CACHIA v ST GEORGE BUILDING SOCIETY LTD [1995] NSWCA 68

CACHIA v ST GEORGE BUILDING SOCIETY LTD

SUPREME COURT OF NEW SOUTH WALES — COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEAL

GLEESON CJ, CLARKE JA and MEAGHER JA 14 August 1995

[1995] NSWCA 68

Gleeson CJ. In October 1990, following a hearing before Cole J in the Commercial Division of this Court in proceedings brought by Mr Cachia against the St George Building Society, judgment was given for the defendant. Mr Cachia, who was and is conducting this litigation in person, then appealed to the Court of Appeal of this Court. The appeal came on for hearing before Clarke and Cripps JJA and myself. The appeal was dismissed. The principal judgment was written by Clarke JA, and his Honour's reasons were agreed in by Cripps JA and myself.

Mr Cachia then made an application for special leave to appeal to the High Court. In that application, he asserted various errors which he said were to be found in the judgment of Clarke JA. He also asserted that he had not received a proper hearing in the Court of Appeal. Mr Cachia argued his own application for special leave to appeal to the High Court and the High Court refused leave.

The order of this Court dismissing the appeal from Cole J was entered on 6 April 1993, and the application for special leave was heard before the High Court on 9 August 1993. Subsequently, Mr Cachia, on this occasion represented by senior counsel, applied to the High Court to have the High Court reopen its decision to refuse special leave to appeal. The High Court refused Mr Cachia's application.

In July 1994, Mr Cachia then made a further application to this Court to reopen its decision on the appeal from Cole J. That application was heard before Priestley and Clarke JJA and myself. The application was refused.

My reasons for refusing the application, which were agreed in by Clarke JA, turned both upon questions relating to jurisdiction and upon questions relating to discretion. It is incorrect to assert that the reasoning of that decision was related solely to jurisdictional matters. Priestley JA, who reached the same conclusion as the majority, decided the matter on a purely jurisdictional basis.