BLUETT v NEW SOUTH WALES INSURANCE MINISTERIAL CORPORATION [1995] NSWCA 50
NSW Caselaw
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BLUETT v NEW SOUTH WALES INSURANCE MINISTERIAL
CORPORATION
SUPREME COURT OF NEW SOUTH WALES COURT OF APPEAL
HANDLEY and SHELLER JJA
9 June 1995, 9 June 1995
[1995] NSWCA 50
MOTOR VEHICLE ACCIDENT — QUANTUM — NO QUESTION OF
PRINCIPLE Motor vehicle accident — quantum — no question of principle — no
grounds for overturning the trial judge's awards.
ORDER
Appeal dismissed with costs.
Handley JA This is an appeal by a plaintiff from an assessment of damages
by McLachlan DCJ in a reserved judgment delivered on 26 May 1994.
The plaintiff, while driving a motor cycle on 1 May 1987 was injured in a
collision with a motor vehicle driven by a person insured by the respondent.
Liability was compromised at the trial on the basis of an apportionment of twenty
per cent responsibility against the plaintiff for his contributory negligence. The
trial judge awarded the plaintiff $15,000 for general damages and $10,000 for
economic loss, but the total of $25,000 was reduced because of the plaintiff's
contributory negligence, resulting in judgment for $20,000.
The trial judge made findings adverse to the plaintiffs credit in a number of
significant respects and Mr Boyd, who has appeared in this Court for the plaintiff
but who did not appear at the trial, understandably but inevitably, accepted that
he was not in a position to challenge those credit findings.
The trial judge said that he couldn't accept evidence from the plaintiff as to his
injuries, disabilities and his losses unless there was some appropriate
corroboration.
Mr Boyd has endeavoured to find in the materials before the Court, particularly
the medical reports, matters which corroborate the plaintiff's complaints of pain
and disability resulting from the accident. Unfortunately for the plaintiff this was
not an easy task.
The initial challenge to the judge's award was directed to the amount allowed
for general damages. Here Mr Boyd relied principally upon the problems that the
plaintiff said he had with his ankles, particularly his left ankle, following this
injury. The Court was taken to a number of medical reports from doctors
qualified on behalf of the plaintiff in support of this submission. Unfortunately,
the Court has the common problem that no doctor gave oral evidence before the
trial judge and the credit findings necessarily devalue any history contained in the
medical reports and any complaints and symptoms except those of a wholly
objective nature. The Court was taken to reports by Dr Seaton of 9 August 1990,
30 November 1990 and 3 June 1993.
In the report of 9 August 1990 Dr Seaton recorded complaints by the plaintiff
of pain and instability in his left ankle and the doctor diagnosed chronic inversion
sprains in both ankles which he thought were related to the motor vehicle
accident. His later reports are consistent with this first report. On 30 November
2 UNREPORTED JUDGMENTS
1990 Dr Seaton reported seeing stress films of the plaintiff's ankles which
showed that they were unstable and that advanced post traumatic osteo-arthritis
was present in the left ankle. In his report of 3 June 1993 the doctor suggested
surgical intervention for the left ankle, which he described as the plaintiff's major
problem.
The views of Dr Seaton are, in general, supported by Dr Middleton who saw
the plaintiff in June 1988, August 1991 and October 1993.
Unfortunately for the plaintiff, the specialist he first consulted after the
accident, Dr Alam, whom he saw on 26 October 1987 and who took a full history
recorded no complaint of pain or disability in either ankle.
Following the accident the plaintiff was taken by ambulance to the Nepean
Hospital at Penrith and after some treatment was discharged later on the same
day. The discharge summary records no problems in relation to the left ankle.
There is a diagnosis of fractures to the right tibia and fibula. There were
complaints of pain in the right ankle and the left leg. On examination a graze was
observed to the dorsum of the right foot with swelling. The problems with the left
leg involved grazing and tenderness on the lateral aspect and swelling below the
knee joint. X-rays were taken of the right leg.
Four days after the accident the plaintiff consulted his local doctor who
reported that the plaintiff then had a plaster of paris on his left leg which seems
totally inconsistent with the discharge summary from the hospital. The doctor
also reported a swollen left ankle, a tender left leg and scars on his left leg. There
was also confusion in the hospital reports of 12 May 1988 and 20 July 1988
relating to the location of the plaintiff's injuries on either the left or the right leg,
but neither report refers to any problems with the left ankle or indeed with the
right ankle, though it is noted that there was swelling in the right foot.
The hospital discharge summary noted that following the application of a crepe
bandage to one of the plaintiff's legs, but to which is not clear, he was able to
weight bear and was discharged in that condition.
The problems for the plaintiff are compounded by evidence given in
cross-examination in which it was suggested to him that he had an injury to his
left ankle while working for Uniwire in April 1988. The cross-examination, on its
most favourable view for the plaintiff, was not conclusive but a number of
admissions were made which, given the findings on credit, would certainly
support the judge's doubts as to the causal nexus between the plaintiff's
continuing problems in his left ankle and this motor vehicle accident.
The doctors who qualified for the defendant, in particular Dr Burniston and Dr
Millar, thought there were no particular disabilities or weaknesses in the
plaintiff's ankles and Dr Miller recommended strongly against surgery.
His Honour's findings on the medical issues were not particularly favourable
to the plaintiff. He noted Dr Burniston's opinion that on x-ray examination in
December 1991 there were no abnormalities of significance in the left ankle joint.
His Honour found that the plaintiff did have problems with his left ankle for at
least a year after the accident but said that he was not satisfied, on the balance of
probabilities, that the symptoms were as severe as the plaintiff claimed and he
also said that he had doubts as to causation. It is impossible for this Court to
interfere with these findings.
The plaintiff made a number of other complaints of injury as a result of this
accident. Dr Alam, in his report of 26 October, listed complaints of pain in the
plaintiff's back, left forearm, left outer leg, complaints of headaches, problems
with his eyes, concentration and memory. None of these complaints, apart from
URWETT v NEW SOUTH WALES INSURANCE MINISTERIAL CORPORATION (Handle?
JA)
the problem with the left outer leg, are supported by the hospital discharge
summary or the report of the plaintiffs general practitioner, based on an
examination within four days of the accident.
Given the judge's findings and in particular his credit findings, this court
cannot hold that the plaintiff discharged the civil onus of establishing that these
other complaints were attributable to this particular accident. I would add that
there is evidence that the plaintiff suffered a broken cheek bone in a fight in a
hotel after this accident and was again injured in another fight in a hotel and there
is, of course, the evidence, such as it is, in cross-examination about his ankle
injury at work in April 1988.
Given these findings, in my opinion this Court cannot or at least should not,
disturb his Honour's award of general damages.
The next challenge related to his Honour's aware of $10,000 for past economic
loss. The judge accepted that the plaintiff may have had some difficulties in
finding a job for a lengthy period but he was unable to accurately assess that loss.
The plaintiff had not been continuously employed prior to the accident and in the
financial year ending 30 June 1987, had been out of work for approximately six
months before the accident. The only objective evidence produced by the plaintiff
in support of his claim for economic loss were copies of his 1987 and 1988 tax
returns. There was no objective or documentary evidence of the plaintiff's
earnings for later financial years.
His Honour gave judgment on 26 May 1994 shortly before the end of the 1994
financial year but there was no documentary evidence relating to the plaintiff's
earnings in that year.
The plaintiff's 1987 tax return showed gross income of $11,131 and his 1988
return gross income of $10,362. That tax return annexed group certificates which
showed that the plaintiff worked for three weeks during November 1987 with
Muras Steel Fabrications. He said in evidence that he ceased working for that
company because he wasn't able to handle the movement of steel drums. He later
secured a job with Uniwire Pty Ltd, starting on 25 February 1988 and worked
continuously for that company for eighteen weeks until the end of the financial
year.
In the absence of any evidence of the plaintiffs earnings after 30 June 1988
and given the possible intervention of an accident at work in April 1988 and the
findings of Dr Alam in October 1987, it seems the better view is that the
plaintiff's claim for past economic loss was for a closed period ending on 26
February 1988 with an allowance for the three weeks in which he was at work
during November. On this view of the facts, the appellant is not entitled to any
greater award than that made by the trial judge.
The final point taken in support of the appeal is that his Honour didn't allow
any interest on the plaintiffs past economic loss. Prima facie, the plaintiff had an
entitlement to such interest but failed to plead it in the statement of claim or in
the Pt12 particulars. His Honour gave no reasons for failing to award interest but
it is apparent that no such claim was made at the trial. This is supported by the
fact that the notice of appeal, filed on 21 November 1994, presumably following
an earlier notice of holding appeal filed within twenty eight days of his Honour's
judgment, does not include his Honour's failure to award interest on past
economic loss as a ground of appeal.
His Honour may have awarded interest on past economic loss had he been
asked to do so when he delivered his reserved judgment but it is equally possible
that his Honour's award of $10,000 was intended to include an appropriate figure
4 UNREPORTED JUDGMENTS
for interest. The plaintiff was out of work for ten months from May 1987 to
February 1988, apart from the three weeks at Muras Steel Fabrications and on
that basis, having regard fo his tax returns for 1987 and 1988, the award for
$10,000 was not ungenerous.
5 Forall these reasons I am of the view that the appeal should be dismissed with
costs.
Sheller JA I agree.
Handley JA The order of the Court will be, the appeal is dismissed with costs.
Appeal dismissed with costs.
Counsel for the Appellant: M BOYD
15 Instructed by: MAXWELL BERGHOUSE AND IVES
Counsel for the Respondent: C LAUGHTON
Instructed by: STEPHEN MODDER
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