FRANKLINS LTD and ANOR v FLANNERY [1997] NSWCA 115
NSW Caselaw
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FRANKLINS LTD and ANOR v FLANNERY
SUPREME COURT OF NEW SOUTH WALES COURT OF APPEAL
HANDLEY, BEAZLEY and STEIN JJA
27 October 1997, 27 October 1997
[1997] NSWCA 115
COSTS — DISTRICT COURT — proceedings within jurisdiction of Local Court —
judgment for less than $10,000 — whether plaintiff entitled to costs DCR Pt38 r1B
The respondent, a minor, recovered $7,000 in a personal injuries action brought in the
District Court at East Maitland. Liability was admitted. The award was below the
prescribed amount of $10,000 under DCR Pt38 rlB. The trial Judge awarded the
respondent costs on the basis that there was sufficient reason for bringing the action in the
District Court because the assessment of damages for minors was fraught with difficulty,
when the action was commenced it was reasonable to think that the plaintiff might well
have recovered more than $10,000, and if the defendant thought otherwise it could have
applied for a transfer to the Local Court. The defendant applied for leave to appeal against
the award of damages and the order for costs.
HELD: (1) The assessment of damages for a minor is not in principle more difficult than
for an adult. The Damages (Infants and Persons of Unsound Mind) Act 1924 contemplates
proceedings being brought by infants in the Local Court. The majority (Beazley JA
doubting) also held that there was no proper basis for a finding that the plaintiff might
reasonably have expected to recover more than the prescribed amount when the
proceedings were commenced. There was no onus on the defendant to seek a transfer to
the Local Court and the costs incurred in a contested transfer application would be
disproportionate to the total cost of the proceedings. (2) The costs recoverable in the
District Court were not greatly different from those recoverable in the Local Court. (3) It
was cheaper and more efficient for the case to be brought in the District Court where it
would be disposed of in a running list instead of in the Local Court where there was a risk
that it could be adjourned part heard to a future date. (4) The costs order should not be
disturbed.
Handley JA Ex tempore
The Court will refuse leave to appeal.
This is an application for leave to appeal from the decision of Knight DCJ
given in the District Court at East Maitland on 13 June this year. The case arises
out of the claimant's liability as an occupier.
The plaintiff, who was five and a half at the date of accident in January 1996,
put his hand on an element attached to a refrigerator which was within reach of
members of the public in one of the claimant's supermarkets. The element was
hot and the boy sustained burns to four fingers and the thumb of his right hand.
The Judge assessed general damages at $7,000 plus out-of-pocket expenses of
$245. The Judge found that the plaintiffs physical injuries and his behavioural
problems cleared up within some eight weeks, but there was a continuing
problem involving increased bed wetting since the accident. The Judge found that
this was due to the accident and that finding cannot be disturbed. The Judge
thought that the bed wetting would gradually resolve after the judgment and
assessed damages on that basis.
2 UNREPORTED JUDGMENTS
I consider the award of damages very high for the physical and psychological
injuries and consequences found by the judge but in my view the Court should
not grant leave to appeal to review that assessment.
The plaintiff recovered less than the prescribed amount of $10,000 provided
for in the DCR Pt38 r1B. Accordingly, the plaintiff was not entitled to recover
any costs in the action "... unless the Court certifies that it appears to it that there
was a sufficient reason for bringing or trying the action in the Court".
The proceedings were commenced by statement of claim filed on 10 July 1996
and were disposed of in a little over eleven months. The Judge made an order
under r1B giving the plaintiff his costs of the action. He found that a number of
matters constituted sufficient reason for departing from the general rule. The first
of these was that the assessment of damages in relation to child plaintiffs is one
that is "fraught with difficulty". In my judgment and with all respect that cannot
be correct as a general statement. It was not correct in relation to this case and
cannot be a reason for departing from the general rule. The Damages (Infants and
Persons of Unsound Mind) Act 1924 specifically contemplates that actions for
damages will be brought on behalf of infants in the Local Court.
The next matter that the Judge referred to was that the time the action was
commenced, "One might well have perceived that he would have been
recovering for a far greater sum because of the psychological problems that he
was then having". As I said the action was commenced on 10 July 1996 but on
the Judge's findings the psychological problems, that is the behavioural
problems, had resolved approximately two months after the accident in the
middle of March. Although the plaintiff was seen by a clinical psychologist at a
later stage, the Judge did not accept the view that there was any behavioural
problems, other than the bed wetting, after some date in March.
The other matter that the Judge referred to was that there was some onus on
a defendant who considered that a matter is more appropriately brought in the
Local Court to apply to have it transferred to that Court. In my view there is no
such onus on a defendant. Moreover the cost of a contested application for
transfer to the Local Court would be quite disproportionate to the total costs
likely to be incurred in the trial of the action in the District Court. In my judgment
therefore the Judge's exercise of discretion miscarried.
This Court would normally consider the case as one appropriate for the grant
of leave to appeal. General rules such as that laid down by DCR Pt39 r1B are
meant to apply unless there is something special about the particular case to
constitute a sufficient reason for the action being brought in the District Court.
However one matter which the Judge did not refer to, which was raised by Mr
Hudson in the argument before him, is that it is more efficient and cheaper for
proceedings such as this to be commenced in the District Court where in all
probability they will get heard in one day or on successive days in a running list.
It seems that there is a real risk that proceedings in the Local Court will be part
heard more than once and be adjourned, not to the next day, but for some weeks.
The result is to greatly increase the overall burden of costs on both parties
without achieving any useful purpose.
If the plaintiff had brought these proceedings in the Local Court at East
Maitland and recovered the same verdict he would ordinarily have been entitled
to an order for payment of his professional costs and disbursements. The
plaintiffs election to sue in the District Court therefore did not subject the
defendant to a liability for costs which it would not have faced in the Local Court.
Moreover Mr Hudson submitted to the Judge, and he was not contradicted, that
URJ FRANKLINS LTD and ANOR v FLANNERY (Handley JA) 3
the costs in the District Court on this scale were not greatly different from the
costs that would be recovered in the Local Court.
In those circumstances the Judge reached the right result albeit for different
and with respect erroneous reasons. I would propose, therefore, that the summons
be dismissed with costs.
Beazley JA I agree with Handley JA except with a slightly different emphasis
in respect of one matter. The trial Judge considered that at the time proceedings
were commenced one might have perceived that, "[The plaintiff] would have
been recovering for a far greater sum because of psychological problems that he
was then having". Whilst such material as appears does not convince me that the
plaintiff would have recovered a far greater sum, it seems to the extent we have
any material on the matter it was likely to be open to his Honour to make an
award of over $10,000 because of the psychological problems that the plaintiff
was then having. Save for that slight variation, I otherwise agree with the reasons
of Handley JA.
Stein JA I agree with Handley JA.
Handley JA The order of the Court is summons dismissed with costs.
Summons dismissed with costs.
Counsel for the appellant: Mr Sheldon
Solicitors for the appellant: Glover & Glover
Counsel for the respondent: Mr Hudson
Solicitors for the respondent: Parke Maher, Maitland
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