ROWE v Australian & Overseas Telecommunications Corp SUPREME COURT OF NEW SOUTH WALES — COURT OF APPEAL MAHONEY ACJ, COLE JA and ABADEE AJA 11 September 1996 [1996] NSWCA 457 Negligence — employer's liability — employee assaulted at work in the city office building — Judge finds no breach of duty — Held: Verdict for employer sustained. Master and Servant: - duty of care found - No breach of duty by employer - reasomableness - No error revealed. Abadee AJA. This is an appeal from a verdict of Cripps JA on 26 August 1992 in favour of an employer respondent in a personal injuries action brought by the appellant, an employee, to recover damages for injuries sustained by her in the course of her employment. Numerous grounds of appeal have been advanced in support of the appeal including a claim that the respondent failed to take any measures reasonably open to it to protect the plaintiff from a found foreseeable risk of injury. His Honour's findings that there was no breach of duty on the part of the respondent is also challenged. It was submitted that the appellant was born on 18 February 1928 and was employed by the respondent as a tea lady. From about March of 1979 she was required to work on the 20th floor of the MLC Centre Sydney. At all relevant times the respondent occupied a number of floors in the Centre including the 20th level. That level contained the respondent's cashier's office and the paymaster's office. Shortly after 10.30 am on Monday 19 October 1981 the appellant was working in the tea room on the 20th level when she was assaulted by an armed criminal intruder in the tea room. She sustained injuries in consequence of this assault. His Honour whilst later rejecting the plaintiff's evidence with respect to the defendant's system stated that the appellant was not dishonest and accepted her evidence concerning the assault and the consequences to her of it. The plaintiff arrived at work on 19 October 1981 at about 9 am. At 10.30 am she had completed her tea route and was in the tea room when she was assaulted. She was standing at the sink with her back to the door (which was in an open position) when she heard a voice tell her to turn around. She thought it was a joke and said words to the effect: 'Get lost.' She was asked to turn around again. She was then grabbed by the collar and forced to turn around, to be confronted by a dishevelled and unkempt man in his thirties who said he wanted money. She said that the man looked sick and desperate, with a peculiar look in his eyes as though he was drugged out and that he had the appearance of a 'drug addict'. (Appeal book 259.) The plaintiff said that she did not have any money. He responded 'Then take me to the pay office.' The appellant said noand asked him to leave. She told the intruder that she was only an employee and that she did not think he would find any money in the pay office. He said 'Put your cardigan on and we' ll see.' He pulled a pistol from his shirt and put it to her right temple saying "This will make you change your mind.' He asked for her bag. As she was putting on her cardigan the man saw money in her cardigan pocket. He ripped the pocket 2 UNREPORTED JUDGMENTS and took the money. He asked her where her purse was, forcing her to go to her locker where she gave him the purse its contents totalling the sum of approximately $60. He produced a pair of small garden shears and cut the watch band off her left wrist. He tried to steal her ring. He pushed her into the corner of the kitchen telling her not to call out otherwise he would come back and shoot her. She stayed in the corner shaking. He left and then returned a short time later when he struck the appellant approximately three times on the right side of the face. He left. The plaintiff then sought assistance. I take these findings from his Honour's reason for judgment. In my view they were findings open on the evidence. The appellant commenced proceedings against the respondent in 1987 alleging that the defendant was in breach of its common law obligation, as her employer, to take reasonable care for her safety in all the circumstances. By her amended statement of claim she alleged that her employer failed to take reasonable care for her safety in a number of respects. The plaintiff's case essentially was that the employer, in breach of its duty, failed to take measures to protect her from injury by armed intruders. His Honour's judgment dealt with the submissions made in respect of each of the necessary measures relied upon by the plaintiff. There is no need to repeat such in terms. However, such include the making of the lift lobby secure by the permanent presence of security personnel; electric surveillance by way of closed circuit television ofpeople coming upon the 20th level; and restricting access from the lift lobby into the corridor leading to the paymaster's office. It is sufficient to say that his Honour did not accept that there had been a failure by the defendant to take the precautions nominated by the plaintiff for her protection, or that the defendant was otherwise in breach of its duty of care in one or more of the respects alleged. His Honour rejected the measures advanced by the plaintiff as appropriate to protect her from injury by armed intruders, giving extensive reasons for doing so. I see no reason for disagreeing with his Honour's views, or for finding error on his Honour's part in arriving at such. It is important to here observe, that, according to his Honour, the plaintiff's claim was based originally upon the assumption that at the time she was assaulted employees of the defendant were counting large sums of money (approximately $1 million) in the pay office for the 5,000 employees of the defendant. His Honour specifically found that this was not so. Indeed his Honour found that the plaintiff's evidence with respect to the defendant's system was 'wrong'. This was an important finding since the success of many of the plaintiff's allegations was said to be dependent upon the accuracy of the system used by the defendant to make and distribute pay envelopes fortnightly. No error has been demonstrated in relation to such finding. His Honour made certain findings as to the system for the make up and distribution of pay envelopes at the relevant period. In my view there was evidence to support such findings which were open to him to make. The findings are essentially summarised as follows. His Honour found that the last pay day before the assault was on 8 October 1981. The next pay day after the assault was on 22 October 1981. The plaintiff was assaultedon 19 October 1981, that is, eleven days after the last pay day and three days before the next. There were approximately 200-300 employees working in the MLC Centre for the respondent. His Honour found that the filled pay envelopes were brought to the MLC Centre for distribution to those employees who worked in the Centre. Pay day was fortnightly and was on a Thursday. On the day preceding pay day (Wednesday) Armaguard, a security firm, sent officers to the 20th floor to collect URJ ROWE v Australian & Overseas Telecommunications Corp (Abadee AJA) 3 envelopes which were then taken to Armaguard's premises to be made up by placing wages within. On pay day, a Thursday, armed Armaguard officers brought the filled pay envelopes to the 20th floor for distribution. Pay envelopes for the staff of OTC employed elsewhere in New South Wales were not, however, brought to the 20th floor. Pay envelopes were distributed during a period of two hours throughout the floors occupied by OTC, supervised by armed guards. It was, however, not unusual for some people not to collect their pay on pay day. Contrary to the plaintiff's understanding his Honour found the pay envelopes that were brought to the Centre for distribution and not collected were left in the cashier's office and, if not collected on Friday, were banked. Thereafter, if unpaid employees wished to receive their pay before the next pay day, they were paid in cash. These findings were said by his Honour to be based upon the evidence of Mr Ellem who, in 1981, occupied the positions of assistant pay master and pay master with the respondent. His Honour was clearly entitled to accept his evidence in preference to that of the plaintiff in relation to the defendant's system of making up and distributing the pay envelopes. After all he had seen and heard both witnesses. The findings in relation to the make up and distribution of the pay envelopes are, in my view, beyond challenge. His Honour carefully considered the security measures adopted by the defendant in the general office area of the 20th floor, describing them with care. His Honour specifically accepted evidence on behalf of the defendant and confirmed by Mr Filewood, a security expert of considerable experience, to the effect that the security measures taken by the defendant in 1981 were much the same as other measures taken in the Central Business District of Sydney on floors well above street level. It is to be noted from the evidence given by Mr Filewood that it was his opinion that the security in place on the 20th floor was adequate for the nature of the business conducted on that floor. (Appeal book page 176.) It is to be observed this view was repeated again at pages 182 and 191 of the appeal book where Mr Filewood again stated that the measures taken were, in his view, adequate for the level of risk, and that the protective measures taken by the respondent were satisfactory. He gave evidence that the security measures in place and which were described in greater detail by his Honour were reasonable measures at the time, in 1981, in the circumstances of the case, and adequate to deal with the risk and nature of the business conducted, as I have said, on the 20th level. His Honour clearly was unimpressed with, and did not accept the expert evidence given by the plaintiff's expert. This is not surprising since some of his conclusions were found by his Honour to be dependent upon assumptions which, in turn, his Honour found to be incorrect. Thus the case for the plaintiff was made complicated not merely by his Honour's findings that her evidence with respect to the defendant's system was wrong but also by the fact that her own expert had assumed facts in his evidence that were likewise shown to be wrong. His Honour was clearly entitled not to act upon the plaintiffs expert's views as to whathe considered were adequate and appropriate precautions or measures to be taken by the defendant to eliminate the risk of injury to the plaintiff, a risk which his Honour described as while not being fanciful was 'albeit, much less than an attempt by sophisticated armed bandits to steal the pay roll.' (Appeal Book 404). There is much force in the respondent's submission that his Honour, in expressing this view, was merely comparing the probability of robbery by intelligent armed bandits with that of the assault on the appellant, finding that the former was more likely, and that with the 4 UNREPORTED JUDGMENTS steps found to have been taken by the respondent to minimise that greater possibility, it had not been established that it would have been reasonable to take any of the lesser steps suggested by the appellant to minimise the lesser possibility. It is appropriate to now deal briefly with his Honour's findings in relation to the nature of the premises in which the plaintiff was employed. The accuracy of his Honour's description is not challenged. His Honour found that the 20th floor was, subject to certain security measures, an open plan arrangement around the centre section of the building. The centre section was used for lifts, including the goods lift, toilets and store room. It also contained the tea room located off the main corridor which connected the office space on the floor. The tea room was about ten metres from the lift lobby and the paymaster's office was about seven metres from the eastern end of the lift lobby and about seventeen metres from the tea room. People could generally move about the floor. The trial judge found that a number of security measures had in fact been adopted by the respondent in the general office area of the 20th floor and these were described with some care by his Honour who observed thatthe measures were so designed to inhibit robbery on pay day. There was no dispute that the defendant owed a common law duty to take reasonable care to avoid exposing the plaintiff to unnecessary risks of injury. The real issue was whether that duty was breached by the respondent in exposing the plaintiff to a foreseeable risk of injury which his Honour concluded, whilst not fanciful, was as I have earlier said much less likely than an attempt by sophisticated armed bandits to steal the pay roll. (Appeal Book 404.) His Honour thus correctly perceived that the question was whether there had been a breach of the duty of care. In deciding this question his Honour directed himself in accordance with the well-known passage from a judgment of Mason J in Wyong Shire Council v Shirt (1980) 146 CLR 40 at 47 and 48. It is not necessary to repeat this passage. However, the principle stated therein provides the basis on what a reasonable person would, by way of response to a risk, do in some future situation. His Honour correctly considered, as the cases suggest, that, in effect, the real question was whether the defendant unreasonably failed to take measures reasonably open to it in all the circumstances, which would have protected the plaintiff from the dangers of her task without unduly impeding its accomplishment; Vozza v Tooth & Company (1964) 112 CLR 316 at 319 applied by the High Court in Bankstown Foundry Pty Limited v Braistina (1986) 160 CLR 301 at 308. As Braistina's case makes clear the reasonable standard of care for an employee's safety is not a 'low one'. Whether or not it will be found to be satisfied is essentially a question of fact to be determined in the light of the circumstances of the case. Nevertheless this said, it is relevant to remember the employer is not an insurer of his employees against danger: Turner v The State of South Australia (1982) 56 ALJR 839 per Gibbs CJ at 840. Again, as Cripps JA recognised, the liability of the defendantwas not to be judged with hindsight. In Maloney v The Commissioner for Railways (1978) 52 ALJR 292 Barwick CJ when referred to the defendant's duty to take care in that case (albeit, not in a master servant context) observed: Perfection or the use of increased knowledge or experience embraced in hindsight after the event should form no part of the components of what is reasonable in all the circumstances. That matter must be judged in prospect and not in retrospect. URJ ROWE v Australian & Overseas Telecommunications Corp (Abadee AJA) 5 As was once said 'it is important to remember the events now long in the past were once in the future.' The relevant events took place in 1981, the judging took place in 1992. In the instant matter Cripps JA, in my view correctly, approached the matter of not judging the matter by reference to hindsight whilst acknowledging, as he did, the existence of other security measures used in other circumstances as some indication of what precautions could have been taken. Having regard to the way the parties presented the issues his Honour conceded that, in the circumstances of the case as it had been presented, the real question was whether the employer would have taken steps to avoid the risk that someone might come to the 20th floor and injure some person in the vicinity of the tea room. In this connection I would note in passing that the plaintiff's counsel had, during the trial, told the trial judge that he was not mounting a case by reference to the plaintiffbeing, for example, a tea lady on the 14th floor but by reference only to the 20th floor: 'The 20th floor was the pay office.' Indeed, his Honour accepted that it was foreseeable that intelligent armed bandits might attempt a pay roll robbery and precautions were taken against that possibility. Mr Hislop's complaint is that measures were not otherwise taken. His Honour, as I have earlier observed, described the security measures and those in place as being designed to 'inhibit robbery on pay day.' It is also quite clear that the case advanced at the trial really concerned the question as to whether the failure of the defendant to take the precautions as nominated by the plaintiff and repeated by Mr Hislop in this Court breached its duty of care to her. As I have also said the plaintiff's case was made all the more difficult by the finding that the plaintiff's evidence with respect to the make up and pay distribution was wrong and by his Honour's views of the evidence of her expert. The appellant was faced with considerable difficulty once his Honour found adequate precautions were taken to protect the pay roll operations. The appellant was in effect, left to establish that the security issues other than those relating to the protection of the pay roll were inadequate. In this task the appellant also failed. His Honour did not accept (and it was open to him in my view not to so accept) that it was reasonable to require the respondent to institute the security measures advocated by the appellant every day of the week, or at all, and particularly given that its other measures were found to be appropriate. I see no error in this approach by his Honour. His Honour, when dealing with the matter of breach, said as follows: The defendant did take precautions against a pay roll robbery ... But in the present case, the plaintiff was not injured in the course of a payroll robbery or by a person of the type ordinarily engaged in sophisticated payroll robberies. She was injured in the circumstances I have outlined above.' (Appeal book 404—405.) His Honour also said at the same page: The defendant had, to some extent, minimised the risk of injury to employees by sophisticated armed hold-up bandits. Was it unreasonable of it not to introduce the same or similar measures every day of the week because the 20th floor was used by, inter alia, the paymaster and the cashier? It is difficult to know how an employer could ever effectively wholly guard against the type of assault that took place on the plaintiff. In the present case, as I have said, it has not been established that there was a departure by the defendant from any standards otherwise adopted. The plaintiff was not assaulted in the course of handling pay roll envelopes. The corridor off which the tea room was located and used frequently by people working in the office at the time. What happened to the plaintiff could have happened to any person on that part of the floor. 6 UNREPORTED JUDGMENTS I agree with these findings and views as expressed by the trial judge. His Honour also stated (appeal book 406) that: In my respectful opinion, the answer to the question cannot be answered simply by pointing to some measure which may have spared the plaintiff the assault.""Again, in finding that the defendant was not in breach of its duty, his Honour also said, when concluding his reasons (Appeal Book 408): As I have said, what happened to the plaintiff could just as easily have happened to anyone who happened to be walking along the corridor at the time when the intruder entered the floor. I agree with these findings and views. I would observe in passing that, in this day and age, regrettably, citizens are potential victims of the wrongful acts of criminals. The risk of sustaining damage from the wrongful acts of criminals is shared by the public at large, whether at work, in the home or even in the streets. Despite reasonable care being exercised perhaps all persons are potential victims of the casual or professional violent criminal who is at large in the community. In making this observation I do not do so as a test of the liability of the respondent in the instant case but in order to perhaps better see his Honour's last quoted observations in context. Next, what will satisfy the duty of care at any particular time will depend upon (as his Honour's judgment reveals) the circumstances prevailing at the time of the accident. As was said by Stephen J in Quigley v The Commonwealth (1981) 55 ALJR 579 at 581: ... But what will satisfy that duty [the employer's duty to take reasonable care] will depend upon the circumstances prevailing at that time: What is a breach on one day at one hour may be no breach at other times when different conditions prevail. When an accidentoccurs and breach of the employer's duty of care is alleged the happening of the accident fixes the relevant time for the examination of the requirements necessary to satisfy the employer's duty of care. Next, in holding there was no breach of duty, his Honour was entitled to have regard to the fact that the person who assaulted the plaintiff had not been encountered by the defendant before and that, at that time, this sort of thing had not happened in high rise offices in the Central Business District of Sydney. There was in fact evidence from Mr Harris that there were no statistics of armed hold-up offences in 1991, due to namely, the absence of there having been previous assaults in high rise buildings in the Central Business District of Sydney. Indeed the same person said that in his experience the majority of armed hold-ups occurred within premises usually on the ground level or one or two levels up so as to permit the bandit a fast getaway. Indeed the same person said he could not remember any particular event of the nature involved in the instant proceedings occurring in a high rise building at a higher level. The weight to be attached to such a view involved a question of fact for the tribunal of fact, to be determined by the tribunal of fact in this case by the trial judge: Braistina at 309. Likewise, it was also a question of fact for his Honour to determine the weight to be attached to the defendant's expert views that the security measures taken by the defendant were also much the same as other measures taken in the Central Business District on floors above street level by others. I see no error in this approach by his Honour. Indeed I agree with it. Next, the question of whether or not there was in the instant case a breach of the duty of care is really not helped by reference to other casesinvolving assault or conduct for which the respondent would not ordinarily be held responsible, URJ ROWE v Australian & Overseas Telecommunications Corp (Abadee AJA) 7 namely, assaults on employees. The cases are referred to in his Honour's reasons for judgment. Each of those cases turn on their own facts. No two cases can provide true comparability in the circumstances. The cases are single instant decisions with the decisions referable to their own particular facts. However, we were taken by counsel to the decision of this Court in Brown v The Commonwealth of Australia (CA unreported 11 March 1992). This was indeed a decision to which the trial judge was also taken. I do not see that decision as laying down any special principle. As his Honour the trial judge said, in analysing the case, in the circumstances there it was held that there had been a foreseeable risk of serious injury to an interviewing taxation officer, that the risk was known to the Taxation Department and that there was a simple cheap effective remedy which, on the evidence could have protected the interviewing officer against risk. It is a question of fact as to what reasonable care is required in the circumstances. The tribunal of fact must determine whether or not in the circumstances of the particular case the employer failed to take those precautions which an employer acting reasonably would be expected to take: See Braistina at pp 308-309. In my view the determination made by Cripps JA adverse to the respondent, with respect, reveals no error and indeed I agree with it. In my view, care must be taken that, in purporting to decide the question as to whether the respondent exercised reasonable care, this Court does not merely substitute its opinion as to what is reasonable for that of the tribunal of fact, particularly where there is material on which either view could be reasonably taken. In this case there was suchmaterial. However, his Honour, as he was entitled to do, did not accept the plaintiffs material. Further, as his Honour said, the question of whether the respondent exercised reasonable care cannot be answered simply by pointing to some measure which may have spared the plaintiff the assault if, in the circumstances, such measure was not reasonably called for. It is for the tribunal of fact, in this case the trial judge, to determine what a reasonable man placed in the defendant's position should have done by way of response to the risk of injury to the plaintiff. Next his Honour, whilst finding that the risk of injury was foreseeable and not fanciful, was entitled to conclude, as he did, that it was much less likely than an attempt by sophisticated armed bandits to steal the pay roll: (Appeal Book 404.) Such a view was also relevant to be considered in relation to the magnitude of the risk and the alleged reasonableness of the security arrangements or measures: see Shirt at 48. His Honour was also entitled to consider such when considering the reasonable person's response to the risk of injury. In my view no error has been demonstrated in his Honour's approach to this matter either. For all the above reasons it was open to his Honour to find that the respondent was not in breach of duty of care to the plaintiff. No error has been demonstrated in his Honour's approach to the matter. It is not necessary to consider the question of whether assuming a breach of the duty of care being established, in any event the causal element necessary to establish liability is, or is not, lacking. I say nothing on this point since it was not argued. Finally, it is appropriate to briefly deal with one other matter raised in the appellant's appeal. His Honour rejected the tender of the document MFI 2. The appellant submits that the document was admissible and that, if admitted, would 8 UNREPORTED JUDGMENTS have provided further evidence of the respondent's failure to take reasonable care for the safety of the appellant. In my view it was not admissible. My reasons may be briefly stated. There was no evidence in relation to what it was. Indeed the respondent's statement at the trial that it was not a union meeting document was not disputed (Appeal Book 667). Looking at the document it appears to be signed by the Chairman of the ACOA Section Committee. In any event, the document dealt with the event involving the tea lady and raised issues of greater security and staff safety arrangements inter alia in the MLC building. Significantly his Honour did not foreclose an application to re-tender MFI 2 if it became 'relevant later'. The further application was made virtually following immediately after its original tender. No attempt was later made to re-tender in accordance with the spirit of his Honour's ruling. Even if I be wrong in my views in any event MFI 2 it seems to me this appears to add little to the plaintiff's expert evidence which also generally asserted matters covered and canvassed by MFI 2. Those views were not accepted by the trial Judge. The ground of appeal in relation to the admissibility of this document has not been made out but, even if it has, I would not consider there is any substance in it. In my view, having regard to the advantages enjoyed by the trial Judge and giving full weight to his Honour's decision there is nothing tosuggest his Honour's decision was in any way wrong or revealed error. In my view, no error has been demonstrated. The appellant has not discharged the onus of showing that this appeal ought to be allowed. I would propose that the appeal be dismissed with costs. Mahoney ACJ. I agree with the judgment delivered and generally with his Honour's reasons. In deference to the written submissions, which are compendious and the oral argument, I shall add some comments of my own. As has been said the only issue before the Court is whether there was a breach of duty owed by the defendant to the plaintiff employee. In the end a question of this kind must be assessed by reference to the fact of the particular case. The Court has indicated that the standard of care required and the precautions to be taken must reach a high standard. The Court has been reminded of, and is conscious of, what was said by this Court and by the members of the High Court in the Bankstown Foundry Pty Ltd v Braistina (1986) 160 CLR 301 and in Bus v Sydney County Council (1989) 167 CLR 78. The duty of an employer to provide for the safety of employees in a public position is illustrated by the differing views of the members of this Court in Brown v Commonwealth of Australia (Court of Appeal 11 March 1982, unreported. In the end the decision whether sufficient precautions have been taken is for the Court. However, it may rely, by way of assistance, upon the evidence of experts in the particular area with which it is concerned. In this case it was accepted that evidence of experts was admissible and the evidence of Mr Filewood was accepted by the Judge specifically. Mr Filewood applied his attention, as a person accepted to be an expert, to the question of what precautions were taken and the adequacy of them. He expressed the opinion that the precautions taken were sufficient. The Judge accepted Mr Filewood's opinion. In my opinion he was correct in doing so. I would, as on a re-hearing, accept his opinion. URJ ROWE v Australian & Overseas Telecommunications Corp (Mahoney ACJ) 9 In considering, apart from the evidence of experts, what precautions are necessary it is of course to be accepted that having regard to the fact that there was being conducted there the activity of a payroll office some precautions were necessary to be taken in order not merely to defeat the possibility of a successful robbery but to provide for the safety of the employees of the defendant upon the premises. The precautions to be taken against the possibility of armed robbery were dealt with at length in the evidence particularly, as I have said, in the evidence of Mr Filewood. I may say tangentially that reference was made to the use of the relevant part of the premises not merely as a payroll office but also as a cashier's office. Counsel have not been able to point the Court to any part of the evidence which describes in detail what were the functions of the cashier's office. I think it may well be inferred from what was said — it may well have been taken into account by Mr Filewood in forming his opinion — that a cashier's office involved access to the particular part of the premises by members of the public and others daily and from time to time. That fact is to be taken into account in determining what precautions were appropriate to be taken. However, putting that aside, the question in the present case was; — having regard to the possibility of armed robbery, what was the defendantrequired to do? Mr Filewood directed his attention, with some particularity, to the position of those who were directly concerned with the payroll and cashier activities of the defendant. It was proper that he do so but, as has been indicated in the present appeal, what was in question was the precautions which had to be taken in relation — if I may use the term without being misunderstood — to the other miscellaneous employees who would be upon the floor from time to time. It would be anticipated that there would be cleaners and other ancillary staff engaged upon the floor from time to time. A person such as the plaintiff, doing what she did, was not directly involved with the payroll or cashier activities but only incidentally occupied in the activities carried on upon the floor. The precautions to be taken for the safety of the employees directly concerned with the payroll and cashier's offices was addressed by Mr Filewood and disposed of by him. What, in the end, was essentially the issue here was what precautions should be taken in relation to — as I have described them — the miscellaneous employees. They are not to be put aside. It is necessary for an employer, in circumstances such as that, to have regard to the possible dangers involved to miscellaneous employees by reason of the way in which the business is conducted and of what is done upon the premises. If a business is apt to attract dangers then precautions are necessary, not merely for the benefit of the staff directly involved but also for the miscellaneous staff who may be upon the premises from time to time. However, the precautions that are to be taken in relation to miscellaneous staff may in circumstances differ from those required for the protection of the more directly engaged staff. In the present case the question is: what precautions should have been taken in relation to theplaintiff having regard to her relationship to what was going on the floor? In all the circumstances, taking into account the possibilities apt to affect her, I do not see error in the conclusion to which the Judge arrived. I would adopt it as my own. A person in her position is, of course, to be protected in the appropriate way and to the appropriate extent against the incidents of armed robbery or the like. She may be subject to all kinds of possible dangers; it is not necessary to take specific precautions against every possible danger. As I have 10 UNREPORTED JUDGMENTS said what is to be done depends on the circumstances of the case In all the circumstances, I do not think that a person working, as she was, apart from the other offices, in the tea room should have the extra protection itemised by Mr Hislop QC. Mr Hislop in his careful submissions directed his attention in the main — though not entirely — to protection of those on the floor generally. He referred to what should be done to restrict access to the floor through the lifts and the like. I take that into account. But I think, in the end, his Honour was entitled to direct his attention more specifically to the plaintiff's position. His Honour took into account, I think, the fact that one of the essential components of the situation was that what was being done was being done on the 20th level of a high building; he was entitled to take into account what would be expected to take place by way of robbery or the like in such a situation. Ihave considered whether — looking at the precautions which were suggested on behalf of the plaintiff — it could be said that some or all of them should have been taken and were not. Weighing the circumstances Ihave come to the conclusion it was not unreasonable for the employer not to take the kinds of precautions which were referred to in the plaintiffs submissions. In all of the circumstances, therefore, I agree with the orders which have been proposed. Cole JA. In my opinion no error has been demonstrated in the judgment of Mr Justice Cripps. His Honour found that there existed a duty of care owed by the respondent to the appellant to avoid foreseeable risk of injury to her. He found that there existed a foreseeable risk of injury to employees such as the appellant arising from armed robberies and he found that there were measures which had been taken to address that risk, and that those steps so taken by the respondent related to minimising risk of injury to employees from armed robbers accorded with reasonable standards current in 1981. There was evidence to support each such finding. It followed that, although there were additional precautions which could be pointed to, which might have been implemented in the general protection of the appellant, it was not unreasonable for the respondent not to have taken such steps. Thus the duty of care was not breached. I agree with the judgment and orders proposed by Justice Abadee. Mahoney ACJ. The order of the Court will therefore be that the appeal is dismissed with costs. Orders accordingly. Counsel for the appellant: J D Hislop QC Solicitors for the appellant: Dexter Healey and Co Counsel for the respondent: D G Staehli Solicitors for the respondent: Australian Government Solicitor