SARLON INDUSTRIES PTY LTD v RODIC [1991] NSWCA 242

SARLON INDUSTRIES PTY LTD v RODIC SUPREME COURT OF NEW SOUTH WALES

KIRBY P, SAMUELS JA AND MAHONEY JA 27 August 1991, 27 August 1991

[1991] NSWCA 242

WORKERS' COMPENSATION — disputed in jury — whether evidence of worker "corroborated" — meaning of "corroborated" whether factual evidence of (a) a complaint to a superior; and (b) contemporary statement in compensation claim form are available to support the worker's evidence and sustain award — held: (1) 'Corroboration'', as used in criminal trials, is not required in establishing a claim for compensation and should not be introduced. Brown v Public Service Board of New South Wales and Ors, Court of Appeal, unreported, 5 August 1991; The Queen v The Statutory Committee of the Phamaceutical Society of Great Britain [1981] 1 WLR 886 applied; (2) In the sense of supportive evidence there was such evidence in the contemporary complaint and claim form. Dobson v Morris and Anor (1975) 4 NSWLR 681 (CA) referred to; (3) Accordingly, as there was some evidence to support the award it could not be disturbed in an appeal limited to a point of law. Azzopardi vy Tasman Industries Limited (1985) 4 NSWLR 139 (CA) applied. EVIDENCE — corroboration — civil trials — undesirability of introducing notions into claims for workers' compensation benefits. WORDS AND PHRASES — "corroboration". Evidence Act 1898, s14CE.

Kirby P Mrs Andja Rodic (the respondent) was successful in a claim for compensation against her employer, Sarlon Industries Pty Limited (the appellant). On 25 May 1990 Judge Herkes entered an award in her favour under the provisions of the Workers' Compensation Act 1926. His Honour ordered the appellant to pay compensation at the statutory rate from 30 September 1988 to date and continuing. The appellant has appealed to this Court under the Compensation Court Act 1984, s32. As it stood at the time of the appeal, the appellant accepted that it was confined to establishing an error of law or an error in the admission or reaction of evidence. The stringent requirements necessary to establish an error of law are well known. They were stated by this Court in Azzopardi v Tasman Industries Limited (1985) 4 NSWLR 139, 142. I dissented in that case. However I am bound by its holding and I forswear the opportunity to repeat, once again, the view which I there expressed. The amendment of the Act has repaired the injustice to which I then called attention. However, the repair does not avail the appellant in this appeal. At least the appellant is prepared to accept that it was bound by s32 as it was originally enacted. As Azzopardi holds, even a perverse conclusion on the primary facts is immune from correction in this Court. I hasten to say I do not believe that the decision in this case was perverse. As I shall demonstrate, it is sustained by the material which was placed before Judge Herkes by the appellant itself.