SAMPSON v ZUCKER [1996] NSWCA 465

SAMPSON v ZUCKER

SUPREME COURT OF NEW SOUTH WALES COURT OF APPEAL GLEESON CJ, COLE JA and Simos AJA

11 December 1996, 11 December 1996

[1996] NSWCA 465

LIMITATION OF ACTIONS — PROFESSIONAL NEGLIGENCE — whether principle enunciated by Deane J in Hawkins v Clayton (1988) 164 CLR 539 at 588-591 would extend the time for the commencement of the action.

The plaintiff sued his former solicitor for negligent advice. The action was commenced seven years after the advice was given and the damage was suffered. The plaintiff sought to rely upon the principle enunciated by Deane J in Hawkins v Clayton (1988) 164 CLR 539 at 588-591. HELD - That principle had no application to the facts of the present case and the claim was clearly statute-barred.

ORDERS

Appeal dismissed with costs.

Gleeson CJ This is an appeal brought by leave from a decision of his Honour Judge Patten in the District Court given on 12 December 1995. The background to the appeal is as follows.

The appellant was injured in a motor vehicle accident on 14 September 19S5. On 17 September 1985 the appellant retained the respondent, who is a solicitor, to act for the appellant in bringing an action against the Government Insurance Office of New South Wales for the recovery of damages for personal injuries.

The respondent, in accordance with his instructions, commenced proceedings in the District Court of New South Wales on 7 March 1986. Those proceedings came on for hearing in the District Court on 31 March 1988, on which date they were settled by agreement between the appellant and the Government Insurance Office. The appellant, acting on the advice of his solicitor, the respondent, accepted a sum of money in full satisfaction of his claim for damages.

The appellant, on 18 February 1992, consulted another solicitor, who is his present solicitor, and sought advice as to the adequacy of the damages which the appellant had received as a consequence of the settlement. That solicitor, after making certain inquiries and investigations, apparently advised the appellant that the damages he had received as a result of the settlement were inadequate. The solicitor advised the appellant to sue his former solicitor, the respondent, for damages for negligent advice.