COUNCIL OF THE SHIRE OF GUNNEDAH v MORGAN-MOFFATT [1995] NSWCA 104
NSW Caselaw
Full text
Select any passage to save a personal note with optional tags.
COUNCIL OF THE SHIRE OF GUNNEDAH v MORGAN-MOFFATT
SUPREME COURT OF NEW SOUTH WALES — COURT OF APPEAL
PRIESTLEY JA, CLARKE JA and MEAGHER JA
8 August 1995
[1995] NSWCA 104
WORKERS COMPENSATION — worker undergoes operation — following
operation she is awarded compensation for partial incapacity — employer appeals
arguing that two separate procedures carried out upon worker only one of which is
work related and partial incapacity caused by non work related procedure — Held:
the evidence before the trial judge supports the view that the necessity for the
operation arose at least partly from a condition which had arisen in the course of the
worker's employment and sufficiently related to that employment to be properly
described as a work related condition: Lindeman Limited v Coleman (1946) 74 CLR
313 at 321 per Dixon J referred to.
Priestley JA. This is an appeal by an employer against orders made in favour
of a worker in the Compensation Court.
There is one principal point in the appeal. To explain this I will begin by
referring to a report of Dr John Clery, dated 13 December 1993 and tendered in
evidence. In it he said that he had seen the worker on 4 March 1993. She then
complained of a lump in her right forearm. She also then said that she had
developed pain in the palms of both hands and the ulna side of the left forearm.
The report continued that the worker had mentioned other symptoms which led
Dr Clery to refer her to Professor Holland in Newcastle for nerve conduction
studies; Professor Holland had reported to Dr Clery that studies on the right
upper limb showed evidence of a median nerve lesion at the wrist and an ulnar
nerve lesion in the forearm; in view of this the worker was admitted to hospital
where Dr Clery operated on her on 2 June 1993; in the operation he first carried
out a carpal tunnel decompression andthen explored the ulnar nerve (of the right
forearm); the ulnar nerve exploration showed a small cyst within the nerve which
he enucleated; he also explored the mass in her forearm (which clearly enough
appears to have been what was referred to in the evidence and in the argument
today as the lump); he removed both the small cyst and the other mass; both
lumps turned out to be benign neurilemomas.
There is no dispute but that Dr Clery's report accurately described the
operation and what happened at it.
Following the operation, the worker developed what was called in the
evidence, in slightly varying forms, reflex sympathetic dystrophy. This condition
led to her partial incapacity for work. She claimed compensation for the partial
incapacity.
Her case was heard by her Honour Judge Truss. An issue was whether the
dystrophy could properly be attributed to the worker's work. It was argued that
the evidence led to the conclusion, if dystrophy was the result of the operation
described by Dr Clery, then it was so only to the extent that that operation related
to his exploration of the ulnar nerve, his excision of the small cyst and his
exploration of the other mass. Therefore it was argued that there had been two
separate procedures carried out at the same time upon the worker, the one
2 UNREPORTED JUDGMENTS
directed to the carpal tunnel being concededly work related, and the one relating
to the ulnar nerve, cyst etc having nothing to do with work, that the partial
incapacity was caused only by the non work related operation and was not
compensable.
The Judge found otherwise. She went in some detail through the evidence of
which I have only given a sufficient summary to enable understanding of the
point argued in the appeal. The critical conclusion in the Judge's reasoning was
that the removal of the neurilemomas was a reasonableand necessary part of the
operation which consisted of the two aspects, the carpal tunnel aspect and the
ulnar nerve aspect.
The principal submission in this court was that that finding of the Judge could
not be supported on the evidence, or to be slightly more accurate, that upon the
Judge's findings on the evidence she could not consistently arrive at that
conclusion.
Had counsel's submission been accepted, then the Court would have had to
choose between one of three courses. One, agreeing with the submission and then
coming to the conclusion that on the evidence the Judge should have found as
counsel contended that what caused the partial incapacity was not related to
work. On this approach the partial incapacity would have had to be set aside.
Two, the Court, coming to the conclusion on the materials that although the
Judge, according to the appellant's counsel, had adopted a mistaken line of
reasoning to her conclusion, nevertheless the conclusion was the right one, upon
the Court's consideration of the evidence. Three, if the court agreed with
counsel's first submission but felt on the materials it was not safe to embark upon
a decision of the substantive matter, the matter should be remitted to the
Compensation Court.
Had the criticised finding been expressed somewhat differently, I do not think
it would have been possible to criticise the Judge's reasoning process. Had she
said, for example, basing herself on Dr Clery's report, that the doctor who
decided to operate on the right arm had been faced with two conditions in the
right hand and arm, one of which on what he then knew was clearly work related
and the other on what he then knew may or may not have been work related, and
decided that it was necessary to operate to deal with both conditions and then in
the course of the operation discovered what he did discover, with the result being
the occurrence of the sympatheticdystrophy, that in my opinion would have been
both a proper finding and one sufficient to support the orders made by the trial
Judge.
Although it is debatable whether the criticised sentence fairly bears the
meaning which I just outlined or a meaning along those lines, it seems to me that
probably the better answer is that when the whole of the Judge's reasons are read,
it is fair to ascribe some such enlarged meaning to what she said in that sentence.
But it does not seem to me to be necessary to decide this. Even if it is not proper
to ascribe that sort of meaning to the critical sentence, then the evidence before
the trial judge seems to me to be clear enough to support a view of the necessity
for the operation of the kind which I have described.
Put shortly, it was an operation made desirable and recommended by
competent medical advice for reasons at least partly directly flowing from a
condition which had arisen in the course of the worker's employment and
sufficiently related to that employment to be properly described as a work related
condition.
URJCOUNCIL OF THE SHIRE OF GUNNEDAH v MORGAN-MOFFATT (Priestley JA) 3
Directly flowing from the proper advice to have the operation to deal with the
two lesions which Professor Holland's report had described, were the procedures
directed to those two lesions. Accepting for the purpose of these reasons, that the
sympathetic dystrophy was the result of the ulnar nerve lesion, nevertheless this
came about from the proper decision to have the two conditions looked at on the
one occasion. To my mind, this means that to the question whether the resulting
partial incapacity was sufficiently work related to justify the finding favourable
to the worker made by her Honour, the answer is plainly 'yes'.
The Court was referred to a passage in Lindeman Limited v Coleman (1946)
74 CLR 313 at 321 where there is a statement made by Dixon J typical of a
number of statements in the reports dealing with situations of this kind which
indicate that where a worker reasonably undergoes treatment orsurgery for a
work related condition, which treatment or surgery results in a further condition
affecting the worker's ability to work, then the Court should treat that further
condition as attributable to the work related injury.
This case seems to me to fall within that category. I would therefore not accept
the submission for the appellant on the first, and as I said earlier, principal point
in the appeal. Had I thought the submission should be accepted, I would in any
event have adopted the second of the three courses I earlier mentioned.
The second point raised concerned the way in which the trial Judge calculated
the amount of the award for partial incapacity. The submission was that she had
not complied with the various steps necessary to be complied with pursuant to s
40 in order to work out the appropriate amount. It seems quite clear on
examination that all the elements necessary for the calculation were dealt with by
her Honour in the course of arriving at the figure which she determined. I do not
think there is anything in this point.
There was a third point which complained about the way in which the trial
judge dealt with medical evidence. I think this is sufficiently answered by saying
that on my reading of the materials and her reasons, she dealt quite carefully and
properly with the medical evidence.
I would therefore be in favour of dismissing the appeal with costs.
Clarke JA. I agree.
Meagher JA. I also agree.
Priestley JA. That is the order of the Court.
Appeal dismissed with costs.
Counsel for the appellant: M CRANITCH / S DEVINE
Solicitors for the appellant: SPARKE HELMORE
Counsel for the respondent: JW DODD
Solicitors for the respondent: P LONG
Related laws
No related documents linked yet.
You've got 21 of 22 free Acts left this visit. Sign up anytime for Facts, Related, and study briefs too.