COMMISSIONER FOR MAIN ROADS v FRANKS [1997] NSWCA 74
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COMMISSIONER FOR MAIN ROADS v FRANKS
SUPREME COURT OF NEW SOUTH WALES COURT OF APPEAL
HANDLEY, SHELLER and COLE JJA
14 March 1997, 14 March 1997
[1997] NSWCA 74
ADMISSIBILITY of evidence — summing up to jury — no questions of principles.
Cole JA A jury, required to assess damages only, awarded the respondent
$511,000. After deduction for workers compensation payments that resulted in a
judgment in the respondent's favour in the sum of $497,659.32. The appellant has
challenged the sum awarded as being excessive and has also challenged, by
various grounds of appeal, the admission of evidence by Bruce J regarding:
(a) the possible requirement for ongoing medical treatment;
(b) evidence from a Dr Robertson and Miss Batchelor concerning the causal
link between brain damage and lead intoxication.
The appellant contends that the trial judge erred in not deciding at the end of
the plaintiff s case whether the casual link between brain damage and lead
intoxication had been established, implicitly submitting that, had such a decision
been reached it ought to have been that such link had not been established.
By another group of grounds of appeal the appellant contends that the trial
judge's summing up was defective in the following respects:
(a) His Honour inadequately directed the jury regarding the scope and effect of
cross-examination;
(b) His Honour's directions regarding future economic loss were misleading,
particularly in relation to vicissitudes.
In my judgment none of the grounds of appeal should be sustained.
It was the respondent's case that as a result of working for the appellant as an
ironwork cleaner on the Sydney Harbour Bridge, he had been subjected to lead
intoxication. This lead poisoning had resulted in both physical and psychological
consequences. Particularised as continuing disabilities were an anxiety state, loss
of concentration and comprehension, stiffening of muscles, nausea and loss of
co-ordination, phobic reactions, insomnia and loss of libido!. The particulars
claimed continuing depression and memory impairment, cognitive impairments,
alleged organic brain damage and neurological disruption, particularly to frontal
lobe functions2.
The plaintiff called Dr Ibels, clinical Professor of Medicine at the University
of Sydney. The Dr Ibels had previously managed patients with lead intoxication.
Tests conducted by Dr Ibels showed a lead extrusion of 5.84% micromoles of
lead. A toxic lead burden is any burden in excess of 2 mircroboles of lead.
Against that background Dr Ibels gave evidence in specific terms that the
memory problems, impaired conversation, problems with temper, aggression,
irritability, nervousness, headaches, anxiety, lethargy, abdominal upsets and
1. Particulars 11 to 16.
2. Particulars 18 and 19.
3. Appeal Book, p 188T.
2 UNREPORTED JUDGMENTS
diarrhoea, muscle aches and pains were all due to lead, and that in the case of the
respondent those disabilities would be with him until he died+. He also gave
evidence that:
"Tt is without doubt that lead intoxication does lead to permanent cerebral
damage, brain damage."5
and that
"The symptoms that Mr Franks has are of neurological nature and consistent
with lead intoxication. I can't answer whether due to brain damage for sure. I am
not qualified to answer that."
Dr Ibels said that he thought "either a clinical psychologist or an expert in the
assessment of neurological function or a psychiatrist or a neurologist would be
certainly far better qualified to answer" the question whether Mr Frank's
symptoms were consistent with brain damage.
Dr Robertson, a specialist psychiatrist and former clinical lecturer in
psychiatry at the University of Sydney and an examiner in post graduate exams
for the College of Psychiatrists, gave evidence that although he had not
previously treated a patient for the psychiatric effects of lead poisoning, he had
generally been aware of the possible harmful cerebral effects of heavy metal
poisoning and lead and had, when confronted with the case of Mr Franks,
improved his knowledge in that respect by library research. After a voir dire, the
trial judge permitted Dr Robertson to give evidence that the effect of lead
poisoning was to cause diffuse brain damage, particularly to the frontal lobe of
the brain. Miss Batchelor, a clinical nueropsychologist holding a masters degree
in science and formerly deputy head and of the Department of Psychological
Medicine at Westmead hospital and a lecturer in the Department if Psychiatry at
the University of Sydney, as well as having held other significant postings and
who had studied the effects of lead and assessed patients with lead poisoning®,
gave evidence that the tests she had performed upon Mr Franks were consistent
with the hypothesis of organic brain damage'. That evidence was given without
objection or challenge to her qualifications.
It is against this background that the grounds of appeal must be considered.
Regarding the grounds of appeal concerning the admission of evidence that there
may be a need for ongoing medical treatment from a psychiatrist or nephrologist,
it is true that was not opened to the jury, was not particularised and was not the
subject of reports served in accordance with the Rules. Nonetheless, in the
exercise of his discretion, the trial judge admitted the evidence. Having regard to
the particulars which I have cited, and the. asserted permanence of the
neurological condition, it is unsurprising that the discretion was exercised in
favour of admitting the evidence. It was not suggested in submissions that the
judge did not have the necessary discretion, but rather that it should have been
exercised adversely to the respondent. I see no error in the exercise of the
discretion to admit the evidence.
Further, the appellant obtained from Dr Ibels a concession that further
chelation was unlikely. There was no evidence of any costs of future medical
attention, and the trial judge, in summing up, whilst he addressed past medical
4. Appeal Book, p184-185.
5. Appeal Book p200S.
6. Appeal Book, p1560-Q.
7. Appeal Book, p159R, 162C-F.
URJ COMMISSIONER FOR MAIN ROADS v FRANKS (Cole JA) 3
expenses, made no reference to the possibility of future medical expenses. In my
judgment this ground is without substance.
It is apparent from what I have previously said that there was an abundance of
evidence sufficient to justify the admission of evidence from Dr Robertson and
Miss Batchelor concerning the causal link between lead poisoning and frontal
lobe damage. Indeed, when ultimately called Dr Lord, who was called by the
defendant, gave the following evidence:
"Q. Would you accept that those symptoms would be entirely consistent
with lead poisoning?
A. I understand that he had lead poisoning.
Q. Given the constellation of symptoms is that not an aspect in which it
is likely that he would suffer some organic brain damage?
A. That is true. Yes it is."
There remains in the first group of grounds of appeal the challenge to the sum
awarded as being excessive. The contention was that assuming medical expenses
of $44,039.26, economic loss to 9 June 1992 of $6,509.96, superannuation loss
of $5,000, economic loss between September 1992 and February 1995 of
$62,463.80 and future economic loss, without discount, of $159,236.13, giving a
total of economic loss of $277,249.15, the resultant general damages of $233,750
was excessive. It was contended that such a sum could only be achieved if the
jury held that the respondent was brain damaged, that the brain damage was
linked to the lead poisoning, and that there was likely to be continuing psychiatric
treatment and continuing chelation treatment. Any view that the respondent was
not brain damaged, or that his brain damage was not linked to lead poisoning
would have been perverse. Establishing those two circumstances in my view
result in it not being able to be said that an award of general damages of $233,750
was beyond the permissible range. Accordingly this ground of appeal fails.
The remaining batch of grounds of appeal, numbers 6, 8, 9, 10 and 14 concern
the summing up. The trial judge did not specifically address the manner in which
the jury should approach cross-examination. Senior Counsel for the appellant
asked his Honour to do so. The only request made to the trial judge was in the
following, terms:
"T am happy for directions to be given to the jury that you don't think anything
I said in cross-examination was worthwhile, but what I am not prepared to
suggest they should accept is that there should be no reference to
cross-examination, period. The jury may get the idea, having been told that you
are the fount of all wisdom - and I'm not meaning to be facetious about it - that
they are not to take any notice of anything in cross-examination either way. I
would suggest that that that may not be clear that should be made clear."
His Honour complied with that request by recalling the jury and directing them
that should have regard to such maters as they regarded as important arising in
cross-examination. Hid honour said:
"I did not mean to suggest to you that you should not consider the
cross-examination of any of the witnesses. You should consider it as part of your
task of selecting that material which you regard as being proper to base your
conclusions on."
No request was made to his Honour to deal in detail with the effect of
cross-examination of Dr Ibels in relation to the respondent's symptoms, or
cross-examination in relation to the employability of the respondent, or indeed in
relation to future treatment
4 UNREPORTED JUDGMENTS
The remaining complaint was that the direction in relation to future economic
loss was misleading. I do not think that it was. His Honour made clear that the
loss to age 65 had been agreed "arithmetically" at $159,236.13. His Honour then
dealt with the question of vicissitudes, the competing percentages being 10 and
5 15, and then posed for the jury the question whether the exposure to lead
poisoning would prevent the respondent from working until he was 658. As his
Honour said "that is a matter which you will decide".
As all grounds of appeal fail, the appeal should be dismissed with costs.
Handley JA I agree.
Sheller JA I also agree.
Cole JA: The appeal is dismissed with costs.
15 Counsel for the Appellant: D G T Nock SC/A E Glasso
Solicitors for the Appellant: Hunt & Hunt
Counsel for the Respondent: P Webb QC/I F Butcher
20 Solicitors for the Respondent: McClellands
8. Appeal Book, p281R-W.