BRADLEY v THE GOVERNMENT INSURANCE OFFICE OF NEW SOUTH WALES SUPREME COURT OF NEW SOUTH WALES COURT OF APPEAL MAHONEY P, MEAGHER JA, WADDELL AJA 29 March 1996, 29 March 1996 [1996] NSWCA 65 Motor vehicle accident — personal injuries. Mahoney P This is an appeal against a judgment given by Rummery J in the District Court on 24 December 1992. The plaintiff had sued the defendant in negligence in reference to a motor vehicle accident which took place on 31 October 1984 at Warriewood near Sydney. The trial judge, having heard the evidence, gave judgment for the defendant. The plaintiff has appealed to this Court against his Honour's judgment. The Court has had the benefit of the submissions of Mr Jobson for the appellant. For myself I would be content to say that I would dismiss the appeal essentially for the reasons given by the trial judge. However, in deference to the submissions made by Mr Jobson for the plaintiff I shall refer to one or two of the matters which he has highlighted. It is not necessary in the circumstances to catalogue the written submissions and to deal with every point in them. The judge described the accident in the following terms. The plaintiff claims damages for personal injuries sustained as the result of a motor accident on 31 October 1984 at Warriewood. At about 7.15 am on that date he was riding his Honda motor cycle in a westerly direction in Mona Vale Road and when at or near its intersection with Walana Crescent there was a collision with a Toyota Pantech truck, which had also been travelling west in Mona Vale Road but at the time of the collision was in the act of making a right-hand turn into Walana Crescent. The plaintiffs claim essentially has been that the defendant, in making the right-hand turn, did not keep a proper lookout. The defendant was a witness whom the judge accepted. His Honour said: "I accept Mr Gard's evidence in its entirety. I found him to be honest and impressive and a witness upon whose evidence I could rely with confidence. On the other hand, the plaintiff's evidence contained inconsistencies and could not be reconciled with the material in Exhibit 1". That finding of his Honour has not in substance been contested, except (to the extent to which I shall refer) by an attempt to discredit the defendant's evidence by the juxtaposition of various parts of the evidence one against the other. The defendant's evidence was that he was driving his truck along Mona Vale Road in the manner to which the judge referred. He was doing about 60 kilometres an hour. He noticed in his rear vision mirror a Ford Fairlane car behind him. He noticed cars coming from the west in Mona Vale Road towards him at a high speed. About 60 to 100 metres from the intersection of Walana Crescent he operated his indicator to indicate his intention to make a right-hand turn. He saw the car which he had noticed in his rear vision mirror cross to the other side of the road, immediately brake and draw back behind him. He next saw this Fairlane vehicle appear at his left-hand rear vision mirror. He began edging 2 UNREPORTED JUDGMENTS towards the centre of the line. He was about 20 to 30 metres from Walana Crescent. At the time he did not see the motor cycle. He went into Walana Crescent in a shallow arc and was wholly on the opposite lane when he felt the impact on the motor cycle upon him. It is not necessary for me to reiterate the further evidence which emerged in cross-examination. What I have said indicates in substance the evidence which, having the defendant's account, the learned judge accepted. The thrust of the argument by Mr Jobson for the plaintiff was that the defendant had not looked or properly looked in his right-hand rear vision mirror so as to see the motor cycle approaching and presumably had not taken care to avoid the motor cycle overtaking him when he commenced the right-hand turn. In the course of the evidence the defendant referred on several occasions to the fact that he had looked in his rear vision mirror on the right-hand side and had, as it was described, "monitored" that mirror. Without detailing all of the matters referred to, it is in my opinion sufficient to indicate that, with the learned judge, I am of the opinion that the defendant took all reasonable care in his driving and in his right-hand turn. I do not think that there was any negligence indicated in what he did. There is no other submission that requires detailed consideration. I agree with the judgment of the learned trial judge. I should note that I have in the conventional way described the driver of the vehicle in which the plaintiff came into collision as the defendant. The defendant is, of course, the Government Insurance Office of New South Wales, who was his insurer. But it is convenient to refer to Mr Gard as the defendant in the manner in which I have. In my opinion it is appropriate that the appeal be dismissed and, if it is dismissed, it must be with costs. Meagher JA I agree. Waddell AJA I agree. MAHONEY P: The order to the Court will therefore be that the appeal is dismissed with costs. Counsel for the Appellant: JA Jobson Solicitors for the Appellant: GJ Sharah Henville and Co Counsel for the Respondent: HJ Mater Solicitors for the Respondent: GM Meadows