WENTWORTH v WENTWORTH; WENTWORTH v WENTWORTH EXECUTOR OF THE ESTATE OF THE LATE G N WENTWORTH; WENTWORTH v WENTWORTH SUPREME COURT OF NEW SOUTH WALES — COURT OF APPEAL CLARKE JA 11 September 1995 [1995] NSWCA 506 Clarke JA. There are a number of notices of motion before the court, some brought by Miss Wentworth, some brought by Mr Wentworth, some brought by Mr Wentworth. The latter seeks an order that conditions be removed from a stay granted to him by Powell JA on 21 August. Miss Wentworth, for her part, seeks an order dissolving the stay on the ground that Mr Wentworth is not able to provide or to satisfy a condition of the story, and has, in some type of fraud on the court, obtained the stays knowing that he cannot meet the condition. The present position is that the conditional stay has been extended until 9 October 1995. If, on that date, Mr Wentworth has not complied with the condition then, unless he is able to get a further extension, the stay will come to an end. The order extending the stay from 4 September to 9 October was made by consent but Miss Wentworth says — and I have no reason to disbelieve — that at the time sheconsented she did not realise that Mr Wentworth's financial situation was such that at no time since June 1995 could he comply with the condition. Before saying what I propose to do with these applications, I should mention another application made by Miss Wentworth today consequent upon the filing, with leave, of a notice of motion in court today, which concerns a claim for injunctions restraining Mr Wentworth from disposing of his assets, which was dealt with by Bryson J late last week. She sought the injunctions, but was unsuccessful in her claims and she has now moved in this Court for a number of orders, including an order that his Honour's judgment be set aside and declared void ab initio. I have a fundamental difficulty in dealing with the claims set out in the notice of motion — either on the basis that they are prefatory to an appeal or that they involve some independent exercise of original jurisdiction to grant injunctions — arising from the absence of Bryson J's judgment. I have made it plain that I would not be disposed to deal with the second motion unless and until I have the opportunity of studying that judgment. The reason for my insistence on that condition is, I think, obvious, because his Honour gave, as I understand it, a reasoned decision in deliberating upon the present motion. WENTWORTH: Your Honour, could I just correct it. His Honour did not deliver a decision. HIS HONOUR: A reasoned decision? WENTWORTH: No, your Honour. HIS HONOUR: I have been told that, I might be wrong. I am going to leave it like that. The other reason why I would be loath to deal with the application in the absence of Bryson J's judgment is that the transactions between these parties and the individual transactions of Mr Wentworth are complex in the extreme and his troubles may, as Mr Lindsay SC says, be dependent upon or have resulted 2 UNREPORTED JUDGMENTS fromsome of the litigious problems he has faced in the litigation to date. I make no judgment as to the rights or wrongs of any party in the litigation to date. I simply wish to point out that it is highly complex and in the time that has been available to me today I have simply been unable to come to grips with the full detail of the interrelationship between the financial position of the parties and the litigation and the nuances of the case, in order to arrive at what might be a just conclusion of the motions presently before the court. I have already fixed for hearing all the costs appeals for a date late in November and because of the limitations of time available to the court, the desire of the parties to have the matters dealt with urgently has placed fairly severe restrictions upon the amount of time available for oral argument. I would not, however, wish, against objection, to stand over these motions for in excess of two months until that date. Quite apart from the delay there is the initial question of time available to the court to hear the appeals. On the other hand, I am not comfortable in dealing with either of the motions today because I think that they may be linked in some way. Miss Wentworth has advised me that she is leaving Sydney tomorrow and will be away until 24 September. Because of that factor and over Mr Lindsay's objections, I have declined to fix a date for the hearing of the making of the orders arising out of reasons for decision delivered on 28 August, until 25 September. That would not, however, be a convenient date from the court's point of view, for reasons I have already enunciated, to adjourn the motions to. Although I regard what I am about to do as unsatisfactory, I have to take into consideration not only the urgency of the matters from the point of view of the parties, but the exigencies of the court's time which is extremely limited. In all these circumstances I propose to adjourn all of the motions presently before me until 9 October which is a date onwhich the conditions need to be met in order for the stay to continue, in the absence of a further extension. I will reserve the costs of the motion until that day. — WENTWORTH: That includes the injunction application as well? HIS HONOUR: Yes it does? Orders accordingly.