THEODOROPOULOS v THEODOSIOU SUPREME COURT OF NEW SOUTH WALES — COURT OF APPEAL PRIESTLEY JA and POWELL JA 22 September 1997 [1997] NSWCA 313 Priestley JA. Before the court is a question arising out of orders made and entered pursuant to reasons, decisions and judgment delivered by the court on 16 November 1995. The judgment was to the effect that pursuant to the De Facto Relationships Act and an application made under it, the respondent to the appeal should have his property interests adjusted by ordering him to pay $50,000 to the appellant and by charging some real property of his with the payment of that sum. All members of the court, for reasons somewhat differently expressed, agreed with the primary order directed to the respondent concerning the $50,000 and the charge on his property. Taking the reasons that were given in their order of delivery, I said that the orders should take effect as at 4 December 1991, the date of the order made by the Master; Clarke JA agreed with the orders that I proposed and Powell JA also agreed with those orders — using his language, he joined in the orders that I had proposed. At the end of my own reasons, after the matter that I have already referred to, I stated the formal orders that, in my opinion, the court shouldmake. These did not deal specifically with the question of interest running on the amount of $50,000 earlier referred to. The question has since arisen between the parties whether interest ran from 4 December 1991 or from some other date or did not run at all. That question has come before the court today. In my opinion, it is clear from a reading of the expressed reasons of each member of the court that the orders were intended to embrace the allowance of interest on the $50,000 from 4 December 1991, the date at which the orders were to take effect. In the course of the argument today, some reference has been made to the fact that two of the judges who took part in the appeal are sitting to hear this motion with the corollary, as it was taken to be by the respondent in the course of submissions made for the respondent in the appeal, that two at least of the judges would know what was intended at the time the reasons were delivered. I would like to make it clear that my view is not based on any recollection of my intentions at the time but upon my reading of the words of the reasons for judgment delivered by each of the three judges. As [have said, it seems to me to be plain from a reading of those reasons that the reasons meant that the court was deciding not only to order the respondent to pay $50,000 to the appellant and to charge that amount on the property referred to but also that interest was to run on that amount of $50,000 from 4 December 1991. The court has jurisdiction both to interpret the orders that were made, as Ihave done, and also, if it were of the view that a specific order has been omitted by reason of an oversight, to supply the order pursuant to the slip rule. 2 UNREPORTED JUDGMENTS Although I do not think it is strictly necessary for the court to resort to the slip tule, in the circumstances, and in the light of the argument that has developed, it seems to me desirable that the order which seems to me to be plainly implied by what the court said be made explicit in the court's formal orders. I would, therefore, propose that the formal orders, which were ordered on 16 November 1995 and entered on 16 February 1996, should be amended by adding to order 4 a sentence saying: This order is to take effect as and from 4 December 1991 and the amount of $50,000 referred to is to carry interest from that date. I would then propose that the costs of the proceedings of today should be costs in the appeal. Powell I agree. I too have approached the matter on the basis of interpreting the words. which I used in my judgment rather than in attempting to reconstruct for myself a memory of my exact intentions at the time. Even though I have proceeded on that basis, it seems to me clear that so far as I was concerned the substituted amount that was proposed by Priestley JA should carry interest as from the date upon which the Master entered his judgment and which judgment was being replaced by the judgment of the Court of Appeal. I agree with the orders which Priestley JA proposes. Priestley JA. The orders are as I have indicated already. Orders accordingly.