GRGIC v AUSTRALIA and NEW ZEALAND BANKING GROUP LTD [1993] NSWCA 126
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GRGIC v AUSTRALIA and NEW ZEALAND BANKING GROUP LTD
SUPREME COURT OF NEW SOUTH WALES COURT OF APPEAL
KIRBY P
5 April 1993, 5 April 1993
[1993] NSWCA 126
PRACTICE and PROCEDURE — subpoenas — access to documents produced by
— observance of privacy of individuals — police produce police briefs of prosecution
of persons allegedly involved in forgery of transfer of title — persons convicted of or
facing criminal charges — one brief contains transcript of personal conversation
between husband and wife secured by warrant issued to police under Listening
Devices Act 1984 s16 — application by parties in absence of husband and wife for
access to file containing transcript of conversation.
Held: (per Kirby P) (1) It is the duty of the Court to be alert to the privacy interests of
persons not present in Court and to protect such interests before permitting access to
documents produced to the Court under compulsory process such as subpoena; (2) Access
by the parties, as requested, to the transcript of the personal conversation between the
husband and wife, without first affording them the opportunity to make submissions to the
Court, would be in breach of basic privacy principles; (3) Accordingly, access would be
denied until notice was given to the participants in the conversation and they were afforded
the opportunity of making submissions to the Court; (4) Meanwhile, the documents would
be kept in a sealed envelope not to be accessed without order of a judge.
Listening Devices Act 1984, s16.
Supreme Court Act 1970, s46(1), s51.
Privacy Act 1988 (Cth), s14 (Privacy Principles).
ORDERS
1. Stand over the further hearing of the motion for directions, anterior to the appeal,
until Monday 17 May 1993;
2. Order that the solicitor for Mr Franco Grgic give notice to the solicitor or solicitors
for Mr Antonio Grgic, Mrs Aida Grgic and Mr Francesco Sierra, if known, or to such
persons personally within eight days of this date of the listing of the matter for directions
before the Court on 17 May 1993 for the purpose of affording such persons the opportunity
of making any representations to the Court which they may consider appropriate
concerning access by the present parties to the transcript of conversations recorded
pursuant to the warrant issued under the Listening Devices Act;
3. [For further orders see transcript].
Kirby P This is a continuation of a very long saga. I am dealing with the
matter under the powers conferred on me by the Supreme Court Act 1970, s46(1).
The saga began at a trial before Lusher AJ. It is unnecessary to recount the
details of what happened. Those details are set out, so far as is relevant to the
motions before me, in the reasons of Mahoney JA dated 19 October 1992 and the
reasons of Priestley JA dated 8 March 1993. In short, Mr Frano Grgic (the
appellant), claims that he lost and important property interest in land by reason
of a forgery of his name on the title document by his son in concert with others.
He wishes to produce fresh evidence before the Court to establish that fact.
Lusher AJ rejected his case founded upon that allegation at trial. Hence the
appeal to this Court.
2 UNREPORTED JUDGMENTS
Since the original trial before Lusher AJ, Mr Grgic's son, Mr Anthony Grgic,
has pleaded guilty to an offence arising out of the alleged forgery. He has been
sentenced and is currently serving a period of imprisonment. Mr Anthony Grgic's
wife, Aida, faces court upon related charges on 6 May 1993. Mr Francesco Sierra,
a Justice of the Peace, is also alleged to have been involved in the forgery. He has
been charged. At this stage the outcome or likely progress of the criminal
proceedings against him are not known.
When the matter was before Priestley JA, his Honour indicated that upon this
day there were three matters that should be considered:
1. Whether the matter was appropriate to be set down for hearing as an appeal;
2. Whether affidavits on behalf of the appellant indicating the fresh evidence
upon which he was relying should be filed according to a timetable; and
3. Whether a stay of execution of the judgment should be removed.
The parties before me today, in the light of the progress being reported in the
concurrent criminal proceedings, have, very properly in my view, made no
application for the removal of the stay of execution of the judgment. On the other
hand, it is obviously desirable, both for the parties and the Court, that this matter
should be brought on for hearing without undue delay.
When the matter was called before me, a police officer produced to the Court,
pursuant to a subpoena issued on behalf of the appellant, three sets of documents.
The police officer raised no objection to access being given to both parties in
respect of any of the documents. Of two of them, it is unnecessary to make
extended comment. Those documents relate to police briefs. I see no reason why
access should not be granted to both parties. They may have that access, the
documents remaining in the custody of the Court.
The third batch of documents presents the particular problem. Although also
contained in a police brief, it includes a transcript of personal conversations
between Mr Anthony Grgic and his wife, Aida, which were obtained by the police
pursuant to a warrant issued under the Listening Devices Act 1984, s16. In my
opinion, basic privacy principles require that, before access should be given to
the parties before me to the transcript of that conversation, Mr and Mrs Grgic
should be first afforded the opportunity to make any representations which they
wish to make to the Court concerning any reasons why access should be denied
to the parties now before the Court to the transcript, either in whole or in part.
Compare Privacy Principle 10 in Privacy Act 1988 (Cth) sl4. See also
Organisation for Economic Co operation and Development (OECD) Guidelines
on Information Privacy ("Use Limitation Principle") in Australian Law Reform
Commission Privacy (ALRC 22) 1983, 2ff. It is the duty of the Court on its own
initiative and irrespective of the parties before it to be alert to such privacy
interests in permitting access by strangers to documents produced to the Court
under compulsory process. Cf Compsyd Pty Ltd v Streamline Travel Service Pty
Ltd (1987) 10 NSWLR 648 (SC) 649.
The transcript referred to is a 72 page document contained in the police brief.
I have directed that those pages be clipped. Access to them will not at this stage
be granted. Instead access will be given to Mr and Mrs Grgic to afford them the
opportunity of putting any submission which they wish to place before the Court
in respect of such access. Meantime the documents will be held by the Court in
a sealed envelope not to be opened without authority of a Judge of Appeal.
I consider that it is also appropriate that Mr Sierra should also be informed of
the proceedings before the Court and allowed to be heard, if he wishes to be
heard, in respect of such access. he ought not to be given access to the transcript
URJ GRGIC v AUSTRALIA and NEW ZEALAND BANKING GROUP LTD (Kirby P) 3
of the conversation because he took no part in it. It is however, at least possible
that he was referred to and implicated in the conversation. The question of
whether he should have access to the transcript and if so, on what terms, will
remain to be determined by the Court after having first heard from the
participants in the conversation, if that be their wish and also having heard any
application which Mr Sierra or his representative makes.
The foregoing procedure can be adopted without any relative disadvantage to
the parties before the Court today because it was, in effect, common ground that
the Court should wait until an interval of time to see what steps were taken in the
prosecution of Mrs Aida Grgic and Mr Francesco Sierra before listing the appeal
for hearing.
There are two other outstanding matters. The first of these is a decision on
whether the whole or part of disputed factual matters raised by way of fresh
evidence should be remitted to a single judge of the Common Law Division in
accordance with s51 of the Supreme Court Act 1970. Such a course would seem
to be a sensible and efficient way to use the scarce time of the Court of Appeal.
However, it is inappropriate to make any decision on the matter at this stage until
affidavits are, in due course, filed for the appellant upon which the extent of such
additional evidence can be judged and a decision on a possible remittal
considered by the Court.
The second outstanding matter relates to a Notice of Contention which has
been filed by the Bank. It raises what I will call loosely a defence based upon
indefeasibility of tide. It was suggested plaintively that the Court should bring on
the point raised by this Notice of Contention, to be heard at an early stage. On
one view, if the defence is good, the opportunity to right the wrong done to Mr
Frano Grgic may not ultimately be availed of by him. I express no concluded
opinion on that possibility.
I am told that no rights of interested innocent third parties have intervened to
disturb the personal equities of the parties before the Court. It is, therefore,
possible that, in the appeal, the Court could fashion orders as it did in Mercantile
Mutual Insurance Co Ltd v Gosper (1991) 25 NSWLR 32 (CA), to correct the
register of land titles. However, whether this will be done will depend upon a full
consideration of the matters raised in the Notice of Contention. It would be
inefficient to sever those matters from the rest of the litigation. It is preferable that
the whole of this unfortunate story should come on for hearing in the Court of
Appeal when it is ready and when all matters in contention between the parties
at that time can be disposed of.
It is at least possible that, in the event that the Bank has access to the fresh
evidence and is satisfied as to the genuineness of the contents, the matters raised
in the Notice of Contention will provide no ultimate barrier to the Court's
correction of an injustice to Mr Frano Grgic if that is what has occurred. It is also
possible that the Bank might, in such circumstances, consent to the amendment
of the tide to the land in the light of all the facts which have come to light since
the matter was tried before Lusher AJ.
In saying that, I indicate no prejudgment. I simply reflect what has been very
properly put before me by the representatives of the parties.
The result of the foregoing is that the following orders should be made: 1.
Stand over the further hearing of the motion for directions, anterior to the appeal,
until Monday, 17 May 1993; 2. Order that the solicitor for Mr Frano Grgic give
notice to the solicitor or solicitors for Mr Anthony Grgic, Mrs Aida Grgic and Mr
Francesco Sierra, if known, or to such persons personally within eight days of
4 UNREPORTED JUDGMENTS
this date of the listing of the matter for directions before the Court on 17 May
1993 for the purpose of affording such persons the opportunity of making any
representations to the Court which they may consider appropriate concerning
access by the present parties to the transcript of conversations recorded pursuant
to the warrant issued under the Listening Devices Act; 3. Order the further
consideration of the application to set the appeal down for hearing and to fix a
timetable for the filing of affidavits and to consider the remittal to the Common
Law Division of any questions which may be appropriate as a result of the
outcome of the hearing on 17 May 1993. It will be expected that at that hearing
the parties will place before the Court as full a report as possible concerning the
outcome of the criminal proceedings pending against Mrs Aida Grgic and Mr
Francesco Sierra; 4. Costs of the motion to be costs in the appeal; and 5. Grant
access to both parties to the documents produced to the Court on subpoena save
for the transcript of conversation secured pursuant to the warrant under the
Listening Devices Act.
"MR MCKENZIE: This may be an administrative matter. But it would be
convenient, particularly with the Easter break coming up, if my instructing
solicitor were given access to uplift the documents and photocopy them. I
understand there is a photocopy facility here?
HIS HONOUR: Yes. Is there any reason why that should not be done?
MR XENOS: No, your Honour.
HIS HONOUR: You can unclip the documents...
MR MCKENZIE: There might be a difficulty in that. There was a record of
interview with the lady and she was asked to listen to the tape and pieces were
put to her. I think that should come within prohibition.
HIS HONOUR: It is very proper for you to bring that to my knowledge. I think
I should simply direct that all of that material be simply clipped and not be made
available to the parties.
MR MCKENZIE: It may be better if the whole of the brief were put in that
position.
MR XENOS: I take it that is one third of the three documents which make up
the appellant's brief?
HIS HONOUR: Yes. All of that material, in the light of what I have now been
told, will be handed back to the court officer and kept in an envelope, not to be
opened without an order of the Court or a Judge of Appeal.
MR XENOS: Perhaps my learned friend's instructing solicitor might be
permitted to take photocopies with copies to be sent to me within fourteen days?
HIS HONOUR: Yes, that may be done."
1. Stand over the further hearing of the motion for directions, anterior to
the appeal, until Monday 17 May 1993;
2. Order that the solicitor for Mr Franco Grgic give notice to the solicitor
or solicitors for Mr Antonio Grgic, Mrs Aida Grgic and Mr Francesco
Sierra, if known, or to such persons personally within eight days of this
date of the listing of the matter for directions before the Court on 17
May 1993 for the purpose of affording such persons the opportunity of
making any representations to the Court which they may consider
appropriate concerning access by the present parties to the transcript of
conversations recorded pursuant to the warrant issued under the
Listening Devices Act;
3. [For further orders see transcript].
URJ GRGIC v AUSTRALIA and NEW ZEALAND BANKING GROUP LTD (Kirby P) 5
Counsel for the Claimant: JR McKenzie
Solicitors for the Claimant: Garry Penhall
Counsel for the Opponent: J Xenos (Solicitor)
Solicitors for the Opponent: Dowe Xenos