BOGOEVSKI v METROPOLITAN WATER SEWERAGE & DRAINAGE BOARD [1995] NSWCA 52
NSW Caselaw
Full text
Select any passage to save a personal note with optional tags.
BOGOEVSKI v METROPOLITAN WATER SEWERAGE & DRAINAGE
BOARD
SUPREME COURT OF NEW SOUTH WALES — COURT OF APPEAL
Kirpy P, HANDLEY JA and POWELL JA
21, 28 April 1995
[1995] NSWCA 52
APPEAL — jury verdict — whether against the weight of evidence — two counts —
evidence available that first accident did not occur and that second accident caused
no damage — held: Verdicts reasonably open on the evidence — no issue of principle
— appeal dismissed. Calin vy The Greater Union Organisation Pty Limited (1991) 173
CLR 33 applied.
Kirby P. I agree with Handley JA.
Handley JA. These are appeals by a plaintiff from judgments entered by
Finlay J pursuant to verdicts of a jury. The plaintiff had sued his then employer
the Metropolitan Water Sewerage & Drainage Board to recover damages for
injuries allegedly suffered in February 1977 while he was a passenger on the back
of a motor lorry operated by the Board which was taking employees to Liverpool
Station. In the second action the plaintiff sued the owner and driver of a motor
vehicle for injuries allegedly suffered as the result of a rear end collision at
Bankstown in February, 1982. The actions were heard together in April 1989 and
the jury returned verdicts for the defendant in both cases.
The sole ground of appeal is that the jury's verdicts were so unreasonable that
they should be set aside and new trials ordered. A party who has failed before a
jury in an action conducted according to law faces a difficult task in seeking to
have the jury's verdict set aside. The principlewhich this Court must apply is that
formulated in Calin v The Greater Union Organisation Pty Ltd (1991) 173 CLR
33 at 41 as follows:
A court on appeal may order a new trial if the jury has reached a conclusion which
is against the evidence in a sense that the evidence in its totality preponderates so
strongly against the conclusion favoured by the jury that it can be said that the verdict
is such as reasonable jurors could not reach.
In the first action the plaintiffs case as pressed at the trial and on appeal was
that the Board was negligent in failing to provide a reasonably safe system of
work. The plaintiff's evidence was that the truck on which he and a group of his
workmates were travelling suddenly braked throwing the group onto the floor of
the tabletop and this fall caused the plaintiff his injuries. The Board was said to
have failed to provide a reasonably safe system of work because there were no
hand holds, straps or other forms of restraint which the plaintiff and his
workmates could have used to stop themselves falling onto the floor.
On this issue the jury were faced with a clear conflict of evidence. The Board
called two fellow workers who were on the truck at the time, Mr Kmiecik and Mr
Smith. Both denied that the plaintiff fell onto the floor. Both said he was not hurt
and that he did not complain of being injured. Mr Kmiecik said that when the
truck arrived at Liverpool Station everybody got off in a normal fashion and went
their own ways. The Board tendered a statement from Mr Lamb, the driver who
2 UNREPORTED JUDGMENTS
said that the truck was travelling at about fifteen mph when he braked and that
when he reached Liverpool Station all the men got off down a ladder and no-one
complained of being injured. There were also several significant inconsistencies
in the plaintiffs evidence.
The trial Judge in his summing up reminded the jury of the submission made
by counsel for the Board that they should not accept anything the plaintiff said
about this accident. Counsel was entitled to make this submission and the jury
were entitled to accept it. There is simply no foundation in the evidence for a
finding by this Court that the jury's verdict was in any way unreasonable.
In the second action there was no dispute that the rear end collision had
occurred and that the defendant had failed to exercise reasonable care. The sole
issue for the jury's consideration was whether the plaintiff had suffered a whip
lash injury in the accident. He relied upon his own evidence and evidence of
complaint to his local doctor, Dr Manevski. There is no dispute that the plaintiff
did complain to that doctor on the day of the accident. The doctor's statement to
that effect was read to the jury. On the other hand the plaintiff did not complain
to either the defendant or to the attending constable and when referred by his
local doctor to a specialist, Dr McJannet on 10 May, 1982 he did not mention the
February 1982 accident or complain about his neck or shoulders.
The plaintiff had previously complained to Dr McJannet of neck trouble on 9
September and 10 December 1981. Professor Jones said that x-rays of his neck
taken on the day of the accident showed that premature degenerative arthritis was
already present. There was also a substantial body of medical evidence before the
jury that the plaintiff was malingering. Evidence to this effect was given by Drs
McJannet, Watts, Haber, Morse and Tracey. The jury was also shown a film taken
in August 1987 which demonstrated free and unrestricted movement of the
plaintiff's neck. It showed that shortly before he got to Dr Revai's rooms he put
on a neck brace which he removed shortly after leaving. The Judge reminded the
jury in his summing up that counsel for the defendant had submitted that they
couldnot be satisfied that the plaintiff had injured his neck in this accident. There
was ample material before the jury which entitled them to reach that conclusion.
Ms Cotter-Moroz who appeared for the appellant, but who did not appear at
the trial, thoroughly prepared the case and in her written and oral submissions
said everything that could possibly have been said on behalf of her client.
However her diligence and skill have not persuaded me that this Court is entitled
to interfere with these verdicts. These were strong defendants" cases and the
verdicts, if not inevitable, were certainly reasonably open on the evidence. In my
opinion the appeal should be dismissed with costs.
Powell JA. I agree with Handley JA.
Appeal dismissed with costs.
Counsel for the appellant: A A Cotter-Moroz
Solicitors for the appellant: Evan A Kontoulas and Associates
Counsel for the respondent: H J Mater
Solicitors for the respondent: G M Meadows: Solicitor for Government
Insurance Office of New South Wales
Related laws
No related documents linked yet.
You've got 21 of 22 free Acts left this visit. Sign up anytime for Facts, Related, and study briefs too.