RAKUSAN v COSIER AND ORS SUPREME COURT OF NEW SOUTH WALES COMMON LAW DIVISION GLEESON CJ, MAHONEY and MEAGHER JJA 21 September 1992, 21 September 1992 [1992] NSWCA 200 Administrative Law — Judicial review on ground of defective exercise of power — alleged failure of Magistrate to give adequate reasons Animals — Prevention of Cruelty to Animals Act 1979 — Magistrate's determination of facts. Gleeson CJ The appellant seeks leave to appeal from a decision of Abadee AJ, ashis Honour then was, given in the Common Law Division on 4 May 1990. The matter came before his Honour primarily by way of a stated case under s101 of the Justices Act. The amended summons also raised certain other claims for declaratory and prerogative relief but for reasons given a little earlier this morning the appellant does not now pursue those claims and they can, for present purposes, be disregarded. The stated case arose in the following circumstances. There are three respondents to the proceedings, Mr and Mrs Cosier and a Magistrate. The Magistrate has taken no active part in the proceedings and it is unnecessary to make further mention of his role in the litigation before Abadee AJ. Mr and Mrs Cosier carried on the business of graziers in 1986. During a drought that occurred in that year they received a visit from the appellant who was an officer of the Royal Society For The Prevention of Cruelty to Animals. The appellant contended that the respondents were guilty of cruelty to some of their sheep and that they failed to provide proper food for their sheep. The alleged acts of cruelty and failure to provide proper food occurred between May and July 1986. The appellant laid informations against the respondents, prosecuting them under certain provisions of the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals Act 1979. There were six informations in all; some related to allegations of cruelty to three particular sheep and others related to failure to provide proper food to 2,000 sheep. The total number of sheep on the respondents' property in 1986 was about 7,000. The informations were heard at the Coonabarabran Local Court. The third respondent was the Magistrate dealing with the matter. The hearing of the charges against the respondents extended over a number of days in April 1987, August 1987 and October 1988. Ultimately, in October 1988 the third respondent dismissed the informations and ordered the appellant to pay costs. The appellant, being dissatisfied with the determination of the third respondent in the exercise of his summary jurisdiction, exercised her right under s101 of the Justices Ace to apply for a case to be stated. The request for a stated case was filed in December 1988 and a draft stated case was submitted to the third respondent in March 1989. In May 1989 the third respondent submitted a further draft of the stated case to the appellant's solicitor and in August 1989 the parties called on the third respondent to settle the draft stated case. Finally, in October 1989 the third respondent signed the stated case and in the same month proceedings were commenced in the Common Law Division of the Supreme 2 UNREPORTED JUDGMENTS Court. As I have indicated earlier, they came on for hearing in May of 1989 and they were dealt with by Abadee AJ by an ex tempore judgment delivered on Friday 4 May 1990. It is unnecessary to go into detail of the various criticisms which were contained in the stated case and which were directed to the determination of the learned Magistrate. It suffices, for present purposes, to note that it was submitted that the Magistrate misdirected himself in relation to the meaning and effect of certain provisions of the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals Act and further, it was contended that the reasons for his determination given by the Magistrate were inadequate. It was argued that he failed sufficiently to state the findings of fact that he made and that his processes of reasoning were not appropriately disclosed. I might say that the reasons for determination of the Magistrate appear in three closely typed pages of judgment which are reproduced in the Appeal Book. Abadee AJ did not accept the submission that the Magistrate had erred in law in his understanding of the relevant provisions of the Prevention of Cruel to Animals Act. His Honour went on to give close consideration to the argument that the Magistrate had failed to comply with the principles of law relating to the obligation of judicial officers to give sufficient reasons for their decisions. There was no dispute before Abadee AJ as to the principles relevant to that matter. Those principles are contained in cases that have been referred to in submissions before this Court this morning and there is no room for argument about them. The matter that Abadee AJ had to determine was whether or not the learned Magistrate in the present case had failed to observe those principles. A decision on that matter required his Honour to give close consideration to the nature of the issues before the Magistrate, to the evidence that had been led before him over a number of days, and to the detail of the Magistrate's reasons for judgment. Having done that, Abadee AJ came to the conclusion that the Magistrate had not failed to comply with his obligations in relation to giving reasons for his decision. The ground upon which it is contended that this Court should give leave to appeal against the decision of Abadee AJ is that the case raises a matter of general importance concerning the obligations of judicial officers to give reasons for their decisions. In my view that proposition has not been made good. As I indicated earlier this is not a case in which there is any dispute of principle as to the nature of the Magistrate's obligations in giving reasons for his decision. The question was one as to the application of the relevant principles to the facts of this particular case. An understanding of the law in relation to the obligations of judicial officers to give reasons for their decision will not be advanced by a detailed application of those principles by this Court to the facts and circumstances of this particular case. Accordingly, I do not consider that the specific ground upon which it is argued that leave to appeal should be granted has been made good. I would add, however, that this is a case in which there seems to me to be powerful discretionary considerations against giving leave to appeal. This is a stale matter. The offences alleged to have been committed by the respondents took place in 1986. The matter was hard fought before the Magistrate over a period of days extending over a couple of years. If we were to grant leave to appeal and if the appeal were to succeed, the practical consequences of that would be that the matter would go back again before the Magistrate who, probably sometime in 1993, would hear extended argument from counsel about the evidence that was URJ RAKUSAN v COSIER AND ORS (Meagher JA) 3 given several years ago and would make a further determination of the matter. If that determination were adverse to the respondents, then the respondents would have a right to have a re-hearing of the matter before a District Court judge. That might take place sometime in 1994 or 1995. In my view, having regard to the nature of the charges against the respondents and having regard, in particular, to the Magistrate's findings of fact that the respondents were people who set out to give proper care to their animals and that they were experienced and competent pastoralists, it seems to me inappropriate that this Court should take any step that would enable this matter to drag out any longer. I would propose, in the circumstances, that leave to appeal be refused. Mahoney JA I agree. Meagher JA I agree entirely with what Gleeson CJ says. The sole remaining pointin the case is one which is said to arise from the learned Magistrate's alleged failure to give reasons for his decision. I must confess I am at a loss to understand this argument. I have read his Worship's judgment and find it informative and convincing. He cannot be accused of deficiency in the supply of reasons solely because it does not extend to the excessive length now unfortunately characteristic of many appellate judgments. GLEESON CJ: The orders of the Court will be that the summons is dismissed, the application for leave to appeal is refused and the appellant is ordered to pay the costs of the summons and the application. Counsel for the appellant: P Johnson/R Burgess Solicitors for the appellant: Pike Pike and Fenwick Counsel for the respondent: C Porter QC/P Arden Solicitors for the respondent: RJ Nolan and Co