LARSEN v NSW INSURANCE MINISTERIAL CORPORATION [1993] NSWCA 119
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LARSEN v NSW INSURANCE MINISTERIAL CORPORATION
SUPREME COURT OF NEW SOUTH WALES — COURT OF APPEAL
KiRBY P, MEAGHER JA and HANDLEY JA
5 November 1993
[1993] NSWCA 119
DAMAGES — personal injury — rigger 38 years — osteoarthritis in wrist —
judgment for $349,495 — appeal and cross appeal — errors in amounts in
calculation — challenge to general damages — complaint about past and future
economic loss — errors in reasoning — failure to allow for special contingencies in
case — held: Appeal and cross appeal dismissed — Court does not fine tune damages
judgments — overall result correct.
Kirby P. I will ask Meagher JA to deliver the first judgment.
Meagher JA. In this matter the plaintiff, Mr Larsen, suffered an accident on
18 October 1985 when he was thirty-one years of age. His Honour Judge
McDevitt, on the hearing of the action, awarded a verdict in the sum of
$349,495.67 in his favour. This has attracted an appeal from the defendant and a
cross-appeal from the plaintiff.
The case contained a number of points on which we have heard detailed
argument. The case seems to be more difficult from a mathematical reservation
than most cases. On the cross-appeal, the plaintiff was undoubtedly correct when
he complains that his Honour took in out-of-pocket expenses at an unjustifiably
low figure of $865.00 instead of $9,108.00. The plaintiff is also correct — and the
appellant accepted — in alleging that his Honour took an unjustifiable interest
rate for past economic loss, namely, four per cent instead of seven per cent. If one
adjusted his Honour's figures toaccount for these two items one would have to
add the best part of another $25,000.00 to the verdict.
The defendant on the appeal has attacked three main areas. One is the general
damages, as to which I should say at once I would not disturb them in the
slightest, particularly in view of the discretionary nature of general damages.
Secondly, as to the past economic loss, the appellant makes a number of
complaints but bearing in mind that the figure which his Honour awarded was
only $84,861.00, and the figure which the appellant suggests is correct is
$78,000.00, the complaints are hardly of major interest.
Where the major dispute arises, however, is future economic loss which was
awarded by his Honour to the plaintiff in the sum of $168,000.00.
There are many attacks of some considerable cogency made on this figure. It
was said it was based on a false finding that the plaintiff would continue to work
as a welder at Garden Island until he was aged sixty-five, whereas there was no
such evidence. There is some truth in this allegation. It was also said that his
Honour made no discount for adverse contingencies, and that is apparently true.
It is also said that the assessment of diminution in future earning capacity of fifty
per cent, was excessive, and, at first sight, that would seem so to be true. What
his Honour did, in calculating future economic loss, was simply to take the
current rate of pay of a rigger, which was $430.00, divided by half getting the
figure of $215.00 and calculated that out until age sixty-five.
2 UNREPORTED JUDGMENTS
My initial intention was to uphold the appeal on the basis that that is obviously
an incorrect way of doing things. However, I have been convinced by Mr Tonner,
in a very interesting argument, that the future economic loss ought not be
disturbed. It may, perhaps, be a fraction high — one does not know — but if one
treats the fifty per cent diminution in earning capacity as including adverse
contingencies, the figure does make more sense, particularly when one
appreciates that the loss at the commencement of the period would be very much
less than the loss toward the end of the period; at age sixty/sixty five I imagine
the plaintiff's loss would be very much greater than that. Taking one thing with
another I would propose that the court accede to Mr Tonner's submission that
both the appeal and cross-appeal be dismissed.
Kirby P. I agree.
Handley JA. I agree. I also thought that the figure for future economic loss too
high but I was reminded, that the plaintiff was aged thirty-eight so at the date of
trial he had twenty-seven years of his normal uninjured retirement from work at
sixty-five. Given the progression of the plaintiff's osteoarthritis in his wrists it
seems to me that, on the evidence before the trial judge, the plaintiff would have
lost far more than fifty per cent of his capacity for many of those years. In the
circumstances I concur in the reasons and the orders proposed by Meagher JA.
Kirby P. The Court adds the order that the appellant should pay two-thirds of
the respondent's costs of the appeal and that there be no order as to the costs of
the cross-appeal. The order in respect of the costs of the appeal is designed to
take into account the success of the cross-appellant in the cross-appeal. The
reason for dismissing the cross-appeal is that, when looked at as a whole, the final
judgment entered (allowing for the cross-appeal) is in a sum which the Court
would not dispute.
The orders of the Court will therefore be:
1. Appeal dismissed;
2. Cross-appeal dismissed;
3. Appellant to pay two-thirds of the costs of the respondent of the appeal.
Orders accordingly.
Counsel for the appellant: G R Petty
Solicitors for the appellant: Michael E Stevens and Co
Counsel for the respondent: R C Toner
Solicitors for the respondent: G M Meadows (Solicitor for GIO of NSW)
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