JOHN FAIRFAX GROUP PTY LTD AND ANOR v WILLIAMS AND ORS [1992] NSWCA 120
NSW Caselaw
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JOHN FAIRFAX GROUP PTY LTD AND ANOR v WILLIAMS AND ORS
SUPREME COURT OF NEW SOUTH WALES COURT OF APPEAL
KirByY P, MAHONEY JA and Hope A-JA
4 February 1992
[1992] NSWCA 120
PRACTICE and PROCEDURE — Court of Appeal — leave to appeal —
interlocutory defamation proceedings — statement of claim seeks to recover
damages for re-publication of alleged defamation by another media outlet —
whether natural and probable consequence of original publication — whether
correct test — HELD: (dismissing summons from orders of David Hunt J) The
summons was not timely. The challenge should be brought as of right, if then needed,
after the jury's verdict in the trial. Observations by Kirby P on the "particular
problem in defamation cases" of a proliferation of interlocutory appeals.
Drummoyne Municipal Council v Australian Broadcasting Corporation
(1990) 21 NSWLR 135 (CA) referred to.
Kirby P In this summons the claimants seek to challenge an order of David
HuntJ (as the Chief Judge at Common Law then was) refusing the claimant's
application to strike out para7 to paral0 of the amended Statement of Claim and
ordering the claimants to pay the opponents' costs. The paragraphs in question
seek to render the claimants liable in law for certain alleged re-publications of the
allegedly defamatory matter made by a broadcaster of the Australian
Broadcasting Corporation.
On the call of the summons, the Court raised the question of the timeliness of
the grant of leave. In my view, the grant of leave is not timely. It would be
preferable that, if necessary, the issue sought to be raised should come to this
Court in an appeal that is brought from any final verdict in favour of the
opponents at the hands of the jury in the principal proceedings. These await trial
in the Common Law Division.
In taking that course, as was demonstrated in argument, there are at least four
advantages.
First, it minimises the interference of this Court in the conduct of trial
proceedings. It reduces the number, cost and complexity of interlocutory appeals,
which are, in my view, a particular problem in defamation cases. See
Drummoyne Municipal Council v Australian Broadcasting Corporation (1990)
21 NSWLR 135, 148 (CA).
Secondly, it avoids unnecessary appeals in the event, for example, that the
claimants succeed at the trial, either generally or on the issue of re-publication,
or suffer a verdict that is acceptable to them or otherwise considered
unappealable.
Thirdly, it avoids the particular disadvantages of a stream of appeals. If this
Court were to grant leave it would do so on the question of whether the
re-publication was the "natural and probable consequence" of the original
publication by the claimants. If the Court granted leave in that case, arguably, it
might be a matter in which the High Court of Australia could be persuaded to
2 UNREPORTED JUDGMENTS
grant special leave to appeal from this Court's order. That would set in train a
series of appeals which would be premature and inconvenient to the opponents
and to the courts.
Fourthly, if the issue is to be reviewed it is desirable, as Mahoney JA pointed
out during argument, that the precise circumstances of the original publication
and of the re-publication should be demonstrated in the exact facts of the
particular case. It is at least possible that, bringing the matter up now, would
simply increase the number of hearings and the risk of multiplicity of
proceedings without compensatory advantage.
I would therefore dismiss the summons with costs necessarily without any
observation on the correctness of Hunt J's orders. It should be left to the trial
judge to decide whether to take a special verdict from the jury on this point, as
would seem appropriate. This would allow that component of any verdict
attributable to the alleged re-publication to be considered in isolation. That would
seem to be useful for any appeal that may be brought from the jury's verdict. The
issue now sought to be raised may then be tested as of right.
The order of the Court should be that the summons is dismissed with costs.
Mahoney J I agree the summons should be dismissed with costs.
Hope AJA I agree.
Kirby P: The order of the Court is summons dismissed with costs.
Summons dismissed with costs.
Counsel for the Claimant: S Rares
Solicitors for the Claimant: Mallesons Stephen Jaques
Counsel for the Opponent: JS Wheelhouse
Solicitors for the Opponent: Fisher Nash Morgan