DOYLES SEAFOODS PTY LTD v PRCHLIK SUPREME COURT OF NEW SOUTH WALES COURT OF APPEAL PRIESTLEY, CLARKE and MEAGHER JJA 5 September 1995, 5 September 1995 [1995] NSWCA 130 WORKERS COMPENSATION ACT 1987 s26 — APPEAL ON FACT — SUFFICIENCY OF REASONS FOR DECISION — trial judge awards amount pursuant to s26 — employer appeals — Held: 1. on the whole of the evidence, the amount awarded by the judge was reasonable and well within the available range; 2. there was enough said by the judge to indicate the reasoning process adopted by his Honour — at any rate, where judge gives insufficient reasons the court would not order a new-trial where it would simply be a futility to do so because the same result would very likely be arrived at. ORDERS Appeal dismissed with costs. Priestley JA We have formed a clear view in this case that the appeal should be dismissed. The case can be dealt with in fairly general terms as it was, in large degree, before the trial judge, the late Judge Gibson, in the Compensation Court. The claim made was by the dependants of a young man who died at the age of seventeen while in the employ of the appellant. There was a contest before the trial judge on a number of matters, but in the appeal the number was reduced. It was not contested in the appeal that there was evidence upon which the judge was entitled to find that the parents of the deceased were dependent within the meaning of s26 of the Workers' Compensation Act 1987 upon their son. The trial judge awarded an amount of $50,000 pursuant to that section. The questions which the appellant argued in the court today were, in substance, two. It was submitted that, on the evidence, the judge should not - and indeed I think it was said could not - have come to the conclusion that the figure of $50,000 was appropriate. Secondly, it was said that the reasons which he gave for his decision were such that the appellant could not see how the $50,000 was arrived at. We are of the opinion that, when the evidence is read and then his Honour's reasons, it is relatively clear that his Honour's reasoning must have involved the following steps. First, the deceased was a member of a close-knit family. Second, he had given ample sign of intention to contribute substantial parts of his earnings to the support of the family, for moneys needed from time to time and also, according to his mother who was accepted by the judge, to contribute to the putting together of a sufficient sum of money to enable a better family home to be purchased. His mother said his idea was to put all the money together that he was earning to put in towards some sort of a nicer place to get to. As I said, the judge accepted that. Third, it is also relatively clear from the evidence that the factual finding was well open that the son was anxious to earn as much as he could, one of his motives being the help that he wished to give to his family. The fourth matter relatively obvious on the evidence was that his earnings were likely 2 UNREPORTED JUDGMENTS to increase substantially in the ten years or more from the date of his death, years during which he was likely to remain closely attached to his family. We further think that, from those broad factual findings, the amount of $50,000 which the trial judge arrived at was, to say the least, a reasonable amount for him to assess. For the appellant it was said, accurately enough, that the factual findings just listed were not made explicit by his Honour in his reasons. The court is of the view, however, that there was certainly enough said by his Honour to give rise to the thought in the mind of the reasonable reader, who was aware of the evidence in the case and the nature of the proceedings, that his Honour must have proceeded substantially upon the basis outlined. Had the amount that his Honour arrived at been one which struck the court as being either excessive or too small, it may have been necessary for the matter to be returned to the Compensation Court for a further hearing. That would have been on the basis that, had the figure his Honour arrived at been markedly out of line with the Court's experience of figures in cases of this kind, there must have been some mistake involved in the reasoning and not cured by the explicit statement of any reason for arriving at such figures. However, there is a well-established line of authority in this court that, although the trial judges are expected to give sufficient reasons to enable their decisions to be understood, even in cases where the error of law which is constituted by failure to do that is apparent, the court will not order a new trial where, in the court's view, it would be simply a futility to do so because, in the court's view, either the same or a very similar result would be very likely to be arrived at. In the present case we would wish to make it clear that we are not saying the judge's reasons were deficient because, as earlier stated, they make it possible to see the line of reasoning which his Honour followed in arriving at the figure which he did, but the further point needs to be made that, even if that challenge to his Honour's judgment had been made good, the court is of the view that, on the materials which his Honour made plain he accepted in the evidence before him, the result he arrived at was well within the available range. In those circumstances, even if the challenge had been made good, the court would have refused to order a new trial. The court's view is that the appeal should be dismissed with costs. Appeal dismissed with costs. Counsel for the Appellant: J POULOS QC/D BENSON Counsel for the Respondent: MJ NEIL QC/L GOODMAN Solicitors for the Appellant: GADENS Solicitors for the Respondent: BACK SCHWARTZ VAUGHAN