non-parole periods are as follows. Nature of offence Maximum penalty SNPP? On 20 August 2022, at Wyong, intimidation of Kara Webb, contrary to s 13(1) of the Crimes (Domestic and Personal Violence) Act 2007 (NSW) (the 'intimidation offence') 5 years' imprisonment and/or 50 penalty units No On 2–3 July 2023, at Ourimbah, causing grievous bodily harm to Sara-Jane Christensen with intent to murder her, contrary to s 27 of the Crimes Act 1900 (NSW) ('Crimes Act') (the 'GBH' offence) 25 years' imprisonment 10 years imprisonment On 19 July 2023, at Wyong, assaulting Kara Webb, thereby occasioning actual bodily harm to her, contrary to s 59(1) of the Crimes Act (the 'ABH offence') 5 years' imprisonment No 1. In addition, in the sentencing hearing, the offender acknowledges her guilt and asks the Court to take into account the additional offence of destruction or damage to property in the value of less than $2,000 when considering sentence for the Intimidation Offence. This additional offence was contrary to s 195(1)(a) of the Crimes Act. The maximum penalty for that offence, when tried on indictment, is 5 years' imprisonment or 2 years (and/or $2,200 fine) when tried summarily. The facts 1. In relation to the GBH offence, the offender personally signed a statement of agreed facts. In relation to the intimidation offence and ABH offence (and the additional offence), the offender's legal representative signed a statement of agreed facts. The parties commonly relied upon those two statements of agreed facts. The intimidation offence (and the additional offence) 1. The victim, Ms Webb, met the offender through a friend, Ryan Williams. Mr Williams started a relationship with the offender in early 2022. Shortly thereafter, the offender started living with Mr Williams at the latter's apartment at unit 5/1–3 Walmsley Road, Ourimbah. Ms Webb lived in Wyong. An earlier incident of the relationship between victim and the offender involved the latter telling Ms Webb that she was a "dumb piece of shit". Ms Webb told the offender that she was not welcome at her house. 2. Two weeks after that earlier incident, on 20 August 2022, the offender went to Ms Webb's Wyong address. She continually kicked the garage roller door and repeatedly yelled "I'm going to fucking kill you". Ms Webb was at her home with her friend, Mr Craig Wright, at the time. 3. Ms Webb reported the incidents to the police but did not request that charges be laid. Mr Williams had persuaded her that the offender was a 'good person'. Ms Webb informed Mr Williams that if he wanted to continue his relationship/friendship with the offender, she could no longer be friends with him and both he and the offender were no longer welcome at her house. 4. Later, when explaining this particular offence to Dr Furst, the offender said that she was upset with Ms Webb. They had argued over Mr Williams. The GBH offence 1. The offender's relationship with Mr Ryan Williams ended some time before July 2023, but she continued to live at Mr Williams' apartment, referred to earlier in these remarks. 2. The offender came to meet the victim, Ms Sara-Jane Christensen through Mr Williams. In fact, Ms Christensen lived in the same apartment block, being unit 6/1–3 Walmsley Rd, Ourimbah. 3. On 26 June 2023, the offender was released from prison on parole. She went to live at Mr Williams' address notwithstanding the circumstance that Mr Williams himself did not occupy the unit (with him living in full-time residential rehabilitation). But a Mr Whalan Williams was staying in Mr Ryan Williams' unit. 4. At about 10pm on 2 July 2023 Ms Christensen was not asleep but was awake. She was using her mobile phone. Some time later, she went downstairs to the lounge room. 5. At some time between 10pm on 2 July and 10:30am on 3 July 2023, the offender had entered Ms Christensen's apartment. The offender attacked the victim by hitting her with a hammer on multiple occasions to the victim's head. 6. On the morning of 3 July, Mr Wilson, who appeared to be Ms Christensen's partner, found the victim unconscious on the floor. He called 000. The victim was found by paramedics. Her head had an open wound and her brain was on show. Police arrived soon after and observed a large pool of blood on the floor next to the lounge, with blood-soaked blankets and blood sprayed on the wall. 7. The victim was flown to John Hunter Hospital. 8. At about 12:30pm, Mr Wilson heard a dog bark. He recognised the sound as being Ruby, the victim's dog. 9. Police attended Mr Ryan Williams' unit. Police were refused entry. It appears, however, that police had sufficient time to notice two pairs of blood-stained shoes in the bath and a hammer sitting on shelving. They also saw a dog in the apartment matching the description of Ruby (and confirmed by scanning of the microchip). 10. The same day, the offender volunteered to have an interview with police. Amongst other things, she told police that she had had a couple of arguments with the victim, mainly about "jealousy bullshit" but otherwise their relationship was good. She explained further that she would frequently walk Ruby the dog. She denied any offending and purported to account for her movements. 11. The offender had a second interview with police on 22 August 2023. In that interview, she said that she learned that whilst she was in a relationship with Ryan Williams from July 2022, the victim had sex with Ryan Williams and that this caused the relationship with Ryan to break up. Although she acknowledged having had an argument with Ryan about the victim, this did not affect their 'friendship'. She initially denied assaulting the victim with a hammer. 12. But after a while, in the course of that interview, the offender relented and admitted to assaulting the victim. When asked why the assault had occurred, the offender said: "[W]ell you're stupid if you need a reason as to why I did it, which I couldn't give a fuck what, if youse do or not at the end of the day I got to have a bit of fun and I'm spewin the bitch isn't fucken dead. And trust me if I get out she's going to be dead and so is Ryan 'cause they're a pewter putrids, mate. Nothing but disgusting little maggotised things which is none of your fucken business or mine, and I plan on having a hell of a lot more fucken fun and that's that." 1. Asked what she meant by having her 'fun', the offender went on: "[W]ell I got to have a bit of fun, I got to cave her skull in didn't I, spewing it didn't happen properly, devo'd, considering what I did it for but anyway which has got nothing to do with being a pathetic worthless little thing over jealousy 'cause that's pathetic. But anyway did you not, did you not see me after I went and seen someone else that's for the same reason, just so you know. Ok. But that's my business I get to pay for that but anyway." 1. She refused to explain to police why this occurred, but did say, two or more times, that she was disappointed the victim was not dead. 2. The victim had multiple surgeries throughout July through to September 2023. The purpose of one of them was to replace her removed skull with a titanium cranioplasty. 3. By mid-September 2023, the victim had made small improvements but continued to be highly confused. She had significant weakness to the left side of her body, with no ability to move her left arm, and limited movement of her left leg. She experienced tremors and ongoing pain in her limbs. She required constant supervision, and significant physical assistance with all transfers and personal care tasks. As will be elaborated later, a family member was appointed to be the victim's guardian. She has had ongoing sessions with multiple professionals with different specialities: a dietician, speech pathologist, physiotherapist, occupational therapist and social worker. 4. The Crown relied upon a recent report from Dr Heather Reid, who works with the Ourimbah Surgery clinic and has looked after Ms Christensen since December 2015. In particular, Dr Reid set out residual disabilities in the victim including an inability to walk, no movement in her left arm, reduced cognitive and executive functioning, partial loss of vision and incontinence of bladder and bowels. 5. A voluminous discharge report from the Royal Rehabilitation Centre in Ryde was in evidence. In the medical history, it is indicated that the primary diagnosis was a severe traumatic brain injury with post-traumatic amnesia. The second diagnosis described traumatic brain injury and skull fracture, contaminated CNS injury (ventriculitis), a cervical spine injury, an enteral feeding tube inserted and she was described as being neutropenic. 6. The Crown also relied upon a recent letter from a counsellor or social worker, Anish Mathew, caring for the victim, dated 12 December 2024. Ms Christensen has fortnightly sessions. That letter referred to diagnoses of Acquired Traumatic Brain Injury, PTSD, low mood and anxiety symptoms. 7. The offender explained to Dr Furst that she and the victim had had an argument relating to the victim's purportedly deficient mothering to her two sons. The ABH offence 1. On 19 July 2023, whilst Ms Webb was in her kitchen with her six-year-old daughter, the offender knocked on the front door at her Wyong property. The victim's then partner, Toby Hecht, opened the front door. Without reference to the victim's attitude, Mr Hecht let the offender in. Mr Chris Wright was also located in the property at this time, but was downstairs in the garage. 2. The offender went upstairs. Ms Webb did not immediately recognise the offender because of the changed colour and length of the offender's hair from the earlier incident in August 2022. 3. An argument ensued between the offender and the victim and a physical altercation followed. At some point, it appears, they were in the kitchen. The offender saw a knife on a bench and grabbed it. She and the victim struggled; in the course of which the offender thrust the knife at the victim, leaving a scratch below her sternum. The victim became backed up against the kitchen sink. Ms Webb screamed for help. Her daughter ran towards Ms Webb. The victim noticed this and as Mr Wright had emerged from the garage, the victim told him to get her daughter out of the kitchen. Mr Wright observed the offender carrying a stainless steel carving knife with a 40cm blade. He heard the offender say that she was dropping the knife. 4. Mr Wright took the daughter out the front and he ran back in. He grabbed the offender's arm that was still holding the knife, albeit by the blade rather than by the handle. He pushed the offender outside and slammed the door behind her. 5. Ms Webb suffered a small cut to her right knee and abdomen. She was later taken to hospital. For an indeterminate period, she was unable to flex her right knee due to pain. There was some soft tissue swelling in the front of the kneecap. Ms Webb was petrified and her daughter traumatised. She feared what would have occurred if the offender was not restrained. 6. On 20 July 2023 the offender spoke to police. She said she had had (an apparently verbal) fight with the victim some months before concerning Ryan Williams and she felt a bit lonely. She said she went to the victim's place, travelling from Ourimbah to Wyong, to say 'hello'. When she got there and when she was let in, she said that she approached the victim in the kitchen and a 'kerfuffle' took place. She claimed that she and the victim both went to grab the knife. She said she was aware of the presence of the victim's daughter. She denied lunging at the victim (a matter that she later admitted). 7. In a later interview with police on 22 August 2023, she admitted that she went to see the victim because she was jealous of her relationship with Ryan Williams. 8. In her explanation to Dr Furst, the offender said that Ms Webb was treating her 'badly'. She did not suggest to him that she acted in self-defence. Evaluating the objective gravity of the offending The intimidation offence 1. The offender plainly engaged in some planning to visit the victim's home. Her conduct could not be said to be spontaneous. The offender had been told by the victim that she was unwelcome to attend the victim's home. She disregarded the victim's stipulation. The threat was plainly serious – a threat to kill. The threat was repeated. But there was nothing to suggest to the victim that the offender had any ready means, such as possession of a weapon, by which such threat could be implemented. Consequently, perhaps, there was no real indication of an enduring sense of fear in the victim from this particular offending. If there was, the victim might not have been so susceptible to being persuaded by Mr Wright not to call the police. The offender had previously verbally abused her, which might explain why the threat was discounted in the particular circumstances. She was prepared to deal with the offending, at that point, without complaint to police until over a year later. 2. I will shortly refer, at greater length, to the significance of the offender's continuing kicking of the door. Objectively, I regard the offending as falling at the lower part of the mid-range. The additional offence on the Form 1 (attached to the intimidation offence) 1. As noted, the offence of damage or destruction to property on the Form 1 was attached to the intimidation offence. It can fairly be said that the act of kicking the roller door was incidental to the offence of intimidation. It was the door that impeded closer spatial proximity to the victim. There was nothing that quantified the damage. 2. In such circumstances, the conduct can be, and is treated by me as part of the facts and underlying seriousness of the primary offence of intimidation and does not substantially elevate the force of retribution and specific deterrence applicable to that offence as additional offences often do. The GBH offence 1. In R v Amati [2019] NSWCCA 193, Johnson J (Simpson AJA and Harrison J – as his Honour then was – agreeing) surveyed sentencing cases under s 27 of the Crimes Act. It is, with respect, difficult to distil any pronounced sentencing patterns from that survey or any extensive consideration of the factors typically affecting that offence. 2. It suffices to state the obvious that an element of the offence is that the offender intends to kill, rather than inflict some lesser form of harm. The Crown referred me to the observation of the Court of Criminal Appeal in R v Macadam-Kellie [2001] NSWCCA 170 that where injuries inflicted 'verge on the fatal', with the intent to kill (and a high likelihood of death) the objective gravity falls little short for the completed crime. The nature and extent of the violence must be a significant consideration. Material also is the presence or absence of planning and whether or not the attack was provoked (Amati at [111]). 3. The offending was highly serious. Given the location of the part of the victim's body where the assault was directed to, it is something of a miracle that the victim is alive. The victim required the replacement of her skull. She has what is known as an Acquired Traumatic Brain Injury. Understandably, she has PTSD and low mood and anxiety. She will remain in a wheelchair for the rest of her life and requires constant care. She has required extensive rehabilitation. Her ongoing therapies are extensive. The attack was unprovoked, inexcusable and carried out against an innocent person. I agree with the Crown that the detailed description of the injuries, featuring large areas of lacerated and debrided scalp and substantial intracranial haemorrhages, is indicative of a vicious and ferocious attack. Indeed, only a month after it had occurred, in a second interview with police, the offender appeared to delight in the attack. That is an indicium of a level of cruelty. The ABH offence 1. Typical considerations relevant to the assessment of objective gravity of this offence are not only the nature and extent of the injury sustained (which for this offence can vary widely) but also the degree of violence inflicted: R v Bloomfield (1988) 44 NSWLR 734. This is so even if the consequences of the attack on the victim are minimal: R v Kirkland [2005] NSWCCA 130 at [33] per Hunt AJA. Of course, regard must be had generally to all of the circumstances of the offence. 2. In this case, the offender planned a confrontation of some kind or another with Ms Webb. She was unaffected by the incident that had occurred in August 2022; so this was not a one-off event against this victim. There was serious violence, involving the offender's use of a knife that, of its nature, was capable of inflicting serious harm, and also a physical struggle. The assault was unprovoked. 3. Fortunately, in terms of physical injuries, these were not the most serious of its kind; although the cut to the abdomen was in a vulnerable part of the victim's body. There were also some injuries to the right knee, although nothing to suggest any lasting effects in that respect. The result of slight physical injuries, however, was substantially attributable to the fortuitous intervention of Mr Wright, who was able to get the offender out of the apartment. The victim was understandably petrified. 4. This offending fell in the mid-range. Aggravating factors 1. All of the offences occurred at the respective victims' homes (and, in Ms Webb's case, her daughter's home) (Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act 1999 (NSW) ('CSP Act'), s 21A(2)(eb). I would also emphasise in Ms Christensen's case that the offending against her occurred at a late hour when it was presumptively on the cards that the victim would be present; and possibly even asleep. In all occasions, the offender indicated no regard to the additional distress to the victims occasioned by the violation of the sanctuary of their homes. 2. The GBH offence involved the offender's use of a weapon (CSP Act, s 21A(2)(b)). I also accept the Crown's submission that the GBH offence also involved other criminal acts, including the offender unlawfully gaining entry to Ms Christensen's home and her detaining her dog (CSP Act, s 21A(2)(m)). 3. In connection with the ABH offence, the offending occurred in the presence of the victim's child (CSP Act, s 21A(2)(ea)). Further in connection with that offence, I have not treated the use of a weapon as an aggravating factor given that I have already had regard to that circumstance in my statement of the objective seriousness of the offending. 4. The GBH and the ABH offences (but not the intimidation offence) were aggravated by their occurrence when the offender was at conditional liberty. The offender committed the GBH offence and ABH offence whilst she was on parole, from 25 June 2023. The offender had acknowledged her understanding of her conditions for parole on 16 June 2023 (CSP Act, s 21A(2)(j)). The victim impact statement 1. This was prepared by Joanne Smidt, who is Ms Christensen's aunty and, as a result of the events giving rise to this proceeding, her guardian and financial manager. The Court wishes to takes the opportunity to specifically commend the admirably loving and selflessly positive attitude of Ms Smidt; especially in view of Ms Smidt's existing commitment to act as one of two kinship carers to a teenage grandson. 2. Ms Smidt referred to the harrowing days, passing into weeks, when she and her brother were at the victim's bedside in John Hunter Hospital, uncertain whether the victim would live or die. 3. She referred to her day-to-day observations of the victim's condition, including epilepsy and paralysis on her left side, and loss of memory. She referred also to the victim's pain through her rehabilitation, featuring physiotherapy and occupational therapy for her speech and her tragic predicament of living her life in a wheelchair with 24/7 care. Unsurprisingly, the victim and Ms Smidt are hugely concerned about the ominous indications expressed by the offender to police in respect to her future safety. The offender's subjective case Age, background, mental conditions 1. The offender is now 31 years of age. She was aged between 29 and 30 in the period of the offending. 2. The offender's background was comprehensively reviewed in a report prepared by the psychiatrist, Dr Richard Furst, dated 16 January 2025. Amongst other things, Dr Furst reviewed a report prepared in 2015 by Jen Harriman, who performed a 'psychosocial' assessment of the offender; which report was included within the offender's evidentiary bundle in the sentencing hearing (as were the primary records from Justice Health). In Ms Harriman's report, there was an indication that the offender is an indigenous Australian, an identification picked up in the Department of Corrective Services' record of her; although according to Ms Harriman, the offender has some doubt about that form of identification. 3. Most of the following is based upon Dr Furst's account of her background which was itself substantially based upon what the offender told him, but also other documents, such as Ms Harriman's report and the Justice Health records that were evidenced in the sentencing hearing. 4. Ms Begg's parents were drug addicts. There was also a suggestion that they were alcoholics. Especially disturbing was her exposure to sexual assault and abuse perpetrated upon her mother who was working as a sex worker. They separated when she was about two years of age and the offender continuously moved between other family members until she became abandoned by her father in a motor vehicle in 2000 and was placed in care of the state when she was only 6 years of age. She was not the only one of her family so placed in the care of the state. Thereafter parental contact ceased. 5. When in care, she experienced the instability associated with frequent placement moves. Ms Harriman noted a statement which was quite telling in contemporaneous reports: "There appear to have been few places that Krystal has lived where someone did not physically and emotionally abuse her, reject her, abandon her or had her taken from them". 6. The offender told Ms Harriman that she hated all of her carers except for two who were too old to look after her. It appears that she later commenced legal action against the Department of Justice arising out of her complaints about the care she received in her childhood. 7. Counsel for the offender referred me to certain material noting the correlation between those children placed out of the care of their home and their later incarceration as adults. 8. By 2002, when she was about 9 years of age, she had been diagnosed with Oppositional Defiant Disorder, reflected in reports of violent and aggressive outbursts. 9. Curiously, it was reported to Dr Furst that the offender did quite well at school when she applied herself; although she left school in Year 10. The offender's Counsel also emphasised a correlation between children whose schooling is interrupted and later offending. 10. She remained in foster care until she was 18, being managed at St Josephs, a facility in Grafton for emotionally and behaviourally disturbed children for 5 years. 11. Whilst she was 15 years old, she commenced a relationship with a man, who was only 6 years her senior. She gave birth to two children through the course of that relationship, who are now aged 10 and 13. She indicated to Dr Furst that her distance from her children saddens her. Both children were removed from her care (in 2009 and 2011, respectively) and subsequently adopted. Unfortunately, it was reported that this relationship with the man was violent in nature. 12. From the time of her late teens, she developed cannabis abuse disorder, and she was still smoking cannabis in 2022 and 2023. From about the age of 18, she took to ice, which was about the time she said she was victimised by her partner. Whilst she was incarcerated in 2016 or 2017, she took the non-prescriptive drug Subutex. She was treated with Buvidal in late 2020 and when released she struggled with withdrawal symptoms in 2022 and 2023. Since her return to jail in 2023 following her arrest for the index offending, she has resumed taking Buvidal. 13. Dr Furst reviewed Justice Health records and noted the various reports from various psychiatrists. Those reports elaborated upon the harm she has threatened or inflicted upon both her and other inmates. 14. It may not surprise, in view of all of this background, to record that she had only a fleeting period of one month's employment in a nursery. 15. CSNSW records going back indicate a range of mental disorders in the offender: Bipolar Disorder, PTSD, Childhood trauma, Borderline Personality Disorder, ADHD, depression and anxiety. 16. On examination, Dr Furst did not consider that there were indications of any depressive disorder, mania or psychosis. He did not regard her as being drug dependent; but rather used drugs as a maladaptive response to coping with stress and her emotional dysregulation. 17. Dr Furst's diagnosis was that she had Borderline Personality Disorder, Intermittent Explosive Disorder and substance use disorder. Overall, he summarised that she had a: ".. long-standing pattern of emotional dysregulation and aggression. (She) appears to be easily slighted. She had poorly controlled anger, loses control and exhibits aggression which is episodic and clearly excessive in the circumstances [relative to the provocation]. She is also impulsive and disinhibited, more so when she is angry, a pattern indicative of intermittent explosive disorder driving her offending. Emotional dysregulation, black and white thinking and self-destructive traits inherent in her borderline personality disorder add to her irrational perception of others and her aggression towards others when stressed/slighted, including on the occasions in question before the court." Moral culpability 1. There was no dispute that the offender suffered from a disadvantaged childhood and has the disorders diagnosed by Dr Furst. However, the Crown puts in issue the circumstance of a causal connection between her mental disorders and the enduring sense of frustration and inability to control violent impulses occasioned by a childhood disadvantage. It cited observations of Simpson J (as her Honour then was) in Aslan v R [2014] NSWCCA 114 at [33]-[34], which to paraphrase, emphasised that the bare circumstances that an offender suffers from a mental abnormality and (I would interpose) has experienced aspects of a disadvantaged childhood background at the time of the offending does not, of itself, reduce an offender's culpability. I note, however, that insofar as Bugmy principles and the incidence of a mental abnormality are concerned, an offender's background featuring childhood disadvantage may have a mitigating effect notwithstanding the absence of a causal link (DR v The Queen (2022) 300 A Crim R 116; [2022] NSWCCA 151 at [37]). Further, for cases of an offender with a mental abnormality, some moderation of general and specific deterrence may arise even in the absence of a causal link between the abnormality and the offending (Binnie v R [2010] NSWCCA 14 at [21]-[23). 2. I accept that her ingrained pattern of emotional dysregulation and barely restrained aggression are connected with childhood disadvantage, giving rise, in turn, to serious mental disorders and, as such, principles derived from the authorities of Bugmy, Muldrock and De La Rosa are potentially engaged. Those principles indicate that there can be a diminution in moral culpability and in that way, the existence of the matters are capable of reducing the seriousness of the offending, and ordinarily moderating, to a degree, the force of other sentencing considerations, including general and specific deterrence, retribution and denunciation. I note, further, and with particular reference to the statement in Bugmy, that "the effects of profound deprivation do not diminish over time". I accept further that the offender's conditions may be apt to make her periods of incarceration weigh more heavily upon the offender. 3. However, there are circumstances where notwithstanding the circumstances of an offender's disadvantaged childhood or associated mental disorders, the circumstances of the offending indicate that there should be no, or little, reduction in moral culpability. This may arise where, for example, the offending is planned and premeditated and not the result of any impulsive but misguided response to triggering events. 4. In the particular circumstances of the attack on Ms Christensen, there was little to suggest any impulsivity in the offender's conduct in response to the sensation of feeling frustrated, and any commensurate inability to regulate emotions, being features typically present, as Hoeben CJ at CL observed in Perkins v R [2018] NSWCCA 62 at [42] when Bugmy principles are engaged in a way that can reduce culpability. The offender's attack on Ms Christensen occurred at nighttime in the latter's home. So too the attacks on Ms Webb in August 2022 and late July 2023 occurred in that victim's home. There were no contextual facts to indicate that either Ms Christensen or Ms Webb had said or done anything, proximate to any of these occasions, to provoke the offender, indicating that the violent responses stemmed from impulsivity and therefore might be explicable (if not excusable) for that reason. It appears rather that the offender developed a brooding resentment towards both victims developed over some period of time and therefore her attacks on them were premeditated. 5. About the causal significance of IED, the psychiatrist suggested that this is essentially a condition that manifests itself in a person's response to a particular situation. The situation leading to the offending, in all cases, was of the offender's own making. She went to both of the victim's homes (without invitation). She could not be said to have been 'triggered' by anything done by the respective victims. Further, this is not a case where the offender's 'substance use disorder' had any causal connection. 6. The closest that the evidence comes to is a view that the offender's borderline personality disorder may have contributed (p 9 of Dr Furst's report), but Dr Furst is insufficiently specific in this regard and it is not for the Court to speculate how this specific disorder contributed to offending without expert assistance. Counsel for the offender referred me to a passage at p 3 of Dr Furst's report (3rd paragraph), but as I read that passage, it addresses the concern as to whether the offender was earlier mis-diagnosed. It does not, in terms, or necessarily impliedly, suggest that events in a person's childhood can contribute to a person's developing BPD. Dr Furst was himself hindered in this respect because of the dearth of factual instructions from the offender herself as to what she was thinking and doing at or about the times she offended. Thus, her recollection that she felt that she was "treated badly" by a victim is insufficient to establish a causal connection. 7. Thus, even if I accept (as I do) that the offender did experience a profound childhood disadvantage, it is not clear what role it played in reducing the culpability for her offending, in the circumstances that occurred. I am not persuaded that IED played a causative role or her substance use disorders – both matters which I think can develop from a disadvantaged childhood – materially contributed to the events either. I think BPD did play a causative role, however. To that extent her culpability might be said to reduce and thus moderate the role of general and specific deterrence. 8. My views in this respect are reinforced by the offender's own admissions, admittedly at only certain times and not expressed consistently, to police that her offending towards both victims were motivated by jealousy of the victims' respective relations with Ryan Williams. That is consistent with the level of planning and premeditation that occurred. Jealousy is typically a state of mind that builds up in a person over time. It did not suddenly impel her offending. Jealousy, moreover, is one of the oldest of human sins or vices, capable of besetting persons irrespective of whether or not they suffer from mental abnormalities or disadvantaged childhoods. It did not appear that Dr Furst, with respect, considered whether underlying the motivation for offending was a jealous state of mind. I think it played a not insignificant role in contributing to her offending. 9. At any rate, the same principles are not all mitigatory. This offender, regrettably, has an ingrained history of violent responses to events, large and small, which trigger her emotional responses and in such way, that history and tendencies and her prospects are such that there is no real indication that such tendencies are likely to be arrested. These matters augment the importance of protecting the community. It is notable that Dr Furst did not regard the offender as suffering any intellectual disability. She has been before the Courts on countless occasions, often being given the benefit of reductions in the statutory ratio of non-parole periods. She has plainly not received the message arising from earlier sentences. As Mr Crown submitted verbally, with reference to her rehabilitation prospects, she has not helped herself in connection with her mental problems. This particular circumstance elevates specific deterrence. Antecedents 1. The offender has an extensive criminal history of offences in this state marked by serial offences of personal violence. They go back a long way. Predictably there are many offences corresponding to the index offending of intimidation and assaults over the years. Within the Crown sentence bundle (Exhibit A) is a chronology which sets out more recent offences, going back to February 2021. One distinctive feature not commonly seen even amongst violent criminals but seen in the case of this offender is her repeated offending for animal cruelty. There is an element of cruelty evident in the attack on Ms Christensen. 2. The criminal history extends to conduct occurring outside NSW. 3. In a supplementary bundle (Exhibit B), the Crown provided the Court with a series of NSW Police Facts sheets which provided the factual bases for nine sentences imposed mainly in the Local Court (with a single statement of agreed facts in the Armidale District Court) for personal violence offences going back to 2014 4. In addition to her criminal history, the offender has had a disturbing history of custodial offences. These were partly summarised in the parole papers (notably the 'Revocation Prior to Release Report' dated 11 December 2024), which are similarly punctuated by offences of intimidation (featuring threats to kill), assaults and damage or destruction of property. It was specifically noted that the offender made statements such as 'I'm the most violent inmate here', an apparent indication of pride in her acts of actual or threatened violence. Her conduct has been so appalling that in the report of 11 December 2024, it was pointed out that the offender had spent extensive time in segregation; given her inability to integrate with others in a pro-social manner. 5. Naturally, this history disentitles the offender to leniency. In addition, it bears upon her prospects for rehabilitation (and also the sentencing principles concerning retribution, specific deterrence and protection of the community) for what it shows about a pattern of her continuing disobedience to the law: Veen v The Queen (No. 2) (1988) 164 CLR 465 ("Veen No. 2") at 477. Discounts for guilty pleas 1. It is common ground that in the circumstances, the offender is entitled to a discount of 25% on sentence. Remorse/contrition 1. Dr Furst did not make any reference to contrition when the offender explained her perspective of the offending. As indicated earlier, in her initial police interviews, the offender denied wrongdoing. Further, as noted, she appeared to gloat when offering a retrospective on her offending towards Ms Christensen. 2. The offender did not dispute the Crown's contention that there is no expression of remorse or contrition. There is no evidence to indicate that the pleas of guilty manifest contrition or remorse for any of the offences. They are purely utilitarian. Rehabilitation prospects & likelihood of reoffending 1. The Windsor Community Corrections officer reported on 11 December 2024 about the offender's refusal to receive continued treatment for her multiple disorders; which verges upon a virtual denial of them. It was specifically noted that the offender stated she would be 'offended' if asked to engage with a counsellor. 2. The Windsor Community Corrections officer also noted that the offender has no social supports in the community. The offender had reported to her that her relationship to her parents was strained. Further, she has no available accommodation options, and would depend upon housing in the community; plainly a problematic concern in view of her violent nature. 3. Dr Furst opined that there was a 'case for cautious optimism' that the offender's level of emotional volatility and associated aggressive behaviour may abate over time and that treatment strategies he recommended will be of some assistance. 4. An obvious difficulty with that opinion is that the actual experience of this offender furnishes no cause for optimism that she is actually willing to commit to engaging in the treatment strategies he recommended. 5. A second difficulty is that Dr Furst did not provide a reasoned basis for his view that her aggressive behaviour may abate in the face of her record, and the lack of supports for her. That said, given the inevitability of a long head sentence, I think Dr Furst's reference to the passage of time and the offender's age has greater significance when considering the extent of the non-parole period. 6. Further, as the Crown pointed out in its written submissions, the offender told police that she intends to violently reoffend against both victims upon release. 7. Earlier I pointed out the relevance of the offender's criminal and custodial history to consideration of her rehabilitation prospects. As to her behaviour in custody, I accept the Crown's submission that she has not only displayed a disregard for indulgences granted through conditional liberty. She does not appear willing to meaningfully help herself reform. 8. Her prospects for rehabilitation are poor. 9. As at 11 December 2024, the community corrections officer opined that the offender presented as a high risk of harm to the community; not to mention custodial staff and her inmates. In his report, Dr Furst also alluded to her high risk of violence and high risk of reoffending. 10. I find that she is highly likely to reoffend and to do so in a violent fashion. INSTINCTIVE SYNTHESISING 1. I have taken into account the maximum penalties and in the case of the GBH offence, the standard non-parole period, as legislative guideposts. 2. I have considered the general sentencing principles in s 3A of the CSP Act; some of which I have already expressly mentioned in these remarks. I have acknowledged some moderation of general and specific deterrence, retribution and denunciation simply on account of the offender's mental disorders and deprived background in childhood; without being persuaded (with the exception of BPD) of a causal connection between that condition or circumstances and the offending. Nevertheless, moderation of that account must also be balanced against an extensive violent history that disentitles her to leniency and which also elevates those same considerations; and the real likelihood that she will reoffend. 3. Moreover, and with particular regard not only to the absence of contrition but ongoing threats to the victims, cases of the present kind bring to bear acutely the issues evident in Veen (No. 2), a paradigm case of an offender with dangerous tendencies, where the High Court alluded to the tension between imposing a sentence or sentences that was or are proportionate to the criminality whilst protecting the community (at 474). Further, at 476-7, the plurality observed that: "a mental abnormality which makes an offender a danger to society when he is at large but which diminishes his moral culpability for a particular crime is a factor which has two countervailing effects: one which tends towards a longer custodial sentence, the other towards a shorter. These effects may balance out, but consideration of the danger to society cannot lead to the imposition of a more severe penalty than would have been imposed if the offender had not been suffering from a mental abnormality." 1. As was later said by the plurality, in terms also applicable to this offender, the "tragedy of Veen's life … has to be balanced against the exigencies of the criminal law especially the protection of society". 2. Finally, a very significant consideration is that the sentence recognises the harm to the victims, Ms Christensen and Ms Webb. 3. It is conceded that the conduct crosses the threshold under s 5(1) of the CSP Act. Counsel for the offender also conceded that the term would be lengthy. Those concessions were properly made and I so find. 4. Indicative terms (taking into account the respective guilty pleas and, in the case of the intimidation offence, the additional offence) are as follows: The intimidation offence: 1 year's imprisonment The GBH offence: 12 years' imprisonment (8 years and 5 months as an indicative non-parole period) The ABH offence: 2 years' imprisonment 1. I must apply the totality principle. There is little scope for concurrency, as between the index offences, notwithstanding that two of the offences were committed against the same victim, Ms Webb. There are some common features of the offences, including a level of planning. However, the offences against that victim were separated by nearly a year. Of course, the most serious offence involved a different victim, Ms Christensen, also separated in time from the other offences. There needs to be a significant provision for notional accumulation. There is a further aspect of the totality principle that I will address when I deal with the aspect of the offender's time in custody. 2. I recognise that the sentence I impose must endeavour to reflect her criminality overall. I also recognise that the sentence should not be 'crushing', but that description is assessed by reference to her record and rehabilitation prospects; neither of which are favourable. One matter which I do take into account, in this connection, notwithstanding what I have said about her record and prospects and mindful of her anxiety and depression, is that I am alive to the consideration of a desire to limit the sense of hopelessness in a still relatively young offender generated by an inevitably long sentence of imprisonment. But ultimately, the objective seriousness of the offending may be such that humanitarian considerations, including the consideration of mercy, must give way to a stern sentence. 3. The offender has been in custody since the date she was arrested (19 July 2023). A subset of that period in custody related to a sentence imposed by the Burwood Local Court on 1 March 2024 for which she was eligible for release on parole from 2 January 2025. She was serving time for offences including assault upon an officer in custody (April 2023) and assault, hindering law enforcement officers and intimidation against officers in custody (September 2023). She was on parole between July 2023 and 25 January 2024. It was submitted that it was not just the commission of the index offences which led to the revocation for parole. The Crown submits that she was refused parole because of the view taken about her risk of re-offending and danger to the community. 4. The offender's Counsel submits that, with particular reference to her subjective circumstances, the commencement date for this sentence should be somewhat backdated to commence prior to the date that she had become eligible for parole (i.e. 2 January 2025). The Crown accepts that this course is open, but emphasises the separate and distinct nature of the earlier offences so that any backdating should be minimal. 5. I substantially agree with the Crown but consider that in the circumstances, a modest degree of backdating should occur, having regard to the same or similar criminogenic factors at play in relation to the earlier offences and the lengthy sentence she is to receive. Special circumstances? 1. Notwithstanding my reservations, given my findings about rehabilitation prospects and likelihood of reoffending, the offender remains of a still relatively young age, she is at risk of institutionalisation and given also the hardship associated with incarceration because of her mental conditions, I make a finding of special circumstances. The extent of the variation of the statutory ratio should, in all of the circumstances, be relatively modest. Sentence and orders 1. Ms Begg, please stand. 2. You are convicted of the offences of intimidation, causing grievous bodily harm with intent to murder and assault occasioning actual bodily harm. 3. I sentence you to a term of imprisonment of 13 years and 6 months, commencing on 2 September 2024 and expiring on 1 March 2038 with a non-parole period of 9 years and 4 months expiring on 1 January 2034; after which you are eligible for release on parole. 4. I direct that a copy of Dr Furst's report of 16 January 2025 be brought to the attention of the personnel within corrective services responsible for the offender's supervision. ********** DISCLAIMER - Every effort has been made to comply with suppression orders or statutory provisions prohibiting publication that may apply to this judgment or decision. The onus remains on any person using material in the judgment or decision to ensure that the intended use of that material does not breach any such order or provision. Further enquiries may be directed to the Registry of the Court or Tribunal in which it was generated. Decision last updated: 14 February 2025