JASWANT KHERA v JONES [1993] NSWCA 154

JASWANT KHERA vy JONES SUPREME COURT OF NEW SOUTH WALES — COURT OF APPEAL

MAHONEY JA, CLARKE JA and MEAGHER JA 22 November 1993

[1993] NSWCA 154

Mahoney JA. The Court notes that it is now a fraction before 2.30 pm. Mr Khera is not here and there is no explanation for his absence. The Court will dismiss the summons with costs.

LATER:

Mahoney JA: This is an application for leave to appeal against the orders made by Cole J on 8 September 1993. The orders were made in proceedings brought by Ian Robert Durston Jones, a solicitor, against Mr Jaswant Khera, another solicitor, in proceedings No 3496 of 1993.

The initial proceeding is one by Mr Jones against Mr Khera. They were partners, as solicitors, for a short time. The partnership came to an end when Mr Jones alleged there had been misrepresentation. Mr Khera denied it. The proceedings came before Cole J on 8 September for the making of interlocutory orders. It is accepted the orders were interlocutory and his Honour, in his judgment indicates he was making orders based upon the Notice of Motion then before him.

The main orders in respect of which leave to appeal is sought are the orders relating to the appointment of Mr Jones as receiver. Mr Jones sought that he be appointed as receiver. His Honour, in the course of a substantial judgment running into some nineteen or more pages, determined to appoint Mr Jones and made the ancillary and other orders then referred to.

Application is made for leave to appeal and the Court has a statement under Part 51 Rule 3 prepared by Mr Khera. Mr Khera has appeared for himself in the matter.

When the matter came initially before the Court Mr Khera sought to lodge an additional affidavit in support of the application. An affidavit by him sworn 22 November 1993 was tendered to the Court. That was rejected on the ground that it was argumentative or otherwise inadmissible. It is not necessary to go through the grounds. The affidavit, in my opinion, is clearly not proper to be put before the Court in the sense that essentially it simply contains argument. I do not think that it is necessary or appropriate that the Court attempt to disentangle the assertions from such matters of fact as may be embodied in it.