KEMP AND ORS v CRISP AND ANOR; BLAKE AND ORS v CRISP AND ANOR SUPREME COURT OF NEW SOUTH WALES COURT OF APPEAL MAHONEY JA 19 October 1992 [1992] NSWCA 123 Mahoney JA I am dealing with two matters; one is Kemp v Crisp and the other is Blake v Crisp. In each of the matters, as I understand the facts, leave to appeal has been granted in respect of a decision given by Mathews J in pending proceedings, and an appeal to this Court is pending in respect of each of them. The appeals arise in relation to a question which has been separately argued and determined by her Honour. That question relates to the operation of the limitation law. The events here in question occurred in or about 1978. The proceedings were commenced subsequently, and as a defence to the proceedings a claim was made that the Limitation Act had operated. Her Honour held, and I state the matter in the most general of terms, that the limitation period did not commence to run until a date substantially after 1978. Her Honour reviewed the law in relation to limitation and arrived at a decision which, it is submitted for the applicants, is not in accord with what had previously been understood to be the law as to the date on which a period of limitation commences to run in a case such as this. The application made is for expedition of the hearing of each of the appeals. Ordinarily the court would, I think, be loathe to grant expedition in cases of this kind. The issue to be determined is an issue extracted from the two individual cases. The determination of it in those cases will not necessarily determine all of the other cases. It may be that, notwithstanding the decision of the court on appeal in the present cases, issues of fact will have to be determined in the other cases which will render inapplicable the limitation law as it will be enunciated by this Court. As I have said, ordinarily these would not be cases which would warrant the grant of expedition. However, several matters have been urged as the basis for treating these cases otherwise. These cases are, as it has been put, cases brought against the solicitor in the one case and the accountant in the other case who, it was said, wrongly advised or failed to advise the plaintiff involved. It is said that, insofar as the matter relates to solicitors, there are other cases which will turn upon a substantially similar issue, and in respect of which proceedings are pending and/or advice has to be given for the determination of them. It is submitted that in these circumstances it is appropriate that the point of law involved be decided as soon as practicable so that these cases and other cases can be effectively dealt with. There are pending in the list before this Court a number of appeals. Some of these have no particular degree of urgency. Others of them have, as I am entitled to know, a significant degree of urgency. I am loathe to disturb the order in which appeals fall to be determined unless there be an appropriate reason for doing so. However, conscious that generalities seldom decide cases and that a generality of this kind should not decide the present case, it is necessary to determine whether 2 UNREPORTED JUDGMENTS the particular circumstances of these two cases warrant them being taken out of the ordinary course and given priority over other cases pending in the list. Having read the judgment of Mathews J, I can see that the basis upon which she acted in this case is one which may require consideration in depth by this Court. This is evidenced by the fact that leave to appeal was granted in respect of each of the cases. If there be, as the witnesses have deposed, a significant number of other cases on which the decision of her Honour will have a significant effect, there may well be, I think, an appropriate ground for preferring these cases to other cases which are ahead of them in the list. In all the circumstances, I am satisfied that a degree of expedition should be given to these two cases. I do not think that they warrant the most urgent category of expedition. It is a matter in which the Registrar should, in my opinion, be allowed to fix an appropriate date for hearing of the cases, having regard to the fact that they have the degree of urgency or priority to which I have referred. In view of the nature of the problem which has arisen for decision, these are each matters in which written submissions should be made. It is accepted that the cases are to be heard together in the Court of Appeal and the cases should be prepared on that basis. Written submissions should be prepared in advance and exchanged in the appropriate way, and the Registrar should fix appropriate dates for the hearing of them. I note that counsel agree that the hearing of the cases will require approximately a day. The matters will be listed for callover on 4 November 1992. The appropriate arrangements can be made for the preparation of the appeal papers in accordance with the directions of the Registrar, and it would appear, unless counsel have anything to offer to the contrary, appropriate that the costs of the present application be costs in the appeal.