WENTWORTH v WENTWORTH SUPREME COURT OF NEW SOUTH WALES — COURT OF APPEAL PRIESTLEY JA 18 March 1996 [1996] NSWCA 550 Priestley JA. The Court of Appeal recently set aside declarations and orders made by Master McLaughlin on review by him of the reconsideration of the plaintiff's Bill of Costs by Taxing Officer Howe in proceedings between Ms Wentworth, as plaintiff, and Mr P Wentworth, as defendant. The Court was of the view that that review should be conducted in the Equity Division. A question has arisen whether some document initiating the review is to be filed in the Equity Division. Ms Wentworth is currently subject to an order by Bryson J that before she commences proceedings of a particular kind she obtain the leave of a Judge in the Equity Division. For practical purposes it seems, whatever the position in strictness may be, that it is necessary for some document to be filed in the Equity Division so that what was the intention of the orders of the Court of Appeal can be carried out. I doubt whether the leave contemplated by Bryson J is necessary for the filing of such a document but, to avoid any possibility of unnecessaryargument about that, I am prepared, acting as a Judge of the Court, to grant that leave. The leave is intended to enable Ms Wentworth to file a document generally along the lines of a document that is before me dated 15 March 1996 entitled 'In matter 3748/89,' but I also wish to make it clear that the granting of the leave, assuming it is necessary, is for the filing of a document which will start again the review which was embarked on by Master McLaughlin, not one commencing any fresh proceedings different from the ones that went before him as a review of the reconsideration of the plaintiff's bill of costs by taxing officer Howe. If Ms Wentworth were to wish to expand or amend those review proceedings in any way so as to be different from those that began before Master McLaughlin then such wish would have to be put into motion by some further application on her part. In saying this I am not suggesting that she does wish to do what I have suggested or, if she did wish to do it, that I have any opinion about what ought to happen in response to such application. I am simply trying to make it clear what I am doing now in the way of granting leave is to enable the recommencing of the review that was embarked upon by Master McLaughlin that led to the orders that the Court set aside in the appeal decision last month. Orders accordingly.