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KERR v KRSTEVSKI
SUPREME COURT OF NEW SOUTH WALES COURT OF APPEAL
COLE, BEAZLEY and STEIN JJA
1 September 1997, 1 September 1997
[1997] NSWCA 175
Motor Vehicle Accident — damages for negligence — no eye witnesses — no other
vehicles in close proximity — adverse finding of credibility of evidence
Stein JA These are two appeals arising out of a single motor vehicle accident.
The actions were determined by Nash DCJ on 12 November 1996 in the District
Court. The appellant (Mr Kerr) was the plaintiff in one action suing the
respondent (Mr Krstevski) for damages for negligence. In the other case, Mr
Krstevski sued Mr Kerr for negligence. The matters were heard together. The trial
judge found in favour of Mr Krstevski and, in his action, awarded the respondent
$178,383 in damages. In the other action brought by the appellant, his Honour
entered a verdict for the defendant.
The appeals challenge the factual findings by the judge.
The facts are in a narrow compass. At around 3.30 pm on 19 November 1993
the respondent was driving his motor vehicle east along Mowbray Road, Lane
Cove. The appellant was driving in a generally westerly direction along the same
road. As the vehicles were negotiating a relatively sharp bend they collided, more
or less head-on. The surface of the roadway had unbroken double lines
prohibiting vehicles in either direction from crossing onto the incorrect side.
Each driver gave evidence maintaining that he was on the correct side and that
the other driver crossed over the unbroken lines onto the incorrect side of the
road.
In addition to the conflict between the respective drivers the task of the tribunal
of fact was made more difficult because there was no passenger in either vehicle
and no eye witness to the accident. No other vehicles were being driven in close
proximity. A police officer visited the accident scene but his inquiries shed no
direct light on how the accident had occurred or the point of impact. Although
there were no witnesses to the collision, three people working in nearby premises
heard the collision. They gave evidence but none of them could assist as to where
on the road surface the collision occurred. His Honour found, and in my opinion
was entitled to find, that no weight should be given to the final positions of the
vehicles after the accident. I will return to this matter shortly.
Each driver had an uninterrupted view of the road ahead, as far as could be
seen around the sharp curve. The evidence of the respondent was that as he
neared the curve he saw the appellant's vehicle coming down the hill close to the
curve. It came across the double lines in front of his vehicle and about 2m into
his lane. The vehicle collided with his vehicle on the right front. Except in a fairly
mild way, his credit was not challenged. It was however put to him that he had
intended crossing over the double lines and driving into a service station opposite
to the bend. He denied this.
2 UNREPORTED JUDGMENTS
The appellant gave evidence that as he approached the bend he noticed a car
travelling in the opposite direction. He proceeded to negotiate the curve and the
other vehicle turned towards the garage into his car. The accident occurred in
front of the eastern driveway of the service station. The collision occurred on his
side of the roadway.
In cross-examination his evidence was challenged, partly on the basis of an
inconsistent statement made to the investigating police officer. Photographs of the
damaged vehicles tendered in evidence reveal that both vehicles were extensively
damaged to their fronts with no damage to their nearsides.
The appellant had given a statement to police at the hospital after the accident.
The statement was to the effect that as he rounded the bend the other vehicle went
to turn across in front of his vehicle and as it crossed the centre line he could not
stop and collided with the front passenger side of that vehicle. In
cross-examination he agreed that the collision was not with the passenger side
and that he should have changed his statement. He agreed that the statement he
had made was read to him at the hospital. With hindsight he agreed that it did not
describe the accident as it happened and in fact the front of his vehicle did not
collide with the passenger side of the other vehicle. His explanation for the
incorrect statement and failure to correct it, was that he was in hospital, badly
injured and on morphine.
Having summarised the evidence the trial judge noted that quite obviously
both vehicles could not have been on their correct side of the road. He
acknowledged that each driver honestly believed he was on his correct side of the
road and that a difficult question of fact arose because of the absence of any
independent evidence.
His Honour turned to the credibility of the appellant's evidence in relation to
the version of the accident he had given to the police. The judge observed that the
account was straightforward, simple and, coherent and that when it was read to
the appellant at a later point of time, he made no complaint as to its correctness.
His Honour stated:
I consider that the version given by Kerr to the police officer was a
reconstruction from the position of the vehicles after the collision. I am quite
satisfied the vehicles were in positions at least fairly close to the evidence given
by Messrs Glen and Russell Taylor and Mr Iddison, as well as by Mr Kerr.
I am not satisfied that, in the circumstances, Kerr observed the direction of
travel of the Laser before the collision, and that, having observed the vehicle in
front of his Torana after the collision, he assumed that it must have turned from
the Laser's correct side of the road onto the incorrect side of the road, across the
path of the Torana, and in that motion the collision must have been with the
passenger side of the Laser. At some time since he gave and late confirmed his
version to Constable Trigg, perhaps after seeing Mr Glen Taylor's sketch that not
only indicated the positions of the vehicles, but positions of the damage, he
realised that there was no impact damage on the passenger side of the Laser, and
that therefore the collision must have been head-on with the front offside of the
Laser, which of course is what in fact happened. In the circumstances I consider
that there is force in the submission relating to his credibility. (AB385E-W)
It will be seen from the last sentence quoted above that his Honour made an
adverse finding of the appellant's credibility. He did not accept the appellant's
account of how and where on the roadway the accident occurred. His Honour
specifically found that the respondent did not intend to, nor in fact, turn or veer
right towards the entrance of the service station. The judge concluded that the
URJ KERR v KRSTEVSKI (Beazley JA) 3
appellant's vehicle cut the bend by partially crossing the double lines, not having
observed the approaching vehicle until it was too late, and that the front offside
of each vehicle came into collision on the appellant's incorrect side of the road.
This was a finding open on the evidence and one based, in part, on the judge's
assessment of the credibility of the witnesses.
The appellant's attack on the judgment is threefold:
(1) that his Honour placed undue reliance on the statement made to the police
officer having regard to the circumstances in which it was made;
(2) that he erred in failing to give any weight to the final position of the
vehicles on the road after the accident;
and
(3) that he erred in inferring that on the probabilities the appellant cut the bend
by partly crossing the double lines.
As to the first argument, it seems to me that in the absence of any independent
evidence his Honour was entitled to place reliance on the inconsistent statement.
His Honour acknowledged the circumstances under which it was made but noted
that the statement was 'straight forward, simple and coherent' and that the
appellant did not complain about its accuracy when it was read to him at a later
point in time. In all of the circumstances no undue reliance was placed upon the
statement, nor did the judge misuse his advantage.
The second submission concerns the following passage in the judgment:
As I have already adverted to, it is well-known that the position of vehicles at
rest after a violent collision is, generally speaking, of little of no assistance to a
Court to determine where vehicles were on the road at the time of collision. The
positions of the vehicles is entirely consistent with what Kerr said in
cross-examination, namely that, immediately after the impact, the Laser bounced
back, stopped, and the driver's side turned slightly askew, pointing towards the
service station. One would expect that a head-on collision of this magnitude
would result in movement of both vehicles, not just one or the other. The
positions of the vehicles do not assist me in determining on which side of the
double lines the collision occurred. It would be an exceptionally strange
manoeuvre for Krstevski to drive around this curve on the incorrect side of the
lines. The probabilities are opposed to this, particularly as there is no suggestion
of excessive speed. If so minded, or without even thinking, Kerr could cut this
bend by partially crossing the double lines. I am satisfied that Krstevski did not
intend to, or in fact, turn or veer right towards the entrance to the service station
and the garden centre. (AB385 Y-386Q)
The trial judge's finding that the positions of the vehicles on the roadway after
the accident did not assist him in ascertaining the point of impact was consistent
with the evidence, and, if I may say, common sense.
The final submission is that the trial judge was not entitled to draw the
inference that the appellant cut the bend. Having rejected the version given by the
appellant as a reconstruction (and that the respondent's vehicle did not turn
across his path towards the service station) it was perfectly open for the Court to
find that the appellant's vehicle partly crossed over to its incorrect side of the road
within the curve coming into a head-on collision with the respondent.
Both appeals should be dismissed with costs.
Cole JA I agree
Beazley JA I agree
Both appeals dismissed with costs.
UNREPORTED JUDGMENTS
Counsel for appellant: D F Rofe QC, K P Rewell
Solicitors for appellant: Gibson Robinson
Counsel for respondent: B M Watson, K Ryan
Solicitors for respondent: Smallwood Cathcart
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