NSW INSURANCE MINISTERIAL CORPORATION (formerly GIO OF NEW SOUTH WALES) v WALLACE [1993] NSWCA 200
NSW Caselaw
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NSW INSURANCE MINISTERIAL CORPORATION (formerly GIO OF
NEW SOUTH WALES) v WALLACE
SUPREME COURT OF NEW SOUTH WALES COURT OF APPEAL
MEAGHER, HANDLEY and CRIPPS JJA
22 March 1993, 22 March 1993
[1993] NSWCA 200
DAMAGES — quantum — no question of principle.
Meagher JA I will ask my brother Handley JA to give the first judgment.
Handley JA This is an appeal by the defendant from an assessment of
damages by Master McLaughlin. The plaintiff was a single man aged 58 at the
date of injury and 63 at the date of trial. He sustained severe head injuries in the
accident and was unconscious for over three weeks.
The Master found that the disabilities from which the plaintiff suffered were
essentially disabilities resulting from brain damage and that he suffered from
gross cognitive impairment. He was described by Dr John Lawson, who gave
evidence on behalf of the defendant, as being grossly intellectually and
neurologically impaired. He has little ability to communicate, suffers from
incontinence of the bowel and the bladder and is totally dependent upon others
for all personal activities, including bathing, toileting, dressing and eating.
The Master assessed damages at $1,024,832.19, to which were added the fees
of the Protective Commissioner for administering the verdict.
The defendant has propounded only four modest challenges to this award. The
first in relation to interest on past loss of wages is not contested. The learned
Master calculated such interest without allowing for the fact that the plaintiff had
received workers compensation payments. These payments will have to be
refunded from the damages but without interest. The plaintiff would be over
compensated if he were awarded interest on his past loss of wages without
allowing for the receipt of workers compensation during this period. This is
established by Bachelor v Burke (1981) 148 CLR 448. The agreed deduction
from the verdict is $16,596.11.
The second and third contentions relate to alleged double counting between the
awards of compensation for loss of earnings, and the awards for the cost of care
in a nursing home. Sharman v Evans (1977) 138 CLR 563 establishes that double
counting can occur in those circumstances and some reduction in the cost of care
should be made to avoid double compensation.
However, I am satisfied in this case that no adjustment of the award of the
learned Master is called for to avoid such over compensation. At the date of trial
the cost of care was in the order of $123 a day, $103 being received by way of
Commonwealth subsidy and $20 a day being paid for from the plaintiff's invalid
pension.
Damages for the cost of future care and for such cost in the period between
trial and judgment were based on the amount of the Commonwealth subsidy at
the date of trial. The balance which was being paid from the plaintiff's invalid
pension was not taken into account. This means that no deduction from the
damages awarded under these heads is required to avoid double counting.
2 UNREPORTED JUDGMENTS
The figure for past out of pocket expenses was agreed at the trial at
$185,868.56. The figure for past nursing home care is not disclosed in the
evidence, nor is the basis upon which that figure was agreed. However it is likely
that the figure for past nursing home care will equal the Commonwealth subsidies
which will have to be refunded and does not include the additional amounts paid
from the plaintiffs invalid pension. In that event there will again be no double
counting and no occasion to reduce this component of the damages awarded by
the learned Master. I would therefore reject the third and fourth grounds of
appeal.
There remains the question of general damages. The learned Master awarded
the sum of $200,000 under this head. On the evidence the plaintiff had a life
expectancy of ten years at the date of trial. This reduced life expectancy was not
causally related to the accident. The Master found that the plaintiff was "to an
extent able to understand his own condition" and therefore had some awareness
of his loss, and this finding was not challenged.
In my opinion, and with respect to the Master, the award of $200,000 for a man
of this age by way of general damages when the plaintiff was only aware of his
loss "to some extent" is disproportionate and outside the range of a sound
discretionary judgment. I would therefore propose that this past of the award be
set aside and on a reassessment I would award the sum of $150,000.
Mr Gross QC for the respondent sought in a notice of contention filed
immediately prior to the hearing to establish that in one respect the Master's
assessment was inadequate and an additional amount should be allowed by way
of off-set against the reductions established by the appellant. The Master awarded
the sum of $29,413.71 for past gratuitous care but made no corresponding
allowance for the future. It seems, however, from the Master's reasons for
judgment, that no claim was ever made for future gratuitous care and it is
significant that no notice of cross-appeal or contention was filed within time
which raised this as a ground for complaint against the Master's award.
In those circumstances I conclude that no such claim was made at the trial and
therefore no such claim can now be entertained.
I would propose therefore that the appeal be allowed and that the judgment for
the plaintiff for $1,024,084.92 be set aside and in lieu thereof there be judgment
for $936,193.08 plus an appropriate allowance for the administration fees of the
Protective Commissioner in relation to a judgment in that sum. The respondent
should pay the costs of the appeal but have a certificate under the Suitors Fund
Act.
Meagher JA I agree except on the question of general damages. In my opinion
the amount awarded for general damages should not be disturbed. The plaintiff
suffered truly horrendous injuries which totally ruined the quality of his life for
its remaining fifteen years, the effect of which is he is at least intermittently
conscious of. Nor do I say anyone could rationally say $200,000 is too much
whereas $150,000 is not. Otherwise I agree with what has fallen from my brother
Handley JA.
Cripps JA I agree with the orders proposed by Handley JA and his reasons
therefore, and in particular I agree with his views concerning the question of
general damages.
Meagher JA: The order of the Court therefore is the order proposed by
Handley JA.
1. Appeal allowed.
WABW INSURANCE MINISTERIAL CORPORATION (formerly GIO OF NEW SOUTH
WALES) v WALLACE (Cripps JA)
2. Judgment for the Plaintiff below in the sum of $1,024,084.92 is set aside
and in lieu thereof judgment is substituted in the sum of $936,193.08
plus an appropriate allowance for the administration fees of the
Protective Commissioner in relation to a judgment in that sum.
5 3. The Respondent is to pay the costs of the appeal and have a certificate
under the Suitors Fund Act.
Counsel:
10 Appellant: M Elkaim
Respondent: BJ Gross QC with L Levy
Solicitors
15 Respondent: TG Hartmann and Associates