WENTWORTH v WENTWORTH SUPREME COURT OF NEW SOUTH WALES — COURT OF APPEAL PRIESTLEY JA 5 October 1995 [1995] NSWCA 508 Priestley JA. On 24 August 1995 the Court of Appeal handed down reasons for the disposition of an appeal and cross-appeal against orders made by Santow J under the Family Provision Act. On 4 October 1995 the same bench of the Court of Appeal considered the consequences of what had happened when the reasons of 24 August 1995 were delivered. Reasons were then given and orders pronounced. In the course of pronouncing the orders, the Court indicated that certain of the orders made yesterday were made to the extent that it was then necessary to make them, or words to that effect, there having been a question whether some orders pursuant to the reasons had not, in fact, been made on 24 August. The course the Court took yesterday enabled orders to be stated finally, without deciding whether some of them had or had not been first made on 24 August. On 24 August an order staying the effect of any orders made on that day had been made. Yesterday the Court discharged that stay. Ms Wentworth then made an application for a stay of the orders of the Court made yesterday but, for reasons then given, which I will not attempt to summarise, the Court declined to entertain that application, remarking, however, that it would beopen to Ms Wentworth to make an application for a stay to a single judge of this Court or to a full bench of this Court. Ms Wentworth then made an application, in what precise form I do not know, but which was reported to me as an application for a stay, and I was told that the application for a stay would be heard on Monday, 9 October next. During the course of today, an application was made that the Court should hear today an application for a stay, to hold the position until Monday next, 9 October. I granted leave to file a Notice of Motion for a stay returnable today at 3.45 pm and requiring that notice of my order be given to opponent parties before 2.30 pm. In the result, Ms Wentworth appeared for herself, Mr Meek for the defendant, Mr Wentworth, and Mr Lee for an ANZ company, which is the trustee of certain property which is involved in the proceedings. After indicating to the parties that it seemed to me that there was no time for me this afternoon to get involved in the substance of any considerations concerning whether or not a stay should be granted of the orders made yesterday by the Court, but that I had it in mind to try and devise orders which would simply leave the position as it is at this moment, untouched, until the Court can have an opportunity of considering the substantive arguments on both sides concerning whether or not a stay should be granted, I heard a number of submissions from all three parties. The net result, as I gather it from what was put to me, was that there would be no prejudice to the defendant, Mr Wentworth, if I were to hold the position in statu quo until Monday, of such a kind as to make it desirable to leave the orders of the Court of Appeal on foot and operative, to the extent that they could operate, UNREPORTED JUDGMENTS pending formal sealing and entry, and that the possibility of prejudice to Ms Wentworth from allowing the orders to remain fully operative so far as they can operate, subject to formal sealing and entry,would outweigh that which Mr Wentworth would suffer for the very small period involved in the time which will elapse between now and Monday. Mr Lee for the trustee drew to my attention problems that the trustee may have but, once again, it did not seem to me that the possibility of any difficulty that might be caused to his client by the holding of matters in status quo until Monday warranted my taking any other course than the one that I have proposed. In the result, therefore, the orders that I make are: qd) (2) I suspend the operation of the orders of this Court made yesterday until 4 pm, Monday, 9 October 1995, or earlier order. I likewise suspend until 4 pm, Monday, 9 October 1995, or earlier order, the operation of any orders of Santow J pursuant to which, directly or indirectly, payments of money have been or are due to Ms Wentworth. I do not understand that these orders that I have now made will prevent — and they are specifically intended not to prevent — the defendant, Mr Wentworth, from taking further procedural steps between now and Monday towards perfecting the form of the orders which this Court made yesterday; that is, it is intended that the defendant, Mr Wentworth, may take any steps in accordance with the usual practice which leads to the sealing and entry of orders of the Court, short of actually having the orders sealed and entered. The obvious idea of this is that if a stay not be granted on Monday, then the defendant, Mr Wentworth, would have not lost any time towards the mechanical side of having the orders made yesterday sealed and entered. To repeat myself I fear, I would like, nevertheless, to make it clear that the intention of the Court this afternoon is simply to impose a moratorium on the parties between now and the making of any decision on Monday so far as anything substantive is concerned happening pursuant to the orders of either Santow J or this Court in that interval. I will reserve any questions of costs until the disposition of the application for a stay. Orders accordingly.